US ECONOMICS
INTEREST RATE
FED. February 19, 2020. Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, January 28-29, 2020
The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee on Wednesday released the attached minutes of the Committee meeting held on January 28-29, 2020.
The minutes for each regularly scheduled meeting of the Committee ordinarily are made available three weeks after the day of the policy decision and subsequently are published in the Board's Annual Report. The descriptions of economic and financial conditions contained in these minutes are based solely on the information that was available to the Committee at the time of the meeting.
FOMC statement
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December indicates that the labor market remains strong and that economic activity has been rising at a moderate rate. Job gains have been solid, on average, in recent months, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Although household spending has been rising at a moderate pace, business fixed investment and exports remain weak. On a 12‑month basis, overall inflation and inflation for items other than food and energy are running below 2 percent. Market-based measures of inflation compensation remain low; survey-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations are little changed.
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1‑1/2 to 1-3/4 percent. The Committee judges that the current stance of monetary policy is appropriate to support sustained expansion of economic activity, strong labor market conditions, and inflation returning to the Committee's symmetric 2 percent objective. The Committee will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the economic outlook, including global developments and muted inflation pressures, as it assesses the appropriate path of the target range for the federal funds rate.
In determining the timing and size of future adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will assess realized and expected economic conditions relative to its maximum employment objective and its symmetric 2 percent inflation objective. This assessment will take into account a wide range of information, including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings on financial and international developments.
Voting for the monetary policy action were Jerome H. Powell, Chair; John C. Williams, Vice Chair; Michelle W. Bowman; Lael Brainard; Richard H. Clarida; Patrick Harker; Robert S. Kaplan; Neel Kashkari; Loretta J. Mester; and Randal K. Quarles.
Implementation Note issued January 29, 2020. Decisions Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation
The Federal Reserve has made the following decisions to implement the monetary policy stance announced by the Federal Open Market Committee in its statement on January 29, 2020:
- The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to set the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances at 1.60 percent, effective January 30, 2020. Setting the interest rate paid on required and excess reserve balances 10 basis points above the bottom of the target range for the federal funds rate is intended to foster trading in the federal funds market at rates well within the FOMC's target range.
- As part of its policy decision, the Federal Open Market Committee voted to authorize and direct the Open Market Desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, until instructed otherwise, to execute transactions in the System Open Market Account in accordance with the following domestic policy directive:
"Effective January 30, 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee directs the Desk to undertake open market operations as necessary to maintain the federal funds rate in a target range of 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 percent. In light of recent and expected increases in the Federal Reserve's non-reserve liabilities, the Committee directs the Desk to continue purchasing Treasury bills at least into the second quarter of 2020 to maintain over time ample reserve balances at or above the level that prevailed in early September 2019. The Committee also directs the Desk to continue conducting term and overnight repurchase agreement operations at least through April 2020 to ensure that the supply of reserves remains ample even during periods of sharp increases in non-reserve liabilities, and to mitigate the risk of money market pressures that could adversely affect policy implementation. In addition, the Committee directs the Desk to conduct overnight reverse repurchase operations (and reverse repurchase operations with maturities of more than one day when necessary to accommodate weekend, holiday, or similar trading conventions) at an offering rate of 1.50 percent, in amounts limited only by the value of Treasury securities held outright in the System Open Market Account that are available for such operations and by a per-counterparty limit of $30 billion per day.The Committee directs the Desk to continue rolling over at auction all principal payments from the Federal Reserve's holdings of Treasury securities and to continue reinvesting all principal payments from the Federal Reserve's holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities received during each calendar month. Principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities up to $20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in Treasury securities to roughly match the maturity composition of Treasury securities outstanding; principal payments in excess of $20 billion per month will continue to be reinvested in agency mortgage-backed securities. Small deviations from these amounts for operational reasons are acceptable.
The Committee also directs the Desk to engage in dollar roll and coupon swap transactions as necessary to facilitate settlement of the Federal Reserve's agency mortgage-backed securities transactions."
- In a related action, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System voted unanimously to approve the establishment of the primary credit rate at the existing level of 2.25 percent.
This information will be updated as appropriate to reflect decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Board of Governors regarding details of the Federal Reserve's operational tools and approach used to implement monetary policy.
INFLATION
DoL. BLS. February 19, 2020PRODUCER PRICE INDEXES - JANUARY 2020
The Producer Price Index for final demand advanced 0.5 percent in January, seasonally adjusted,
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Final demand prices rose 0.2 percent in
December and declined 0.1 percent in November. (See table A.) On an unadjusted basis, the final
demand index increased 2.1 percent for the 12 months ended in January, the largest advance
since moving up 2.1 percent for the 12 months ended May 2019.
In January, 90 percent of the increase in the final demand index is attributable to prices for final
demand services, which climbed 0.7 percent. The index for final demand goods inched up 0.1
percent.
Prices for final demand less foods, energy, and trade services advanced 0.4 percent in January,
the largest increase since a 0.4-percent rise in April 2019. For the 12 months ended in January,
the index for final demand less foods, energy, and trade services moved up 1.5 percent.
Final Demand
Final demand services: The index for final demand services climbed 0.7 percent in January, the
largest increase since rising 0.7 percent in October 2018. In January, margins for final demand trade
services advanced 1.2 percent, and prices for final demand services less trade, transportation, and
warehousing moved up 0.6 percent. (Trade indexes measure changes in margins received by
wholesalers and retailers.) In contrast, the index for final demand transportation and warehousing
services fell 1.6 percent.
Product detail: Forty percent of the January increase in the index for final demand services can be
traced to margins for apparel, jewelry, footwear, and accessories retailing, which jumped 10.3
percent. The indexes for machinery and vehicle wholesaling; health, beauty, and optical goods
retailing; inpatient care; guestroom rental; and portfolio management also moved higher. Conversely,
prices for airline passenger services decreased 5.8 percent. The indexes for professional and
commercial equipment wholesaling and for wireless telecommunication services also declined. (See
table 4.)
Final demand goods: Prices for final demand goods inched up 0.1 percent in January, the fourth
consecutive rise. Leading the January increase, the index for final demand goods less foods and
energy climbed 0.3 percent. Prices for final demand foods advanced 0.2 percent. In contrast, the
index for final demand energy fell 0.7 percent.
Product detail: A 13.9-percent rise for prices of iron and steel scrap was a major factor in the January
advance in the index for final demand goods. Prices for fresh and dry vegetables; jet fuel; search,
detection, navigation, and guidance systems and equipment; and grains also moved higher.
Conversely, the gasoline index decreased 1.5 percent. Prices for chicken eggs, diesel fuel, and motor
vehicles also declined.
| Month | Total final demand | Final demand less foods, energy, and trade | Final demand goods | Final demand services | Change in final demand from 12 months ago (unadj.) | Change in final demand less foods, energy, and trade from 12 mo. ago (unadj.) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Foods | Energy | Less foods and energy | Total | Trade | Transportation and warehousing | Other | |||||
2019
| ||||||||||||
Jan.
| -0.3 | 0.1 | -0.6 | -1.4 | -3.3 | 0.3 | -0.1 | -0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 | 2.6 |
Feb.
| 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 2.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.6 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 2.4 |
Mar.
| 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.3 | 4.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 0.2 | 2.0 | 2.2 |
Apr.
| 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 1.9 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
May
| 0.2 | 0.3 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
June
| -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.5 | 0.5 | -3.0 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 1.6 | 2.1 |
July
| 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 1.9 |
Aug.
| 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -1.4 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.9 | -0.2 | 0.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 |
Sept.
| -0.3 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 0.4 | -1.4 | -0.1 | -0.3 | -0.9 | -0.2 | 0.0 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
Oct.
| 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 1.5 |
Nov.
| -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | -0.3 | -0.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 |
Dec.
| 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | -0.3 | 1.5 | 0.2 | 0.0 | -0.3 | 2.5 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 1.5 |
2020
| ||||||||||||
Jan.
| 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 | -1.6 | 0.6 | 2.1 | 1.5 |
NOTE: Some of the percent changes shown here and elsewhere in this release may differ from those previously reported because seasonal adjustment factors have been recalculated to reflect developments during 2019. In addition, indexes for September 2019 have been recalculated to incorporate late reports and corrections by respondents. All indexes are subject to revision 4 months after original publication.
| ||||||||||||
Intermediate Demand by Commodity Type
Within intermediate demand in January, prices for processed goods declined 0.3 percent and the
index for unprocessed goods fell 0.6 percent, while prices for services were unchanged. (See tables B
and C.)
Processed goods for intermediate demand: The index for processed goods for intermediate
demand decreased 0.3 percent in January following three consecutive increases. Leading the decline,
prices for processed energy goods fell 2.1 percent. The index for processed foods and feeds edged
down 0.1 percent. In contrast, prices for processed materials less foods and energy advanced 0.3
percent. For the 12 months ended in January, the index for processed goods for intermediate demand
fell 1.0 percent.
Product detail: Leading the January decrease in prices for processed goods for intermediate demand,
the index for diesel fuel dropped 5.5 percent. Prices for electric power, gasoline, natural gas to
electric utilities, hot rolled steel sheet and strip, and beef and veal also moved lower. Conversely, the
index for basic organic chemicals climbed 2.2 percent. Prices for jet fuel and prepared animal feeds
also rose. (See table 5.)
Unprocessed goods for intermediate demand: The index for unprocessed goods for intermediate
demand moved down 0.6 percent in January following two consecutive increases. The decline can be
attributed to a 5.7-percent drop in the index for unprocessed energy materials. In contrast, prices for
unprocessed nonfood materials less energy rose 5.6 percent, and the index for unprocessed foodstuffs
and feedstuffs climbed 0.9 percent. For the 12 months ended in January, prices for unprocessed
goods for intermediate demand fell 3.2 percent.
Product detail: Leading the January decrease in the index for unprocessed goods for intermediate
demand, prices for natural gas dropped 14.3 percent. The indexes for crude petroleum, ungraded
chicken eggs, strawberries, slaughter hogs, and recyclable plastics also fell. Conversely, prices for
iron and steel rose 2.8 percent. The indexes for nonferrous metals and grains also advanced.
| Month | Processed goods for intermediate demand | Unprocessed goods for intermediate demand | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Foods and feeds | Energy goods | Less foods and energy | Total, change from 12 months ago (unadj.) | Total | Foodstuffs and feedstuffs | Energy materials | Nonfood materials less energy | Total, change from 12 months ago (unadj.) | |
2019
| ||||||||||
Jan.
| -0.8 | 0.2 | -4.8 | 0.0 | 1.2 | -4.9 | -0.2 | -10.4 | -2.0 | -3.1 |
Feb.
| 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.9 | -0.2 | 0.6 | -2.5 | -0.8 | -5.7 | -0.2 | -6.7 |
Mar.
| 0.6 | -0.3 | 3.5 | -0.1 | 1.2 | -0.1 | -2.0 | 0.7 | 1.6 | -3.8 |
Apr.
| 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.8 | -0.1 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 4.2 | 1.1 | -2.2 | -3.3 |
May
| -0.5 | -0.5 | -1.3 | -0.2 | -0.7 | -3.0 | -2.0 | -3.4 | -3.7 | -8.2 |
June
| -1.0 | -0.2 | -4.2 | -0.3 | -2.3 | -3.0 | -0.5 | -6.5 | -0.6 | -10.0 |
July
| 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.1 | -0.2 | -2.3 | 1.4 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 | -9.7 |
Aug.
| -0.5 | 0.3 | -1.4 | -0.3 | -3.0 | -1.6 | -0.5 | -3.1 | -0.6 | -7.7 |
Sept.
| -0.1 | 0.8 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -3.5 | 0.0 | -0.9 | 1.5 | -0.9 | -8.9 |
Oct.
| 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.5 | 0.1 | -3.7 | -0.8 | 3.7 | -4.9 | -1.5 | -12.3 |
Nov.
| 0.1 | 1.4 | 0.8 | -0.3 | -2.9 | 4.0 | -0.3 | 10.9 | 0.2 | -5.5 |
Dec.
| 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.8 | -0.2 | -1.7 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 0.4 | 3.1 | -7.3 |
2020
| ||||||||||
Jan.
| -0.3 | -0.1 | -2.1 | 0.3 | -1.0 | -0.6 | 0.9 | -5.7 | 5.6 | -3.2 |
NOTE: Some of the percent changes shown here and elsewhere in this release may differ from those previously reported because seasonal adjustment factors have been recalculated to reflect developments during 2019. In addition, indexes for September 2019 have been recalculated to incorporate late reports and corrections by respondents. All indexes are subject to revision 4 months after original publication.
| ||||||||||
Services for intermediate demand: The index for services for intermediate demand was unchanged
in January, after increasing 0.4 percent in December. In January, advances of 0.1 percent in prices for
services less trade, transportation, and warehousing for intermediate demand and 0.3 percent in
margins for trade services for intermediate demand offset a 0.9-percent decline in the index for
transportation and warehousing services for intermediate demand. For the 12 months ended in
January, the index for services for intermediate demand moved up 1.7 percent.
Product detail: In January, prices for portfolio management rose 2.3 percent. The indexes for
television advertising time sales; hardware, building materials, and supplies retailing; chemicals and
allied products wholesaling; and bundled wired telecommunications access services also increased.
In contrast, prices for airline passenger services moved down 5.8 percent. The indexes for business
loans (partial), staffing services, machinery and equipment parts and supplies wholesaling, and
arrangement of freight and cargo transportation also fell.
| Month | Services for intermediate demand | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Trade | Transportation and warehousing | Other | Total, change from 12 months ago (unadj.) | |
2019
| |||||
Jan.
| 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.8 |
Feb.
| 0.0 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 2.6 |
Mar.
| 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 2.7 |
Apr.
| 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 3.1 |
May
| 0.1 | -0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 2.8 |
June
| 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 2.6 |
July
| 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 2.3 |
Aug.
| 0.4 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 2.7 |
Sept.
| 0.2 | 1.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 2.5 |
Oct.
| -0.4 | -0.2 | -0.1 | -0.5 | 1.6 |
Nov.
| -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.1 | -0.1 | 1.4 |
Dec.
| 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.3 | 1.8 |
2020
| |||||
Jan.
| 0.0 | 0.3 | -0.9 | 0.1 | 1.7 |
NOTE: Some of the percent changes shown here and elsewhere in this release may differ from those previously reported because seasonal adjustment factors have been recalculated to reflect developments during 2019. In addition, indexes for September 2019 have been recalculated to incorporate late reports and corrections by respondents. All indexes are subject to revision 4 months after original publication.
| |||||
Intermediate Demand by Production Flow
Stage 4 intermediate demand: Prices for stage 4 intermediate demand decreased 0.1 percent in
January, the first decline since falling 0.2 percent in June 2019. In January, the index for total goods
inputs to stage 4 intermediate demand inched down 0.1 percent, while prices for total services inputs
were unchanged. (See table D.) Decreases in the indexes for diesel fuel, machinery and equipment
parts and supplies wholesaling, business loans (partial), staffing services, and electric power
outweighed advances in the indexes for portfolio management; chemicals and allied products
wholesaling; hardware, building materials, and supplies retailing; and paving mixtures and blocks.
(See table 6.) For the 12 months ended in January, prices for stage 4 intermediate demand rose 1.5
percent, the largest increase since moving up 1.6 percent in the 12 months ended August 2019.
Stage 3 intermediate demand: The index for stage 3 intermediate demand declined 0.1 percent in
January following a 0.6-percent rise in December. In January, prices for both total goods inputs and
total services inputs to stage 3 intermediate demand edged down 0.1 percent. Decreases in the
indexes for ungraded chicken eggs, machinery and equipment parts and supplies wholesaling,
arrangement of freight and cargo transportation, diesel fuel, and business loans (partial) outweighed
advances in prices for jet fuel, asphalt, basic organic chemicals, and bundled wired
telecommunications access services. For the 12 months ended in January, the index for stage 3
intermediate demand moved up 0.9 percent, the largest increase since rising 1.0 percent in the 12
months ended May 2019.
Stage 2 intermediate demand: Prices for stage 2 intermediate demand moved down 0.6 percent in
January after advancing 0.3 percent in December. In January, the index for total goods inputs to stage
2 intermediate demand dropped 1.5 percent, and prices for total services inputs fell 0.1 percent.
Declines in the indexes for gas fuels, staffing services, crude petroleum, airline passenger services,
arrangement of freight and cargo transportation, and advertising agency services outweighed rising
prices for portfolio management, cable network advertising time sales, and oilseeds. For the 12
months ended in January, the index for stage 2 intermediate demand decreased 1.8 percent.
Stage 1 intermediate demand: Prices for stage 1 intermediate demand rose 0.3 percent in January,
the third consecutive increase. In January, the index for total goods inputs to stage 1 intermediate
demand advanced 0.5 percent, and prices for total services inputs inched up 0.1 percent. Advances in
the indexes for iron and steel scrap, basic organic chemicals, nonferrous scrap, grains, chemicals and
allied products wholesaling, and guestroom rental outweighed decreases in prices for diesel fuel,
business loans (partial), and airline passenger services. For the 12 months ended in January, the index for stage 1 intermediate demand fell 0.8 percent.
| Month | Stage 4 intermediate demand | Stage 3 intermediate demand | Stage 2 intermediate demand | Stage 1 intermediate demand | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Goods inputs | Services inputs | Total | Goods inputs | Services inputs | Total | Goods inputs | Services inputs | Total | Goods inputs | Services inputs | |
2019
| ||||||||||||
Jan.
| -0.1 | -0.3 | 0.0 | -0.3 | -1.0 | 0.3 | -1.9 | -4.5 | 0.1 | -1.2 | -2.4 | 0.2 |
Feb.
| 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -2.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.2 |
Mar.
| 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | -0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0.3 |
Apr.
| 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.0 | -0.5 | 0.6 |
May
| -0.1 | -0.3 | 0.1 | -0.3 | -0.6 | 0.0 | -0.5 | -1.7 | 0.4 | -1.0 | -1.7 | 0.0 |
June
| -0.2 | -0.4 | 0.1 | -0.9 | -2.0 | 0.2 | -1.3 | -2.8 | -0.3 | -1.2 | -2.3 | -0.1 |
July
| 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | -0.1 | -0.2 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | -0.2 |
Aug.
| 0.1 | -0.4 | 0.6 | 0.1 | -0.4 | 0.5 | -0.5 | -1.4 | 0.3 | -0.4 | -1.0 | 0.7 |
Sept.
| 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.3 | -0.9 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 | -0.2 | -0.5 | 0.3 |
Oct.
| 0.0 | 0.3 | -0.3 | 0.3 | 1.1 | -0.2 | -0.9 | -1.3 | -0.4 | -0.1 | 0.2 | -0.6 |
Nov.
| 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 1.3 | 3.2 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | -0.4 |
Dec.
| 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.3 | -0.2 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.2 |
2020
| ||||||||||||
Jan.
| -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.6 | -1.5 | -0.1 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
NOTE: Some of the percent changes shown here and elsewhere in this release may differ from those previously reported because seasonal adjustment factors have been recalculated to reflect developments during 2019. In addition, indexes for September 2019 have been recalculated to incorporate late reports and corrections by respondents. All indexes are subject to revision 4 months after original publication.
| ||||||||||||
Recalculation of Seasonal Adjustment Factors
Effective with this release, seasonal adjustment factors have been recalculated to reflect price-
movement patterns during 2019 for the Final Demand-Intermediate Demand (FD-ID) system and
commodity-grouping indexes. This routine annual recalculation may affect previously published
seasonally adjusted indexes and percent changes for January 2015 through December 2019.
Revised seasonally adjusted data for this period, as well as seasonal adjustment factors for directly
adjusted commodity indexes to be used through December 2020, were released February 14, 2020.
To obtain this information, contact the Division of Industrial Prices and Price Indexes, Section of
Index Analysis and Public Information at ppi-info@bls.gov or (202) 691-7705, or visit the Producer
Price Index homepage at www.bls.gov/ppi.
Tables E and F below provide monthly seasonally adjusted percent changes for major FD-ID system
indexes in 2019, based on former and recalculated seasonal factors. These percent changes include
final price data through August 2019 and may differ from values shown in tables A through D of this
release, which include final price data through September 2019.
Table E. Over-the-month percent changes in major final demand indexes, seasonally adjusted, using
former and recalculated seasonal factors for 2019
Final Final demand Final demand Final demand less foods,
demand goods services energy, and trade services
Month Former Recalc. Former Recalc. Former Recalc. Former Recalc.
January -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1
February .2 .2 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .2
March .4 .4 1.0 .9 .1 .2 .1 .1
April .5 .4 .4 .3 .6 .5 .4 .4
May .2 .2 -.2 -.2 .3 .3 .3 .3
June -.3 -.2 -.5 -.5 .0 .0 -.1 -.1
July .2 .3 .3 .3 .2 .2 .1 .2
August .2 .1 -.3 -.3 .3 .3 .2 .1
September -.3 -.3 -.4 -.3 -.3 -.3 .0 .0
October .4 .3 .7 .6 .3 .3 .1 .1
November .0 -.1 .3 .3 -.3 -.3 .0 -.1
December .1 .2 .3 .3 .0 .0 .1 .2
Table F. Over-the-month percent changes in major intermediate demand indexes, seasonally adjusted,
using former and recalculated seasonal factors for 2019
Processed goods for Unprocessed goods for Services for
intermediate demand intermediate demand intermediate demand
Month Former Recalculated Former Recalculated Former Recalculated
January -0.9 -0.8 -4.6 -4.9 0.2 0.1
February .1 .2 -2.5 -2.5 .0 .0
March .6 .6 -.4 -.1 .5 .5
April .1 .1 1.7 1.6 .4 .4
May -.4 -.5 -3.1 -3.0 .1 .1
June -1.2 -1.0 -2.9 -3.0 .0 .0
July .1 .1 1.2 1.4 .1 .1
August -.5 -.5 -1.7 -1.6 .4 .4
September -.2 -.1 -1.6 -1.2 -.1 .0
October .4 .4 1.0 .4 -.2 -.2
November .2 .1 3.9 4.0 -.1 -.1
December .1 .1 1.8 1.6 .4 .4
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ppi.pdf
PANAMA
U.S. Department of State. 02/19/2020. Deputy Secretary Biegun’s Meeting with Panamanian Foreign Minister Ferrer
The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:
Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun met with Panamanian Foreign Minister Alejandro Ferrer today in Washington. Deputy Secretary Biegun and Foreign Minister Ferrer discussed the importance of the U.S.-Panamanian partnership and the need to continue countering irregular migration and combatting the flow of illegal narcotics. They also discussed transparent investment for economic growth, the upcoming election for the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, and the ongoing political crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua.
CHINA / MEDIA
U.S. Department of State. 02/18/2020. Senior State Department Officials On the Office of Foreign Mission’s Designation of Chinese Media Entities as Foreign Missions. Washington, D.C. Press Correspondents’ Room
MODERATOR: Okay, so we have two briefers here to talk about the Office of Foreign Missions designation of Chinese media entities as foreign missions. So we have and . They’ll be referred to as senior State Department officials from here on out. The briefing will be on background. They’ll both have some opening remarks, and then we’ll turn to your questions. Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So I’ll talk a little bit about why we’re doing what we’re doing, and then can talk about what that actually means.
So we are designating five Chinese state-run media organizations as foreign missions. That’s the Xinhua News Agency; China Global Television Network which falls under China Central Television, CCTV; China Radio International; China Daily Distribution Corporation; and Hai Tian Development USA, which is the distributor for the People’s Daily here in the United States.
Again, I’ll defer to on what this actually means in terms of what they’ll be required to do, but we are – we’re making this designation based on the very indisputable fact that all five of these are subject to the control of the Chinese Government. Obviously, the Chinese Communist Party has always had a pretty tight rein on media in general and state-run media in particular, but that has only further tightened since Xi Jinping took over. Since he became general secretary, China’s Communist Party has reorganized China’s state news agencies and asserted even more direct control over them, both in terms of content, editorial, et cetera, et cetera.
Xi Jinping’s got a number of quotes on this score that are – there’s many of them. One of them is that, “Managing China’s media messaging is crucial for the future and fate of the Chinese Communist Party and the state.” There are many others of a similar ilk that demonstrate exactly how much of a function of the state Xi Jinping considers the media to be.
In addition to the very clear state control of these media organizations, the PRC Government has also expanded its overseas media operations in recent years, including here in the United States. I can talk a little bit briefly about each one of these organizations and how we came to make the determination that it was foreign mission.
For Xinhua, this is an institution directly reporting to China’s State Council, which is the chief administrative authority of the PRC Government. China Global Television Network is part of the China Media Group, which is a media company run by the PRC Government. The same goes for China Radio International; that’s also part of the China Media Group. China Daily Distribution Corporation acts on behalf of the China Daily, which is an English-language daily newspaper owned by the Publicity Department of the CCP. And then fifth, Hai Tian Development USA acts on behalf of the People’s Daily, which is the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
And then just to reiterate, each one of these entities meets the definition of foreign mission under our Foreign Mission Act, which is to say they are either substantially owned or effectively controlled by a foreign government. And that’s why we have now determined that we will be treating them as foreign missions.
One thing I want to clarify – I’m sure you guys all know this very well, but it’s worth pointing out that some people conflate this with FARA, the Foreign Agents Registration Act. That’s a separate authority, a Department of Justice authority. It’s a separate regulatory or statutory regime administered by DOJ that requires agents of foreign principals, including foreign governments, that are engaged in certain activities to disclose their relationship with and conduct on behalf of the foreign principals. This is separate. That’s a DOJ authority. They are the ones that implement the Foreign Agent – the FARA. This is a totally separate authority. This is under the Foreign Missions Act. And again, a foreign mission is, as defined by that law, as an entity that is substantially owned or effectively controlled by a foreign government.
I think I’ll leave it at that and then ask to talk a little bit about what this designation will actually mean for those five entities.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Thank you. Again, as – we have designated them as foreign missions. That does not mean that they are embassies or consulates or have traditional diplomatic privileges or immunities. What we are doing is imposing two requirements on these entities.
The first is that they will – are required to notify the Office of Foreign Missions within the State Department of their current personnel in the United States, basic information about those individuals, and then as – if there’s any changes to those employment situations. So if anyone departs or new people come on, they would notify us, just like the standard requirement for an embassy or consulate.
The second is that they would need to notify us of their current real property holdings, whether they are owned or leased; and in connection with that, prior to acquiring, whether by purchase or lease any new real property, they would need to obtain prior approval from my office. Those are the only two requirements that are in place, and all of that was notified to each of these entities earlier today.
MODERATOR: Okay. Are we good?
QUESTION: You’re the Office of Foreign Missions?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct.
MODERATOR: So we’ll take questions.
QUESTION: Can I —
MODERATOR: I guess we’ll start with Matt.
QUESTION: Thank you. Actually, can I go second? Because I forgot what my question was. (Laughter.)
MODERATOR: Sure. Sure.
QUESTION: Could I —
MODERATOR: Shaun.
QUESTION: Sure. Could I ask you, first of all, what made you choose to do it now, and particularly to Chinese state media outlets? There are plenty of countries that have media outlets that are seen as offering propaganda for the regime. Why in particular do this with China as opposed to plenty of other countries? Why now? And do you think or fear that there’d be any repercussions for journalists from democratic countries who are working in mainland China now?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’ll take a swing at those questions.
The 2017 National Security Strategy, a big part of that is great power, competition in China, obviously, looms large from – in that lens. And obviously, I can’t speak about what came before, but certainly viewing China as a competitor and one that we are going to – we’re not seeking conflict by any stretch of the imagination, but we’re going to call it straight, we’re going to call it the way we see it. The fact of the matter is each and every single one of these entities does, in fact, work 100 percent for the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party.
This process took some time. Obviously, we considered it very carefully, but we think it’s altogether appropriate that we basically call these entities what they are, which are organs of the Chinese one-party state propaganda apparatus.
I will not speculate on whether, and if so how, Beijing might choose to respond. I’m not – we’re not in any way, shape, or form constraining any of the journalistic activities these entities engage in. We’re just saying we’re going to treat them as a foreign mission, and as said, require that they share a little bit of information about their employees and real estate holdings.
Of course, as you know, Western journalists already suffer very severe restrictions on their ability to do their jobs inside of the People’s Republic of China. So that’s obviously worth keeping in mind.
QUESTION: So when you talk about them notifying you of their personal – that would include, like, American citizen employees as well, correct?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct.
QUESTION: But for foreigners – for, like, Chinese nationals – don’t you guys already have access to that information? Don’t they need, like, J-1 visas? Wouldn’t you – don’t you already know who their foreign employees who – at least any employee who would need a visa to come here?
And then just secondly on that, you talk about five organizations, but do you have an idea now, before they’ve actually registered with you, how many offices or employees they actually have? Do you have a way to crosscheck to make sure that they’re telling the truth? Like, they might have a bureau in San Francisco or Seattle, or something like that, not just one in New York or Washington.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: So working those in reverse, so we are – we’ve (inaudible) sent letters and made contact with each of the five entities today. So we will begin that process of clarifying our current understanding against what they have to share with us. And so we certainly have some information, but this is – another aspect of this is it helps improve our understanding of how these entities do operate in the United States. And so we’ll see what information we have in hand.
QUESTION: And just employees on – don’t you already have access to the —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, the State Department is a big place, and certainly visas aren’t – certainly if somebody tracked all the visas and went down individually, yeah, they could probably put that together, but we aren’t currently centrally capturing that information, at least not in my office.
MODERATOR: (Inaudible).
QUESTION: There’s been a major emphasis by this administration on counterintelligence operations against China and Chinese espionage operations here in the United States. I’m wondering if this is in any way related to trying to identify Chinese espionage officers, intelligence officers, who may be working undercover at any of these entities. And will that information be passed on to counterintelligence officials here in the United States when they give you the identities and the names of their employees?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Look, I mean, this is a very clear justification, right. I mean, there is no dispute that all five of these entities are part of the PRC party state propaganda news apparatus. I mean, they take their orders directly from the top, and we’re merely recognizing that by placing them on our foreign missions list. Will there be more transparency when and after they share the information that ’s office will get from them? Absolutely, but I – I mean, I want to make it clear: We’re doing this because we actually view them as foreign missions and that’s what we do with foreign missions – we put them on the foreign missions list.
QUESTION: Sure, I understand that. But could this information also be valuable to U.S. counterintelligence officials who have been pressing efforts to uncover Chinese – what have been increased Chinese intelligence operations here in the United States?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’m going to pass on that one and go to the next question.
MODERATOR: Yeah, we’re not going to speculate on what the intelligence value might be here. Yeah, Nicole.
QUESTION: Yeah, , I just wanted to follow up on Shaun’s question. When he asked you why now, you cited the 2017 NSS. That was almost three years ago.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yep.
QUESTION: So again, why now? And secondly, it does mention China, but it also mentions Russia. And outlets like RT could arguably be described in exactly the same way, so why not Russia as well, or others?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’m not going to comment on the Russia one because I’m only the .
QUESTION: Okay. Who could speak to that?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I know we have designated media organizations from other countries as foreign missions before. Why we’re doing it right now – again, the process is not a super-fast one. We very carefully considered this before coming to this determination. But as I pointed out, yes, we all know these guys have been state-controlled for forever, but that control if anything has gotten more stronger over time and it’s far more aggressive – their activities outside of China, including here in the United States. And so based on that, we decided it was time to act.
QUESTION: Can speak to why just the one country? Why not —
MODERATOR: Do you have anything to add?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Not really.
QUESTION: Why not Russia?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I mean, I – at the moment, we haven’t announced any new restrictions for those types of (inaudible) or requirements.
QUESTION: Okay. It just seems like a weird – a mission, given Russian media and Russian social media.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: What I will say, not being a Russia expert, but I can tell you about these Chinese, and these guys are part and parcel. They’re on the org chart; they fall directly under the politburo propaganda jurisdiction. So without reference to – and the way it works in any other country, it is clearly the case with the People’s Republic of China that we’re dealing with organs of the party state.
MODERATOR: Okay. Lara.
QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about the discussions and the deliberations you all had about to the effect that there might be a chilling effect on journalists not just from the United States, but from other democracies or other countries that support a free press in China as a result of this?
And then also it’s a little ironic that this briefing is on background if we’re talking about press rights and protecting what a free press does that we don’t have an on-the-record quote from a government official defending and justifying this. So I would ask if there’s any part of this that we could put on the record.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’ll have to get back to you on the latter one —
QUESTION: Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: — but for now, we’re working under the ground rules. Can I —
QUESTION: Well, maybe you could give us – we could quote from the Federal Register Notice, if you can give that to us. I mean, that’s going to be —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Federal Register is – I mean, can’t you guys access that?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Public record?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: It’s a public —
QUESTION: Yeah, I just tried to find it and it’s not up there yet.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: It probably will not be on there until Thursday at the earliest, just for the publication schedule. That’s my – I think they do Tuesday, Thursdays – that —
QUESTION: Okay. Is this effective immediately?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: But to your first question, I mean, obviously, we’re painfully aware of the very tough operating environment that U.S. and other foreign journalists operate under in China. Again, we – this is not intended to put any sort of constraint on what the CGTN or the Xinhua people do here in the United States with regards to their journalistic operations. But obviously, it’s impossible for me to speculate on how Beijing is going to react. It’s already the case that freedom of the press is under severe siege in the People’s Republic of China, and that was long before this announcement came about in – earlier on this afternoon.
So I mean, we’re going to have to defer to our Chinese counterparts on what they’re going to do about freedom of the press in the PRC.
MODERATOR: Carol.
QUESTION: So are you saying there will be no restrictions on what they do journalistically? So they can travel if they want to cover the campaign, they can come here to the State Department as some of them have before to ask a question of Secretary Pompeo – they don’t need permission – do they need permission to sign a lease for an apartment?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: For office?
QUESTION: For office.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: This is not for the individuals; this is for these five offices, right?
QUESTION: For the five. So – but there are no journalistic restrictions on them?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: That is correct.
QUESTION: So what is the purpose of this?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, we’re going to be getting the information about their employees and their holdings, so there’s going to be some transparency. And now that they are on our office – now that they’re on the list of foreign missions, I think there is a – we are serving a certain purpose by making clear that these guys are part and parcel of the PRC Government. These are not independent journalistic outlets.
QUESTION: And at the moment, they are the only country in which there are news organizations on the foreign mission list?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t know that that’s the case.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: No, they’re not the only one.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I would not say —
QUESTION: What are the others?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Off the top of my head, so I know that one that we recently did several years ago was the Vietnam News Agency about five years ago.
MODERATOR: Okay. Nike.
QUESTION: Yeah. Could you talk about the repercussion if the five entity and their employees choose not to comply with the requirements? And secondly, do you happen to have a number of the Chinese nationals and U.S. citizens, employees? Thank you.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t think we have that information yet, but —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct. We do not currently have a list of employees, but we hope to have one soon. That’s one of the requirements. We don’t want to speculate about what are the enforcement actions. There are some provisions in the Foreign Missions Act that talk about property acquired without obtaining our permission generically. We could – the law says that that lease could be invalidated if that’s the case. But we’re not – we don’t expect them not to comply. These are really basic requirements and very minimal impact.
MODERATOR: Yeah, Jen.
QUESTION: You said you wouldn’t speculate on what Beijing will do, but have you thought about what will happen if Beijing does retaliate against any U.S. media outlets or any other media outlets operating in China. If they try to revoke licenses for example, what will the State Department response be?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Look, we have a very long track record of speaking up for freedom of the press in China and will continue to do that. If you – again, I don’t want to predict what they may or may not do, but I think it would be faulty logic to attribute that to this action. But like I said, and as clarified, we’re not doing anything to restrict the activities of these folks here in the United States. They’re going to continue to enjoy our free and open system. And let’s not forget that before today, there were already plenty of restrictions on foreign journalists operating in China, so I just want make sure that that point is highlighted and you keep that in mind.
MODERATOR: Nick.
QUESTION: Just to go back to Jonathan’s question but asking it more generically, what will be done with the list of employees, especially U.S. citizens? Who will they be sent to and how will you treat them? And then per the historical question, if you – just to make sure RT, Sputnik, other Russian media are not on this list right now. Do you have any idea if Russian or Soviet media in the past have been designated on this list?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: So certainly maybe all of the Soviet news entities at that time were designated. I know ITAR-TASS —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Pravda was on there.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Pravda.
QUESTION: They were all on this —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah.
QUESTION: — this same designated list?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: The same – same designation, the same law. There’s a number of them, some I wouldn’t even recognize today. And then you ended up —
QUESTION: Just generically, like —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We don’t have any Russia experts here, so I’m kind of – personally, I’m not comfortable talking about the Russia angle, just because that’s not my brief.
QUESTION: I know. I was just asking historically.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah.
QUESTION: Yeah. Okay.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: But what was the first part of your question?
QUESTION: The first question was just what are you going to do with the list? Where does it go, especially U.S. citizens’ data? What’s the use for it?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Oh, yeah.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: So I would refer you to I think it’s the SORN – I think that stands for System of Records Notice. It’s on the State Department website. It goes into great detail about how at least my office, Office of Foreign Missions, handles its – this type of data. And so that – it’s at least a page of description there, so I would refer you there.
QUESTION: Can you give us some highlights?
QUESTION: Some of that would be?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: It just says it’s certainly available within the – to the federal government. We are – this generic data, there had to be a reason for it. But it’s available upon request from state and local governments. Again, speaking – we have lots of data about just saying that the Chinese embassy or the British embassy – the same type of information. There are some requirements of when we would share that data. Sometimes if there’s a valid law enforcement reason, there’s a process for that. But it’s all detailed heavily on the website.
QUESTION: For personnel, does – what does that include? Age, address, visa number, Social Security number if they’re Americans? Or is it just name?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: It does not include Social Security number. That’s not something we’re capturing. It would – basic data, I think date of birth, residential address, I think what is their job title, something – not much more than that.
QUESTION: Oh, sorry, is it only staff, or is it also contractors?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I’d say – we don’t draw that distinction if they’re —
QUESTION: You don’t draw a distinction. So anyone who works for the embassy.
MODERATOR: Okay. One or two more.
QUESTION: So previously when the State Department asked diplomats here from China to let them know in advance about meetings, was that done also under the Foreign Missions Act or under another authority?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yes, it was.
QUESTION: It was. Okay. We just didn’t know that at the time.
QUESTION: But these don’t have to do that.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct. This group was explicitly exempted from that requirement that you mentioned.
QUESTION: Right. Okay. So basically this is like expanding that previous requirement that you made in October?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, no, because that requirement is not applicable to this group. That – so – the —
QUESTION: I mean you’re making more people disclose under this act.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: But that – the requirement that you’re referring to – the act is – does – is a broader authority. The action in October was limited – was for —
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Diplomatic personnel.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct. That’s about – or Chinese Government officials visiting the U.S., whether assigned here or TDY, that they would notify us of certain types of meetings or visits with certain types of institutions. This – that was – that action was taken against Chinese foreign missions, which now these five are, but in this action, we waived that October requirement for this group.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So they do not have to notify five days in advance of meetings with sub-national government officials?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Right, taking into account some of the press freedoms we didn’t – we’re not looking to interfere with that, so we didn’t want to have any challenge there.
QUESTION: Okay. I just – I didn’t – I think I didn’t really know the name of this act at the time when that came out and I’m just, like, putting it together.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Ah, got it.
QUESTION: And then just to triple-clarify, for the real estate disclosures, that has to be made by the actual entities, not the individual personnel, right? Like, if I work for Xinhua, I don’t have to tell you a house I bought?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Correct. This is about – anything that those entities – the entity themselves would seek to acquire.
QUESTION: Right, right, right.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Real property.
QUESTION: Okay. And then last, in terms of, like, compliance, I mean, with FARA, my understanding is that Xinhua never did register even though DOJ told them to, and even though it is, as you say, fairly basic disclosures. So I would like to know a little bit more about what type of enforcement you would look at if people don’t provide this information.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, they’re required to comply with this, and I think we’re not prepared to go beyond that.
QUESTION: I mean, would you be able to refer noncompliance to DOJ?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: That’s kind of a four-fer.
QUESTION: Huh?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: It’s kind of a four-fer here.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Right.
QUESTION: Sorry. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: No, I’ll back it up. I’d like to know too.
MODERATOR: So, last question. In the back.
QUESTION: You said there were no journalistic constraints on their activities. Do you have concerns about the content that they’re producing, though? Do you consider it – all of it to be propaganda or disinformation?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t know that I’d want to characterize every single thing that comes out of those five entities, but they are, in fact, part and parcel of the PRC propaganda apparatus. And I think it’s – anyone that consumes news or any other content that those guys produce should keep that in the back of their mind. I’m sure if they reported 1+1=2, I’d have to say that’s actually spot on, that’s pretty correct, but there’s a whole range of stuff beyond that.
QUESTION: And for this record, this has nothing to do with coronavirus, does it?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: No.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Not at all.
QUESTION: That’s purely coincidental?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes.
QUESTION: Just a technical thing. Does this change visa status?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Does not, (inaudible) the answer.
MODERATOR: Okay. And that’s it.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: There we go.
MODERATOR: Thank you.
U.S. Department of State. 02/19/2020. Chinese Action Against Journalists. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State
The United States condemns China’s expulsion of three Wall Street Journal foreign correspondents. Mature, responsible countries understand that a free press reports facts and expresses opinions. The correct response is to present counter arguments, not restrict speech. The United States hopes that the Chinese people will enjoy the same access to accurate information and freedom of speech that Americans enjoy.
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ORGANISMS
GLOBAL ECONOMY
IMF. FEBRUARY 19, 2020. Finding Solid Footing for the Global Economy
By Kristalina Georgieva
As the Group of Twenty industrialized and emerging market economies (G-20) finance ministers and central bank governors gather in Riyadh this week, they face an uncertain economic landscape.
After disappointing growth in 2019, we began to see signs of stabilization and risk reduction, including the Phase 1 U.S.-China trade deal. In January, the IMF projected growth to strengthen from 2.9 percent in 2019 to 3.3 percent in 2020 and 3.4 percent in 2021. This projected uptick in growth is dependent on improved performance in some emerging market and developing economies.
Monetary and fiscal policy have been doing their part. In fact, monetary easing added approximately 0.5 percentage points to global growth last year. Forty-nine central banks cut rates 71 times as part of the most synchronized monetary action since the global financial crisis.
But the global economy is far from solid ground. While some uncertainties have receded, new ones have emerged. The truth is that uncertainty is becoming the new normal.
Working together, we can take the necessary steps to reduce uncertainty and put the global economy on more solid footing.
The coronavirus is our most pressing uncertainty: a global health emergency we did not anticipate in January. It is a stark reminder of how a fragile recovery could be threatened by unforeseen events. There are a number of scenarios, depending on how quickly the spread of the virus is contained. If the disruptions from the virus end quickly, we expect the Chinese economy to bounce back soon. The result would be a sharp drop in GDP growth in China in the first quarter of 2020, but only a small reduction for the entire year. Spillovers to other countries would remain relatively minor and short-lived, mostly through temporary supply chain disruptions, tourism, and travel restrictions.
However, a long-lasting and more severe outbreak would result in a sharper and more protracted growth slowdown in China. Its global impact would be amplified through more substantial supply chain disruptions and a more persistent drop in investor confidence, especially if the epidemic spreads beyond China.
Even in the best-case scenarios, however, the projected rate of global growth is still modest in too many parts of the world.
And over the medium term, growth is expected to remain below historical averages.
In this context, while some uncertainties—like disease—are out of our control, we should not create new uncertainties where we can avoid it.
I believe there are three areas where the finance ministers and central bank governors can make progress in providing more certainty about future actions during the G-20 meetings in Saudi Arabia: Trade, Climate, and Inequality.
Building a Better Global Trading System
The Phase 1 trade deal between the United States and China eliminated some of the immediate negative consequences for global growth.
We estimate the deal will reduce the drag from trade tensions on the level of GDP in 2020 by 0.2 percent—about one quarter of the total impact.
Why not a larger reduction ? The deal only addresses a small share of the recently imposed tariffs and specifies minimum increases in China’s imports from the United States. These types of bilateral managed trade arrangements have the potential to distort trade and investment while harming global growth. In fact, our estimates suggest that the managed trade provisions cost the global economy close to $100 billion dollars.
There are also broader concerns. The agreement leaves many of the underlying issues between China and the United States unaddressed. Further, the world needs a modern global trading system that can unleash the full potential of services and e-commerce while protecting intellectual property rights.
And tackling trade is only a start. The global economy will continue to encounter major shocks if we fail to address another urgent global challenge: climate change.
Tackling our Climate Crisis
The human toll of climate change confronts us every day. Think of the recent Australian wildfires. The economic costs confront us too. Just one example: the damages from Hurricane Maria amounted to over 200 percent of Dominica’s GDP and over 60 percent of Puerto Rico’s GDP.
IMF staff estimates, released today, show that a typical climate-related natural disaster reduces growth by an average of 0.4 percentage points in the affected country in the year of the event.
Moreover, these types of events are becoming more frequent, particularly in the poorest countries and those least able to cope with the impact.
What steps can policymakers take? Mitigation and adaptation.
A recent IMF staff study shows that global oil demand is expected to peak in the coming decades. That is why the Gulf Cooperation Council, and all members of the G-20, are right to put a renewed focus on finding the path forward on diversification.
Investments in clean energy and resilient infrastructure can yield what I call a triple dividend: averting future losses, delivering innovation gains, and creating new opportunities for those most in need.
Additional revenues generated from carbon taxes, for example, could be used to cut taxes elsewhere and fund assistance to affected households, or finance spending that can help close some of the gaps in our societies. For countries and communities at highest risk of climate disasters investing in adaptation is both urgent and cost-effective. Analysis by the Global Commission on Adaptation suggests the benefits of such investments could far outweigh their cost.
This brings me to my third and final area of focus for the G-20: reducing inequality.
Reducing Inequality
Across much of the OECD and the G-20 countries, income and wealth inequalities remain persistently high. There is a significant opportunity gap when it comes to gender, age, and geography. We know these gaps quickly can become chasms that fuel uncertainty about the future, distrust in government, and ultimately contribute to social unrest. This week, the ministers can put a renewed focus on raising living standards and creating better paying jobs.
In support of the G-20, the IMF, in collaboration with the World Bank, is identifying key areas where access to opportunities can be increased. In particular, investing in high-quality education, R&D, and digitalization. The timing is right. The current low interest rate environment means that some policymakers may have additional money to spend. Of course, that advice will not work everywhere. Public debt is near record levels in many places. So in countries with a high debt-to-GDP ratio, fiscal restraint continues to be warranted.
However, reducing deficits—when needed—should always be done in a way that protects essential social spending. This is how countries can increase access to opportunities for all and build a stronger foundation within their own economies.
Conclusion
In the 14th century, the Arab thinker and historian Ibn Khaldun wrote about the concept of strength in solidarity and the power of joint purpose. He described the bond between people that can form a community. As G-20 ministers and governors meet this week in Saudi Arabia, I hope they consider the wisdom of Ibn Khaldun. Working together, we can take the necessary steps to reduce uncertainty and put the global economy on more solid footing.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://blogs.imf.org/2020/02/19/finding-solid-footing-for-the-global-economy/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
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ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS
PIB
FGV. 18/02/2020. Bate-Papo. Os últimos 10 anos do Produto Interno Bruto
"A última década do PIB no Brasil foi uma década perdida, como aconteceu nos anos 1980. Foi até pior, pois naquela época era fácil entender a crise dramática”. Com essa declaração, o entrevistado Armando Castelar, pesquisador do FGV IBRE, faz uma breve análise dos últimos 10 anos do PIB no Brasil. A grande crise de 2014 a 2016 foi considerada a pior recessão da história. A boa notícia é que estamos na retomada do crescimento entre 2020 e 2021, com o crédito alavancando o consumo.
VÍDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1BH-WG-sXs&feature=youtu.be
INDÚSTRIA
CNI. 19/02/2020. Confiança do empresário cai 0,5 ponto neste mês. Apesar da queda em relação a janeiro, o ICEI está 10 pontos acima da média histórica. Pesquisa mensal, da CNI, foi feita com 2.393 indústrias de todo o país
Depois de três altas consecutivas, o Índice de Confiança do Empresário Industrial (ICEI) caiu 0,5 ponto percentual em relação a janeiro e ficou em 64,8 pontos em fevereiro. Mesmo assim, o indicador está 10 pontos acima da média histórica e é 0,3 ponto maior do que o registrado em fevereiro de 2019, informa a pesquisa divulgada nesta quarta-feira (19), pela Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI). Os indicadores variam de zero a cem pontos. Quando estão acima de 50 pontos mostram que os empresários estão confiantes.
“A confiança permanece elevada. Isso significa que os empresários continuam dispostos a aumentar a produção, as contratações e os investimentos”, observa o economista da CNI Marcelo Azevedo.
A queda na confiança é resultado da redução da percepção sobre as condições atuais e das estimativas para os próximos seis meses sobre as condições da economia e das empresas.
O índice geral de condições atuais das empresas e da economia diminuiu 0,6 ponto frente a janeiro e ficou em 58,4 pontos neste mês. O índice de expectativas para os próximos seis meses recuou 0,5 ponto e ficou em 67,9 pontos. Azevedo destaca que a queda na confiança se deve mais à mudança da percepção dos empresários com relação às condições atuais e futuras da economia brasileira do que sobre as próprias empresas.
“Enquanto os índices relacionados à empresa, seja relativo à avaliação das condições atuais seja às expectativas, recuaram menos de meio ponto entre janeiro e fevereiro, os índices relacionados à economia brasileira registraram quedas de mais de um ponto. Cabe ressaltar, no entanto, que todos os indicadores continuam acima da linha divisória dos 50 pontos, o que mostra percepção de melhora nas condições atuais e nas expectativas, das empresas e da economia”, afirma o economista.
Confiança aumentou nas pequenas empresas e diminuiu nas grandes
De acordo com a pesquisa, a confiança aumentou levemente nas pequenas empresas e diminuiu nas médias e nas grandes. Em fevereiro frente a janeiro, o ICEI caiu 0,5 ponto nas indústrias de médio porte. Nas grandes, a queda foi de 0,9 ponto. Nas pequenas, o aumento foi de 0,2 ponto na comparação mensal. Mesmo com a queda mais acentuada, a confiança ainda é maior nas grandes empresas, segmento em que o ICEI foi de 65,5 pontos neste mês, acima da média nacional.
Além disso, a pesquisa mostra que a confiança aumentou 0,9 ponto e passou para 65,5 pontos entre os empresários da região Centro-Oeste. Nas demais regiões, o indicador recuou. No Sudeste, a queda foi de 0,9 ponto e o ICEI ficou em 63,7 pontos em fevereiro. No Nordeste, a retração foi de 0,7 ponto e o indicador caiu para 63,8 pontos.
Esta edição do ICEI foi feita entre 3 e 12 de fevereiro com 2.393 empresas. Dessas, 931 são pequenas, 875 são médias e 587 são de grande porte.
DOCUMENTO: https://noticias.portaldaindustria.com.br/noticias/economia/confianca-do-empresario-cai-05-ponto-neste-mes/
PPI / PRIVATIZAÇÕES
MEconomia. REUTERS. 19 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2020. Com o PPI no Ministério da Economia, governo desiste de fast track para privatização de estatais
Por Marcela Ayres
BRASÍLIA (Reuters) - O governo Jair Bolsonaro não enviará mais ao Congresso projeto para criar um “fast track” para privatização de estatais, afirmou nesta quarta-feira o secretário especial de Desestatização, Desinvestimento e Mercados, Salim Mattar, justificando que isso não é mais necessário após a ida do Programa de Parcerias de Investimentos (PPI) para o Ministério da Economia.
“Nós agora estamos lado a lado sob a mesma batuta do ministro (Paulo) Guedes. Então é desnecessário queimar capital político no Congresso com o fast track”, disse.
Segundo Mattar, um decreto será publicado pelo governo para estruturar um processo pelo qual as estatais dependentes financeiramente da União sejam avaliadas a cada dois anos e as independentes, a cada quatro anos, para que todo portfólio de empresas públicas seja constantemente revisto e discutido.
A secretária Especial do PPI, Martha Seillier, afirmou que o arcabouço legislativo existente já prevê que várias empresas possam ser desestatizadas por um rito no Poder Executivo.
As exceções, reforçou ela, também estão especificadas em lei, envolvendo por exemplo Petrobras, Banco do Brasil e Caixa Econômica Federal, que demandariam um aval específico dos parlamentares para serem vendidas.
Seillier disse que a ideia é que os ministros setoriais responsáveis por cada uma das estatais levem ao conselho do PPI a lista de suas empresas, especificando quais são dependentes do Tesouro e quais não são e justificando quais são estratégicas e de fato não podem ser vendidas.
“Se isso não for bem demonstrado, bem justificado, o caminho natural é que a gente diminua o peso do tamanho do Estado brasileiro sobre a nossa economia e a gente comece já a estruturar (as operações)”, disse ela.
A saída do PPI da Casa Civil para o Ministério da Economia anunciada no fim de janeiro foi ao encontro de estrutura pensada por Guedes para a equipe econômica ainda na campanha presidencial de 2018.
O maior gargalo para a venda de estatais, contudo, não está na secretaria do programa, mas na indisposição dos ministérios responsáveis pelas empresas em tocarem o processo adiante.
A própria lei que criou o PPI no governo do ex-presidente Michel Temer, em 2016, estabelece que cabe aos ministérios setoriais a tarefa de propor a inclusão das empresas no PPI e no Programa Nacional de Desestatização (PND).
Diante da forte resistência do ministro da Ciência e Tecnologia (MCTIC), Marcos Pontes, em privatizar os Correios, chegou-se à solução de colocar essa possível venda “em estudo” no PPI.
Nesta quarta-feira, inclusive, a equipe econômica apresentou um cronograma de desestatizações que não previu a privatização dos Correios em dezembro de 2021 e da EBC em janeiro de 2022, destoando de documento exibido por Mattar em evento público recente, que incluía as duas empresas.
Questionado sobre a diferença, Mattar afirmou que a expectativa é que, com os estudos que estão ocorrendo no âmbito do PPI, as companhias possam ir “oportunamente” para o PND.
Ele ponderou, por outro lado, que dependendo das conclusões apresentadas pelos estudos, o governo até pode chegar à conclusão de que a empresa não será vendida, mas extinta. O secretário, em seguida, reforçou que esta seria uma hipótese.
Nesta manhã, o governo incluiu no PND a Ceitec, de microeletrônica, após ela ter sido qualificada no âmbito do PPI para estudos para desestatização em outubro do ano passado.
“No caso dos Correios, há um pensamento de que ele possa acontecer (ser privatizado) efetivamente não em 2020, mas pela complexidade, pelo tamanho da empresa, e toda necessidade de passar pelo Congresso, somente em 2021”, disse Mattar.
Sobre a capitalização da Eletrobras, que tirará a União do controle da elétrica, ele afirmou que está “tudo correndo” para que a operação possa ocorrer neste ano e que esta é a prioridade número um de sua secretaria.
Mattar afirmou que a modelagem da operação está sendo elaborada e deve ser finalizada em até duas semanas. Mattar avaliou ainda que a privatização da Eletrobras conta com o apoio do presidente da Câmara, Rodrigo Maia (DEM-RJ), e que o esforço agora é de convencimento do Senado.
MEconomia. 19/02/2020. PPI. REUNIÃO DO CONSELHO. Programa de Parcerias de Investimentos qualificará 22 novas iniciativas. Governo promove primeira reunião do Conselho do PPI após transferência do programa para o Ministério da Economia
A 12ª Reunião do Conselho do Programa de Parcerias de Investimentos (CPPI), a acontecer na manhã desta quarta-feira (19/2), qualificará 22 novas iniciativas no portfólio do programa. Presidida pelo Ministro da Economia, Paulo Guedes, a reunião contará com a presença do presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, e da Secretária Especial do PPI, Martha Seillier. Esta é a primeira reunião do Conselho após a transferência do programa para o Ministério da Economia.
Projetos e políticas qualificados pelo CPPI passam a compor a carteira do programa e tornam-se, a partir de então, prioridade nacional. Dentre as 22 iniciativas está a política de atração de investimentos privados para o setor de turismo, bem como a concessão de terminais pesqueiros; arrendamentos de terminais portuários; concessão de parques nacionais e concessão de florestas.
Também são membros do CPPI o ministro-chefe da Casa Civil, Walter Braga Netto; o ministro da Infraestrutura, Tarcísio Freitas; o ministro da Secretaria de Governo, Luiz Eduardo Ramos; o ministro de Minas e Energia, Bento Albuquerque; o ministro do Meio Ambiente, Ricardo Salles; o ministro do Desenvolvimento Regional, Rogério Marinho, e os presidentes da Caixa Econômica Federal, Pedro Guimarães, do BNDES, Gustavo Montezano, e o do Banco do Brasil (BB), Rubem Novaes.
PPI em números
O PPI apresentou resultados relevantes para o desenvolvimento de parcerias no Brasil desde a sua criação, em 2016. Dos 287 projetos qualificados nas 11 reuniões anteriores do CPPI, 172 já foram leiloados ou concluídos e vão gerar cerca de R$ 700 bilhões de investimentos nos próximos anos, sem contar o valor das outorgas de cerca de R$ 137 bilhões para a União.
FLUXO CAMBIAL
BACEN. REUTERS. 19 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2020. Fluxo cambial fica negativo em US$1,82 bi entre 10 e 14 de fevereiro--BC
SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O Brasil voltou a perder dólares na semana passada, com o fluxo cambial ficando negativo em 1,820 bilhão de dólares, puxado pela conta financeira numa semana em que a escalada da moeda a sucessivos recordes forçou o Banco Central a intervir no mercado depois de um ano e meio.
As operações financeiras —que incluem empréstimos externos, remessas de lucros e dividendos e recursos para portfólio, entre outros— tiveram saldo negativo de 1,442 bilhão de dólares na semana entre 10 e 14 de fevereiro, segundo dados do BC divulgados nesta quarta-feira.
O fluxo cambial comercial —câmbio contratado para exportação menos importação— teve déficit de 378 milhões de dólares.
Com o mau desempenho da semana passada, o superávit de fevereiro caiu de 3,698 bilhões de dólares para 1,878 bilhão de dólares. Um ano antes, o resultado era positivo em 6,697 bilhões de dólares.
No acumulado de 2020, o fluxo cambial mostra sobra de 1,494 bilhão de dólares, ainda assim resultado bem abaixo do de um ano antes (+6,752 bilhões de dólares).
Nesta quarta, o dólar à vista BRBY subia 0,35%, a 4,3733 reais na venda, a caminho de novo recorde histórico nominal para um fechamento.
Por José de Castro
AVIAÇÃO
EMBRAER. 19/02/2020. Phenom 300 da Embraer é o jato executivo leve mais entregue do mundo pelo oitavo ano consecutivo
Melbourne, EUA, 19 de fevereiro de 2020 – A Embraer Aviação Executiva entregou 51 jatos Phenom 300 e Phenom 300E em 2019, tornando-o o jato leve com mais entregas no período. Esse é o oitavo ano consecutivo em que o Phenom 300 alcança esta marca, tendo acumulado mais de 530 entregas desde dezembro de 2009. Os dados constam no relatório da GAMA (General Aviation Manufacturers Association), entidade americana que representa o setor.
“O marco histórico de entregas revelado hoje reforça o sucesso desta fenomenal aeronave, que recentemente recebeu novos avanços de desempenho, conforto e tecnologia”, disse Michael Amalfitano, Presidente e CEO da Embraer Aviação Executiva. “Embora já seja o jato leve mais entregue no mundo, iniciamos o novo decênio tornando o Phenom 300E ainda melhor para atingir nosso objetivo principal que é oferecer a melhor experiência em aviação executiva aos clientes.”
Originalmente lançado em 2005, o Phenom 300 tem liderado o segmento de jatos leves desde o início da década de 2010. Em 2019, teve cerca de 20% a mais de entregas do que o concorrente próximo. O jato está em operação em mais de 30 países e sua frota já acumula mais de um milhão de horas de voo.
Em janeiro deste ano, a Embraer anunciou novos avanços de desempenho, conforto e tecnologia para o Phenom 300E, que estará disponível para o mercado a partir de maio de 2020. A aeronave agora oferece mais velocidade, tornando o jato executivo single-pilot mais veloz e com maior alcance do mundo ainda melhor e capaz de atingir Mach 0.80.
Com os avanços, o Phenom 300E passa a oferecer velocidade máxima de cruzeiro de 464 nós (859 km/h) e um alcance de 2.010 milhas náuticas (3.724 km) com cinco ocupantes nas condições NBAA IFR. A aeronave também terá uma cabine ainda mais silenciosa, mais espaço para as pernas no cockpit, além de uma nova opção de design interno premium, conhecida como Bossa Nova.
Em termos de tecnologia, o Phenom 300E está recebendo uma atualização aviônica que incluirá um sistema de alerta e prevenção de saídas de pista (ROAAS), sendo a Embraer a primeira fabricante na Aviação Executiva a desenvolver, certificar e patentear uma tecnologia do tipo, além de proteção contra o fenômeno tesoura de vento (windshear), modo de descida de emergência, PERF, TOLD, FAA, Datacom e muitos outros sistemas. Para completar as melhorias, o Phenom 300E será a única aeronave em sua categoria a oferecer conectividade 4G via Gogo AVANCE L5.
Phenom 300E
O Phenom 300E está entre os melhores jatos single-pilot, com velocidade máxima de cruzeiro de 464 nós (859 km/h) e um alcance de 3.724 quilômetros (2,010 milhas náuticas) nas condições NBAA IFR. Com a melhor performance de subida e desempenho de pista da sua classe, o Phenom 300E tem custos de operação e de manutenção menor do que seus concorrentes. A aeronave voa a uma altitude de 45 mil pés (13.716 metros), propulsionada por dois motores Pratt & Whitney Canada PW535E1, com 3.478 libras de empuxo cada.
O Phenom 300E oferece uma cabine espaçosa com o DNA de design da Embraer e um dos maiores bagageiros de sua categoria. As maiores janelas de sua classe proporcionam luz natural abundante na cabine e no toalete. O conforto dos assentos, com capacidade de reclínio e amplo movimento é acentuado pela melhor pressurização de cabine entre os jatos leves (altitude máxima de 6.600 pés). O Phenom 300E oferece zonas de temperatura distintas para pilotos e passageiros, uma ampla galley, opções de comunicação de voz e de dados e um sistema de entretenimento.
A cabine de comando permite operação single-pilot e oferece a opção avançada Prodigy Touch Flight Deck. Os recursos que a aeronave inclui, e que são tipicamente encontrados em categorias superiores, são ponto único de reabastecimento, manutenção externa do toalete e uma elegante escada.
Embraer Aviação Executiva
A Embraer é uma das maiores fabricantes de jatos executivos do mundo, tendo entrado neste segmento de mercado a partir de 2000, com o lançamento do jato Legacy. A Embraer Aviação Executiva foi constituída em 2005. Seu portfólio, entre os mais amplos da indústria, é formado pelos jatos entry-level Phenom 100EV, o jato leve Phenom 300E, os jatos médios Legacy 450 e Legacy 500, o médio Praetor 500 e o supermédio Praetor 600, o grande Legacy 650E e ultra-large Lineage 1000E. A frota da Embraer Aviação Executiva excede a marca de 1.300 jatos, que estão em operação em mais de 70 países. Os clientes são atendidos por uma rede global de 70 centros de serviços, entre próprios e autorizados, complementados por um Contact Center 24/7.
DOCUMENTO: executive.embraer.com.
EMBRAER. 19/02/2020. Embraer entrega um total de 198 jatos em 2019
São José dos Campos - SP, 19 de fevereiro de 2020 – A Embraer (NYSE; ERJ; B3;
BOVESPA; EMBR3) entregou um total de 198 jatos em 2019, sendo 89 comerciais e 109
executivos (62 leves e 47 grandes), o que representa um aumento de 9% em relação às entregas
de 2018, quando a Empresa entregou um total de 181 jatos.
DOCUMENTO: https://daflwcl3bnxyt.cloudfront.net/m/498fb1a4aeb4a94c/original/005-Entregas-Backlog-4T19-Ins-VRF-POR-19.pdf
ENERGIA
ANP. 19 de Fevereiro de 2020. Produção de petróleo e gás no Brasil ultrapassa 4 milhões de boe/d pela primeira vez
Em janeiro de 2020, pela primeira vez, a produção de petróleo e gás natural no Brasil ultrapassou 4 milhões de barris de óleo equivalente por dia (boe/d), totalizando 4,041 milhões de boe/d. O mês registrou recorde de produção tanto de petróleo – 3,168 milhões de barris por dia (bbl/d) – quanto de gás natural – 138,753 milhões de metros cúbicos por dia (m³/d).
A produção de petróleo representou um aumento de 1,99% com relação a dezembro de 2019 e de 20,43% com relação a janeiro do ano passado. Já a de gás natural foi 0,71% maior que no mês anterior e 22,58% maior do que no mesmo mês de 2019.
A produção no Pré-sal foi de 2,682 milhões de boe/d, representando 66,37% de toda a produção nacional. Nessa região, foram produzidos 2,150 milhões de bbl/d de petróleo e 84,572 milhões de m³/d de gás.
O maior produtor em janeiro foi o campo de Lula, com 1,052 milhão de bbl/d de petróleo e 44,096 milhões de m³/d de gás.
Painel Dinâmico de Produção de Petróleo e Gás Natural da ANP: http://www.anp.gov.br/noticias/5628-producao-de-petroleo-e-gas-no-brasil-ultrapassa-4-milhoes-de-boe-d-pela-primeira-vez.
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LGCJ.:
