US POLITICS
THE WASHINGTON POST. June 17, 2020. Politics. Trump asked China’s Xi to help him win reelection, according to Bolton book
By Josh Dawsey
John Hudson, Rosalind S. Helderman and Tom Hamburger contributed to this report.
President Donald Trump, right, with China's President Xi Jinping, left, during their bilateral meeting at the G20 Summit on Dec. 1, 2018 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. National security adviser John Bolton is visible to Trump’s left. (Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP)
President Trump asked Chinese President Xi Jinping to help him win the 2020 U.S. election, telling Xi during a summit dinner last year that increased agricultural purchases by Beijing from American farmers would aid his electoral prospects, according to a damning new account of life inside the Trump administration by former national security adviser John Bolton.
During a one-on-one meeting at the June 2019 Group of 20 summit in Japan, Xi complained to Trump about China critics in the United States. But Bolton writes in a book scheduled to be released next week that “Trump immediately assumed Xi meant the Democrats. Trump said approvingly that there was great hostility among the Democrats.
“He then, stunningly, turned the conversation to the coming U.S. presidential election, alluding to China’s economic capability to affect the ongoing campaigns, pleading with Xi to ensure he’d win,” Bolton writes. “He stressed the importance of farmers, and increased Chinese purchases of soybeans and wheat in the electoral outcome. I would print Trump’s exact words but the government’s prepublication review process has decided otherwise.”
At the same meeting, Xi also defended China’s construction of camps housing as many as 1 million Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang — and Trump signaled his approval. “According to our interpreter,” Bolton writes, “Trump said that Xi should go ahead with building the camps, which Trump thought was exactly the right thing to do.”
The episode described by Bolton in his book, “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir,” bears striking similarities to the actions that resulted in Trump’s impeachment after he sought to pressure the Ukrainian president to help dig up dirt on Democratic rival Joe Biden in exchange for military assistance. The China allegation also comes amid ongoing warnings from U.S. intelligence agencies about foreign election interference in November, as Russia did to favor Trump in 2016.
And on the Ukraine scandal itself, Bolton cites personal conversations with Trump confirming a “quid pro quo” that Trump had long denied, including an August meeting in which Trump allegedly made the bargain explicit.“He said he wasn’t in favor of sending them anything until all Russia-investigation material related to [Hillary] Clinton and Biden had been turned over,” Bolton writes.
The 592-page memoir, obtained by The Washington Post, is the most substantive, critical dissection of the president from an administration insider so far, coming from a conservative who has worked in Republican administrations for decades and is a longtime contributor to Fox News. It portrays Trump as an “erratic” and “stunningly uninformed” commander in chief, and lays out a long series of jarring and troubling encounters between the president, his top advisers and foreign leaders.
The book is the subject of an escalating legal battle between the longtime conservative foreign policy hand and the Justice Department, which filed a lawsuit Tuesday seeking to block its publication by alleging that it contains classified material. Bolton’s attorney has said the book does not contain classified material and that it underwent an arduous review process.
Trump and allies have plotted for several days on how to block or attack the book. Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press secretary, said on Wednesday that the tome still contained classified information.
Bolton describes the book as being based on both contemporaneous accounts and his own notes, and it includes numerous details of internal meetings and direct quotations attributed to Trump and others.
The request for electoral assistance from Xi is one of many instances described by Bolton in which Trump seeks favors or approval from authoritarian leaders. Many of those same leaders were also happy to take advantage of the U.S. president and attempt to manipulate him, Bolton writes, often through simplistic appeals to his various obsessions.
In one May 2019 phone call, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin compared Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó to 2016 Democratic presidential nominee Clinton, part of what Bolton terms a “brilliant display of Soviet style propaganda” to shore up support for Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Putin’s claims, Bolton writes, “largely persuaded Trump.”
In May 2018, Bolton says, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan handed Trump a memo claiming innocence for a Turkish firm under investigation by the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York for violating Iranian sanctions.
“Trump then told Erdogan he would take care of things, explaining that the Southern District prosecutors were not his people, but were Obama people, a problem that would be fixed when they were replaced by his people,” Bolton writes.
Bolton says he was so alarmed by Trump’s determination to do favors for autocrats such as Erdogan and Xi that he scheduled a meeting with Attorney General William P. Barr in 2019 to discuss the president’s behavior. Bolton writes that Barr agreed he also was worried about the appearances created by Trump’s behavior.
In his account, Bolton broadly confirms the outline of the impeachment case laid out by Democratic lawmakers and witnesses in House proceedings earlier this year, writing that Trump was fixated on a bogus claim that Ukraine tried to hurt him and was in thrall to unfounded conspiracy theories pushed by presidential lawyer Rudolph W. Giuliani and others.
Trump was impeached in January by the Democratic-controlled House of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress, before being acquitted by the GOP-controlled Senate the next month. Bolton resisted Democratic calls to testify without a subpoena.
Bolton is silent on the question of whether he thinks that Trump’s actions related to Ukraine were impeachable and is deeply critical of how House Democrats managed the process. But he writes that he found Trump’s decision to hold up military assistance to pressure newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “deeply disturbing,” and that he tried to work internally to counter it, reporting concerns to Barr and the White House Counsel’s Office.
“I thought the whole affair was bad policy, questionable legally and unacceptable as presidential behavior,” he writes.
In the memoir, Bolton describes the president's advisers as frequently flummoxed by Trump and said a variety of officials — including Chief of Staff John F. Kelly, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Bolton himself — all considered resigning in disgust or frustration. Even some of the president’s most loyal advisers hold a dim view of him in private, he writes.
“What if we have a real crisis like 9/11 with the way he makes decisions?” Kelly is quoted as asking at one point as he considers resigning.
“He second-guessed people’s motives, saw conspiracies behind rocks, and remained stunningly uninformed on how to run the White House, let alone the huge federal government,” Bolton writes, always looking to “personal instinct” and opportunities for “reality TV showmanship.”
Given Bolton’s expertise and his White House role from 2018 to 2019, the book is heavily focused on foreign policy episodes and decisions, from Ukraine and Venezuela to North Korea and Iran.
Bolton recounts numerous private conversations Trump had with other leaders that revealed the limits of his knowledge. He recalls Trump asking Kelly if Finland is part of Russia. In a meeting with then-British Prime Minister Theresa May in 2018, a British official referred to the United Kingdom as a “nuclear power,” and Trump interjects: “Oh, are you a nuclear power?” Bolton adds that he could tell the question about Britain, which has long maintained a nuclear arsenal, “was not intended as a joke.”
Bolton’s commentary ranges from expressions of disgust with the president’s actions to relief that advisers were able to prevent catastrophe. During a NATO summit in the summer of 2018, Bolton recounts a moment when Trump had decided to inform U.S. allies that the United States was going to withdraw from NATO if allies didn’t substantially increase defense spending by January.
“We will walk out, and not defend those who have not [paid],” read a message Trump dictated to Bolton.
Bolton tried to stop Trump from delivering the threat, and became even more alarmed when Trump told him, “Do you want to do something historic?”
During one trade meeting, Trump grew irate when advisers begun discussing Japan and the alliance, and began railing about Pearl Harbor, Bolton writes.
Bolton’s book is also filled with examples of Trump’s closest advisers sharply criticizing the president behind his back, including Pompeo.
After Trump completed a phone call with South Korea’s president ahead of the 2018 Singapore summit with North Korea, Pompeo and Bolton shared their disdain for the president’s handling of the conversation, he writes. Pompeo, having listened in on the call from the Middle East, told Bolton he was “having a cardiac arrest in Saudi Arabia.” Bolton shared his similar disappointment with the call, describing it as a “near death experience.”
Bolton attributes a litany of shocking statements to the president. Trump said invading Venezuela would be “cool” and that the South American nation was “really part of the United States.” Bolton says Trump kept confusing the current and former presidents of Afghanistan, while asking Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to help him strike a deal with Iran. And Trump told Xi that Americans were clamoring for him to change constitutional rules to serve more than two terms, according to the book.
He also describes a summer 2019 meeting in New Jersey where Trump says journalists should be jailed so they have to divulge their sources: “These people should be executed. They are scumbags,” Trump said, according to Bolton's account.
Bolton describes in depth the feuding and backbiting among Trump’s cadre of advisers, as well as referring dismissively to Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner’s efforts to get involved in domestic and foreign policy issues. Almost every adviser — including Pompeo, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, former defense secretary Jim Mattis and former U.N. ambassador Nikki Haley — comes under the scalpel. By contrast, Bolton seems to hold himself in high regard and admits few mistakes of his own.
Bolton describes Trump as callously unconcerned about human rights violations. He writes that during an opening dinner of the G-20 meeting in Osaka in 2019 attended only by interpreters, Xi explained to Trump “why he was basically building concentration camps” in a northwest Chinese province where the government has been interning Uighurs, an ethnic minority.
According to Bolton, the U.S. interpreter said that Trump spoke approvingly of the camps. Bolton writes that he was told by Matt Pottinger, a National Security Council official who is hawkish on China, that Trump had said something similar during a 2017 trip to China.
“In my government experience, it was the most irrational thing I ever witnessed any president do,” he said.
“This is really dangerous,” Pompeo said, according to Bolton’s book, as both men fumed about the president.
For Trump, Bolton writes, one singular goal loomed above all: securing a second term.
“I am hard pressed to identify any significant Trump decision during my tenure that wasn’t driven by reelection calculations,” Bolton writes.
Bolton says Trump said he wanted out of Afghanistan during his second year instead of his third year so he could blame his predecessor for the war. Screaming about the border wall in a meeting with top advisers in 2018, Trump described why illegal immigration had to go down and the wall had to go up, according to Bolton’s book.
“I got elected on this issue and now I’m going to get unelected,” Trump said, startling those around him.
For all his public bluster, Bolton describes Trump as frequently uncertain, fretful and wobbly during difficult policy choices.
For instance, driven by a desire to please Florida Republicans, Trump talked tough about his desire to oust Maduro throughout much of 2018. But Bolton portrays Trump as inconsistent and worry-worn when presented with the opportunity to support Guaidó, who declared himself Venezuela’s president in January 2019. Though Trump approved of a proposal from Bolton to publicly declare the United States recognized Guaidó rather than Maduro, within 30 hours Trump was already worrying that Guaidó appeared weak — a “kid” compared to “tough” Maduro — and considering changing course. “You couldn’t make this up,” Bolton writes.
In describing his White House experience on Russia-related issues, Bolton presents a picture of a president who is impulsive, churlish and consistently opposed to U.S. policy designed to discourage Russian aggression and to sanction Putin’s malign behavior.
Bolton spends little effort trying to explain Trump’s sympathetic approach to Putin. But the book makes the case that there is a disturbing and undeniable pattern of presidential reluctance to embrace policies designed to inhibit Russian aggression. He describes in detail the events leading up to the widely panned Helsinki summit in July 2018, when Trump sided with Putin against U.S. intelligence agencies over Moscow’s interference in the 2016 presidential election.
“This was hardly the way to do relations with Russia, and Putin had to be laughing uproariously at what he had gotten away with in Helsinki,” Bolton writes.
Soon after he arrived at the White House, Bolton said Kelly gave him a warning. “You can’t imagine how desperate I am to get out of here,” Kelly said, according to Bolton’s book. “This is a bad place to work, as you will find out.”
Throughout the book, he describes Trump and top advisers repeatedly slashing each other, lying to each other and maneuvering to gain advantage.
At one point, Bolton says he learned that Kushner was going to be calling the finance minister of Turkey because he was also Erdogan’s son-in-law.
“I briefed Pompeo and Mnuchin on this new ‘son-in-law channel’ and they both exploded. Pompeo was furious, Bolton writes, “because this was one more example of Kushner’s doing international negotiations he shouldn’t have been doing (along with the never quite ready Middle East peace plan).”
For extended periods of time, Trump kept telling different advisers they were in charge of border policy, according to Bolton’s book. One day in 2018 in the Oval Office, Kelly purportedly learned that Kushner was calling Mexican authorities when he barged into the Oval Office and said so.
“Why is Jared calling Mexicans?” Kelly asked loudly, according to the book. “Because I asked him to. How else are we going to stop the caravans?” Trump responded.
In November 2018, Trump came under fire for writing an unfettered defense of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, littered with exclamation points, over the killing of Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. But according to Bolton’s book, the main goal of the missive was to take away attention from a story about Ivanka Trump using her personal email for government business.
“This will divert from Ivanka,” Trump said, according to Bolton’s book. “If I read the statement in person, that will take over the Ivanka thing.”
He repeatedly describes Trump lashing out at military leaders, demanding to withdraw troops from the Middle East and from Africa and Europe, too. “I want to get out of everything,” Trump said during a meeting at his Bedminster, N.J., golf club, according to Bolton, as military leaders pressed him to take more nuanced positions.
At another point, arguing in 2018 with Mattis, Trump told him that Russia should take care of the Islamic State.
“We’re seven thousand miles away but we’re still the target,” Trump said, according to the account. “ They’ll come to our shores. That’s what they all say. It’s a horror show. At some point we’ve got to get out.”
Describing the conflict in Afghanistan, Trump said: “This was done by a stupid person named George Bush.”
Trump repeatedly told Mattis that the defense official had been given a chance but had failed.
“I gave you what you asked for: Unlimited authority, no holds barred. You’re losing. You’re getting your ass kicked. You failed,” Trump says.
Determined to make friends with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump decided that he wanted to give Kim some American gifts — gifts that violated U.S. sanctions that eventually had to be waived, per Bolton’s book.
When Bolton recounts the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore, the first summit of U.S. and North Korean leaders in history, Bolton castigates Trump’s diplomatic efforts, saying the president cared little for the details of the denuclearization effort and saw it merely as a “an exercise in publicity.”
He describes it extensively — including what Kim and his advisers say, and what Trump and his advisers say in return, giving a fly-on-the-wall account of a historic event.
“Trump told . . . me he was prepared to sign a substance-free communique, have his press conference to declare victory and then get out of town,” Bolton wrote.
In the months following the summit, Bolton described Trump’s inordinate interest in Pompeo delivering an autographed copy of Elton John’s “Rocket Man” on CD to Kim during Pompeo’s follow-on visit to North Korea. Trump had used the term “Little Rocket Man” to criticize the North Korean leader but subsequently tried to convince Kim that it was a term of affection.
“Trump didn’t seem to realize Pompeo hadn’t actually seen Kim Jong Un [during the trip], asking if Pompeo had handed” the CD, wrote Bolton. “Pompeo had not. Getting this CD to Kim remained a high priority for several months.”
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ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS
TAXA BÁSICA DE JUROS SELIC
BACEN. 17 Junho 2020. Copom reduz a taxa Selic para 2,25% a.a.
Em sua 231ª reunião, o Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom) decidiu, por unanimidade, reduzir a taxa Selic para 2,25% a.a.
A atualização do cenário básico do Copom pode ser descrita com as seguintes observações:
- No cenário externo, a pandemia da Covid-19 continua provocando uma desaceleração pronunciada do crescimento global. Nesse contexto, apesar da provisão significativa de estímulos fiscal e monetário pelas principais economias e de alguma moderação na volatilidade dos ativos financeiros, o ambiente para as economias emergentes segue desafiador;
- Em relação à atividade econômica, a divulgação do PIB do primeiro trimestre confirmou a sua maior queda desde 2015, refletindo os efeitos iniciais da pandemia. Indicadores recentes sugerem que a contração da atividade econômica no segundo trimestre será ainda maior. Prospectivamente, a incerteza permanece acima da usual sobre o ritmo de recuperação da economia ao longo do segundo semestre deste ano;
- O Comitê avalia que diversas medidas de inflação subjacente se encontram abaixo dos níveis compatíveis com o cumprimento da meta para a inflação no horizonte relevante para a política monetária;
- As expectativas de inflação para 2020, 2021 e 2022 apuradas pela pesquisa Focus encontram-se em torno de 1,6%, 3,0% e 3,5%, respectivamente;
- No cenário híbrido, com trajetória para a taxa de juros extraída da pesquisa Focus e taxa de câmbio constante a R$4,95/US$*, as projeções do Copom situam-se em torno de 2,0% para 2020 e 3,2% para 2021. Esse cenário supõe trajetória de juros que encerra 2020 em 2,25% a.a. e se eleva até 3,00% a.a. em 2021; e
- No cenário com taxa de juros constante a 3,00% a.a. e taxa de câmbio constante a R$4,95/US$*, as projeções situam-se em torno de 1,9% para 2020 e 3,0% para 2021.
Por um lado, o nível de ociosidade pode produzir trajetória de inflação abaixo do esperado. Esse risco se intensifica caso a pandemia se prolongue e provoque aumentos de incerteza e de poupança precaucional e, consequentemente, uma redução da demanda agregada com magnitude ou duração ainda maiores do que as estimadas.
Por outro lado, políticas fiscais de resposta à pandemia que piorem a trajetória fiscal do país de forma prolongada, ou frustrações em relação à continuidade das reformas, podem elevar os prêmios de risco. Adicionalmente, os diversos programas de estímulo creditício e de recomposição de renda, implementados no combate à pandemia, podem fazer com que a redução da demanda agregada seja menor do que a estimada, adicionando uma assimetria ao balanço de riscos. Esse conjunto de fatores implica, potencialmente, uma trajetória para a inflação acima do projetado no horizonte relevante para a política monetária.
O Copom avalia que perseverar no processo de reformas e ajustes necessários na economia brasileira é essencial para permitir a recuperação sustentável da economia. O Comitê ressalta, ainda, que questionamentos sobre a continuidade das reformas e alterações de caráter permanente no processo de ajuste das contas públicas podem elevar a taxa de juros estrutural da economia.
Considerando o cenário básico, o balanço de riscos e o amplo conjunto de informações disponíveis, o Copom decidiu, por unanimidade, reduzir a taxa básica de juros em 0,75 ponto percentual, para 2,25% a.a. O Comitê entende que essa decisão reflete seu cenário básico e um balanço de riscos de variância maior do que a usual para a inflação prospectiva e é compatível com a convergência da inflação para a meta no horizonte relevante, que inclui o ano-calendário de 2021.
O Copom entende que, neste momento, a conjuntura econômica continua a prescrever estímulo monetário extraordinariamente elevado, mas reconhece que o espaço remanescente para utilização da política monetária é incerto e deve ser pequeno. O Comitê avalia que a trajetória fiscal ao longo do próximo ano, assim como a percepção sobre sua sustentabilidade, são decisivas para determinar o prolongamento do estímulo.
Neste momento, o Comitê considera que a magnitude do estímulo monetário já implementado parece compatível com os impactos econômicos da pandemia da Covid-19. Para as próximas reuniões, o Comitê vê como apropriado avaliar os impactos da pandemia e do conjunto de medidas de incentivo ao crédito e recomposição de renda, e antevê que um eventual ajuste futuro no atual grau de estímulo monetário será residual. No entanto, o Copom segue atento a revisões do cenário econômico e de expectativas de inflação para o horizonte relevante de política monetária. O Comitê reconhece que, em vista do cenário básico e do seu balanço de riscos, novas informações sobre a evolução da pandemia, assim como uma diminuição das incertezas no âmbito fiscal, serão essenciais para definir seus próximos passos.
Votaram por essa decisão os seguintes membros do Comitê: Roberto Oliveira Campos Neto (presidente), Bruno Serra Fernandes, Carolina de Assis Barros, Fernanda Feitosa Nechio, João Manoel Pinho de Mello, Maurício Costa de Moura, Otávio Ribeiro Damaso e Paulo Sérgio Neves de Souza.
*Valor obtido pelo procedimento usual de arredondar a cotação média da taxa de câmbio R$/US$ observada nos cinco dias úteis encerrados no último dia da semana anterior à da reunião do Copom.
CORONAVÍRUS
FGV. 17/06/2020. Impactos da COVID-19. Contratos Empresariais na Pandemia
Para João Pedro Nascimento, da FGV Direito Rio, a pandemia pode ser um fator de desequilíbrio nos contratos empresariais, mas é preciso analisar cada caso para assegurar a estabilidade e segurança jurídica das relações. Neste FGV Impactos da COVID-19, o professor fala sobre a pacta sunt servanda, a função social dos contratos e a lei da liberdade econômica.
VÍDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHEKYRzl8zo&feature=youtu.be
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US ECONOMICS
US - FRANCE
U.S. Department of State. 06/17/2020. Joint Statement of the United States and France on the Strategic Dialogue
The following is the text of a joint statement by the Governments of the United States of America and France.
Begin text:
France and the United States held a virtual bilateral Strategic Dialogue to discuss the most pressing challenges facing our two nations, including joint efforts to counter the COVID-19 pandemic, on June 17, 2020. Hosted by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the discussion was led by Director General for Political and Security Affairs Philippe Errera and Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale.
France and the United States discussed NATO, Transatlantic cooperation and European security, China, as well as regional issues in the Middle East and Africa, including counterterrorism cooperation in the Sahel.
End text.
G7 - HONG KONG
U.S. Department of State. 06/17/2020. G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Hong Kong
The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union.
Begin text:
We, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union underscore our grave concern regarding China’s decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong.
China’s decision is not in conformity with the Hong Kong Basic Law and its international commitments under the principles of the legally binding, UN-registered Sino-British Joint Declaration. The proposed national security law would risk seriously undermining the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and the territory’s high degree of autonomy. It would jeopardize the system which has allowed Hong Kong to flourish and made it a success over many years.
Open debate, consultation with stakeholders, and respect for protected rights and freedoms in Hong Kong are essential.
We are also extremely concerned that this action would curtail and threaten the fundamental rights and freedoms of all the population protected by the rule of law and the existence of an independent justice system.
We strongly urge the Government of China to re-consider this decision.
End text.
US - EU
U.S. Department of State. 06/17/2020. Briefing With Acting Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Ambassador Philip T. Reeker On Readout From U.S.-EU Foreign Affairs Council Discussion. Philip T. Reeker, Acting Assistant SecretaryBureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Via Teleconference
MR BROWN: Hey, good afternoon, everyone. As you know, Secretary Pompeo spoke on Monday by videoconference with EU High Representative Joseph Borrell and EU member state foreign ministers. Secretary Pompeo took the opportunity to engage with his counterparts on a host of issues central to the robust transatlantic ties, including rebuilding our economies post COVID, upholding our shared commitment to democratic values that serve as the bulwark against Russian and PRC attempts to undermine democratic societies, reaffirming our collective resolve to uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and exchanging views on developments in the Middle East.
Our Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Ambassador Phil Reeker was by the Secretary’s side during Monday’s discussion, and I’m grateful that he – we could impose on his time today to get his perspective on the conversation. His comments will be on the record, and he’ll have time to answer your questions after a short opening statement. A reminder that the contents of this briefing are embargoed until the end of the call.
Ambassador Reeker, please, go ahead.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Hey, thanks, Cale. And hi, everybody. Hope everybody is healthy and doing well in these continuing somewhat surreal times. But here at the State Department we continue to be busy. One of the great accomplishments for me and my team was being able to do this engagement with Secretary Pompeo with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Union, something we’ve been trying to do for quite a while – for about a year – certainly since I came on board. Of course, ideally we would do it in person at their committee table in Brussels, but made the most of it. This time both sides acknowledged that we look forward to being able to get together more often.
I would point out that over the last several months, particularly while we’ve been responding to COVID, the Secretary has spoken to just about all of the foreign ministers of the EU – 27 EU member states and of course with High Representative Borrell. They’ve spoken frequently on a whole range of issues. We’ve tried to make the most without the visits, many of which had been planned before the COVID pandemic changed the way we do business. We turned those into videoconferences and phone calls because, as both sides said, there are so many important issues in the transatlantic partnership.
So I’ll just mention that the format was fairly straightforward. High Rep Borrell opened it up, again, underscoring this opportunity to exchange on the most important issues. We did talk about China, of course, the Middle East, the Eastern Partnership – that is the EU’s Eastern Partnership – Ukraine and other countries – who is – conversation about Afghanistan, Serbia/Kosovo came up, Syria, work on security and defense, and really the whole range of issues.
The Secretary then made some opening remarks noting that it was a fitting time to get together 75 years after VE Day, which of course we celebrated in May, and underscored the decades where our values have bound us together and the great challenges we’ve overcome.
As the Secretary noted in Munich this year, the West really is winning when we work together as we have been in so many things, including what we’re doing to fight to the COVID pandemic, the EU and the U.S. governments being the two largest contributors to COVID-19 foreign assistance by far. Some of the aid that we supplied to friends who are EU members to help them get through particularly challenging times, and of course the fact that President Trump and the European Commission President von der Leyen participated in the Global Vaccine Summit, raising almost $9 billion. At the same time, one of the main themes was coordinating to drive the global economy recovery in the post-COVID era as well. So once again underscoring we are together a powerful force for good in the world.
With that, why don’t I just turn it over to your questions. And I know we never have enough time but appreciate the chance to talk with you all. Thanks.
MR BROWN: Okay, for our first question can you open the line of Matt Lee.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Matt.
QUESTION: Hello?
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Hi, Matt. How are you?
QUESTION: Thank you. I’m doing just fine. I’m doing just fine. Hope you are well, too.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Thank you.
QUESTION: Thanks for doing this. I have a couple questions. I’ll make them real brief. One, on the Mideast, I presume that you’re talking about the peace plan/annexation and possibly Iran. If that’s the case, and I think it is, then these are areas of major disagreement between you guys and the Europeans, and I’m just wondering if any headway at all – if you can report any headway being made on either issue.
And then the other one is just on Germany and these alleged plans that – I don’t know – Kay Bailey Hutchison seem to really know about, but the troop withdrawal or redeployment from Germany. Did that come up, and if so, what was the Secretary able to tell the Europeans? Thanks.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Thanks, Matt. Why don’t I start with that last one. The – Germany and force posture decisions did not come up. The – as we’ve said and of course the White House has said, the President’s made clear and certainly the Secretary underscored that in this engagement as well as so many others that we are very committed to working with allies. That obviously includes Germany, one of our most important allies. That includes issues like burden sharing and of course at NATO, and the defense ministerial is going on now, so I’d refer you over there.
But we really have made so much progress on NATO, not only on the burden sharing with 140 billion in additional funds as we move countries toward meeting their 2 percent commitments – the Wales pledge – but all of the other things we’ve done in terms of force posture and creating – taking on new challenges like China, like cyber, things we have to be thinking about; the forward-looking review process that we endorsed at the leaders meeting back in December and all we did last year in commemorating the first 70 years of NATO, as well as taking in NATO’s 30th member, North Macedonia. Real progress on that.
In terms of Germany and force posture things, obviously I’d have to refer you over to the Pentagon and the White House on the specifics of that. That’s the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief to assess force posture, doing that with the military. But our broad engagement with Germany not only on security issues but just about every other major issue remains important, and Foreign Minister Heiko Maas of course was one of the ministers who spoke. About half of them spoke at the FAC in the 90 minutes. We had a number of them speak on behalf of several of their colleagues. And he too noticed that – noted that Europe is United States’s closest ally, and as we often recognize, the EU itself exists thanks to wise U.S. policies post-war, and we are stronger and winning together. So continue to discuss all those issues.
On the Middle East, it was a good chance to exchange views. Obviously ongoing process there. The Secretary reiterated the goals and hopes offered by the President’s Vision for Peace in the Middle East, the hope that the Palestinians would actually engage, consider that, and talk about opportunities there. This is certainly an important part of the conversation with any of those countries. There are risks with any decisions that are made, and that’s the goal of diplomacy, is to balance those risks and take these opportunities that we think have been put forward.
We noted as well – it was noted by several of the speakers that in fact we do have broadly the same goals with Iran. You mentioned Iran. Sometimes there are differences in tactics and we are able to discuss those, but strategically the goals and concerns about Iran – their support for terrorism, their efforts to develop nuclear weapons – all of us share the same goal there. Thanks.
MR BROWN: Okay. For the next question, let’s go to the line of Nick Schifrin.
QUESTION: Hey, Phil. Thanks very much for doing this. Appreciate it. If I could follow up on Matt’s Germany question, I know that you won’t be able to engage on force posture, so let me just try and ask you something as – that you could engage on: Do you believe that Germany is not living up to its commitments and therefore a slightly different strategic or even just numbers posture toward Germany is the right way to go right now? And is there a chance right now to shift some of the focus, some of the U.S. resources, if you will, to Poland? Would you advocate for that? Thanks.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Look, again, in terms of actual force posture, I have to leave that to military colleagues to determine right up the chain of command. As you know, I spent some time at European Command. We in the European Bureau at State of course work closely with European Command on the diplomatic channel of these things. With Germany, of course I have regular conversations with German colleagues. We’ve got strong representation there at our mission in Berlin and five consulates around the country, as well as the military commands there. I just couldn’t get into how you do the numbers, what the military experts think is best. We’ve got a National Security Strategy which we’re – broadly guides us, and a National Defense Strategy which helps define things like force posture. We focus on military mobility, compatibility. The importance, of course, of burden-sharing is also about making sure that other countries, other allies, are well postured, are well prepared for any eventualities.
I think the COVID crisis showed us that NATO, which is a highly successful military and political alliance, also can be adapted to things like this, this kind of a crisis. No one, I think, ever expected NATO to be focused on helping with a pandemic, but in fact the secretary general quickly mobilized NATO’s ability to source materiel, contracting, mobility, and they were able to support a number of allies, some of it with equipment, with medical assistance at times, and I think that’s an area they’ll continue to look at as well.
So I hope that gets to your question generally. There’s a whole range of things that we’re, of course, working on with Germany, and we’re determined to find the right balances there, and obviously our military colleagues will be in touch with NATO. As I said, I don’t want to get ahead of the defense ministerial that’s going on now. I’m sure some of you are covering that, or your colleagues are.
MR BROWN: Okay, for our next question let’s open the line of Nick Wadhams.
QUESTION: Hi, Phil. Thanks very much. Interfax News Agency is reporting today that there are talks underway between the U.S. and Russia over a prisoner swap for Paul Whelan, Paul Whelan for Viktor Bout and Konstantin Yaroshenko. Can you talk about whether that’s the case and whether you’re still working to obtain his release? Thanks.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: I think you saw certainly our statements about the so-called conviction of Paul Whelan, and I’d just refer you to the statements of Ambassador Sullivan and the Secretary on that. It’s – I can’t comment on anything beyond that other than that we believe his conviction – a case that had so many flaws – was absolutely unacceptable. So I’ll just leave it at that.
MR BROWN: Okay, next question. Let’s go to the line of Carol Morello.
QUESTION: Hi, Phil. Thank you for doing this. Say, I was wondering if during the talks on Monday anyone raised any concerns that if President Trump wins reelection, it might mean that the U.S. is more likely to withdraw from NATO. And also, if I may quickly – Mr. Borrell said afterwards that the U.S. – that the EU, even though it shares many of the U.S. concerns with China, does not want to pick sides. So do you feel you need the EU as an ally with – in trying to pressure China, and what are you doing to try to convince them to join you? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: On your first question, the answer is no. I was there for the entire session; nobody said that. And on the question of China, which was a major topic of discussion, I think we share with our European partners the concerns about China. As you’ve heard directly from him, High Representative Borrell talked about that. The EU’s put out a number of statements in recent months in terms of China being a systemic rival, a competitor, always, of course, looking for ways where it could be a cooperative partner. I think that very much mirrors our approach to China as well, and as you know, the Secretary has engaged in that outside of my purview and this bureau. We also noted, recognized, that the Chinese are very happy to see or pursue the idea of the U.S. and the EU being divided. So instead, we did talk about how much we are united in looking at these things, and I think the high representative referred to the idea of pursuing a U.S.-EU dialogue on China, and we look forward to doing so, sort of fleshing out some of the details of that and the different levels we’ll do that as part of our regular engagement and diplomacy on China.
I think the Secretary’s point was we’re not asking the EU to choose between or any of its member states to choose between China and the United States. It’s the Chinese that are doing that. The facts suggest a simple truth. We aren’t the ones suggesting choose between Chinese authoritarianism and the free world, the West, what we’ve done together and continue to do – the largest trading relationship, the fundamental values that we all share. It’s China that’s trying to force a decision on that. And as the Chinese Communist Party tries to make the world safe for an authoritarian system, we are really more focused on the side of freedom, of defending the values that we have, the prosperity that we’ve shared, and that’s something we work on obviously very closely with the European Union and with all of its member states.
And so that’s – that was a big part of our discussion, but certainly not the only part. We talked about what different countries have done. A number of the ministers that intervened talked about their concerns about China, the various areas where we need to look at not only our recovery together from the COVID crisis and the economic recovery, but ensuring our resilience in the future, talking about things like supply chains, trusted vendors. And of course, that ties also to conversations that we’ve been having for a long time with a number of our EU partners, and that would be the 5G information technology networks that can be trusted rather than those that are accessible to or make data accessible to the Chinese Communist Party.
So it was a good opportunity to discuss there. I think we found that useful, and as indicated, we’re going to pursue that with more discussions through a dialogue focused on all the different facets of that relationship. Over.
MR BROWN: Great. If you want to ask a question, go ahead and dial 1 and 0. The last person in the queue right now is Jennifer Hansler. Jennifer, go ahead.
QUESTION: Hi, Ambassador. Thanks for doing this. I was wondering how much the World Health Organization factored into your conversations. Borrell mentioned their disapproval of the U.S. decision to sever ties and said this was something they expected could be reconsidered. Is it under reconsideration that the U.S. will leave the World Health Organization? And then were there any specific conversations about punishments for China related to the coronavirus? Were EU allies supportive of that potential move? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: The World Health Organization was mentioned in a number of points. Our position on that I think is clear. I won’t rehash that for you. You’ve seen the review that we undertook, having been the largest donor and supporter of the World Health Organization for years, having outlined where the WHO really failed in its mission, and our decisions about future funding and engagement. One of the great things about this kind of engagement with the FAC was an opportunity to share different views on that. It’s no secret that other countries have not taken our decision or have suggested reconsidering. I think we’re very comfortable where we are and what we will continue to do, and working with partners like the EU and its 27 member states to deal with these things and finding other ways where we can put our resources to make sure that it achieves what we want multilateral structures to achieve, that they defend and meet the needs that we have for them. And that’s what we’ll keep doing.
So it was a good conversation in that sense. As I indicated, we talked about the President and Ursula von der Leyen having both participated in the vaccine conference, fundraising for that over $9 billion – 9 billion dollars or euros? I’d have to double check. And so there’s a lot of cooperation there, as there, again, is in so many areas, even where we may have a difference in particular tactics or approaches, sometimes at the EU level, sometimes the individual member states. It’s also worth knowing that the EU, like any gathering of 27 nations that come together, do not always have exactly the same views either. So they use their Foreign Affairs Council meetings on a regular basis, even without the special guest of the U.S. Secretary of State, to discuss and debate and exchange differing views on how to tackle and approach some of these global challenges as well as their own internal matters.
MR BROWN: Okay. We’ve got a hard stop in about five minutes. We’ll try to get through the next two, if that’s possible. Next in the queue is Arshad Mohammed.
QUESTION: Hi, Phil.
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Hi, Arshad.
QUESTION: Two quick things. One: Going back to Germany, I know you can’t talk about the numbers, but critics of the President’s announcement on Monday that he plans to cut troops, U.S. troops there by 9,500 down to 25,000, argue that that erodes faith in the U.S. Article 5 commitment, and also erodes deterrence of Russia or anyone else who might consider aggression toward a NATO member. Why are they wrong? And second: Just practically, in Monday’s conversation, did each minister just kind of give a speech and then it was over, or was there any actual substantive interplay where they would talk and respond to one another rather than just reciting their talking points?
AMBASSADOR REEKER: Hey, thanks, Arshad. I’m really – I’m really glad you asked that because I did mean to sort of expand on that a little bit in my intro remarks. One of the things we really wanted to design this for, particularly because it had to be this virtual engagement, was to avoid what can happen in such diplomatic engagements where you have an intervention followed by an intervention followed by an intervention. And instead, we structured it so that there were introductory remarks – very brief, really – by first the high rep, who of course was the host, then by Secretary Pompeo who was invited to make some intro remarks, and then we went back and forth.
So several foreign ministers in a row might make an intervention, as I said, several of them on behalf of their – of some colleagues, some of them did it in groups. I think about – in the end, about half of the ministers ended up taking the – I want to say take the floor, but taking the mike. And then we would go back, and the Secretary was invited to comment, respond, make some additional points, and we had topics – China, obviously, Middle East peace, Eastern Partnership – and then several of them raised other issues. And it gave the Secretary an opportunity to have a little more of a conversational approach, and that was I think, again, very useful, and underscored the very high level of goodwill, the sort of positive tone there, as the – one of the first speakers said what is thought to divide us makes headlines, what unites us is what makes progress in the world. And we took that to heart.
To your first question, I think anyone that thinks that faith in an alliance or commitments, or deterrents in the broad sense, is based on sort of static numbers of troops ignores, first of all, history, but certainly ignores the changes and adaptations of the alliance and that the transatlantic security architecture, which has been successful for 70 years as NATO, 75 years since defeating fascism in Europe – I think some would say wildly successful – is its ability to adapt and change and look at different approaches. And all of that is done in any of these decisions about force posture and troop numbers. There’s nothing that says X number is what indicates a particular level of commitment.
I mean, some of us are actually old enough to remember when there were a quarter of a million troops in – U.S. troops that is – in Europe, when lines were very different, when threats were very different. Now we face, as we’ve talked about, a variety of different things. Dealing with cyber threats, dealing with disinformation is a big challenge, that is not addressed by the number of forces in any particular country within the alliance or how that’s structured.
So I think it just takes a little more sophisticated looking at this and discussion. Everybody’s free to offer their views on this – plenty of armchair analysts and experts – and they may be heartfelt views, but I think we take these things very seriously. Our military right through the chain of command, looks at this very closely, and of course we’ll consult with allies. And as I said, you’ve got the NATO defense ministerial going on right now.
So I think I’ve got to cut out there. But thank you all and continued good health and good moods, and look forward to being in touch when we can maybe do this in person again sometime. Thanks, Cale.
MR BROWN: Thanks, Ambassador Reeker, appreciate it. And thanks to everyone for joining. Sorry we couldn’t get to the last question, but we do have a hard stop. As this is the end of the call, the embargo on the contents is lifted, and hopefully we’ll see you on the next call.
US - CANADA / MINERALS COOPERATION
U.S. Department of State. 06/17/2020. United States and Canada Forge Ahead on Critical Minerals Cooperation
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Cynthia Kierscht and Associate Deputy Minister of Natural Resources Canada Shawn Tupper participated in the second U.S.-Canada Critical Minerals Working Group virtual meeting on June 17, hosted by Canada.
In spite of the unique challenges posed by COVID-19, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kierscht and Associate Deputy Minister Tupper reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen the U.S.-Canada supply chain for critical minerals that are essential to our mutual security and future prosperity. The United States and Canada reviewed progress of the five Sub-Working Groups implementing the countries’ Joint Action Plan for Cooperation on Critical Minerals and set priorities for the next phase of bilateral collaboration. Officials across both governments explored opportunities for joint action in priority areas such as rare earth elements, materials for next generation batteries, and minerals essential to semi-conductor development and production. They also discussed each country’s efforts to address the effects of the global pandemic on the mining and natural resources sectors and to stimulate economic recovery. The inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Canada Critical Minerals Working Group was held on October 3, 2019, in Washington, D.C.
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LGCJ.:
