14 de julho de 2020



U.S. Department of State. 07/14/2020. Welcoming the United Kingdom Decision to Prohibit Huawei from 5G Networks. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

We welcome news that the United Kingdom plans to ban Huawei from future 5G networks and phase out untrusted Huawei equipment from existing networks. With this decision, the UK joins a growing list of countries from around the world that are standing up for their national security by prohibiting the use of untrusted, high-risk vendors. We will continue to work with our British friends on fostering a secure and vibrant 5G ecosystem, which is critical to Transatlantic security and prosperity.

The momentum in favor of secure 5G is building. The UK joins democracies such as the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Sweden in banning Huawei from future 5G networks. Clean carriers like Jio in India, Telstra in Australia, SK and KT in South Korea, NTT in Japan, and others have also prohibited the use of Huawei equipment in their networks.

Countries need to be able to trust that 5G equipment and software will not threaten national security, economic security, privacy, intellectual property, or human rights.

U.S. Department of State. 07/14/2020. Renaming of the International Telecommunication Advisory Committee as the International Digital Economy and Telecommunication Advisory Committee and Renewal of Charter

The International Telecommunication Advisory Committee (ITAC) has been renamed as the International Digital Economy and Telecommunication Advisory Committee (IDET) and its charter has been renewed for two years.

The IDET will provide views and advice to the Department of State on international policy issues related to the digital economy, digital connectivity, economic aspects of emerging digital technologies, telecommunications, and communication and information policy matters.  The IDET includes members of the telecommunications industry; organizations, institutions, or entities with specific interests in digital economy, digital connectivity, economic aspects of emerging digital technologies, and communications and information policy matters; academia; civil society; and officials of interested government agencies.  The IDET intends to meet at least three times per year.

IDET meetings are generally open to the public and activities are announced in the Federal Register and by email reflectors maintained by the Department of State


DoL. BLS. July 14, 2020. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – JUNE 2020

The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) increased 0.6 percent in
June on a seasonally adjusted basis after falling 0.1 percent in May, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Over the last 12 months, the all items
index increased 0.6 percent before seasonal adjustment.

The gasoline index rose sharply in June after recent declines and accounted for
over half of the monthly increase in the seasonally adjusted all items index. The
energy index increased 5.1 percent in June as the gasoline index rose 12.3 percent.
The food index also rose in June, increasing 0.6 percent as the index for food at
home continued to rise.

The index for all items less food and energy rose 0.2 percent in June, its first
monthly increase since February. The index for motor vehicle insurance increased
sharply in June after recent declines. The indexes for apparel, shelter, and medical
care also increased in June, while the indexes for used cars and trucks, recreation,
and communication all declined.

The all items index increased 0.6 percent for the 12 months ending June; this
compares to a 0.1-percent increase for the 12 months ending May. The index for all
items less food and energy increased 1.2 percent over the last 12 months. The food
index increased 4.5 percent over the last 12 months, with the index for food at home
rising 5.6 percent. Despite increasing in June, the energy index fell 12.6 percent
over the last 12 months.

 Table A. Percent changes in CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. city
                                  Seasonally adjusted changes from             
                                          preceding month                      
                              Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  Apr.  May   June   ended 
                              2019  2020  2020  2020  2020  2020  2020   June  
 All items..................    .2    .1    .1   -.4   -.8   -.1    .6       .6
  Food......................    .2    .2    .4    .3   1.5    .7    .6      4.5
   Food at home.............    .0    .1    .5    .5   2.6   1.0    .7      5.6
   Food away from home (1)..    .3    .4    .2    .2    .1    .4    .5      3.1
  Energy....................   1.6   -.7  -2.0  -5.8 -10.1  -1.8   5.1    -12.6
   Energy commodities.......   3.0  -1.6  -3.5 -10.4 -20.0  -3.5  11.7    -23.2
    Gasoline (all types)....   3.1  -1.6  -3.4 -10.5 -20.6  -3.5  12.3    -23.4
    Fuel oil................   1.1   -.4  -8.5 -13.7 -15.6  -6.3  10.2    -29.9
   Energy services..........   -.2    .6   -.3   -.5    .1   -.5   -.2       .1
    Electricity.............   -.2    .4   -.1   -.2    .1   -.8   -.3       .1
    Utility (piped) gas                                                        
       service..............   -.5   1.0   -.9  -1.4    .2    .8    .0      -.2
  All items less food and                                                      
     energy.................    .1    .2    .2   -.1   -.4   -.1    .2      1.2
   Commodities less food and                                                   
      energy commodities....    .0    .0    .2   -.3   -.7   -.2    .2     -1.1
    New vehicles............    .1    .0    .1   -.4    .0    .3    .0      -.2
    Used cars and trucks....   -.4  -1.2    .4    .8   -.4   -.4  -1.2     -2.8
    Apparel.................    .1    .7    .4  -2.0  -4.7  -2.3   1.7     -7.3
    Medical care commodities   1.0   -.6   -.6    .0   -.1    .1    .2      1.3
   Services less energy                                                        
      services..............    .2    .3    .2    .0   -.4    .0    .3      1.9
    Shelter.................    .2    .4    .3    .0    .0    .2    .1      2.4
    Transportation services    -.1    .3    .3  -1.9  -4.7  -3.6   2.1     -7.0
    Medical care services...    .3    .3    .3    .5    .5    .6    .5      6.0

   1 Not seasonally adjusted.


The food index increased 0.6 percent in June following a 0.7-percent increase in May.
The food at home index rose 0.7 percent in June after increasing 1.0 percent in May.
Five of the six major grocery store food group indexes rose in June. The index for
meat, poultry, fish, and eggs increased 2.0 percent in June. This reflected another
increase in the beef index which rose 4.8 percent in June and increased 20.4 percent
over the last 3 months.

The index for nonalcoholic beverages increased in June, rising 0.7 percent. The
indexes for cereals and bakery products and for fruits and vegetables both rose
0.4 percent. The index for other food at home rose 0.2 percent in June. The only
major grocery store food group index to decline was dairy and related products,
which fell 0.4 percent in June, its first decline since July 2019.

The index for food away from home rose 0.5 percent in June following a 0.4-percent
increase in May. The index for full service meals increased 0.9 percent, its largest
ever monthly increase. The index for limited service meals advanced 0.5 percent in
June after rising 0.6 percent in May. 

The food at home index increased 5.6 percent over the last 12 months, its largest
12-month increase since the period ending December 2011. All six major grocery store
food group indexes rose over that span. The beef index increased 25.1 percent over
the last 12 months, leading to a 12.8-percent increase in the index for meats,
poultry, fish, and eggs. The remaining groups rose more modestly, with increases
ranging from 2.3 percent (fruits and vegetables) to 5.3 percent (nonalcoholic
beverages). The index for food away from home rose 3.1 percent over the last year.
The index for limited service meals increased 4.1 percent and the index for full
service meals rose 2.7 percent over the last 12 months.


The energy index rose 5.1 percent in June after falling in each of the previous 5 months.
The increase was a result of the gasoline index, which rose 12.3 percent in June after
falling in the first 5 months of the year. (Before seasonal adjustment, gasoline prices
rose 10.0 percent in June.) The electricity index, in contrast, declined in June, falling
0.3 percent. The index for natural gas was unchanged in June.

The energy index fell 12.6 percent over the past 12 months. The gasoline index decreased
23.4 percent, while the fuel oil index fell 29.9 percent. The index for natural gas
declined 0.2 percent, while the index for electricity increased slightly over the year,
rising 0.1 percent.

All items less food and energy

The index for all items less food and energy increased 0.2 percent in June. The index
for motor vehicle insurance rose 5.1 percent in June after falling sharply in April and
May. The apparel index rose 1.7 percent in June following recent declines. The shelter
index rose 0.1 percent in June, with the indexes for rent and owners’ equivalent rent
both increasing 0.1 percent.

The medical care index rose 0.4 percent in June after increasing 0.5 percent in May.
The index for physicians’ services increased 0.5 percent, the index for hospital
services rose 0.4 percent, and the index for prescription drugs increased 0.1 percent.
Other indexes that increased in June include household furnishings and operations
(0.4 percent), airline fares (2.6 percent), and tobacco (1.1 percent).

The index for used cars and trucks declined in June, falling 1.2 percent, its third
consecutive monthly decline. The recreation index declined 0.6 percent in June after
rising 0.9 percent in May. The index for communication fell 0.3 percent in June. The
new vehicles index was unchanged in June after increasing 0.3 percent in May. 

The index for all items less food and energy rose 1.2 percent over the past 12 months.
The shelter index rose 2.4 percent over the 12-month span. The index for rent increased
3.2 percent and the index for owners’ equivalent rent rose 2.8 percent, while the index
for lodging away from home fell 14.0 percent. The medical care index increased 5.1 percent
over the last 12 months. The indexes for airline fares, apparel, motor vehicle insurance,
used cars and trucks, and new vehicles all declined over the past 12 months.

Not seasonally adjusted CPI measures

The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) increased 0.6 percent over the
last 12 months to an index level of 257.797 (1982-84=100). For the month, the index rose
0.5 percent prior to seasonal adjustment.

The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W) increased
0.5 percent over the last 12 months to an index level of 251.054 (1982-84=100). For the
month, the index rose 0.6 percent prior to seasonal adjustment.

The Chained Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (C-CPI-U) increased 0.4 percent
over the last 12 months. For the month, the index increased 0.6 percent on a not
seasonally adjusted basis. Please note that the indexes for the past 10 to 12 months are
subject to revision.


DoL. BLS. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Preços ao consumidor nos EUA se recuperam em junho

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Os preços ao consumidor nos Estados Unidos se recuperaram em junho, após três quedas mensais consecutivas, à medida que as empresas reabriram, mas o núcleo do índice sugeriu que a inflação permanece sem forças e permite ao Federal Reserve continuar injetando dinheiro na economia em dificuldades.

O Departamento do Trabalho informou nesta terça-feira que seu índice de preços ao consumidor subiu 0,6% no mês passado, após recuar 0,1% em maio. Nos 12 meses encerrados em junho, o índice subiu 0,6%, após acréscimo de 0,1% em maio, este o menor aumento em base anual desde setembro de 2015.

Economistas consultados pela Reuters previam que o índice aumentaria 0,5% em junho e avançaria 0,6% ano a ano.

Reportagem de Lucia Mutikani


FED. July 14, 2020. Speech. Navigating Monetary Policy through the Fog of COVID. Governor Lael Brainard. At the Perspectives on the Pandemic Webinar Series, hosted by the National Association for Business Economics, Washington, D.C. (via webcast)

The COVID-19 contraction is unprecedented in modern times for its severity and speed. Following the deepest plunge since the Great Depression, employment and activity rebounded faster and more sharply than anticipated. But the recent resurgence in COVID cases is a sober reminder that the pandemic remains the key driver of the economy's course. A thick fog of uncertainty still surrounds us, and downside risks predominate. The recovery is likely to face headwinds even if the downside risks do not materialize, and a second wave would magnify that challenge. Fiscal support will remain vital. Looking ahead, it likely will be appropriate to shift the focus of monetary policy from stabilization to accommodation by supporting a full recovery in employment and a sustained return of inflation to its 2 percent objective.1

A variety of data suggest the economy bottomed out in April and rebounded in May and June. Payroll employment rebounded strongly in May and June. Retail sales jumped 18 percent in May, exceeding market expectations, and real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are estimated to have increased 8 percent. Consumer sentiment improved in May and June.2 And both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing Institute for Supply Management indexes jumped into expansionary territory last month. Financing conditions remain broadly accommodative on balance: They continued to ease over recent weeks for nonfinancial corporations and municipalities, although they remained stable or tightened slightly for small businesses and households.3

The earlier-than-anticipated resumption in activity has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the virus spread in many areas. Uncertainty will remain elevated as long as the pandemic hangs over the economy. Even if the virus spread flattens, the recovery is likely to face headwinds from diminished activity and costly adjustments in some sectors, along with impaired incomes among many consumers and businesses. On top of that, rolling flare-ups or a broad second wave of the virus may lead to widespread social distancing—whether mandatory or voluntary—which could weigh on the pace of the recovery and could even presage a second dip in activity. A broad second wave could re-ignite financial market volatility and market disruptions at a time of greater vulnerability. Nonbank financial institutions could again come under pressure, as they did in March, and some banks might pull back on lending if they face rising losses or weaker capital positions.

A closer look at the labor market data hints at the complexity. The improvement in the labor market started earlier, and has been stronger, than had been anticipated. Over May and June, payroll employment increased by 7.5 million, the unemployment rate fell 3.6 percentage points, and the labor force participation rate rose 1.3 percentage points.4 The large bounceback is a sharp contrast to the Global Financial Crisis, when the initial employment decline was shallower and it took much longer before a similar share of the initial job losses was recouped.

The job gains in the past two months were concentrated among workers who were on temporary layoff. They likely were driven by an earlier-than-expected rollback of COVID-related restrictions as businesses ramped up hiring and consumers exhibited more comfort engaging in commercial activities, as well as by a boost to employment from the Paycheck Protection Program. While nearly all industries experienced increases, the improvement was especially notable in the leisure and hospitality sector, which had been particularly hard hit by COVID-related closures in April.

It is unclear whether the rapid pace of labor market recovery will be sustained going forward, and risks are to the downside. The pace of improvement may slow if a large portion of the easiest gains from the lifting of mandated closures and easing of capacity constraints has already occurred. Moreover, weekly COVID case counts have been rising, and some states are ramping up restrictions. These developments mostly occurred after the reference period for the June employment report. After declining at a fast clip through early June, initial claims for unemployment insurance have moved roughly sideways in recent weeks and remained at a still elevated level of 1.3 million in the week ending July 4.5 Some high-frequency indicators tracked by Federal Reserve Board staff (including mobility data and employment in small businesses) suggest that the strong pace of improvement in May and the first half of June may not be sustained.

The pandemic's harm to lives and livelihoods is falling disproportionately on black and Hispanic families. After finally seeing welcome progress narrowing the gaps in labor market outcomes by race and ethnicity in the late stage of the previous recovery, the COVID shock is inflicting a disproportionate share of job losses on African American and Hispanic workers. According to the Current Population Survey, the number of employed persons fell by 14.2 percent from February to June among African Americans and by 13.4 percent among Hispanics—significantly worse than the 10.4 percent decline for the population overall.6

Separately, on the other side of our dual mandate, inflation has receded further below its 2 percent objective—reflecting weaker demand along with lower oil prices in recent months. Both core and total PCE price inflation measures have weakened, with the 12-month percent changes through May standing at 1.0 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively.7 Measures of inflation expectations are mixed; while market-based measures have moved below their typical ranges of recent years, survey measures have remained relatively stable within their recent historical ranges.8 Nonetheless, with inflation coming in below its 2 percent objective for many years, the risk that inflation expectations could drift lower complicates the task of monetary policy.

The strong early rebound in activity is due in no small part to rapid and sizable fiscal support. Several daily and weekly retail spending indicators tracked by Federal Reserve Board staff suggest that household spending increased quickly in response to stimulus payments and expanded unemployment insurance benefits. Household spending stepped up in mid-April, coinciding with the first disbursement of stimulus payments to households and a ramp-up in the payout of unemployment benefits, and showed the most pronounced increases in the states that received more benefits.9 With some of the fiscal support measures either provided as one-off payments or slated to come to an end in July, the strength of the recovery will depend importantly on the timing, magnitude, and distribution of additional fiscal support.

At the sectoral level, there is substantial heterogeneity in the effect of COVID. Recent data suggest that the recoveries in sectors such as manufacturing, residential construction, and consumer goods are likely to be relatively more resilient, while consumer services are more likely to remain hostage to social distancing. Manufacturing production jumped nearly 4 percent in May (following a historic drop in April), and forward-looking indicators point to another solid increase in June. Pending home sales and single-family permits rose more than anticipated in May. In the consumer sector, the rebound in spending has been concentrated in goods categories—especially those sold online—whereas most services categories have remained quite depressed. A similar concern may apply to the commercial real estate (CRE) sector and to equipment investment. Some parts of the CRE market—most notably, the lodging and retail segment—are experiencing significant distress and have seen sharp increases in delinquency rates along with tighter bank lending standards. For equipment investment, production and supply chain disruptions and high levels of uncertainty continue to weigh on expenditures.

In addition to the headwinds facing demand, there could be persistent effects on the supply side of the economy. The cross-border distancing associated with the virus raises the possibility of persistent changes to global supply chains. Within the U.S. economy, the virus may cause durable changes to business models in a variety of activities, resulting in greater reliance on remote work, reductions in nonessential travel, and changes to CRE usage and valuations.

In downside scenarios, there could be some persistent damage to the productive capacity of the economy from the loss of valuable employment relationships, depressed investment, and the destruction of intangible business capital. A wave of insolvencies is possible. As the Federal Reserve Board's May Financial Stability Report highlighted, the nonfinancial business sector started the year with historically elevated levels of debt.10 Already this year, we have seen about $800 billion in downgrades of investment-grade debt and $55 billion in corporate defaults—a faster pace than in the initial months of the Global Financial Crisis. Several measures of default probabilities are somewhat elevated. It remains vitally important to make our emergency credit facilities as broadly accessible as we can in order to avoid the costly insolvencies of otherwise viable employers and the associated hardship from permanent layoffs.

Finally, in keeping with the global nature of the pandemic, foreign developments could impinge on the U.S. recovery. The International Monetary Fund estimates that real global gross domestic product dropped at an annual rate of about 18 percent in the second quarter after falling nearly 13 percent in the first quarter. While the potential for a fiscal response across the euro area is positive and important, there has been some renewal of tensions between the United States and China, and the outlook for many emerging markets remains fragile.

The Federal Reserve moved rapidly and aggressively to restore the normal functioning of markets and the flow of credit to households and businesses. The forceful response was appropriate in light of the extraordinary nature of the crisis and the importance of minimizing harm to the livelihoods of so many Americans. With the restoration of smooth market functioning and credit flows, our emergency facilities are appropriately moving into the background, providing confidence that they remain available as an insurance policy if storm clouds again move in.

While it is welcome news that 7.5 million jobs were added in the past two months, it is critical to stay the course in light of the remaining 14.7 million job losses that have not been restored since the COVID crisis started. The healing in the labor market is likely to take some time. Last month, a majority of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants indicated they expect economic activity to decline notably this year and recover only gradually over the following two years. A majority of FOMC participants indicated that they expect core inflation to remain below our 2 percent objective and employment to fall short of its maximum level at least through the end of 2022.

Looking ahead, it will be important for monetary policy to pivot from stabilization to accommodation by supporting a full recovery in employment and returning inflation to its 2 percent objective on a sustained basis. As we move to the next phase of monetary policy, we will be guided not only by the exigencies of the COVID crisis, but also by our evolving understanding of the key longer-run features of the economy, so as to avoid the premature withdrawal of necessary support. Because the long-run neutral rate of interest is quite low by historical standards, there is less room to cut the policy rate in order to cushion the economy from COVID and other shocks. The likelihood that the policy rate is at the lower bound more frequently risks eroding expected and actual inflation, which could further compress the room to cut nominal interest rates in a downward spiral. With underlying inflation running below 2 percent for many years and COVID contributing to a further decline, it is important that monetary policy support inflation expectations that are consistent with inflation centered on 2 percent over time. And with inflation exhibiting low sensitivity to labor market tightness, policy should not preemptively withdraw support based on a historically steeper Phillips curve that is not currently in evidence. Instead, policy should seek to achieve employment outcomes with the kind of breadth and depth that were only achieved late in the previous recovery.11

With the policy rate constrained by the effective lower bound, forward guidance constitutes a vital way to provide the necessary accommodation. For instance, research suggests that refraining from liftoff until inflation reaches 2 percent could lead to some modest temporary overshooting, which would help offset the previous underperformance.12 Balance sheet policies can help extend accommodation by more directly influencing the interest rates that are relevant for household and business borrowing and investment.

Forward guidance and asset purchases were road-tested in the previous crisis, so there is a high degree of familiarity with their use. Given the downside risks to the outlook, there may come a time when it is helpful to reinforce the credibility of forward guidance and lessen the burden on the balance sheet with the addition of targets on the short-to-medium end of the yield curve.13 Given the lack of familiarity with front-end yield curve targets in the United States, such an approach would likely come into focus only after additional analysis and discussion.

The Federal Reserve remains actively committed to supporting the flow of credit to households and businesses and providing a backstop if downside risks materialize. With a dense fog of COVID-related uncertainty shrouding the outlook, the recovery likely will face headwinds for some time, calling for a sustained commitment to accommodation, along with additional fiscal support.


  1. I am grateful to Ivan Vidangos of the Federal Reserve Board for assistance in preparing this text. These remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
  2. This is reflected in the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers and the Conference Board.
  3. Nearly all of the financial conditions indexes that we track indicate only slightly less accommodative financial conditions currently than just before the onset of the COVID outbreak.
  4. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has indicated that the official unemployment rate has understated the extent of joblessness in recent months because many workers who lost their jobs were incorrectly reported as being employed but absent from work, rather than unemployed on temporary layoff. The BLS estimated that this misclassification held down the unemployment rate by about 5 percentage points in April and by about 1 percentage point in June, such that the reduction in the unemployment rate would be about 7-1/2 percentage points if these job losses were classified correctly.
  5. The flattening out seen in recent weeks is even clearer when looking at nonseasonally adjusted claims numbers, which might be a slightly better measure than seasonally adjusted numbers in the current environment. The usual seasonal adjustment procedure, which relies on multiplicative seasonal factors, is not ideally suited to the current extraordinary circumstances. See Jason Bram and Fatih Karahan (2020), "Translating Weekly Jobless Claims into Monthly Net Job Losses," Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics (blog), May 7. In addition, the Department of Labor stated that 49 states reported about 1 million initial claims for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) in the week ending July 4. However, since most PUA applicants must first apply for, and be denied, regular state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits before they apply for PUA, initial PUA claims and initial claims for regular UI benefits will be strongly correlated (likely with some lag) and do not constitute independent measures of the number of unemployed persons seeking unemployment benefits.
  6. The Current Population Survey (or household survey) measures the number of employed persons and includes detailed demographic information, whereas the Current Employment Statistics survey (or establishment survey) measures the number of jobs in the payrolls of nonfarm establishments.
  7. That said, the trimmed mean PCE inflation rate calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas over the 12 months ending in May remained stable at 2.0 percent; the data as of May 2020 are available on the Bank's website at And this morning's Consumer Price Index (CPI) data for June showed some signs of stabilization, with both core and total CPI inflation increasing noticeably last month, driven by a partial rebound in price categories that seemed most affected by social distancing in prior months (such as apparel, accommodation, and transportation services).
  8. The median 5-to-10-year measure from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers and the median three-year-ahead expected inflation from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Survey of Consumer Expectations both came in at 2.5 percent in June—well within their ranges in recent years. Median long-run expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters ticked down 0.1 percentage point to 1.9 percent in the second quarter, which is historically low for this measure. Market-based measures of inflation compensation over the next few years have retraced much of their sharp declines in mid-March but remain below their typical ranges in recent years. The 5-to-10-year measure of longer-term inflation compensation derived from Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, at around 1.4 percent, remains notably below pre-pandemic levels.
  9. This evidence is also consistent with recent research by Baker and others, who examine a panel of households using a financial planning app and show that these households responded quickly to CARES Act (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act) stimulus payments despite stay-at-home orders and social distancing; see Scott R. Baker, R.A. Farrokhnia, Steffen Meyer, Michaela Pagel, and Constantine Yannelis (2020), "Income, Liquidity, and the Consumption Response to the 2020 Economic Stimulus Payments," NBER Working Paper Series 27097 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, May). Other recent studies, including Kargar and Rajan as well as Chetty and others, find similar responses to the CARES Act using different data. See Ezra Karger and Aastha Rajan (2020), "Heterogeneity in the Marginal Propensity to Consume: Evidence from Covid-19 Stimulus Payments," Working Paper Series 2020-15 (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May); and Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Michael Stepner, and the Opportunity Insights Team (2020), "How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization Policies Affect Spending and Employment? A New Real-Time Economic Tracker Based on Private Sector Data (PDF)," Opportunity Insights Working Paper (Cambridge, Mass.: Opportunity Insights, May). Analysis by Bhutta and others uses data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to assess how the cash assistance (expanded unemployment insurance benefits and stimulus payments) under the CARES Act would help families cope with job loss and find that the CARES Act dramatically improves households' financial security; see Neil Bhutta, Jacqueline Blair, Lisa J. Dettling, and Kevin B. Moore (2020), "COVID-19, the CARES Act, and Families' Financial Security," working paper, July. The act's cash assistance, in addition to families' liquid savings, would allow an estimated 94 percent of working families to cover their recurring nondiscretionary expenses if they were to lose all of their income for six months from April through September 2020. In contrast, in the absence of the CARES Act, only about half of working families would be able to cover six months of expenses by relying exclusively on their liquid savings and standard unemployment insurance benefits.
  10. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2020), Financial Stability Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, May).
  11. See Lael Brainard (2019), "Federal Reserve Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications: Some Preliminary Views," Remarks at the Presentation of the 2019 William F. Butler Award New York Association for Business Economics, New York, New York.
  12. See Ben S. Bernanke, Michael T. Kiley, and John M. Roberts (2019), "Monetary Policy Strategies for a Low-Rate Environment (PDF)," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-009 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February).
  13. During the recovery from the previous financial crisis, there were several junctures when the expectations implied by market pricing and Committee communications got out of alignment, which proved costly.



U.S. Department of State. 07/13/2020. Secretary Pompeo’s Call with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov

The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:‎

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.  Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Lavrov discussed convening P5 leaders in the near future to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.  The Secretary and Foreign Minister also discussed issues of mutual concern, including Afghanistan.  The Secretary raised the issue of election security.


U.S. Department of State. 07/14/2020. On the Pan-Democratic Primary Election in Hong Kong. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

I warmly congratulate Hong Kong’s pan-democrats for their successful primary election.  More than 600,000 Hong Kongers cast ballots in the first territory-wide, pan-democratic primary election. Their enthusiasm clearly demonstrates their desire to make their voices heard in the face of the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to suffocate the territory’s freedoms.

We note with grave concern Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s threat that this primary may have violated Beijing’s new “national security” law for the territory, once again demonstrating the Chinese Communist Party’s fear of democracy and its own people’s free thinking.  We will be watching developments closely, especially as the September 6 Legislative Council elections draw closer.


U.S. Department of State. 07/14/2020. Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s Call with Dominican President-Elect Abinader

The following is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Dominican President-elect Luis Abinader Corona to congratulate him on his victory in the July 5 election.  Secretary Pompeo commended the people of the Dominican Republic for a successful, free, fair, and transparent election and reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to working with the Abinader administration.  The Secretary underscored the importance of U.S.-Dominican cooperation to security and prosperity in the Caribbean region and throughout the Western Hemisphere.




By Nicoletta Batini, James Lomax, and Divya Mehra

Food systems are essential to economic activity because they provide the energy that we need to live and work. However, macroeconomists have long ignored them in the belief that the global agri-food industry, now highly mechanized, subsidized and concentrated, offers all we could wish for when it comes to food.

2020 will be a year of reckoning for the world’s food systems. In just months, COVID-19 shut down half the globe. Images of panic buying, empty grocery shelves and miles-long queues at food banks have suddenly reminded us how important food systems are in our lives and how imbalanced they have become.

Pandemic-induced runs on food, however, do not merely reflect human behavior during emergencies. They are evidence that the global food supply chain—highly centralized and operating on a just-in-time supply basis—is prone to falter in the face of shocks. In many countries, for example, it became impossible to harvest or package food as workers were blocked at borders or fell sick. Elsewhere, stocks piled up and avalanches of food went to waste because restaurants and bars were closed. In developing countries, the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Food Program expect that a “hunger pandemic” and a doubling of people starving may soon eclipse the coronavirus, unless action is taken.

Unhealthy state

Cracks in the global food system’s facade have long been apparent. According to the latest State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World, already in 2018 about 820 million people went to bed hungry and a third of all people lacked essential nutrients. At the same time, 600 million people were categorized as obese and 2 billion overweight, because of imbalanced diets, which were also associated with obesity, diabetes, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases that compromise immune health. Today, immuno-depressed and malnourished people worldwide are suffering disproportionally the lethal consequences of COVID-19. In all these cases, the human toll comes with huge economic costs, including lost incomes and soaring public debt.

The limitations of the food system go beyond failing to feed the world well. Food produced through the overuse of chemicals, in monoculture cropping systems, and intensive animal farming on land and at sea degrades natural resources faster than they can reproduce and causes a quarter of all man-made greenhouse gas emissions, with livestock responsible for about a half of that. According to scientific research, including by the Food and Agriculture Organization, industrial animal farming operations that rear large numbers of animals in confined spaces breed lethal viruses, like the 2009 swine flu, and spread antibiotic-resistant “superbugs” because of the overuse of antibiotics to promote their growth and prevent infections.

Chart 1

At the same time, our uncontrolled disturbance of pristine habitats to farm and hunt has allowed deadly pathogens like SARS, HIV, Ebola, to jump species, infecting ours.

Economic reset

The rebuilding of economies after the COVID-19 crisis offers a unique opportunity to transform the global food system and make it resilient to future shocks, ensuring environmentally sustainable and healthy nutrition for all. To make this happen, United Nations agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Environment Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the World Food Program, collectively, suggest four broad shifts in the food system:

  • Resilient food supply chains. Efficient and effective food supply chains are essential to lowering the risks of food insecurity, malnutrition, food price fluctuations and can simultaneously create jobs. Rural transformation to empower small producers and retailers and mainstream them in the food systems economy can help build resilient food supply chains.
  • Healthy diets. Curbing the overconsumption of animal and highly-processed food in wealthier countries and improving access to good nutrition in poorer ones can improve well-being and land use efficiency, make healthy food more affordable globally, and slash carbon emissions. Retargeting agricultural subsidies toward healthy foods, taxing unhealthy foods, and aligning procurement practices, education programs and healthcare systems toward better diets can go a long way in achieving this. In turn, this can reduce healthcare costs globally, reduce inequality, and help us weather the next pandemic with healthier individuals.
  • Regenerative farming. A shift toward sustainable and regenerative land and ocean farming connected to strong local and regional food systems can heal our soils, air and water, boosting economic resilience and local jobs. It can be attained by promoting sustainable farming, facilitating market access and leveling the financial and regulatory playing field for smaller, sustainable farmers relative to large intensive farmers.  
  • Conservation. Breeding fewer animals to accommodate a shift toward more plant-based diets in wealthier countries is key to saving pristine ecosystems. Conservation efforts in line with recent proposals by the UN Environment Assembly for a global framework to protect the Earth's plant and wildlife, together with bold measures to eradicate the trade of wild animals, are central to restoring biodiversity, boost carbon sequestration and lower the risk of future pandemics.

Food systems are at the cross-roads of human, animal, economic and environmental health. Ignoring this exposes the world economy to ever-larger health and financial shocks as climate changes and global population grows. By prioritizing food system reforms in our “build forward” agendas, we can instead make concrete inroads toward the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement. Because as Winston Churchill once famously said: “Healthy citizens are the greatest asset any country can have.”





BACEN. 14 Julho 2020. BC divulga o Índice de Atividade Econômica do Banco Central (IBC-Br) de maio de 2020. ​​​​


BACEN. PORTAL G1. 14/07/2020. 'Prévia' do PIB do BC indica alta de 1,31% na economia em maio, a maior desde junho de 2018. Resultado foi registrado após forte tombo em abril. Na parcial do ano e em 12 meses até maio, o indicador do nível de atividade registra resultado negativo.
Por Alexandro Martello, G1 — Brasília

Após apresentar forte tombo em abril, a economia brasileira reagiu em maio, segundo números divulgados nesta terça-feira (14) pelo Banco Central.

O Índice de Atividade Econômica (IBC-Br), considerado uma "prévia" do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), apresentou crescimento de 1,31% em maio, na comparação com o mês anterior. O número foi calculado após ajuste sazonal, uma espécie de "compensação" para comparar períodos diferentes.

De acordo com informações do BC, essa foi a maior alta do indicador desde junho de 2018 – quando a economia voltou a crescer após a greve dos caminhoneiros. Naquele mês, a expansão foi de 3,30%.

Evolução do IBC-Br
Em %, frente ao mês anterior

Fonte: Banco Central

O crescimento do indicador já era esperado em maio, quando a produção industrial registrou expansão de 7%. As vendas do comércio varejista também tiveram forte alta naquele mês, mas o setor de serviços ainda registrou queda, embora menor.

Os resultados do IBC-Br, neste ano, refletem os efeitos da pandemia do novo coronavírus, sentidos com maior intensidade na economia de março em diante. Apesar do crescimento em maio, a economia ainda não se recuperou do tombo registrado nos meses anteriores.

Em março, primeiro mês de impacto da Covid-19 na economia, o IBC-Br já havia registrado retração de 6,14% na comparação com fevereiro. Em abril, o recuo de 9,45% (número revisado) foi o maior desde o início da série histórica do BC, em 2003.

  • Na comparação com maio do ano passado, porém, o índice de atividade econômica do BC apresentou queda de 14,24%. Nesse caso, o índice foi calculado sem ajuste sazonal, pois considera períodos iguais.
  • No acumulado dos cinco primeiros meses deste ano, de acordo com a instituição, o índice de atividade econômica registrou uma redução de 6,08% - sem ajuste sazonal.
  • Em 12 meses até maio de 2020, os números do BC indicam uma queda de 2,08% na prévia do PIB – também sem ajuste sazonal.

Previsões para a economia

Em 13 de maio, o governo brasileiro estimou uma queda de 4,7% para o PIB de 2020, tendo como base a perspectiva de que as medidas de distanciamento social terminariam no fim daquele mês.

O Banco Mundial prevê uma queda de 8% do PIB brasileiro e o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) estima um tombo de 9,1% em 2020.

Economistas do mercado financeiro estimaram, na semana passada, uma retração de 6,10% para o PIB brasileiro em 2020.

Em 2019, segundo dados do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), o PIB cresceu 1,1%. Foi o desempenho mais fraco em três anos. Nos três primeiros meses de 2020, foi registrada uma retração de 1,5% na economia brasileira.


Os resultados do IBC-Br são considerados uma "prévia do PIB". Porém, nem sempre mostraram proximidade com os dados oficiais do Produto Interno Bruto.

O cálculo dos dois é um pouco diferente – o indicador do BC incorpora estimativas para a agropecuária, a indústria e o setor de serviços, além dos impostos.

O IBC-Br é uma das ferramentas usadas pelo BC para definir a taxa básica de juros do país. Com o menor crescimento da economia, por exemplo, teoricamente haveria menos pressão inflacionária.

Atualmente, a taxa Selic está em 2,25% ao ano, na mínima histórica, e o Banco Central indicou, no comunicado da última reunião do Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom), que um "eventual ajuste futuro no atual grau de estímulo monetário será residual".

BACEN. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Atividade econômica no Brasil tem alta de 1,31% em maio, mostra BC
Por Camila Moreira

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O Índice de Atividade Econômica do Banco Central (IBC-Br), sinalizador do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), registrou alta de 1,31% em maio na comparação com o mês anterior, informou o BC nesta terça-feira.

Na comparação com maio de 2019, o IBC-Br apresentou queda de 14,24% e, no acumulado em 12 meses, teve perdas de 2,08%, segundo números observados.

BACEN. 14 Julho 2020. Apresentação do Presidente Roberto Campos Neto, em reunião, por teleconferência, com grupo de investidores, organizada pelo Citibank.


BACEN. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Saídas de capital vão se acomodar e melhorar contas externas, diz Campos Neto

BRASÍLIA (Reuters) - O presidente do Banco Central, Roberto Campos Neto, indicou nesta terça-feira que as saídas de capital vão se acomodar e que as contas externas vão melhorar no Brasil, conforme apresentação divulgada em reunião com investidores organizada pelo Citibank.

No documento, ele reiterou a mensagem de que a conjuntura econômica prescreve estímulo monetário extraordinariamente elevado, mas que o Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom) reconhece que o espaço remanescente para corte na Selic é “incerto e deve ser pequeno”.

Campos Neto repetiu ainda que qualquer possível ajuste ao estímulo monetário será residual.

Por Marcela Ayres


CECAFÉ. 14/07/2020. Relatório mensal de exportações Junho de 2020

No mês de junho deste ano, o Brasil exportou 2,8 milhões de sacas de café, com receita cambial de US$ 327,5 milhões, equivalente a R$ 1,7 bilhão (aumento de 19,9% em reais em relação a junho de 2019) e preço médio de US$ 116,96.

Ano-Safra 2019/20

No ano-safra 2019/20 (julho de 2019 a junho de 2020), o Brasil exportou um total de 40 milhões de sacas de café, considerando a soma das exportações de café verde, solúvel e torrado & moído, segundo balanço do Cecafé – Conselho dos Exportadores de Café do Brasil. O volume representa o segundo recorde histórico de exportações brasileiras de café para o mundo e foi i no período e teve como destaque o crescimento de 22,7% nas exportações de café robusta, na comparação com o ano-safra 2018/19.


CECAFÉ. PORTAL G1. REUTERS. 13/07/2020. Exportação brasileira de café cai 3,6% na safra 2019/2020. Queda é explicada por colheita menor no ano passado. No total, Brasil vendeu ao exterior 39,9 milhões de sacas de 60 kg.

A exportação total de café do Brasil (verde e industrializado) em 2019/20 atingiu 39,9 milhões de sacas de 60 kg, queda de 3,6% em relação ao ciclo anterior, que refletiu uma safra menor colhida no ano passado, disse nesta segunda-feira (13) o presidente do Conselho dos Exportadores de Café do Brasil (Cecafé), Nelson Carvalhaes.

Segundo ele, a pandemia de Covid-19 não teve impacto material nos embarques do maior produtor e exportador global de café.

"Tivemos um semestre muito bom, com muita eficiência, bons resultados e dentro da quantidade de café que era possível embarcar para o mercado internacional", declarou ele, em entrevista a jornalistas, por meio de videoconferência.

Apesar do recuo anual, o resultado representa o segundo maior volume embarcado em uma safra da história, atrás apenas da temporada 2018/19, que atingiu 41,4 milhões de sacas, conforme dados do Cecafé.

Baixa em 2019

Carvalhaes lembrou que o ano passado foi período de baixa no ciclo bianual da produção de café arábica, o que impediu maiores embarques na temporada 2019/20, em função de estoque reduzidos.

Após o Brasil ter sido "muito agressivo" na exportação em 2018/19, "fez esforço terrível" para manter seus embarques, em função da baixa disponibilidade.

"Praticamente exaurimos os estoques de arábica (em 2019/20)", disse ele, ao explicar o desempenho da exportação no ano-safra.

A exportação de café arábica do Brasil em junho somou 1,85 mi sacas, queda de 21,3% ante mesmo período do ano passado, segundo o Cecafé, enquanto na safra atingiu 35,9 milhões de sacas, queda de 4% na comparação anual.

"A exportação foi um pouco menor mais em função da oferta de café", concluiu o presidente do Cecafé, que avaliou que a pandemia não afetou a demanda de forma expressiva, embora tenha exigido maiores cuidados, desde a colheita até a exportação.

O dirigente evitou fazer projeções para o novo ano safra, de julho a junho.

Mas afirmou acreditar que, diante de uma grande safra que está sendo colhida neste ano de alta do arábica, o país deverá ter embarques volumosos, principalmente a partir de agosto e setembro, quando o produto da nova safra já estará pronto para embarque.

"Vejo toda a chance de concluir 2020 igual ou até melhor (na exportação de café). Vejo possibilidade, o Brasil fez boas vendas (antecipadas) para o segundo semestre", destacou ele.

Aumento do consumo em casa

Para Carvalhaes, o consumo de café em casa teve incremento "fantástico" em tempos de Covid-19, compensando redução de demanda por hotéis, cafeterias e restaurantes.

"Acho que um vai compensar o outro, e com a abertura paulatina poderá recuperar uma parte do mercado de hotéis, restaurantes e cafeterias", disse.

Na avaliação do presidente do Cecafé, o consumo mundial de café deverá ficar estável em 2020, "até com possível crescimento", mas ele avaliou que é prematuro falar em números neste momento.

"No meio de um problema muito sério (pandemia)... Tudo indica que, pelo que os países estão exportando, acho que este ano o consumo deve ser mantido e haver até um possível crescimento."

Em meio à baixa oferta de arábica, o destaque na exportação de café na temporada 2019/20 foi a variedade robusta, cujos embarques aumentaram quase 23% para 4,4 milhões de sacas no ano completo, segundo os dados do Cecafé.


CHINA. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. China registra primeiro crescimento das importações desde pandemia, exportações sobem em junho
Por Stella Qiu e Gabriel Crossley

PEQUIM (Reuters) - As importações da China subiram pela primeira vez desde que a crise do coronavírus paralisou a economia, uma vez que o estímulo do governo alimentou a demanda por commodities, enquanto as exportações foram impulsionadas por produtos médicos e avançaram em sinal de que a recuperação está ganhando força.

As importações da China em junho subiram 2,7% na comparação com o mesmo período do ano anterior, mostraram dados da alfândega nesta terça-feira, contra expectativa do mercado de queda de 10%. Elas haviam caído 16,7% no mês anterior.

As exportações também aumentaram inesperadamente, marcando um ganho de 0,5% que sugere que a demanda global está começando a subir de novo conforme muitos países começam a aliviar as medidas contra o vírus. Analistas estimavam recuo de 1,5% após queda de 3,3% em maio.

O desempenho das exportações da China não foi tão afetado pela desaceleração global como alguns analistas temiam, sustentado pelo embarque de máscaras, equipamentos de proteção pessoal e computadores.

“A melhora significativa nas importações da China é uma indicação da recuperação econômica em aceleração da China, que tem sido direcionada principalmente por aumentos substanciais nos investimentos em setores como imobiliário e infraestrutura”, disse Boyang Xue, analista da DuckerFrontier.

As importações chinesas dos Estados Unidos subiram 11,3% em junho, revertendo a tendência de queda de dois dígitos vista após o surto de coronavírus.

“Diante das dificuldades apresentadas pela epidemia, ainda estamos honrando nossos compromissos e implementando do acordo (comercial)”, disse o porta-voz da alfândega, Liu Kuiwen, a repórteres nesta terça-feira.

O superávit comercial da China com os EUA aumentou para 29,41 bilhões de dólares em junho de 27,89 bilhões em maio.

No total, o superávit comercial chinês em junho foi de 46,42 bilhões de dólares ante resultado positivo de 62,93 bilhões em maio.

CHINA. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. China tem importação recorde de soja em junho, com grandes carregamentos do Brasil
Por Hallie Gu e Tom Daly

PEQUIM (Reuters) - As importações mensais de soja pela China tiveram um recorde em junho, com salto de 71% na comparação anual, mostraram dados de alfândega nesta terça-feira, com forte ritmo de chegadas de carregamentos do Brasil, o principal fornecedor do país.

A China, maior importadora global da oleaginosa, importou 11,16 milhões de toneladas em junho, ante 6,51 milhões no mesmo período do ano anterior. Houve ainda alta de 19% na comparação com os 9,38 milhões de toneladas de maio, segundo números da Administração Geral de Alfândegas.

As exportações do Brasil tiveram uma retomada após março, na sequência de uma melhoria do lima no país da América do Sul.

“A principal razão é que os grãos brasileiros estavam baratos e as margens de processamento em junho estavam realmente boas, então processadores agendaram um monte de cargas”, disse Xie Hullian, analista da consultoria agrícola Cofeed.

“Processadores assinaram muitos contratos com consumidores finais e realizaram pré-vendas de muito farelo, para travar os lucros”, acrescentou.

Processadores chineses de soja, que mais cedo neste ano tiveram que parar operações devido à falta de oferta do grão, estão agora sofrendo com excesso de estoques.

Ainda assim, as importações neste mês devem permanecer acima dos níveis normais, acima das 9 milhões de toneladas, disseram analistas e operadores de mercado.

“As importações em julho devem atingir 10 milhões de toneladas também, com a maior parte dos carregamentos vindo do Brasil”, disse a analista Monica Tu, da Shanghai JC Intelligence.

CHINA. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Importação de carne pela China no 1° semestre cresce 73,5%

PEQUIM (Reuters) - A China importou 4,75 milhões de toneladas de carne, incluindo miudezas, no primeiro semestre, mostraram dados da alfândega nesta terça-feira, com alta de 73,5% ante mesmo período do ano anterior.

Compradores chineses aumentaram as importações de carne depois de um colapso na produção doméstica de carne suína causado por uma epidemia de peste suína africana que varreu o país desde 2018.

A China importou 896 mil toneladas de carne em junho, segundo dados da Administração Geral de Alfândegas, alta de 9,8% ante as 813 mil toneladas em maio.

“É um número surpreendentemente alto. Os preços de porcos vivos caíram um pouco em maio, então achei que isso reduziria importações um tanto, mas isso não ocorreu”, disse Darin Friedrichs, analista sênior na StoneX.

Ele acrescentou que espera significativa redução nas importações em julho devido a questão logísticas relacionadas a testes adicionais para coronavírus em carnes importadas.

Em comunicado em separado, a alfândega disse que as importações chinesas de carne suína cresceram 140% de janeiro a junho, para 2,12 milhões de toneladas. As importações de carne bovina avançaram 42,9%, para 997 mil toneladas. Não foram divulgados dados individuais de junho.

Por Hallie Gu e Dominique Patton

CHINA. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Futuros do minério de ferro na China ampliam ganhos por otimismo com demanda

PEQUIM (Reuters) - Os futuros do minério de ferro na China avançaram pela segunda sessão consecutiva nesta terça-feira, em meio a um sentimento positivo no mercado quanto à recuperação econômica e com esperanças de melhora na demanda após a estação de chuvas.

Os futuros mais negociados do minério de ferro na bolsa de commodities de Dalian, para entrega em setembro, chegaram a saltar 3,2%, para 845 iuanes (120,53 dólares) por tonelada. O contrato encerrou com alta de 2,4%, a 839 iuanes por tonelada.

“A alta nos futuros do minério de ferro vem sem que haja contradições entra oferta e demanda. É mais guiada pelo sentimento do mercado e em antecipação à época de pico (de demanda)”, disse a Huatai Futures em nota.

Dados de alfândega mostraram que as importações de minério de ferro da China em junho tiveram máximas de 33 meses, ao atingirem 101,68 milhões de toneladas, impulsionadas por maiores embarques de grandes mineradoras e perspectivas de forte demanda.

No aço os preços do vergalhão para construção avançaram na bolsa de Xangai. O contrato mais ativo, para entrega em outubro encerrou em alta de 0,2%, recuperando-se de perdas iniciais.

Por Min Zhang e Tom Daly


OPEP. REUTERS. 14 DE JULHO DE 2020. Opep vê aumento recorde na demanda global por petróleo em 2021

LONDRES (Reuters) - A demanda global por petróleo deve ter um crescimento recorde de 7 milhões de barris por dia em 2021, à medida que a economia global se recupera da pandemia de coronavírus, mas ainda seguirá abaixo dos níveis de 2019, disse a Organização dos Países Exportadores de Petróleo (Opep) em relatório mensal.

O relatório foi o primeiro em que a Opep fez uma avaliação sobre os mercados de petróleo no próximo ano. O grupo disse que a projeção não levou em conta a materialização de possíveis riscos com tensões comerciais entre Estados Unidos e China ou uma segunda onda de infecções por coronavírus.

“(A previsão) presume que a Covid-19 será contida, especialmente nas principais economias, permitindo recuperação do consumo privado e investimento, apoiados por massivas medidas de estímulos adotadas por governos para combater a pandemia”, afirmou a Opep.

Por Dmitry Zhdannikov



13 de julho de 2020



U.S. Department of State. 07/13/2020. U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

The United States champions a free and open Indo-Pacific. Today we are strengthening U.S. policy in a vital, contentious part of that region — the South China Sea. We are making clear: Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.

In the South China Sea, we seek to preserve peace and stability, uphold freedom of the seas in a manner consistent with international law, maintain the unimpeded flow of commerce, and oppose any attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes. We share these deep and abiding interests with our many allies and partners who have long endorsed a rules-based international order.

These shared interests have come under unprecedented threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states in the South China Sea, bully them out of offshore resources, assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with “might makes right.” Beijing’s approach has been clear for years. In 2010, then-PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told his ASEAN counterparts that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.” The PRC’s predatory world view has no place in the 21st century.

The PRC has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region. Beijing has offered no coherent legal basis for its “Nine-Dashed Line” claim in the South China Sea since formally announcing it in 2009. In a unanimous decision on July 12, 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – to which the PRC is a state party – rejected the PRC’s maritime claims as having no basis in international law. The Tribunal sided squarely with the Philippines, which brought the arbitration case, on almost all claims.

As the United States has previously stated, and as specifically provided in the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties. Today we are aligning the U.S. position on the PRC’s maritime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision. Specifically:

  • The PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim – including any Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims derived from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands – vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf. Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC actions to exploit those resources. In line with the Tribunal’s legally binding decision, the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to Mischief Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philippines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction, nor does Beijing have any territorial or maritime claims generated from these features.
  • As Beijing has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the South China Sea, the United States rejects any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over such islands). As such, the United States rejects any PRC maritime claim in the waters surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malaysia), waters in Brunei’s EEZ, and Natuna Besar (off Indonesia). Any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.
  • The PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to (or derived from) James Shoal, an entirely submerged feature only 50 nautical miles from Malaysia and some 1,000 nautical miles from China’s coast. James Shoal is often cited in PRC propaganda as the “southernmost territory of China.” International law is clear: An underwater feature like James Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of generating maritime zones. James Shoal (roughly 20 meters below the surface) is not and never was PRC territory, nor can Beijing assert any lawful maritime rights from it.

The world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire. America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law. We stand with the international community in defense of freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty and reject any push to impose “might makes right” in the South China Sea or the wider region.




By Poul M. Thomsen

Europe, like the rest of the world, faces an extended crisis. An element of social distancing—mandatory or voluntary—will be with us for as long as this pandemic persists. This, coupled with continued supply chain disruptions and other problems, is prolonging an already difficult situation. Based on updated IMF projections released last month, we now expect real GDP in the EU to contract by 9.3 percent in 2020 and then grow by 5.7 percent in 2021, returning to its 2019 level only in 2022. If an effective treatment or vaccine for COVID‑19 is found, the recovery could be faster—but the opposite would hold true if there are large new waves of infection.

Chart 1

Some European countries will face a tougher recovery path than others. Several went into the crisis with entrenched product and labor market rigidities holding back their growth potential. Others depend on industries that are tightly integrated into cross-border supply chains, leaving them deeply vulnerable to disruptions of such links. In several large euro area countries, slow growth has coexisted with high public debt and limited fiscal space, constraining the ability to cushion shocks. Inescapably, sharply divergent initial conditions are likely to result in a highly uneven recovery across Europe.

Europe’s high-debt countries will bear the brunt of the social impact. For decades, several of these countries have seen their public debt burdens ratchet up in times of trouble and stabilize—but not fall—in good times. The stepwise pattern of rising debt speaks to a weak record of addressing structural deficiencies, whether due to institutional rigidity or insufficient political will. Results have included high unemployment and emigration, especially among the youth, and a trend toward less-progressive taxation—but pensions have largely been protected. COVID‑19—a disease that calls for protection of the elderly but leaves the young shouldering much of the cost—complicates an already difficult demographic situation.

Fiscal policies for a transforming Europe

Against such backdrops, policies—especially national fiscal policies—need to start being repositioned for a longer crisis. At the outset of the pandemic, lockdowns were a vital tool to save lives. To help economic capacity survive a short but extreme disruption and allow activity to promptly bounce back afterwards, fiscal policies were eased sharply. Months later, fiscal support remains as vital as at the onset. But, as dislocations persist, resources will become stretched. Now is the time, therefore, to think ahead and reassess how best to use limited fiscal space without unduly burdening future taxpayers. The longer the slump, the greater will be the need to carefully target support for firms and households in the high-debt countries.

Policymakers must also recognize that the post-crisis economy may look very different from the economy of 2019. It is becoming clear that we are in the throes of—and that we need—permanent change. COVID‑19 has reminded us that nature still reigns supreme, that environmental degradation must stop, and that investing in resilience is good policy. Moreover, prudence requires us to consider that this pandemic could last several years, and may well be followed by future pandemics. Europe must strive for a new, greener economy, one that can operate efficiently even with prolonged social distancing. It may take many years to complete, but transformation needs to be nurtured starting now. We cannot just return to the way things were before.

Change is already underway, with winners and losers. Digitalization has emerged as a key bulwark of resilience, yet also as a divide. Across Europe and beyond, countless employees are adapting to remote work, students to remote learning, doctors and patients to telemedicine, and firms to internet-based sales and door-to-door delivery. Countless others, however, are shut out. Many contact-intensive activities—hospitality, travel, and more—could take years to recover. Some outputs—take coal-fired power or carbon-emitting vehicles—may slip into terminal decline. Again, some countries will be hit harder than others, and inequalities could grow both across and within national borders. We may not yet be able to fully envision the new normal, but the transition has begun.

Public funds must be used to steer the needed resource reallocation while protecting the most vulnerable. In labor and product markets, the focus should be on flexibility, including by ensuring that short-time work schemes that tie workers to their employers are kept temporary. In the corporate sector, support programs must embed incentives that encourage uptake by firms with strong business plans and discourage uptake by firms on a path to failure. As liquidity needs become solvency needs, state aid may need to include equity injections—various European initiatives are already moving this way. Clarity on carbon pricing will also be important to set the stage for a climate-friendly recovery of private investment. Finally, public investment can and should take the lead, focusing on greening, digitalization, and other aspects of resilience.

Given divergent national conditions, there is a strong case for joint EU fiscal action. Supporting the recovery will continue to require substantial fiscal resources. By focusing EU funds on countries hardest hit by the pandemic or with less fiscal space, lower income levels, and greater environmental damage, the “Next Generation EU” package stands to improve outcomes for the single market as a whole. To do so, however, it is vital that it serve as a catalyst and not a substitute for structural reforms and prudent fiscal policies. With fundamental limits to the size of any joint EU assistance, the responsibility for ensuring that debt burdens are sustainable will remain squarely at the national level. Even with low borrowing costs, all countries will need to partner upfront stimulus provision with credible medium-term policy plans.

Preserving financial stability and the supply of credit

Through the acute crisis phase and beyond, monetary policy will need to remain strongly accommodative. With crisis-related demand shortfalls further weakening the inflation outlook, central banks must continue to deliver substantial stimulus and ensure that financial markets remain liquid. In practice, this means policy rates must remain at extraordinarily low levels for now, supported by net asset purchases that implicitly look to bond spreads and issuance volumes. Once the period of stress has passed, however, there will be a need for introspection—reflecting on the many years of missed inflation objectives, on how to properly demarcate monetary policy from fiscal policy, on the global decline in equilibrium real interest rates as savings outpace investment, on the choice of monetary instruments, and more. The European Central Bank’s strategic review remains as essential as ever.

Finally, another key priority in the coming period will be to ensure an uninterrupted supply of bank credit to the economy. History has taught us that, when efficient savings allocation breaks down, crises tend to last longer. For now, most European banks have the capital and liquidity they need to expand credit. But, as this crisis wears on, there will be many defaults, and these could erode bank buffers and lending capacity. Potentially, therefore, one feedback loop of this crisis may simply be time: the longer the pandemic, the greater the credit disruption, and the slower the post-pandemic recovery. It is vital that supervisors prepare banks for the coming test. Robust lending standards must be upheld, losses provisioned for fully and transparently, and restructurings of bad assets pursued actively to preserve value. In some cases, bank recapitalization may prove necessary.

A calibrated policy mix

With many difficult challenges lying in wait, managing this vast crisis will call for an increasingly calibrated approach going forward. The initial emphasis on opening the fiscal and monetary floodgates had its place. As time passes, however, policymakers must reflect also on longer-term considerations. Even as low borrowing costs soften some of the tradeoffs, responsible policymaking will still need to weigh immediate imperatives against future burdens on young taxpayers and new generations. Difficult reforms must be pursued with renewed determination.

The overarching policy goals are not one, but two: to save lives now, and to ensure that Europe emerges with a greener and safer economy for the long run, one where future generations can thrive equitably.



By Tobias Adrian and Gita Gopinath

While capital mobility provides many benefits, capital flows to emerging market and developing economies are often volatile and depend critically on global financial conditions. The risks posed by volatile capital flows to macroeconomic and financial stability are often difficult to address with conventional monetary policy tools. Hence, policymakers have complemented interest rate policy with additional tools—including foreign exchange intervention, capital flow measures, and macroprudential actions—to achieve their objectives.

A significant shortcoming of this more eclectic approach is the lack of clear frameworks to guide how these tools should be used in concert to achieve central bank objectives. Accordingly, IMF staff have been engaged in a major push to use conceptual and quantitative models to guide how these tools should be used in an integrated way.

Our research on an Integrated Policy Framework considers policy tradeoffs associated with using these tools in an open economy macroeconomic setting that explicitly takes account of key frictions—such as, dominant currency pricing, currency mismatch on balance sheets, foreign investors limited appetite for emerging markets’ local currency debt, poorly anchored inflation expectations—as well as both domestic and external shocks (as managing director Kristalina Georgieva pointed out recently). In this blog, we provide a brief overview of two recently released working papers that provide frameworks for an integrated use of the tools.

The paper “A Conceptual Model for the Integrated Policy Framework” analytically derives optimal policies as a function of country specific frictions and shocks. Some of the insights are as follows: First, if an additional policy instrument becomes available, it should not necessarily be deployed because it may not be the right tool to address the imperfection at hand. For example, while pricing in dominant currencies, most often the dollar, in international goods markets reduces the benefits of exchange rate flexibility and can give rise to more volatile exchange rates, in the absence of other frictions, flexible exchange rates are still optimal. In this case, deploying unconventional tools such as foreign exchange intervention and capital flow measures can worsen outcomes because they do not address the specific pricing friction.

However, and this is a second insight, if there are additional frictions such as imperfections in capital markets, often associated with over borrowing, then dominant currency pricing can enhance the need for tools such as exchange interventions and capital flows and macroprudential measures. Private agents in an open economy have a tendency to overborrow in foreign currency because they do not internalize the impact of their decisions on future market stress that can arise when foreign lending conditions tighten, currencies depreciate, and balance sheets weaken. To prevent excessive volatility over time, prudential capital inflow controls can mitigate overborrowing in good times and excessive deleveraging in bad times. There is a greater need for such prudential inflow controls in countries with dominant currency pricing because the exchange rate is less effective in stabilizing demand in those countries.

Third, unlike the classic trilemma in international economics, flexible exchange rates do not necessarily preserve monetary policy independence. Episodes such as the taper tantrum in 2013 can sharply raise premia demanded by foreign investors to hold local currency debt. To counter the adverse impact of this external shock, monetary policy comes under pressure to raise policy rates at the expense of tightening domestic financial conditions. In such circumstances, the analysis suggests that it can be beneficial to use exchange intervention and prudential policies to address the external shock freeing the domestic policy rate to focus on domestic price pressures.

A second working paper, “A Quantitative Model for the Integrated Policy Framework” proposes a more empirically-oriented approach to the integrated use of policies. The starting point is an open economy New Keynesian model as is commonly used in central banks. The model embeds complex, nonlinear balance sheet channels and a range of frictions that help capture key empirical features of financial stress episodes, including that domestic credit conditions tend to tighten when the exchange rate depreciates.

The model highlights another form of loss of monetary policy independence that arises when inflation expectations are poorly anchored, as is the case in some emerging and developing economies. In this case, their central banks often face a difficult tradeoff in responding to external shocks that cause sharp exchange rate depreciations and capital outflow pressures. If inflation expectations are poorly anchored, and tend to drift away from target, the central bank is forced to choose between sharp raising interest rates to keep inflation stable—at the cost of a steep output decline—and pursuing a more passive policy that risks allowing inflation to become unmoored.

In this case, the model suggests that foreign exchange intervention and capital controls can improve policy tradeoffs considerably under certain conditions, especially for economies with less well-anchored inflation expectations, a high sensitivity of domestic borrowing conditions to the exchange rate, and that are more vulnerable to shocks that cause capital outflow and exchange rate pressures. Notably, the use of integrated policies may reduce downside risks to output associated with shocks that resemble a sudden stop.

In sum, research on the Integrated Policy Framework is in full swing at the IMF. The COVID-19 crisis has made stark the volatile nature of capital flows and limits to conventional monetary policies. Our newly released working papers shed light on the macroeconomic policy tradeoffs that many emerging markets and small open economies face. Our contributions provide both conceptual and quantitative approaches that aim at a fully integrated macroeconomic framework to assess policy tradeoffs.

The work on model frameworks is also being complemented by extensive empirical work and country case studies at the IMF. These other streams test empirically the impact of various tools and their trade-offs, explores the unintentional consequences of deploying unconventional tools on foreign currency exposure and financial market developments, the communication challenges when multiple instruments are used, among others. The combined work, which will be discussed by the IMF’s Executive Board in the fall, should provide useful insights to policy makers on how to deploy multiple tools with special attention to the form of the shock, the specific frictions, the pre-existing conditions, alongside practical considerations.





(Projeções atualizadas semanalmente pelas 100 principais instituições financeiras que operam no Brasil, para os principais indicadores da economia brasileira)


BACEN. PORTAL G1. 13/07/2020. Mercado vê recessão menor em 2020 e aumenta estimativa para a inflação. Analistas passaram a prever queda de 6,10% da atividade econômica este ano, ante recuo de 6,50% na semana passada; expectativa para o IPCA foi de 1,63% para 1,72%
Por Bianca Lima, G1 — Brasília

Os economistas do mercado financeiro voltaram a melhorar as estimativas para o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) de 2020. A projeção passou de uma retração de 6,50% para 6,10%.

Os números fazem parte do boletim de mercado, conhecido como relatório "Focus", divulgado nesta segunda-feira (13) pelo Banco Central (BC). O levantamento foi feito na semana passada e ouviu mais de 100 instituições financeiras.

O PIB é a soma de todos os bens e serviços produzidos no país e serve para medir a evolução da economia.

A expectativa para o nível de atividade foi medida em meio à pandemia do novo coronavírus, que tem derrubado a economia global e colocado o mundo no caminho de uma recessão.

Em 13 de maio, o governo brasileiro estimou uma queda de 4,7% para o PIB de 2020, tendo como base a perspectiva de que as medidas de distanciamento social terminariam no fim de maio.

O Banco Mundial prevê uma queda de 8% no PIB brasileiro e o Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) estima um tombo de 9,1%.

Em 2019, segundo dados do Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), o PIB cresceu 1,1%. Foi o desempenho mais fraco em três anos. Nos três primeiros meses de 2020, foi registrada uma retração de 1,5% na economia brasileira.

Para o próximo ano, a previsão do mercado financeiro para o crescimento do PIB permaneceu estável em 3,50%.

Aumento na projeção de inflação

Segundo o relatório divulgado pelo BC nesta segunda-feira, os analistas do mercado financeiro elevaram a estimativa de inflação em 2020, de 1,63%, para 1,72%.

A expectativa de inflação do mercado para este ano segue abaixo da meta central, de 4%, e também do piso do sistema de metas, que é de 2,5% neste ano.

Pela regra vigente, o IPCA pode oscilar de 2,5% a 5,5% sem que a meta seja formalmente descumprida. Quando a meta não é cumprida, o BC tem de escrever uma carta pública explicando as razões.

A meta de inflação é fixada pelo Conselho Monetário Nacional (CMN). Para alcançá-la, o Banco Central eleva ou reduz a taxa básica de juros da economia (Selic).

Para 2021, o mercado financeiro manteve em 3% sua previsão de inflação. No ano que vem, a meta central de inflação é de 3,75% e será oficialmente cumprida se o índice oscilar de 2,25% a 5,25%.

Novo corte nos juros

O mercado também manteve a previsão de um novo corte na taxa básica de juros da economia, a Selic, que atualmente está em 2,25% ao ano. A previsão dos analistas é de que a taxa caia para 2% até o fim de 2020.

Para o fim de 2021, a expectativa permaneceu estável em 3% ao ano. Isso quer dizer que os analistas seguem estimando alta dos juros no ano que vem.

Outras estimativas

  • Dólar: a projeção para a taxa de câmbio no fim de 2020 continuou em R$ 5,20. Para o fechamento de 2021, caiu para R$ 5,00 por dólar.
  • Balança comercial: para o saldo da balança comercial (resultado do total de exportações menos as importações), a projeção em 2020 foi elevada para US$ 54 bilhões de resultado positivo. Para o ano que vem, a estimativa dos especialistas do mercado foi mantida em US$ 55,25 bilhões de superávit.
  • Investimento estrangeiro: a previsão do relatório para a entrada de investimentos estrangeiros diretos no Brasil, em 2020, foi mantida em US$ 55 bilhões. Já para 2021, a estimativa dos analistas foi cortada, para US$ 64,10 bilhões.

BACEN. REUTERS. 13 DE JULHO DE 2020. Mercado passa a ver contração de 6,10% da economia este ano no Focus

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O mercado passou a ver menor contração econômica neste ano pela segunda semana seguida, em meio a dados mostrando o impacto do surto de coronavírus, de acordo com a pesquisa Focus que o Banco Central divulgou nesta segunda-feira.

O levantamento semanal mostrou que a projeção agora é de uma contração do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) em 2020 de 6,10%, contra queda de 6,50% calculada na semana anterior.

Para 2021, permanece a expectativa de um crescimento do PIB de 3,50%.

Para a inflação, os economistas consultados ajustaram sua estimativa para a alta do IPCA este ano a 1,72%, de 1,63% ante, mantendo a taxa de 3,00% para o índice em 2021.

O centro da meta oficial de 2020 é de 4% e, de 2021, de 3,75%, ambos com margem de tolerância de 1,5 ponto percentual para mais ou menos.

A pesquisa com uma centena de economistas mostrou ainda que não houve mudanças para a expectativa sobre a taxa básica de juros, com a Selic estimada em 2% este ano e em 3% no próximo.

Entretanto, o Top-5, grupo dos que mais acertam as previsões, reduziu a conta para a Selic em 2020 a 1,88% na mediana das projeções, de 2,0% antes, enquanto aumentou a estimativa para 2021 a 2,38%, ante 2,25%.

Em outra frente, o mercado revisou com força a estimativa para o déficit em conta corrente este ano a 9,50 bilhões de dólares, de um resultado negativo de 11,75 bilhões de dólares previsto na semana anterior. Para 2021, o déficit estimado passou a 19,5 bilhões de queda antes de 20,44 bilhões de dólares.

Por Camila Moreira




FGV. IBRE. 13/07/2020. Prévia da Incerteza da Economia: nível do IIE-Br de julho se aproxima do nível de março

Em apuração preliminar, com dados coletados entre 26 de junho e 9 de julho, o Indicador de Incerteza da Economia (IIE-Br) da Fundação Getulio Vargas sinaliza uma queda de 7,3 pontos em julho, para 166,3 pontos. Após o terceiro mês em queda, o IIE-Br devolveria 46% da alta de 95,4 pontos observada no bimestre março-abril.

“Após a terceira queda consecutiva, o nível do IIE-Br de julho se aproxima do nível de março, de 167,1 pontos, primeiro momento em que o país precisou forçar paralisações e iniciar o isolamento social para conter o avanço da pandemia. As dificuldades de se prever cenários para o futuro da economia continuam muito grandes, como reflete o componente de Expectativas, que, no nível apurado nesta prévia, recuperaria, até julho, apenas 7% da alta ocorrida entre março e maio. Uma queda mais acelerada da Incerteza daqui para a frente dependerá da evolução pandemia no país e da velocidade de normalização das atividades econômicas e do apaziguamento das tensões políticas”, afirma Anna Carolina Gouveia, Economista da FGV IBRE.

O componente de Mídia recuou 7,0 pontos, para 145,5 pontos, nesta prévia de julho. O componente de Expectativa, recuou 5,6 pontos, para 222,4 pontos. Ambos os componentes ainda estão em patamares considerados extremamente elevados, com destaque para o de Expectativas, que permanece pelo quarto mês consecutivo acima dos 200 pontos.



FGV. IBRE. 13/07/2020. Inflação da terceira idade supera o IPC-BR no 2° Trimestre de 2020

O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor da Terceira Idade (IPC-3i), que mede a variação da cesta de consumo de famílias majoritariamente compostas por indivíduos com mais de 60 anos de idade, registrou no segundo trimestre de 2020, variação de -0,03%. Em 12 meses, o IPC-3i acumula alta de 2,54%. Com este resultado, a variação do indicador ficou acima da taxa acumulada pelo IPC-BR, que foi de 2,22%, no mesmo período.

Na passagem do primeiro trimestre de 2020 para o segundo trimestre de 2020, a taxa do IPC-3i registrou decréscimo de 0,91 ponto percentual, passando de 0,88% para -0,03%. Seis das oito classes de despesa componentes do índice registraram decréscimo em suas taxas de variação. A principal contribuição partiu do grupo Transportes, cuja taxa passou de 0,42% para -2,93%. O item que mais influenciou o comportamento desta classe de despesa foi gasolina, que variou -10,55% no segundo trimestre, ante -1,66%, no anterior.

Contribuíram também para o decréscimo da taxa do IPC-3i os grupos: Educação, Leitura e Recreação (-0,42% para -3,59%), Alimentação (2,61% para 2,16%), Habitação (0,25% para -0,10%), Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais (1,13% para 0,90%) e Vestuário (-0,17% para -0,44%). Nestas classes de despesa, vale destacar o comportamento dos itens: cursos formais (4,29% para -2,50%), hortaliças e legumes (28,48% para 6,45%), empregado (a) doméstico (a) (0,91% para 0,14%), artigos de higiene e cuidado pessoal (1,66% para -0,28%) e calçados (-0,07% para -1,94%).

Em contrapartida, os grupos Comunicação (0,43% para 0,92%) e Despesas Diversas (0,38% para 0,63%) apresentaram avanço em suas taxas de variação. Nestas classes de despesa, vale citar os itens: combo de telefonia, internet e TV por assinatura (0,09% para 1,87%) e alimentos para animais domésticos (-2,51% para 3,89%).



MEconomia. 13/07/2020. COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR. Balança comercial tem superávit de US$ 1,655 bilhão na segunda semana de julho. Corrente de comércio no período de cinco dias úteis chega a US$ 6,764 bilhões

A balança comercial brasileira registrou superávit de US$ 1,655 bilhão e corrente de comércio de US$ 6,764 bilhões, na segunda semana de julho de 2020 – com cinco dias úteis –, como resultado de exportações no valor de US$ 4,21 bilhões e importações de US$ 2,554 bilhões. Os dados foram divulgados nesta segunda-feira (13/7) pela Secretaria de Comércio Exterior (Secex) do Ministério da Economia.

No ano, as exportações totalizam US$ 108,638 bilhões e as importações, US$ 83,341 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 25,298 bilhões e corrente de comércio de US$ 191,979 bilhões.

Análise do mês

Nas exportações, comparadas a média diária até a segunda semana de julho de 2020 (US$ 864,85 milhões) com a de julho de 2019 (US$ 876,13 milhões), houve queda de -1,3%, em razão da diminuição nas vendas na Indústria Extrativa (-2,6%) e de produtos da Indústria de Transformação (-8,1%). Por outro lado, houve aumento nas vendas em Agropecuária (+18,7%).

A queda nas exportações foi puxada, principalmente, pela diminuição nas vendas dos seguintes produtos da indústria extrativista: óleos brutos de petróleo ou de minerais betuminosos, crus (-29,3% ); outros minerais em bruto (-21,4%); outros minérios e concentrados dos metais de base (-12,6%); minérios de alumínio e seus concentrados (-25,7%) e pedra, areia e cascalho (-8,3%). já em relação aos produtos da indústria de transformação, a queda nas exportações foi puxada, principalmente, por ferro-gusa, spiegel, ferro-esponja, grânulos e pó de ferro ou aço e ferro-ligas (-67,4%); produtos semi-acabados, lingotes e outras formas primárias de ferro ou aço (-50,7%); obras de ferro ou aço e outros artigos de metais comuns (-71,4%); instalações e equipamentos de engenharia civil e construtores, e suas partes (-55,2%) e carnes de aves e suas miudezas comestíveis, frescas, refrigeradas ou congeladas (-18,6%).

Nas importações, a média diária até a segunda semana de julho de 2020 (US$ 493,03 milhões) ficou -36,1% abaixo da média de julho do ano passado (US$ 772,15 milhões). Nesse comparativo, caíram os gastos, principalmente, com Agropecuária (-15,6%), com produtos da Indústria de Transformação (-34,7%) e com a Indústria Extrativista ( -58,9%).

A queda das importações foi puxada, principalmente, pela diminuição dos gastos com os seguintes produtos agropecuários: látex, borracha natural, balata, guta-percha, guaiúle, chicle e gomas naturais (-62,0%); trigo e centeio, não moídos (-14,3% ); pescado inteiro vivo, morto ou refrigerado (-42,2%); frutas e nozes não oleaginosas, frescas ou secas (-21,4%) e milho não moído, exceto milho doce (-65,1%). Já na Indústria de Transformação, a queda das importações ocorreu devido à diminuição dos gastos com a compra de óleos combustíveis de petróleo ou de minerais betuminosos, exceto óleos brutos (-74,5%); plataformas, embarcações e outras estruturas flutuantes (-97,4%); obras de ferro ou aço e outros artigos de metais comuns (-40,2%); partes e acessórios dos veículos automotivos (-65,8%) e veículos automóveis de passageiros (-71,9%). Por fim, também caíram os gastos com as compras dos seguintes produtos da indústria extrativista: óleos brutos de petróleo ou de minerais betuminosos, crus (-38,2%); carvão, mesmo em pó, mas não aglomerado (-70,6%); gás natural, liquefeito ou não (-100,0%); minérios de cobre e seus concentrados (-100,0%) e outros minérios e concentrados dos metais de base (-75,8%).


Na 2ª semana de Julho de 2020, a balança comercial registrou superávit de US$ 1,655 bilhão e corrente de comércio de US$ 6,764 bilhões, resultado de exportações no valor de US$ 4,21 bilhões e importações de US$ 2,554 bilhões. No mês, as exportações somam US$ 6,919 bilhões e as importações, US$ 3,944 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 2,975 bilhões e corrente de comércio de US$ 10,863 bilhões. No ano, as exportações totalizam US$ 108,638 bilhões e as importações, US$ 83,341 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 25,298 bilhões e corrente de comércio de US$ 191,979 bilhões.



MRE. DCOM. NOTA-75. 10 de Julho de 2020. Diálogo Bilateral Brasil-França

Brasil e França mantiveram, por videoconferência, em 7 de julho, diálogo político bilateral, para discutir temas internacionais e multilaterais de interesse comum.

Organizada pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores brasileiro e pelo Ministério da Europa e de Assuntos Estrangeiros francês, a reunião foi presidida pelo embaixador Kenneth da Nóbrega, Secretário de Negociações Bilaterais no Oriente Médio, Europa e África, e o embaixador Fabio Mendes Marzano, Secretário de Assuntos de Soberania Nacional e Cidadania, e por seu homólogo francês, senhor Philippe Errera, Diretor-Geral de Assuntos Políticos e de Segurança.

As partes trocaram impressões aprofundadas sobre o futuro da relação bilateral, a cooperação tecnológica, os fluxos de comércio e investimento, a cooperação transfronteiriça com a Guiana Francesa, no contexto da propagação da Covid-19, a proteção do meio-ambiente, a preservação da biodiversidade e a luta contra a mudança climática. As partes concordaram em dar seguimento ao aprofundamento do diálogo.


MRE. DCOM. NOTA-77. 13 de Julho de 2020. Eleição do Novo Presidente do Suriname

O Governo brasileiro felicita o senhor Chan Santokhi por sua eleição à presidência do Suriname, realizada na data de hoje pela Assembleia Nacional, cujos integrantes tomaram posse no dia 29 de junho passado.

O Governo brasileiro saúda, assim, o povo e as instituições surinamesas por concluírem o processo eleitoral em um contexto tão desafiador, caracterizado pela pandemia da COVID-19, o que demonstra o vigor da democracia no ano em que o Suriname completa 45 anos de sua independência.

O Governo brasileiro faz votos de pleno êxito ao novo mandatário e às autoridades recém-empossadas surinamesas e reafirma seu compromisso em aprofundar o já excelente estado das relações bilaterais, em prol do desenvolvimento e do bem-estar de suas sociedades.