US ECONOMICS

VENEZUELA

U.S. Department of State. May 9, 2019. Detainment of Edgar Zambrano. Statement. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

Washington, DC - The arbitrary arrest yesterday evening of Edgar Zambrano, First Vice President of Venezuela’s National Assembly, is an unacceptable and illegal act that is yet another reflection of the repression of the former Maduro regime. This is an attack on the independence of the nation’s democratically elected legislative branch and is part of the Maduro regime’s continued attempts to crush dissent and free debate in Venezuela.

This assault on the National Assembly should serve as a clarion call to the region and the world that the dictatorship is not interested in constitutional solutions to the Venezuelan people’s problems.

Zambrano must be released immediately.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. 05/10/2019. Treasury Identifies the Venezuelan Defense and Security Sector as Subject to Sanctions and Further Targets Venezuelan Oil Moving to Cuba

Washington – Today, Secretary of the Treasury Steven T. Mnuchin, in consultation with Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, and pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended, determined that persons operating in the defense and security sector of the Venezuelan economy may be subject to sanctions.  In addition, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two companies that operate in the oil sector of the Venezuelan economy, pursuant to E.O. 13850, as amended.  OFAC has also identified two vessels, which transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba, as blocked property owned by the two companies.

“Treasury’s action today puts Venezuela’s military and intelligence services, as well as those who support them, on notice that their continued backing of the illegitimate Maduro regime will be met with serious consequences,” said Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The U.S. will take further action if Cuba continues to receive Venezuelan oil in exchange for military support. As we have repeatedly said, the path to sanctions relief for those who have been sanctioned is to take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order.”

Today’s designations, which are a direct response to SEBIN’s illegal arrest of National Assembly members, is intended to target those actors who have had a hand in the repressive Maduro defense and intelligence sector. This includes Venezuela’s oil sector, which continues to be critical to the survival of the illegitimate regime of former President Maduro:

• Monsoon Navigation Corporation is based in Majuro, Marshall Islands, and is the registered owner of the vessel, Ocean Elegance.

• Ocean Elegance is a crude oil tanker (IMO: 9038749) that delivered crude oil from Venezuela to Cuba from late 2018 through March 2019.

• Serenity Maritime Limited is based in Monrovia, Liberia, and is the registered owner of the vessel, Leon Dias.

• Leon Dias is a chemical and oil tanker (IMO: 9396385) that delivered crude oil from Venezuela to Cuba from late 2018 through March 2019.

For information about the methods that Venezuelan senior political figures, their associates, and front persons use to move and hide corrupt proceeds, including how they try to exploit the U.S. financial system and real estate market, please refer to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) advisories FIN-2019-A002, “Updated Advisory on Widespread Public Corruption in Venezuela,” FIN-2017-A006, “Advisory to Financial Institutions and Real Estate Firms and Professionals” and FIN-2018-A003, “Advisory on Human Rights Abuses Enabled by Corrupt Senior Foreign Political Figures and their Financial Facilitators.”

As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of these entities, and of any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by the designated entities, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.

U.S. sanctions need not be permanent; sanctions are intended to bring about a positive change of behavior.  For example, on May 7, 2019, OFAC removed sanctions imposed on former high-ranking Venezuelan intelligence official Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera after his public break with Maduro.  The United States continues to make clear that the removal of sanctions is available for persons designated under E.O. 13692 or E.O. 13850, both as amended, who take concrete and meaningful actions to restore democratic order, refuse to take part in human rights abuses, speak out against abuses committed by the illegitimate Maduro regime, or combat corruption in Venezuela.

Venezuela-related Designations. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL. Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

JENNIFER NAVIGATION LIMITED (a.k.a. JENNIFER NAVIGATION LTD.), 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia; Identification Number IMO 4098018 [VENEZUELA-EO13850].

LARGE RANGE LIMITED, 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia; Identification Number IMO 6002286 [VENEZUELA-EO13850].

LIMA SHIPPING CORPORATION (a.k.a. LIMA SHIPPING CORP), 80 Broad Street, Monrovia, Liberia; Identification Number IMO 4063640 [VENEZUELA-EO13850].

PB TANKERS S.P.A. (a.k.a. PB TANKERS SPA), Via Principe di Belmonte 55, Palermo PA 90139, Italy; Via Jacopo Peri 1, Rome RM 00198, Italy; Website www.pbtankers.com; Email Address info@pbtankers.com; Identification Number IMO 5161787 [VENEZUELA-EO13850].

The following vessels have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

ALBA MARINA Floating Storage Tanker Italy flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9151838 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

GOLD POINT Chemical/Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9506693 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

ICE POINT Chemical/Oil Tanker Italy flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9379337 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

INDIAN POINT Chemical/Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9379325 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

IRON POINT Chemical/Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9388209 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

NEDAS Crude Oil Tanker Greece flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9289166 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: JENNIFER NAVIGATION LIMITED).

NEW HELLAS Crude Oil Tanker Greece flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9221891 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: LIMA SHIPPING CORPORATION).

SILVER POINT Chemical/Oil Tanker Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9510462 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: PB TANKERS S.P.A.).

S-TROTTER Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9216547 (vessel) [VENEZUELA-EO13850] (Linked To: LARGE RANGE LIMITED).

U.S. Department of State. May 10, 2019. The United States Sanctions Venezuela's Defense and Security Sector

Washington, DC - Today, the United States took action against the former Maduro regime for increasing its intimidation of those supporting democracy in Venezuela, including members of the democratically elected National Assembly. Pursuant to E.O. 13850, the United States determined persons operating in the defense and security sector of the Venezuelan economy may be subject to sanctions.

In addition, we have designated two companies, Monsoon Navigation Corporation and Serenity Maritime Limited, that operate in the oil sector. We have also identified two vessels that transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba as blocked property.

The Venezuelan people continue to suffer at the hands of this despotic regime, aided in no small part by Cuba and Russia. Cuban forces provide intelligence and physical security to help oppress the Venezuelan people. Russian military personnel and companies operate in the defense and security sector. The Maduro regime’s latest cowardly gambit – the arbitrary detention of National Assembly First Vice President Edgar Zambrano – is illegal and inexcusable.

We call on all actors within the defense and security sector to protect and defend the rights of all Venezuelans.

Today’s determination allows the United States to take action against the malign actors that are impeding the will of the courageous Venezuelan people, who demand democracy. The United States continues to stand with them, their interim President Juan Guaido, and the National Assembly, as they work to peacefully restore constitutional order and prosperity to their country.

RUSSIA

U.S. Department of State. May 10, 2019. Senior State Department Official Previewing Secretary Pompeo's Upcoming Trip to Russia. Special Briefing. Senior State Department Official

MODERATOR: Welcome, everyone. Thank you for joining us this morning. I see many of you also joined us last week while we previewed the Secretary’s travel to Europe. This upcoming visit to Russia will mark the 39th country that Secretary Pompeo has visited as Secretary of State. Since his first overseas trip at the end of April 2018, the Secretary has spent 92 days on official travel. He remains firmly committed to getting out to engage with his counterparts around the world to advance the Trump administration’s foreign policy goals to ensure the secure, prosperity, and freedom of the American people.

The ground rules for today’s call are that it’s on background. For your situational awareness only and not for reporting, today we have [Senior State Department Official], and you may cite him as a, quote, “senior State Department official,” end quote. [Senior State Department Official] will talk about Secretary Pompeo’s upcoming travel to Moscow and Sochi, Russia, the meetings that they have planned, and a whole range of challenges that the Secretary will be discussing on his trip.

And with that, I will turn it over to [Senior State Department Official].

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Great. Thank you, everybody. Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you. And I will just run quickly through the trip and some of our issues, and then we can get into some questions.

So Secretary Pompeo will arrive in Moscow on Monday, May 13th, and begin his visit to Russia by meeting with his team at the U.S. embassy in Moscow. Under the leadership of Ambassador Huntsman, this team has done incredible work under difficult circumstances on behalf of the American people. The Secretary will have an opportunity to express his appreciation and support for all that they do.

While in Moscow, the Secretary will meet with American business leaders and U.S. exchange program alumni to hear their perspectives. He will also participate in a wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to honor the sacrifices of those who died fighting with us against the Nazi regime.

The Secretary will then travel to Sochi on Tuesday afternoon to meet with Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin. An issue high on the agenda for their discussions will be arms control. President Trump has made clear that he wants arms control agreements that reflect modern reality. These agreements must include a broader range of countries and account for a broader range of weapon systems than our current bilateral treaties with Russia. There will be a full range of global challenges to discuss, including Ukraine, Venezuela, Iran, Syria, and North Korea.

The Secretary will also talk about the challenges in our bilateral relationship with Russia. It is no secret that we have many areas of disagreement with the Russian Government, and the Secretary will have a very candid conversation about concerns in our bilateral relationship, including Russia’s breach of longstanding arms control agreements like the INF, and Kremlin-backed attempts to meddle in U.S. and other foreign elections. These are issues he’s raised before, and he will continue to raise. No administration has been tougher than the Trump administration in imposing costs on Russia for its malign activities.

But as President Trump has said, and I quote, “A productive dialogue is not only good for the United States and good for Russia, [but] it is good for the world. [But] if we're going to solve many of the problems facing our world, then we are going to have to find ways to cooperate in pursuit of shared interests,” end quote. This is the work of diplomacy: showing up, having frank discussions, and working to find areas where we can cooperate.

The United States is not the only nation having frank discussions with Russia. Our European allies and partners have stood with the United States in expressing our concern about Russian actions that threaten our shared commitment to Europe that is strong and free. We are not going to solve these issues overnight, but we are going to have – we have to be engaging to create opportunities for progress.

And we have made progress in a number of areas. The Secretary met earlier this week with Foreign Minister Lavrov in Finland at the Arctic Council ministerial, and they had productive discussions there. We have open channels of communication on a range of key issues – like Afghanistan, North Korea, and counterterrorism – where engagement with Russia can advance U.S. interests. Let me just run through those very quickly.

On North Korea, Special Representative Biegun is engaging with Russia about how to achieve our shared goal of final, fully verified denuclearization. These have been constructive discussions. Even though we don’t agree with Russia about all the details of how to achieve this goal, we will continue dialogue to bridge gaps on the way forward.

On Afghanistan, Special Representative Khalilzad has met twice with his Russian and Chinese counterparts. Together they issued a trilateral statement outlining support for the Afghan peace process, demanding the Taliban take tough and public steps against international terrorists, and encouraging the Taliban to sit down with an inclusive, intra-Afghan delegation to discuss a political settlement that ends this conflict. We welcome the positive role of Russia, China, and any other country in the Afghan peace process.

And finally, on counterterrorism, our reciprocal exchange of information with Russia on foreign terrorist fighters, on preventing terrorist travel, and on the protection of major international sporting events helps protect the United States, its people, and its interests.

The Secretary then will depart on Tuesday evening to return home, so I think you see it will be a short trip but an important visit.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you, [Senior State Department Official].

Lois, we’re ready for some questions. Thank you.

OPERATOR: Thank you. And again, if you do have a question, please, press * then 1 at this time.

Our first question is from Matthew Lee from the Associated Press. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi there. Thank you. I’m wondering – you mentioned that no one’s under any illusions that you’re going to solve anything overnight, but I’m just wondering: Do you – is there any particular item that you think could be described as a deliverable that might come out of this meeting, or is it more just a kind of, I don’t know, continuation of the President’s phone call with Putin from last week and the Secretary’s discussion with Foreign Minister Lavrov on Monday in Finland?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don’t want to be – I don’t want to predict any outcomes. I think we’re approaching this from a very realistic approach that this is an opportunity to take the conversation to a higher level and to have that frank and direct conversation on this full range of issues on the relationship.

MODERATOR: Next question, please.

OPERATOR: Thank you. And our next question is from the line of Shaun Tandon from AFP. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. Perhaps getting a little bit more specific on some of the global hot spots that you mentioned, particularly Venezuela and Syria. It’s no secret, as you mentioned, that the two countries are on different sides on both of those issues. Do you see any room for cooperation with Russia on either of these? Do you expect to reiterate the U.S. stance on Venezuela in terms of Russian involvement there and on Syria? Do you find a way that the two countries could actually have some positive outcome together in either place?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So I think on both of those, we will be reiterating our concerns about Russia’s role. I think, as you well know, on Syria we have a very productive de-confliction channel and we will continue that type of conversation. On Venezuela, our policy is very clear. We continue to support democracy in Venezuela, and the National Assembly is the only democratically elected institution in the country. We have – we disagree with Russia’s continued support for Maduro and that’s going to be the subject of discussion.

MODERATOR: Thanks, Shaun. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: Thank you. And that is from Nick Wadhams from Bloomberg News. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. Could you talk about two things – one, the idea that the President essentially wants to reboot the U.S. relationship with Russia now that the Mueller report has been released and that this trip is part of that effort; and also, how much of this trip would be to lay the groundwork for a potential meeting between President Trump and President Putin during the G20 in Osaka? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Nick, we’ve been clear all along that part of our Russia policy is it is in our interest to have a better relationship with Russia. The President has been clear, the Secretary has been clear on that. And so where we have concerns, we’re going to raise them directly, narrow those differences, and find areas where we can cooperate to protect and advance our interests.

With regard to any future travel, I’d really have to refer you to the White House. Thanks.

QUESTION: Are you looking for a meeting?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, I’d have to refer you to the White House about any future meetings.

MODERATOR: Thanks, Nick. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: And that question is from Nike Ching from Voice of America. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Sure. Thank you very much for this phone call. Do you have any updates on the Americans being detained or under house arrest in Russia, including the case of Paul Whelan and Michael Calvey? Will this be discussed during Secretary Pompeo’s meeting in Russia, and how do you characterize the handling of these cases by Russia? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sure, thank you for that question. So the administration places the highest priority on the safety and the welfare of U.S. citizens overseas. We stand ready to provide all appropriate consular services in cases where U.S. citizens are detained. I think you’re aware of the very active role Ambassador Huntsman has played on this issue. And so I don’t have something specific but I would expect this issue will be discussed.

OPERATOR: The next question is from the line of John Hudson from The Washington Post. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hey, thanks. You mentioned that arms control discussions are going to be a top priority. I was just wondering if you have gotten any closer to finding sort of a point person on these discussions in the T family. You mentioned that you’d like a broader range of weapon systems included. Can you say what weapon systems those are? Yeah, just any sort of insight into that and the extension of New START would be helpful. Thanks.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Again, the President and the Secretary have been clear, is that we need a new era of arms control to address new and emerging threats. So I don’t want to preview or get ahead of where the conversations with – between the Secretary and the Russian Government will go, but this is an opportunity to discuss exactly those issues, and we’ll see where they go from there.

MODERATOR: Next question.

OPERATOR: And that’s from Dmitry Kirsanov from TASS. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi. Thanks a lot for doing this. I wanted to ask what the United States expects to achieve as a result of this visit, and I also wanted to follow up on Matt’s and Nick’s questions and ask again if you – if we can expect any deliverables – I’m sorry – in the form of at least a joint statement or something and if a discussion about a potential summit is going to be on the agenda in Sochi.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay, so look, I think the starting point we have to have when we discuss any – our policy towards Russia – and this is part of what diplomacy does – and the Secretary’s trip is to acknowledge frankly that Russia has taken a series of aggressive and destabilizing actions on the global stage. And this is – this trip is an opportunity to make those points clear to the Russian Government and what our expectations are and see how to forge a path forward. Again, an improved relationship between the United States and Russia would be in our interests, but we have expectations for the Russian side.

And so, again, in terms of summit or future meetings, I would have to refer you to the White House, and we will see what comes out of the visit.

MODERATOR: Thanks.

OPERATOR: And the next question is from Conor Finnegan from ABC News. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hey, thanks very much for the call. Two questions if I could. The first one: Will the Secretary meet with any opposition leaders or democratic activists while he’s on the ground in Moscow?

And then secondly, this has kind of been addressed, but can you just say why this meeting is happening now? I believe it’s the first time the Secretary is traveling to Russia. If you could correct me if I’m wrong on that. So why does he think now presents an opportunity?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. So this is the Secretary’s first trip as Secretary of State, but he’s had multiple engagements now with Foreign Minister Lavrov, and this is a good opportunity, as I think we’ve laid out with all the issues on the agenda, to take that conversation to a higher level and for a frank exchange of views on where the challenges and opportunities are.

MODERATOR: Thanks. Next question, please.

OPERATOR: The next question is from Mike Eckel from Radio Free Europe. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks very much. Two questions. Fiona Hill was in Moscow a few weeks back, and we’re told that she made a proposal that roughly involved Russia letting up on Venezuela in exchange for some U.S. concessions on Ukraine. Can you discuss more details of this proposal and the specific Venezuela discussions that the Secretary will have with Putin?

And secondly, on Ukraine, I wonder if you can address the question of why Ambassador Masha Yovanovitch was removed from her post in Kyiv prematurely. Was it a political decision by the White House? Was the State Department involved? Thanks very much.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sure. So look, if you have questions about Fiona’s trip, I’d really, again, have to refer you to the White House to address the substance of her visit and her conversations. I think we have a very clear policy, and the Secretary has been abundantly clear with both Russia on – with Russia on both the issues of Venezuela and Ukraine, where our concerns are about their actions, and where we expect the path forward.

MODERATOR: Last question, please.

OPERATOR: And that will come from Deirdre Shesgreen from USA Today. Please, go ahead.

QUESTION: Thanks so much. Can you say specifically how many Russian troops are in Venezuela, Russian military personnel, and then provide further details about what Secretary Pompeo said was their role in persuading Maduro not to leave the country?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The Secretary’s concerns about Russia, they speak for themselves. We are concerned about Russia’s actions in Venezuela, and we think support for Maduro is a losing bet. And so our support for the Venezuelan people continues, and that will be a subject for the discussion.

MODERATOR: Great. Thank you very much to everyone who joined today’s call. This concludes the call. Again, a reminder, today’s call was on background and our speaker may be referred to as a senior State Department official. Thanks so much. Bye-bye.

CHINA

THE WHITE HOUSE. 05/10/2019. President Trump’s Tariff Tactic is the Best Way to Finally Make China Stop Cheating

President Donald J. Trump’s tariffs are the best way to finally make China stop cheating in international trade, Steven Mosher writes in the New York Post.

“The president held off raising tariffs on Chinese-made goods to 25 percent on March 1, as he had promised. The hope was that China, after decades of cheating on trade in every way imaginable, would finally agree to play by the rules . . . Then, [last] Friday, China attempted to rewrite a whole host of provisions it had previously agreed to,” Mosher explains.

“Unless China stops cheating, no deal may be the best deal of all. Trump understands this.”

THE NEW YORK POST. Trump’s tariff tactic is the best way to finally make China stop cheating
By Steven W. Mosher

China’s Communist rulers have no one to blame but themselves for the reported breakdown in trade talks with the Trump administration.

Remember last December, when President Trump met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Buenos Aires to talk trade? Xi looked Trump in the eye and promised to stop cheating. Not once, but 140 times.

That was the number of items on the long list of trade complaints that US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer had submitted to Beijing months before. High on the list was the theft of intellectual property, accomplished through relentless cyber attacks against military and civilian targets and the theft of intellectual property by visiting Chinese scholars.

The tariff and non-tariff barriers that kept American products and services out of the Middle Kingdom took up another whole section, while the endless demands made upon the American companies that were allowed in to China yet another: China had a great game going. It forced US companies to partner with a Chinese-owned company, which then, after squeezing the Americans dry of their technology, squeezed them right back out of China.

Then there is the Chinese court system, in which foreigners almost always lose. Why? Because the Communist Party-appointed judges have been ordered to discriminate in favor of their own citizens.

We didn’t have just one beef with China. We had a whole herd.

Taking Xi’s promises in Buenos Aires at face value, Trump’s advisers urged the president to push back his plan to raise tariffs.

So the president held off raising tariffs on Chinese-made goods to 25 percent on March 1, as he had promised. The hope was that China, after decades of cheating on trade in every way imaginable, would finally agree to play by the rules.

Months of negotiations followed. The list of 140 items grew shorter as issue after issue was successfully negotiated. According to White House economic adviser Larry Kudlow, the draft agreement grew to a respectable 150 pages.

Still, critical issues were missing. How soon would China be required to fulfill its promise to import more US goods? How would the agreement be evaluated and enforced? And most critically, what sort of recourse would Washington have if it turned out that Beijing was still cheating?

And then, on Friday, China attempted to rewrite a whole host of provisions it had previously agreed to. Trump’s team, seeing the hard-won gains of five months of nonstop negotiations slipping away, had had enough. White House ­advisers went to Trump and told him the bad news.

That’s why Trump on Sunday morning tweeted out a warning: “The Trade Deal with China continues, but too slowly, as they attempt to renegotiate. No!”

If Xi thought he could keep Trump happy with an occasional photo op, buy time with empty promises of better behavior or negotiate until a more pliable president took office, he woke up this past Sunday to a different reality.

Beijing’s backpedaling proved too much even for Sen. Chuck Schumer who in a rare show of bipartisan unity urged the president to “hang tough on trade. Don’t back down. Strength is the only way to win with China.”

Most people in Washington now understand that there are bigger issues at play here than simply tariffs. The US and China are locked in a competition to decide which country will dominate the 21st century.

What will happen if we actually increase the tariffs on all $575 billion of Chinese imports to the US to 25 percent? The American economy, followed by much of the rest of the world, will begin to disengage from China’s economy.

Companies will flee China for other countries — including our own — where it is cheaper to conduct business. Not only will American manufacturing continue its renaissance, our allies in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and India, will also benefit.

Yes, the American consumer will bear some of the cost of tariffs on Chinese goods. But China’s pain will be far more acute. What better way to confront what Vice President Mike Pence recently called China’s “empire and aggression” than by weakening its economy? Conversely, how long should Washington be expected to tolerate Chinese trade cheating and misconduct?

Unless China stops cheating, no deal may be the best deal of all. Trump understands this.

Steven Mosher is president of the Population Research Institute and the author of “Bully of Asia: Why China’s Dream Is the New Threat to World Order.”

THE WHITE HOUSE. New York Post. 05/10/2019. Trump is Just Fighting Back in a Trade War that China Started Long Ago

“China is up to its old tricks on trade, but it’s learning the hard way that there’s a new sheriff in town: President Trump,” the New York Post editorial board writes. “China has operated in bad faith not only in negotiations, but in its actual trade policies, time and again breaking promises to stop stealing intellectual property and trade secrets. Let’s be honest: It was Beijing that started this war. Yet until Trump, America declined to fight back.”

Trump is just fighting back in a trade war that China started long ago

China is up to its old tricks on trade, but it’s learning the hard way that there’s a new sheriff in town: President Trump.

On Wednesday, Reuters confirmed Team Trump charges that Beijing had reneged on its vows to make numerous key concessions on trade, upending months of talks between Chinese and US officials.

A cable from Beijing on Friday contained “systematic edits to a nearly 150-page draft trade agreement” that “undermined core US demands,” sources told Reuters.

Instead of OKing the deal anyway, Trump fired back, moving to toughen tariffs on Chinese goods: Thursday, the White House filed notice that it would hike fees on $200 billion in imports to 25 percent, up from 10 percent, starting Friday. Trump is also vowing to slap tariffs on more Chinese goods “soon,” absent a deal.

It’s true that such fees are economically harmful; both sides suffer in a trade war, just as in real wars.

But China has operated in bad faith not only in negotiations, but in its actual trade policies, time and again breaking promises to stop stealing intellectual property and trade secrets. Let’s be honest: It was Beijing that started this war.

Yet until Trump, America declined to fight back: “After 20 years of having their way with the US, China still appears to be miscalculating,” noted a private-sector Reuters source briefed on the talks.

In the wake of Trump’s move, Beijing is threatening to retaliate with “necessary countermeasures.” But its options are pretty limited.

Fact is, the US economy is strong, while China’s is slowing. And the US trade deficit with China, $419 billion last year, means Beijing has more to lose from escalations.

You can see why New York’s own Sen. Chuck Schumer is urging the president to “hang tough on China.”

Beijing tried this stunt because it thought it might work, as it has in the past. If a hardball US response is what it takes to force Chinese reforms, so be it. Americans will reap the rewards soon enough.

ECONOMY

FED. May 10, 2019. Speech. Is the Middle Class within Reach for Middle-Income Families?. Governor Lael Brainard. At "Renewing the Promise of the Middle Class" 2019 Federal Reserve System Community Development Research Conference, Washington, D.C.

It is good to be here at the Federal Reserve System's Community Development Research Conference. This year, our conference is focusing on renewing the promise of the middle class, a topic that goes to the heart of the American dream and underpins the vibrancy of our democracy and society.1

What Does It Mean to Be Part of the Middle Class?

Before I dig into the data, I want to touch on what it means to be a part of the middle class, recognizing aspirations differ from person to person. From a purely economic perspective, being middle class commonly means having financial security and the ability to invest for our futures and for our children. In turn, having a strong middle class implies that families with average incomes have the purchasing power to consume and the savings to invest. So a strong middle class is often seen as a cornerstone of a vibrant economy and, beyond that, a resilient democracy.2

In recent years, households at the middle of the income distribution have faced a number of challenges. That raises the question of whether middle-class living standards are within reach for middle-income Americans in today's economy.

There are a number of ways to define middle income. I will primarily focus on households between the 40th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution. In 2018, these households had incomes between $40,000 and $85,000.3

To explore the issues associated with financial resilience and intergenerational financial well-being, it is necessary to go beyond measures of income and better understand household assets and liabilities.

Today I will share with you findings from a promising new data resource developed by Federal Reserve staff, the Distributional Financial Accounts (DFAs). These accounts combine household-level data on balance sheets, incomes, and demographic characteristics of families in the United States from the triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) with aggregate data from the Financial Accounts of the United States to track the distribution of these household assets and liabilities on a quarterly basis.4 The timeliness of the data, which are currently available through the fourth quarter of 2018, can provide valuable insights into how different types of households are faring over the business cycle.

I will also share some new results from the 2018 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED), which deliver further insights on the financial resilience of households, particularly those with low and moderate income, on an annual basis.5 These results are slated for release soon.

Wealth across Households

Let us start by taking a look at how the wealth of middle-income households has evolved over recent years.6 Over the past three decades, the wealth of middle-income households increased an average of about 1 percent per year, adjusted for inflation (figure 1).7 That compares with average annual growth of 2.6 percent in real gross domestic income over this period. By comparison, the average wealth of the households in the top decile of the income distribution has increased three times faster per year, on average, than the wealth of middle-income households, more than doubling over the period as a whole.

The past decade is even more sobering. Middle-income families still have not fully recovered the wealth they lost in the Great Recession. On average, households at all levels of income lost wealth as a result of the declines in asset prices and rise in unemployment during the crisis (figure 2). But the recovery in wealth since the Great Recession has been much less for middle- and lower-income households than for higher-income households. The wealth of the top 10 percent of households is 19 percent higher than before the recession, even after factoring in the decline in stock prices at the end of last year. In contrast, the wealth of middle-income families still has not returned to its pre-crisis level, and lower-income families have a wealth shortfall of 16 percent.8

The gap is also large in absolute terms. At the end of 2018, the average middle-income household had wealth of about $340,000, while the average households in the top 10 percent of the income distribution had wealth of about $4.5 million (figure 3). The average wealth of the top income decile is now 13 times higher than that of the middle-income group, while it was 7 times higher in 1989.

Given these developments, it is no surprise that the share of wealth held by middle-income households has declined over the past three decades. However, the extent of the decline is nonetheless striking: Today the 30 percent of households between the 40th and 70th percentiles of the income distribution hold 13 percent of all wealth, down from 19 percent over the past three decades (figure 4). The top 10 percent of households by income now own 57 percent of all wealth—up from 47 percent 30 years ago. The 10 percent of households with the highest income hold more of the national wealth than the remaining 90 percent of households combined.

Do Middle-Income Households Have Middle-Class Economic Security?

Having sketched out the contours of the overall level and growth of wealth owned by middle-income households, let us now turn to economic security. Basic financial security is one important marker of the middle class. Wealth is an important source of economic resilience for households, allowing them to handle unexpected expenses as well as providing them with the financial security to manage the usual changes in income over a lifetime. When we dig into the various liquid savings, assets, and liabilities that underlie the overall wealth numbers for middle-income households, the picture suggests limited room to absorb volatility in cash flows. Many middle-income families have relatively little in easily accessible, or liquid, savings, carry a significant amount of debt, and are concerned about the adequacy of their retirement savings.

Liquid savings

By drawing from several household surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve, we can gain important insights into how assets and liabilities of middle-income households affect their economic security. Research based on the 2016 SCF shows that only about one-fourth of middle-income households have enough liquid savings to cover six months of expenses—the amount often recommended by financial advisers—and only 4 in 10 could cover three months of expenses.9 The majority of middle-income households thus do not have sufficient liquid savings to weather a typical material financial disruption—for instance, one associated with a temporary job loss or illness.

Even modest unexpected expenses could be disruptive for many middle-income families. According to the forthcoming results from the 2018 SHED, one-third of middle-income adults said that they would borrow money, sell something, or not be able to pay an unexpected $400 expense (figure 5).10 Drilling down further indicates that while 6 percent of middle-income adults said they would not be able to pay the expense using any means, 27 percent would borrow or sell something to pay the expense.

The reliance on credit to meet unexpected expenses is pronounced among those already carrying a balance on their credit cards. Nearly 3 in 10 middle-income adults carry a balance on their credit card most or all of the time, and the same households are five times as likely to borrow if faced with a $400 expense as those who never carry a balance.

Borrowing money is not the only way that middle-income households cope with unexpected expenses. In 2018, one-fourth of middle-income adults said they skipped some kind of medical care because of its cost, suggesting insufficient savings can have implications for physical health as well as financial health. Thus, low levels of savings can create a challenging cycle when material disruptions in income, or even smaller unexpected expenses, spiral into a broader financial setback.

Financial security in retirement

A key component of middle-class financial security is the cushion of savings to cover retirement. Here, the DFAs suggest some progress. One of the innovations of the DFAs is that they include defined benefit plans from the Financial Accounts in addition to defined contribution plans, whereas measures of household pension wealth in the SCF are confined to the latter. The balances in defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s, in which retirement savings accumulate in an account, are typically simpler to measure. By contrast, the value of defined benefit plans requires estimating how much the future fixed payments each year in retirement are worth today. These future payments are a sizable asset for households, currently estimated at about $15 trillion, or about 70 percent of total pension assets.11

The DFAs indicate that the average pension wealth for middle-income households—including both types of plans—has increased 2.5 percent per year over the past three decades (figure 6). Pension assets are now the largest asset held by middle-income households, representing 40 percent of their wealth, substantially exceeding the 22 percent share of home equity in their wealth.

In part, the growth in pension balances reflects the sustained decrease in long-term interest rates over this period, which has boosted the value of the future fixed payments associated with defined benefit pensions. It reflects the aging of the population, since households near or in retirement age have the largest accumulated levels of pension savings and are also likely hold a relatively greater share of defined benefit plans (figure 7).

How do we square the growth in pension assets with survey evidence indicating that many households in the middle of the income distribution are concerned that they will not have enough to live on in retirement? Only 35 percent of middle-income adults, who are not retired, say that their retirement saving is on track, and 16 percent of middle-income adults do not have any money saved for retirement.12 In part, this may reflect the long-term shift by employers to defined contribution plans and away from defined benefit plans, especially in the private sector. While in 1989 more middle-income households had a defined benefit pension than a defined contribution plan, the reverse has been true since 1989.13 With defined contribution plans, employees have to decide how much they will save and how they will invest, and they face uncertainty regarding how much savings will be available in retirement. Those who save and invest effectively can help secure their retirement. But those who opt out, save too little, or make investment choices that turn out to yield low returns may find themselves unprepared as retirement approaches, despite years of hard work. Two-thirds of middle-income adults who hold self-directed accounts, including defined contribution plans and individual retirement accounts, say that they have little or no comfort in managing the investments.14

Assets and liabilities

Stepping back, it is instructive to look at the evolution of the underlying assets and liabilities of middle-class households more broadly. The liabilities of the average middle-income household have nearly doubled over the past three decades, while assets have increased only 50 percent (figure 8). The gap between the relative growth of liabilities and assets peaked during the financial crisis and has narrowed somewhat for middle-income households more recently. While mortgages rose and fell sharply around the Great Recession, the rise in consumer debt, such as credit cards, auto loans, and student loans, has been relatively steady.

The rapid growth in liabilities reflects both short-term cash flow management and longer-term investments. Taking on debt is an important way for middle-income families to help buffer unexpected expenses or a temporary loss of income, as indicated by the 8 in 10 middle-income adults who are at least somewhat confident that they could obtain an additional credit card if they applied for it.15 Debt is also a critical mechanism for making key middle-class investments, which I turn to next.

Investing in the Future

There is a palpable sense that the opportunity to reach the middle class and remain in it is receding for many middle-income households. Many households find it challenging to make key middle-class investments because incomes at the middle are not keeping up with the rising costs of education and homeownership, and it is difficult to save enough. Often, making these investments requires having some savings in the first place—for instance, to make a down payment on a home, forgo income for a few years while paying tuition, or secure credit for a small business.

Disparities by race and ethnicity

This challenge is compounded for some racial and ethnic minority groups that have experienced large and persistent racial gaps in wealth. In 2016, the average wealth of white households ($933,700) was seven times the average wealth of black households ($138,200) and five times that of Hispanic households ($191,200). Even among households at the middle of the income distribution, the average wealth in 2016 of white households ($277,200) was roughly one and a half times that of black households ($179,700) and nearly three times that of Hispanic households ($95,400).16 Differences in educational attainment cannot fully account for these disparities: The average wealth of black households in which the head had a bachelor's degree ($271,200) was 26 percent less than that of white households in which the head did not attend college ($367,800).17

This matters not least because disparities in wealth often are inherited.18 The prospects that a young person will reach the middle class often depend on attributes he or she inherits—such as the income, wealth, education, age, race, and ethnicity of his or her parents.19 Beyond financial wealth, children inherit intangible assets that affect their ability to access information and social networks that help in obtaining jobs and taking advantage of educational and other wealth-building opportunities.

Homeownership

Owning a home has been a key marker of middle-class status for many Americans. The accumulation of equity in a home is the primary form of wealth building and economic security for many middle-class families. Homeownership is valued for nonfinancial reasons as well, such as protection against unwanted moves and the freedom to make alterations and investments in the home.20

However, the financial crisis brought into focus that there are also risks associated with homeownership. Home equity—defined as the difference between the house value and the mortgage balance—for an average middle-income household peaked at $90,200 in late 2005, then declined by almost two-thirds through 2011 (figure 9). By the end of 2018, after several years of rising house prices, the home equity of the average middle-income family was still below the pre-recession peak and not much above the value in 1989.

Middle-income households saw such steep declines in their average home equity during the Great Recession because they had taken on a high level of mortgage debt relative to their house values.21 This high leverage amplified the effect of the fall in house prices on their wealth. Moreover, the homeownership rates of middle-income households also declined during the recession, so they did not benefit as much from the subsequent rebound in house prices since 2013 as did higher-income families.

The recent decline in homeownership rates does not appear to reflect a change in attitudes toward homeownership, as recent surveys show that the desire to own a home remains strong.22 Instead, it appears house prices are rising faster than income for many middle-income families, putting homeownership out of reach. By 2017, the median sales price for a single-family home was about four times median household income, up from three times median income in 1988.23 The homeownership rate for middle-income families was 68 percent in 2016, down from its peak in 2004 of 74 percent.24 For black households, the declines during and after the recession erased a decade of increases in homeownership—the homeownership rate for black households across the income spectrum was 42 percent in 2018, the same as the rate in the mid-1990s.25 The homeownership rate of Hispanics also declined with the recession but has recovered somewhat, reaching 47 percent in 2018.

With homeownership lower and home prices rising faster than incomes, renting is also taking a bigger slice of many middle-income households' earnings, leaving less savings for a down payment, an unexpected expense, or other investments. From 2007 to 2018, the share of income spent on rent rose from 18 percent to 25 percent for middle-income renters.26

Many middle-income families struggle to afford rent, particularly in the high-demand areas where jobs are most available, underscoring the need for more workforce housing. One way to increase the supply of middle-income housing is to reduce exclusionary zoning and other land-use restrictions that limit the supply of housing and keep prices high.27 Often put in place in areas with single-family homes to block the development of affordable, multifamily housing, these policies also have contributed to the persistence of racially segregated neighborhoods. The challenge is to increase accessibility to workforce and affordable housing in ways that address legacy disparities.28

Skills, education, and student debt

Manufacturing and the skilled trades have provided an important pathway to the middle class for many workers, enabling them to own their homes, educate their children, and retire securely. Today, though, many face uncertainties associated with the decline in manufacturing jobs, the erosion of employee benefits, and reduced bargaining power. Increasingly, the onus is on individuals to ensure that their skills are marketable and up-to-date in a highly competitive global marketplace with growing automation.

Juan Salgado, the chancellor of the City Colleges of Chicago and our closing keynote speaker, has emphasized the role of community colleges in offering affordable, quality education and training.29 Students can begin with a certificate program in advanced manufacturing and continue either to a bachelor's degree in engineering at a nearby public university or to the workplace, acquiring marketable skills likely at lower cost than if they had started at a four-year college. Similar programs around the country help provide accessible pathways to the middle class.

For others, college is seen as an important pathway to middle-class economic security. The average wealth of households with a college degree significantly exceeds the average wealth of those without a college degree (figure 10). A key reason is that college graduates generally have higher incomes. Graduates with a bachelor's degree have median weekly earnings that are about 65 percent higher than high school graduates and unemployment rates that are 2 percentage points lower, and they are often better positioned to adapt to changes in the labor market.30

However, the cost of higher education has been rising, placing an increasing financial burden on many middle-income households. Between 2008 and 2018, tuition and fees at four-year public colleges rose more than six times faster than real median incomes.31 Moreover, as Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago President Evans discussed, while there are benefits associated with attending college, there are also some financial risks, and the returns to education vary widely. While two-thirds of individuals with a bachelor's degree or more say that the lifetime financial benefits of their education exceed its costs, those who do not complete their degree are half as likely to report net benefits from their studies.32 And some groups face higher barriers in accessing college: Children of parents who did not attend college are far less likely to attend college due to financial and informational barriers, and those who do start college are more likely to drop out.33

For many middle-income families, affording post-secondary education means taking on a sobering amount of student debt. Total student loan debt, in inflation-adjusted terms, more than doubled from 2006 to 2018 (figure 11).34 Repayment of student loans can be challenging. In 2018, 2 in 10 middle-income adults with education debt were behind on their payments, and those who did not complete a degree were nearly twice as likely to be behind.35 Repayment status also differs by the type of institution attended. Among middle-income adults with education debt, 30 percent who attended for-profit institutions were behind on student loan payments, compared with 17 percent of those who attended public institutions and 12 percent who attended not-for-profit private institutions.

Investing in higher education may come at the cost of deferring or forgoing other investments. For example, higher tuition costs—reflected in increasing student loan debt—together with the rising costs of homeownership, have left many middle-income households in a poor position to save for a down payment or handle a mortgage. Researchers at the Fed have estimated that roughly 20 percent of the decline in homeownership among young adults can be attributed to their increased student loans since 2005. This suggests that more than 400,000 young individuals would have owned a home in 2014 had it not been for the rise in student debt.36

Businesses and stock ownership

Another concern is that high debt may hinder people seeking to start a business. Starting a business is a classic pathway to securing a foothold in the middle class. This has been particularly true for members of some groups that historically have faced challenges in the labor market, particularly minorities and first-generation Americans.37

Aspiring small business owners with student loans may lack the financial ability to invest in starting a business while staying current on payments. One study found that individuals with student loan debt are less likely to start a business, and those who do are more likely to fall behind on their loan payments.38 Another study found that growth in student loan debt resulted in a 14 percent reduction in small business formation in counties over a 10-year period.39

The personal assets of small business owners have been an important source of capital for entrepreneurs as they seek to start and sustain a small business. As wealth for middle-income households has stagnated, reliance on this source of capital has declined in recent years.40 Very small firms depend heavily on personal debt for start-up and working capital. Owners of smaller firms often struggle to qualify for bank credit, and among those that apply and are denied, low credit scores and insufficient credit history are the most frequently cited reasons.

More broadly, a key reason that middle-income households have not seen wealth increases commensurate with high-income households is that they have not benefited as much from the strong performance of stocks and privately held businesses. In inflation-adjusted terms, total business assets (including corporate stocks, mutual funds, and unincorporated businesses) have more than tripled since 1989. Similarly, the average business assets of top-income households have more than tripled since 1989. But the average business assets of middle-income families have grown only 31 percent since 1989 and are lower than they were before the Great Recession (figure 12). Stock market participation fell for middle-income families after the Great Recession, so they have not benefited as much from the subsequent rise in stock prices.41 By 2018, the 30 percent of households in the middle of the income distribution held only 6 percent of aggregate business assets, while the top 10 percent of households held over three‑fourths.

Maximum Employment, Wages, and Wealth

With lower net worth and financial assets, the livelihoods of most middle-income families, other than retirees, depend primarily on compensation from working. So the robustness of labor income over time is central to the ability of middle-income families to achieve and maintain middle-class financial security. While the strengthening of the labor market over the course of this extended recovery has benefited middle-income families, the long-term decline in the share of national income going to wage earners is concerning.

The Congress put maximum employment right at the heart of the Federal Reserve's mandate, alongside price stability. In fact, we are one of only a handful of central banks that have the explicit responsibility to promote maximum employment. Given that households at the middle of the income distribution rely primarily on wage income, our full employment mandate has served the country well during this extended recovery.

The gains to workers, including those in the middle class, from the strong labor market are clear. Unemployment is now at 3.6 percent—its lowest level in 50 years. Employment rates of adults in their prime working years (ages 25 to 54) have been rising steadily during the expansion and recently reached their pre-recession peak of 80 percent.42 Importantly, wage growth has begun to pick up after years of slow gains.

It is notable that the near recovery in middle-class wealth from the Great Recession did not take hold until the labor market began to strengthen. While higher-income households saw their wealth begin to recover as soon as financial markets stabilized in early 2009, middle-income households did not see their wealth begin to recover until 2010, when the unemployment rate began to decline (figure 13).

Even as we welcome the many benefits of the current strong job market, longer-term trends raise concerns. Labor market disparities by race have been an enduring feature of the labor market for decades. The unemployment rate of blacks, while near its historical low, remains at about 7 percent, twice the unemployment rate of whites. Recent research suggests that the strong labor market may be helping to narrow some of the long-standing disparities for some racial minorities and women, although the results are tentative and very modest.43

The progressive long-term decline in the share of national income that goes to workers through wages is concerning for middle-income households. The share going to workers—which economists call the labor share—translates into how much of our economic output shows up in people's paychecks. The decline in the labor share goes to the heart of the rising inequality of wealth and the unequal sharing of prosperity.

Several explanations have been put forward for the decline in the labor share. The increasing concentration of industries into the hands of a few firms has likely reduced the bargaining power of workers.44 Increasing automation in the workplace is also a factor, along with the ongoing effects of globalization and offshoring. Earnings have declined as the job market has shifted away from important middle-income occupations. Manufacturing, for example, employs vastly fewer people now than it has historically.45 It is important to understand the relative importance of these different drivers, as they have different implications for the overall health of the economy and for policies to support middle-income families.

Monetary policy aims to influence employment and inflation over the business cycle, as opposed to addressing these longer-run structural changes. But the distribution of income and wealth may have important implications for macroeconomic developments, such as the evolution of consumption, which is the single biggest engine of growth in our economy. That is why the Federal Reserve has a significant interest in understanding distributional developments and their implications.

Recent research finds that households with lower levels of wealth spend a larger fraction of any income gains than households with higher levels of wealth.46 Consequently, an economy that delivers an increasing share of income gains to high-wealth households could result in less growth in consumer demand than one in which the gains are distributed more equally. In fact, the recovery of consumer spending after the Great Recession was slower than the recovery in aggregate household income and net worth would previously have suggested, and rising inequality is one plausible explanation.47

Conclusion

The discrepancy between slow growth in income and wealth, on the one hand, and rising costs of housing, health care, and education, on the other, may be making it more difficult for middle-income families to achieve middle-class financial security. Long-term, the shifting of wealth and income to the top of the distribution and away from the middle could pose challenges to the health and resilience of our economy. These are important questions, and I am pleased that this conference is bringing to light interesting research to shed light on them.

Notes

1. I am grateful to Claudia Sahm of the Federal Reserve Board for her assistance in preparing this text, along with Barbara Lipman, Kevin Moore, Karen Pence, Paul Smith, and Mike Zabek. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
2. Take, for example, this statement attributed to Aristotle: "The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well-administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both the other classes." See Constitutional Rights Foundation (2010), "Plato and Aristotle on Tyranny and the Rule of Law," Bill of Rights in Action, vol. 26 (Fall), (quoted text under the heading "Aristotle's Politics").
3. This definition errs slightly on the higher side of what might be considered middle income, but the results are qualitatively robust to taking the middle third of the income distribution.
4. For more details on the construction of the DFAs, see Michael Batty, Jesse Bricker, Joseph Briggs, Elizabeth Holmquist, Susan McIntosh, Kevin Moore, Eric Nielsen, Sarah Reber, Molly Shatto, Kamila Sommer, Tom Sweeney, and Alice Henriques Volz (2019), "Introducing the Distributional Financial Accounts of the United States (PDF)," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-017 (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March). The publicly available DFAs data can be found on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/efa/efa-distributional-financial-accounts.htm. Visualization tools for the data are forthcoming.
5. The SHED is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/consumerscommunities/shed.htm.
6. The published data set includes data on the distribution of nominal wealth by wealth percentiles. For this speech, Board staff analyzed the data, with the wealth distribution by income percentiles and other demographic categories. Wealth and all of its subcomponents are reported here in 2018 dollars using the personal consumption expenditures price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (see table 1.1.4, which is available at https://www.bea.gov). Wealth is defined as the sum of assets, including financial and nonfinancial assets, net of liabilities, including mortgages, consumer debt, and other liabilities.
7. Income groups at each point in time are defined here using current household income. Specific households may move across income groups over time. Since households in the high-income group during their working years may, in retirement, move to low- or middle-income groups, some of the wealth assigned to low- or middle-income groups in this analysis comes from households with high lifetime income.
8. Wealth in figure 2 is indexed to the first quarter of 2007, which is between the peak in house prices in 2006 and the start of the Great Recession at the end of 2007. As figure 2 shows, household wealth began declining before the recession officially began.
9. See Neil Bhutta and Lisa Dettling (2018), "Money in the Bank? Assessing Families' Liquid Savings using the Survey of Consumer Finances," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, November 19). In this study, "middle income" refers to households with income between the 25th and 75th percentiles. Income is defined as the "usual amount" of income the household earned in the previous year and could differ from the actual amount. Overall expenses are estimated using partial data on household expenses, including rent, mortgages payments, car loans, and food.
10. This statistic and the rest in this subsection are from the 2018 SHED and are only for middle-income adults. The SHED collects ranges of family income, not a dollar amount. Middle income is defined as the ranges of family income from $40,000 to $99,000, which is roughly the 40th to 70th percentiles.
11. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release Z.1, "Financial Accounts of the United States," table L.117. For more information, see John Sabelhaus and Alice Henriques Volz (2019), "Are Disappearing Employer Pensions Contributing to Rising Wealth Inequality?" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 1).
12. The data are from the 2018 SHED. Tabulations include only middle-income adults who are not retired. Retirement savings in the SHED include pensions, individual retirement accounts, and other savings for retirement.
13. The data source is the SCF (1989–2016). In 1989, 50 percent of middle-income households had a defined benefit pension, and 29 percent had a defined contribution pension, but by 1998, the relative ownership of each pension type had reversed to 36 percent and 43 percent, respectively. Since then, the rates have been fairly stable.
14. The data are from the 2018 SHED. The tabulation includes only middle-income adults, who have self-directed retirement accounts.
15. The 2018 SHED is the data source. Tabulations include only middle-income adults.
16. The source is the 2016 Survey of Consumer Finances, which is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm.
17. See Lisa J. Dettling, Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B. Moore, and Jeffrey P. Thompson (2017), "Recent Trends in Wealth-Holding by Race and Ethnicity: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 27). See also, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, William Darity, Jr., Darrick Hamilton, Mark Paul, Alan Aja, Anne Price, Antonio Moore, and Caterina Chiopris (2018), What We Get Wrong about Closing the Racial Wealth Gap (PDF) (Durham, N.C.: Samuel DuBois Cook Center on Social Equity and Insight Center for Community Economic Development, Duke University, April).
18. See Laura Feiveson and John Sabelhaus (2018), "How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth Concentration?" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June 1). See also Maury Gittleman and Edward N. Wolff (2004), "Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth Accumulation," Journal of Human Resources, vol. 39, (Winter), pp. 193–227.
19. See Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones, and Sonya R. Porter (2018), "The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility," NBER Working Paper Series 25147 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October).
20. See Matthew Desmond (2016), Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City (New York: Crown).
21. See Lisa Dettling, Joanne Hsu, and Elizabeth Llanes (2018), "A Wealthless Recovery? Asset Ownership and the Uneven Recovery from the Great Recession," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 13). Their analysis focused on working-age households, and income classifications are based on the "usual amount" of income the household earns.
22. As one example, in March 2019, according to Fannie Mae's National Housing Survey, 69 percent of households say they would "buy" if they were going to move. See Fannie Mae's March 2019 Data Release, which is available on its website at http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/research/housingsurvey/pdf/nhs-monthly-data-040819.pdf.
23. See Alexander Hermann (2018), "Price-to-Income Ratios Are Nearing Historic Highs," Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, Housing Perspectives (blog), September 13.
24. The data are from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
25. See U.S. Census Bureau (2019), Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey, April 4, https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/ann18ind.html.
26. See Dettling, Hsu, and Llanes, "A Wealthless Recovery?" in note 23; and Jeff Larrimore and Jenny Schuetz (2017), "Assessing the Severity of Rent Burden on Low-Income Families," FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 22).
27. Glaeser and Gyorko found that zoning restrictions increased the cost of housing by 25 percent or more in around 15 percent of cities in 2013 and doubled housing costs in about 6 percent of cities. See Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko (2018), "The Economic Implications of Housing Supply," Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 32 (Winter), pp. 3–30.
28. See Richard Rothstein (2017), The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (New York: Liveright).
29. See Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2019), "An Interview with Juan Salgado, Chancellor of the City Colleges of Chicago: Charting Pathways to the Middle Class," CDPS Blog, April 5.
30. See Elka Torpey (2018), "Measuring the Value of Education," Bureau of Labor Statistics, Career Outlook (blog), April.
31. Net tuition and fees at four-year public colleges increased 44 percent between 2008 and 2009 and between 2018 and 2019 (according to data from the College Board, which are available on its website at https://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/tuition-fees-room-and-board-over-time), while income increased about 7 percent in the same period (as indicated by U.S. Census Bureau data, which can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis's FRED website at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=nDPn). For more information, see College Board (2018), Trends in College Pricing 2018 (PDF) (New York: CB).
32. The data are from the 2018 SHED. Tabulations include all adults (regardless of income) who attended any post-secondary program.
33. The 2018 SHED is the data source. Tabulations include all adults (regardless of income).
34. The data are from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Release G.19, "Consumer Credit." For a comparison of various estimates of student loan debt, see Jesse Bricker, Meta Brown, Simona Hannon, and Karen Pence (2015), "How Much Student Debt Is Out There?" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 7).
35. The 2018 SHED is the data source. Tabulations include middle-income adults who currently owe money for their own education and do not include those who have already paid off their education debts.
36. See Alvaro Mezza, Daniel Ringo, and Kamila Sommer (2019), "Can Student Loan Debt Explain Low Homeownership Rates for Young Adults?" Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Consumer & Community Context, vol. 1 (January), pp. 2–6.
37. African American women are one of the fastest-growing groups of entrepreneurs. See National Women's Business Council (2016), "New Report Highlights Challenges Faced by Black Women Entrepreneurs; Offers Roadmap for Solving Toughest Issues," press release, October 5. Immigrants compose approximately 15 percent of the U.S. workforce and around one-fourth of U.S. entrepreneurs. See Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr (2016), "Immigrant Entrepreneurship," NBER Working Paper Series 22385 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, July). See also the minority-owned businesses special report of the Federal Reserve Banks' Small Business Credit Survey, which is available on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's website at https://www.newyorkfed.org/smallbusiness/small-business-credit-survey-employer-firms-2016.
38. See Karthik Krishnan and Pinshuo Wang (2018), "The Cost of Financing Education: Can Student Debt Hinder Entrepreneurship?" Management Science, published online in Articles in Advance, May 23.
39. See Brent W. Ambrose, Larry Cordell, and Shuwei Ma (2015), "The Impact of Student Loan Debt on Small Business Formation (PDF)," Working Paper Series 15-26 (Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, July)
40. See Arthur B. Kennickell, Myron L. Kwast, and Jonathan Pogach (2017), "Small Businesses and Small Business Finance during the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession: New Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances," in John Haltiwanger, Erik Hurst, Javier Miranda, and Antoinette Schoar, eds., Measuring Entrepreneurial Businesses: Current Knowledge and Challenges, National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Income and Wealth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 291–349.
41. See Dettling, Hsu, and Llanes, "A Wealthless Recovery?" in note 23; and Bing Chen and Frank P. Stafford (2016), "Stock Market Participation: Family Responses to Housing Consumption Commitments," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 48 (June), pp. 635–59.
42. The data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
43. See Stephanie R. Aaronson, Mary C. Daly, William Wascher, and David W. Wilcox (2019), "Okun Revisited: Who Benefits Most from a Strong Economy? (PDF)" paper presented at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Conference, held at the Brookings Institution, Washington, March 7–8.
44. José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall I. Steinbaum (2017), "Labor Market Concentration," NBER Working Paper Series 24147 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, December; revised February 2019); Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara, "Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force," University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper Series 18-013 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Law School, April); Sandeep Vaheesan (forthcoming), "Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two Gilded Ages," Maryland Law Review; and David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen (2017), "The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms," NBER Working Paper Series 23396 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, May).
45. See David Autor and Anna Salomons (2018), "Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share (PDF)," paper presented at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Conference, held at the Brookings Institution, Washington, March 8–9; David H. Autor and David Dorn (2013), "The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market," American Economic Review, vol. 103 (August), pp. 1553–97.
46. See Jonathan Fisher, David Johnson, Timothy Smeeding, and Jeffrey Thompson (2019), "Estimating the Marginal Propensity to Consume Using the Distributions of Income, Consumption and Wealth (PDF)," Working Paper Series 19-4 (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, February).
47. See Aditya Aladangady and Laura Feiveson (2018), "A Not-So-Great Recovery in Consumption: What Is Holding Back Household Spending?" FEDS Notes (Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 8).

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ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS

INFLAÇÃO

IBGE. 10/05/2019. IPCA fica em 0,57% em abril

O Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo - IPCA de abril foi de 0,57% e ficou 0,18 ponto percentual (p.p.) abaixo da taxa de março (0,75%). A variação acumulada no ano foi de 2,09%. Essas duas variações são as maiores para um mês de abril desde 2016 (0,61% e 3,25%, respectivamente). O acumulado dos últimos doze meses foi para 4,94%, contra os 4,58% nos 12 meses imediatamente anteriores. Em abril de 2018, a taxa foi de 0,22%.

Período	Taxa
Abril de 2019	0,57%
Março de 2019	0,75%
Abril de 2018	0,22%
Acumulado no ano	2,09%
Acumulado nos 12 meses	4,94%

O resultado do IPCA de abril sofreu forte influência dos grupos Alimentação e bebidas (0,63%), Transportes (0,94%) e Saúde e cuidados pessoais (1,51%). Juntos, estes três grupos responderam por 89,5% do índice do mês, com impactos de 0,16 p.p., 0,17 p.p. e 0,18 p.p., respectivamente. O grupo Artigos de residência, com -0,24%, foi o único que apresentou deflação em abril. Os resultados de todos os grupos de produtos e serviços pesquisados estão na tabela a seguir.

IPCA - Variação e Impacto por grupos - mensal

Grupo	Variação (%)		Impacto (p.p.)
	Março	Abril	Março	Abril
Índice Geral	0,75	0,57	0,75	0,57
Alimentação e Bebidas	1,37	0,63	0,34	0,16
Habitação	0,25	0,24	0,04	0,04
Artigos de Residência	0,27	-0,24	0,01	-0,01
Vestuário	0,45	0,18	0,02	0,01
Transportes	1,44	0,94	0,26	0,17
Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais	0,42	1,51	0,05	0,18
Despesas Pessoais	0,16	0,17	0,02	0,02
Educação	0,32	0,09	0,02	0,00
Comunicação	-0,22	0,03	-0,01	0,00
Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Índices de Preços

O grupo Saúde e cuidados pessoais se destacou com a maior variação (1,51%) e o maior impacto (0,18 p.p.) dentre os grupos de produtos e serviços pesquisados. As principais altas foram nos grupamentos de remédios (2,25%), refletindo o reajuste anual, em vigor desde 31 de março, com teto de 4,33%; higiene pessoal (2,76%), com destaque para os perfumes (de 1,45% em março para 6,56% em abril) e plano de saúde (0,80%).

Mesmo com a desaceleração no nível de preços de março (1,44%) para abril (0,94%), o grupo dos Transportes foi o segundo com maior variação e impacto (0,17 p.p.) no IPCA de abril. A gasolina foi o principal impacto individual no mês (2,66% mais cara, em média). As variações ficaram entre o - 0,58% na região metropolitana de Salvador e a alta de 5,98% na região metropolitana de Porto Alegre.

Outras contribuições positivas no grupo dos Transportes vêm da passagem aérea (5,32%) e do ônibus urbano (0,74%), ambos com 0,02 p.p. de impacto no índice. Este último contempla os reajustes de 9,30% nas tarifas em Porto Alegre (3,98%), em vigor desde 13 de março, de 7,81% em Recife (0,58%) e de 5,88% em Curitiba (0,45%), ambos a partir de 02 de março. Os índices de Salvador (7,30%) e de Goiânia (2,75%) refletem os reajustes de 8,11%, desde 02 de abril e de 7,50%, desde 19 de abril, respectivamente.

Ainda nos Transportes, o ônibus intermunicipal (0,18%) considera os reajustes de 3,78% em Campo Grande (3,07%), a partir de 1º de abril, e de 19,57% em São Luís (15,91%), desde 23 de março. O trem (1,56%) leva em conta o reajuste de 27,30% em Porto Alegre (10,82%), em vigor desde 13 de março, e o metrô (1,52%) reflete o reajuste de 6,98% no Rio de Janeiro (6,28%) a partir de 02 de abril.

O grupo Alimentação e bebidas desacelerou de março (1,37%) para abril (0,63%). Os alimentos para consumo no domicílio saíram da alta de 2,07% no mês passado para 0,62% no mês corrente, influenciados pelas quedas no feijão-carioca (-9,09%) e nas frutas (-0,71%), mesmo com a pressão exercida pelo tomate (28,64%), pelo frango inteiro (3,32%), pela cebola (8,62%) e pelas carnes (0,46%). Por outro lado, a alimentação fora foi de 0,10% para 0,64%.

No grupo Habitação (0,24% e impacto 0,04 p.p.), destacam-se energia elétrica (0,10%), taxa de água e esgoto (0,49%) e gás encanado (1,38%). Este último reflete os reajustes da região metropolitana de Curitiba (16,48%), onde houve a apropriação integral do reajuste de 16,48% nas tarifas, vigente desde 28 de fevereiro, e que ainda não havia sido apropriado nos índices. Já na região metropolitana de São Paulo, a queda de 0,20% é reflexo da redução de 11,00% para 9,00% no reajuste aplicado, sendo o primeiro percentual vigente desde 1º de fevereiro e, o segundo, desde 1º de março.

Ainda no grupo Habitação, a taxa de água e esgoto (0,49%) considera os reajustes de 2,99% a partir de 1º de abril em Brasília (2,81%); 15,86%, a partir de 24 de março, em Fortaleza (12,39%) e 5,89% desde 1º de março em Aracaju (0,36%).

O resultado da energia elétrica (0,10%) reflete a variação média apresentada nas regiões pesquisadas, que oscilou entre os -5,40% da região metropolitana de Vitória e os 6,65% de Campo Grande. Os principais reajustes incorporados ao índice ocorreram em: Campo Grande (6,65%), de 12,39% a partir de 08 de abril; Rio de Janeiro (4,20%): 11,53% e 9,72% nas concessionárias, a partir de 15 de março, sendo reduzido para 8,80% e 7,30%, respectivamente, a partir de 1º de abril; Fortaleza (2,91%): 7,39% a partir de 22 de abril; Recife (2,64%): 5,56% a partir de 29 de abril; Salvador (1,70%): 6,21% a partir de 22 de abril; e Aracaju (1,50%): 3,04% a partir de 22 de abril. Os destaques das quedas foram em Rio Branco (-2,60%), com redução de 3,16% nas tarifas a partir de 1º de abril, e na região metropolitana de Vitória (-5,40%), motivada pela redução na alíquota do PIS/COFINS.

Quanto aos índices regionais, conforme mostra a tabela a seguir, Rio Branco (0,05%) apresentou a menor variação no IPCA de abril, em razão da queda na energia elétrica (-2,60%), decorrente da redução de 3,16% nas tarifas desde 1º de abril. O maior índice ficou com a região metropolitana de Fortaleza (0,91%), cujo resultado foi influenciado, principalmente, pelo item taxa de água e esgoto (12,39%), referente ao reajuste de 15,86%, em vigor desde 24 de março.

IPCA - Variação por regiões - mensal e acumulada em 12 meses

Região	Peso Regional (%)	Variação (%)		Variação Acumulada (%)
		Março	Abril	Ano	12 meses
Fortaleza	2,91	1,04	0,91	2,82	4,91
São Luís	1,87	1,36	0,87	2,77	5,49
Porto Alegre	8,40	1,18	0,83	2,26	5,63
Salvador	6,12	0,76	0,83	2,16	5,26
Aracaju	0,79	1,21	0,80	2,87	5,59
Brasília	2,80	0,93	0,77	1,58	4,21
Belém	4,23	0,49	0,62	2,35	4,35
Goiânia	3,59	0,12	0,62	1,44	4,67
Recife	4,20	0,82	0,59	2,28	4,86
Curitiba	7,79	0,83	0,57	1,63	4,50
Campo Grande	1,51	0,70	0,52	1,95	4,27
São Paulo	30,67	0,78	0,49	2,10	4,99
Rio de Janeiro	12,06	0,83	0,46	2,27	5,02
Belo Horizonte	10,86	0,29	0,42	1,94	4,82
Vitória	1,78	0,39	0,32	1,57	5,02
Rio Branco	0,42	0,78	0,05	1,88	5,38
Brasil	100,00	0,75	0,57	2,09	4,94
Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Índices de Preços

O IPCA é calculado pelo IBGE desde 1980, se refere às famílias com rendimento monetário de 01 a 40 salários mínimos, qualquer que seja a fonte, e abrange dez regiões metropolitanas do país, além dos municípios de Goiânia, Campo Grande, Rio Branco, São Luís, Aracaju e de Brasília. Para o cálculo do índice do mês foram comparados os preços coletados no período de 30 de março a 30 de abril de 2019 (referência) com os preços vigentes no período de 27 de fevereiro a 29 de março de 2019 (base).

INPC em abril foi de 0,60%

O Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor - INPC do mês de abril apresentou variação de 0,60%, 0,17 ponto percentual (p.p.) abaixo da taxa de março (0,77%). A variação acumulada no ano ficou em 2,29%. Tanto a variação mensal quanto a anual são as maiores para um mês de abril desde 2016 (0,64% e 3,58%, respectivamente). O acumulado dos últimos doze meses foi para 5,07%, contra 4,67% nos 12 meses imediatamente anteriores. Em abril de 2018, a taxa foi de 0,21%.

Os produtos alimentícios tiveram alta de 0,64% em abril, contra 1,50% em março. O agrupamento dos não alimentícios foi para 0,58%, frente a 0,45% em março.

Regionalmente, conforme a seguir, Rio Branco (0,00%) mostrou, na média, estabilidade no nível de preços. O maior índice ficou com a região metropolitana de Salvador (1,08%), influenciado, principalmente, pelo ônibus urbano (7,30%), reflexo do reajuste de 8,11% nas tarifas, em vigor desde 02 de abril.

INPC - Variação por regiões - mensal e acumulada em 12 meses

Região	Peso Regional (%)	Variação (%)		Variação Acumulada (%)
		Março	Abril	Ano	12 meses
Salvador	8,75	0,75	1,08	2,30	5,45
Fortaleza	5,42	1,02	0,89	2,95	4,93
São Luís	3,11	1,39	0,85	2,96	5,39
Aracaju	1,29	1,08	0,84	3,04	5,43
Porto Alegre	7,38	1,27	0,81	2,22	5,65
Brasília	1,88	0,72	0,67	1,58	3,40
Belém	6,44	0,45	0,64	2,43	3,97
Curitiba	7,29	0,92	0,63	1,82	4,93
Rio de Janeiro	9,51	0,91	0,61	2,58	5,28
Goiânia	4,15	0,32	0,58	1,70	5,07
Recife	5,88	0,99	0,45	2,46	4,78
São Paulo	24,24	0,70	0,42	2,22	5,19
Belo Horizonte	10,60	0,35	0,41	2,19	5,06
Campo Grande	1,64	0,67	0,40	2,02	4,52
Vitória	1,83	0,53	0,29	2,19	5,50
Rio Branco	0,59	0,66	0,00	1,71	5,50
Brasil	100,00	0,77	0,60	2,29	5,07
Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Índices de Preços

Para o cálculo do índice do mês foram comparados os preços coletados no período de 30 de março a 30 de abril de 2019 (referência) com os preços vigentes no período de 27 de fevereiro a 29 de março de 2019 (base).

O INPC é calculado pelo IBGE desde 1979, se refere às famílias com rendimento monetário de 01 a 05 salários mínimos, sendo o chefe assalariado, e abrange dez regiões metropolitanas do país, além dos municípios de Goiânia, Campo Grande, Rio Branco, São Luís, Aracaju e de Brasília.

Inflação atinge 0,57% em abril pressionada pelo reajuste no preço dos remédios. A alta de 2,25% nos remédios refletiu o ajuste anual, em vigor desde 31 de março

Influenciada pela alta no preço dos remédios, a inflação chegou a 0,57% em abril, segundo o Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA), divulgado hoje pelo IBGE. É a maior alta para um mês de abril desde 2016. Com isso, a variação acumulada no ano ficou em 2,09% e a variação nos últimos 12 meses em 4,94%.

A alta de 2,25% nos remédios refletiu o ajuste anual, em vigor desde 31 de março, que atingiu todas as classes desses produtos, com um teto de 4,33%. Com os aumentos nos itens higiene pessoal (2,76%) e plano de saúde (0,80%), o grupo Saúde e cuidados pessoais foi o que registrou a maior inflação do mês (1,51%).

IPCA - Variação mensal (%)

BrasilBelémFortalezaRecifeSalvadorBelo HorizonteGrande VitóriaRio de JaneiroSão PauloCuritibaPorto AlegreRio BrancoSão LuísAracajuCampo GrandeGoiâniaBrasília

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Fonte: IBGE - Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo

O grupo dos Transportes mostrou a segunda maior variação no IPCA de abril (0,94%). O principal impacto veio da gasolina que ficou, em média, 2,66% mais cara, sendo o principal impacto individual no índice do mês. Mas também houve alta no preço das passagens aéreas (5,32%) e dos ônibus urbanos (0,74%), que foram reajustados em Goiânia, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Recife e Curitiba. Também influenciou o grupo, o reajuste de 27,30% dos trens, em Porto Alegre, e de 6,98% do metrô, no Rio de Janeiro.

Já a inflação dos alimentos e bebidas desacelerou de março (1,37%) para abril (0,63%) influenciada, principalmente, pela queda nos preços do feijão-carioca (-9,09%) e das frutas (-0,71). Mesmo assim, ainda houve pressão de alguns produtos como tomate (28,64%), frango inteiro (3,32%) e cebola (8,62%).

Segundo o gerente da Pesquisa, Fernando Gonçalves, os alimentos e os transportes já vinham se destacando nos últimos meses, cenário que se repetiu em abril: “no resultado do mês, a novidade foi o grupo Saúde e cuidados pessoais, que não tinha aparecido nos últimos meses. De qualquer modo, isso reflete o aumento anual dos medicamentos, que ocorre no final de março”.

Em maio, a inflação será influenciada pelo aumento de 3,43% no preço do botijão nas refinarias, autorizado pela Petrobrás e em vigor desde o dia 5 e, também, pelo início da cobrança da bandeira amarela no consumo da energia elétrica, que acrescenta R$ 1,00 a cada 100 kW/h.


DOCUMENTO: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/24370-ipca-fica-em-0-57-em-abril

FGV. IBRE. 10/05/19. Índices Gerais de Preços. IGP-M Primeiro Decêndio. IGP-M varia 0,58% na 1ª prévia de maio

O Índice Geral de Preços - Mercado (IGP-M) subiu 0,58% no primeiro decêndio de maio, registrando variação abaixo da apurada no mesmo período de abril, quando o índice havia variado 0,62%.

O Índice de Preços ao Produtor Amplo (IPA) variou 0,74% no primeiro decêndio de maio. No mesmo período do mês de abril, o índice havia subido 0,65%. Na análise por estágios de processamento, os preços dos Bens Finais variaram 0,58% em maio, ante 0,64% em abril. A principal contribuição para este recuo partiu do subgrupo alimentos in natura, cuja taxa passou de -1,32% para -2,02%. O índice correspondente aos Bens Intermediários subiu 1,00% no primeiro decêndio de maio, contra 0,11% no mês anterior. Contribuiu para o movimento o subgrupo combustíveis e lubrificantes para a produção cuja taxa passou de -0,37% para 3,47%.

O índice referente as Matérias-Primas Brutas variou 0,63% no primeiro decêndio de maio, contra alta de 1,30% no mês anterior. Contribuíram para o recuo da taxa do grupo os seguintes itens: soja (em grão) (1,06% para -2,42%), mandioca (aipim) (5,25% para -5,06%) e milho (em grão) (-2,78% para -5,68%). Em sentido oposto, vale citar minério de ferro (1,29% para 5,75%), arroz (em casca) (-1,85% para 4,75%) e café (em grão) (-1,89% para -1,05%).

O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPC) variou 0,35% no primeiro decêndio de maio, ante 0,65% no mês anterior. Sete das oito classes de despesa componentes do índice registraram decréscimo em suas taxas de variação, com destaque para o grupo Alimentação (0,69% para 0,09%). Nesta classe de despesa, vale mencionar o comportamento do item frutas, cuja taxa passou de 3,94% para -2,70%.

Também foram computados decréscimo nas taxas de variação dos grupos Vestuário (1,29% para -0,21%), Habitação (0,50% para 0,25%), Educação, Leitura e Recreação (0,38% para -0,29%), Transportes (1,38% para 1,10%), Comunicação (0,21% para -0,01%) e Despesas Diversas (0,15% para 0,09%). Nestas classes de despesa, as maiores influências observadas partiram dos seguintes itens: roupas (2,13% para -0,38%), tarifa de eletricidade residencial (1,86% para 0,29%), show musical (3,77% para -3,56%), gasolina (4,10% para 3,24%), pacotes de telefonia fixa e internet (0,58% para -0,22%) e alimentos para animais domésticos (0,37% para -0,37%).

Em contrapartida, apenas o grupo Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais (0,09% para 0,88%) apresentou acréscimo em sua taxa de variação. Nesta classe de despesa, vale mencionar o comportamento do item medicamentos em geral, cuja taxa passou de 0,14% para 2,04%.

O Índice Nacional de Custo da Construção (INCC) variou 0,09% no primeiro decêndio de maio, taxa inferior a apurada no mês anterior, quando o índice havia subido 0,36%. Os três componentes do INCC registraram as seguintes taxas na passagem do primeiro decêndio de abril para o primeiro decêndio de maio: Materiais e Equipamentos (0,54% para 0,24%), Serviços (0,25% para 0,00%) e Mão de Obra (0,25% para 0,00%).

DOCUMENTO: https://portalibre.fgv.br/navegacao-superior/noticias/noticias-1508.htm

CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL

IBGE. 10/05/2019. Índice Nacional da Construção Civil tem alta de 0,34% em abril

O Índice Nacional da Construção Civil (Sinapi) apresentou variação de 0,34% em abril, 0,18 ponto percentual (p.p.) abaixo do mês anterior, que registrou 0,52%.

Na comparação com abril de 2018 (0,26%), o índice aumentou 0,08 p.p.

O acumulado em 12 meses ficou em 4,95%, pouco acima dos 4,86% registrados nos 12 meses imediatamente anteriores. No ano, a alta acumulada é de 1,50%.

O custo nacional da construção, por metro quadrado, passou para R$ 1.130,67 em abril, sendo R$ 590,15 relativos aos materiais e R$ 540,52 à mão de obra. Em março, o custo nacional do setor havia sido de R$ 1.126,82. 

Os custos dos materiais subiram 0,33%, ficando 0,46 p.p. abaixo do resultado do mês anterior (0,79%). Em relação a abril de 2018 (0,14%), essa variação aumentou 0,19 p.p. Os materiais acumularam 1,87% no ano e 6,50% nos últimos 12 meses.

Já a taxa da mão de obra teve nova alta e ficou em 0,36%, 0,13 p.p. acima de março. Na comparação com abril de 2018 (0,37%), a taxa ficou no mesmo patamar. A mão de obra acumulou 1,12% no ano e 3,35% em 12 meses.

Norte é a região com maior alta nos custos

O Norte teve a maior alta no custo da construção civil entre as grandes regiões, com variação de 0,53%, e crescimento significativo da mão de obra no Amapá. As demais regiões também apresentaram alta com os seguintes resultados: 0,46% no Nordeste, 0,25% no Sudeste, 0,33% no Sul e 0,20% no Centro-Oeste.

Os custos regionais da construção, por metro quadrado, foram de R$ 1.135,07 no Norte, R$ 1.050,49 no Nordeste, R$ 1.180,74 no Sudeste, R$ 1.175,96 no Sul e R$ 1.131,69 no Centro-Oeste.

Maranhão registra o maior custo entre os estados

O Maranhão apresentou o maior crescimento nos custos da construção entre os estados, 2,75%, influenciado pela alta na mão de obra. A seguir veio o Amapá, com 1,81%, também com aumento nos custos com profissionais.

Sinapi - Abril/2019
Com a desoneração da folha de pagamento de empresas do setor

ÁREAS GEOGRÁFICAS	CUSTOS MÉDIOS	NÚMEROS ÍNDICES	VARIAÇÕES PERCENTUAIS
	R$/m2	JUN/94=100	MENSAL	NO ANO	12 MESES
BRASIL	1130,67	565,84	0,34	1,50	4,95
REGIÃO NORTE	1135,07	565,61	0,53	1,16	6,17
Rondônia	1166,61	650,46	0,20	1,03	4,39
Acre	1240,93	658,74	0,02	0,59	5,37
Amazonas	1096,74	537,02	0,58	1,15	6,07
Roraima	1184,03	491,67	-0,12	0,82	5,91
Para	1129,46	541,36	0,66	1,46	7,34
Amapá	1106,52	537,51	1,81	1,65	5,12
Tocantins	1161,15	610,54	-0,29	-0,01	3,50
REGIÃO NORDESTE	1050,49	567,47	0,46	1,27	4,66
Maranhão	1096,41	577,57	2,75	2,69	6,60
Piauí	1079,94	717,66	0,18	2,35	3,68
Ceará	1038,38	599,76	0,01	0,29	2,95
Rio Grande do Norte	1034,56	521,47	-0,40	0,95	3,64
Paraíba	1090,26	602,97	0,35	0,48	4,48
Pernambuco	1016,18	543,34	0,18	0,26	2,87
Alagoas	1033,45	516,40	0,27	1,10	3,70
Sergipe	985,31	523,62	0,26	1,65	4,58
Bahia	1053,31	557,49	0,01	1,78	6,39
REGIÃO SUDESTE	1180,74	565,28	0,25	1,94	5,07
Minas Gerais	1084,03	596,55	0,59	4,06	6,59
Espírito Santo	1020,05	565,72	-0,09	0,66	3,64
Rio de Janeiro	1249,18	569,28	0,40	1,97	4,81
São Paulo	1224,36	553,02	0,04	0,92	4,44
REGIÃO SUL	1175,96	562,35	0,33	1,60	5,46
Paraná	1151,19	550,49	0,57	1,71	6,02
Santa Catarina	1269,69	687,74	0,12	1,74	4,76
Rio Grande do Sul	1127,22	511,63	0,15	1,28	5,26
REGIÃO CENTRO-OESTE	1131,69	577,77	0,20	0,66	3,80
Mato Grosso do Sul	1087,51	511,42	-0,37	-0,47	2,31
Mato Grosso	1136,69	648,54	0,06	0,93	5,75
Goias	1104,95	583,70	0,10	0,75	2,10
Distrito Federal	1192,64	526,68	0,87	0,89	4,54

Sinapi - Abril/2019
Sem a desoneração da folha de pagamento de empresas do setor

ÁREAS GEOGRÁFICAS	CUSTOS MÉDIOS	NÚMEROS ÍNDICES	VARIAÇÕES PERCENTUAIS
	R$/m2	JUN/94=100	MENSAL	NO ANO	12 MESES
BRASIL	1213,37	607,01	0,33	1,46	4,82
REGIÃO NORTE	1212,28	604,13	0,53	1,14	5,98
Rondônia	1245,97	694,67	0,19	1,17	4,36
Acre	1324,96	703,19	0,02	0,54	5,22
Amazonas	1172,35	574,26	0,56	1,10	6,03
Roraima	1273,40	528,75	-0,11	0,76	5,82
Pará	1204,49	577,08	0,63	1,39	6,95
Amapá	1182,72	574,33	2,01	1,86	5,17
Tocantins	1241,68	652,97	-0,27	0,06	3,47
REGIÃO NORDESTE	1123,45	606,83	0,47	1,32	4,58
Maranhão	1171,36	617,29	2,80	2,72	6,59
Piauí	1152,31	765,56	0,16	2,44	3,70
Ceará	1106,58	638,69	0,01	0,33	2,82
Rio Grande do Norte	1105,53	557,11	-0,37	0,98	3,53
Paraíba	1163,53	643,53	0,43	0,52	4,29
Pernambuco	1087,08	581,05	0,17	0,23	2,77
Alagoas	1103,08	551,20	0,25	1,06	3,62
Sergipe	1053,19	559,73	0,24	1,58	4,47
Bahia	1130,95	598,18	0,01	1,89	6,33
REGIÃO SUDESTE	1271,61	608,43	0,22	1,79	4,85
Minas Gerais	1163,00	639,83	0,55	4,05	6,40
Espírito Santo	1094,23	606,99	-0,08	0,62	3,50
Rio de Janeiro	1347,01	614,23	0,39	1,70	4,60
São Paulo	1320,95	596,62	0,01	0,75	4,24
REGIÃO SUL	1266,47	605,57	0,32	1,53	5,32
Paraná	1243,09	594,44	0,53	1,60	5,84
Santa Catarina	1371,03	742,60	0,11	1,63	4,62
Rio Grande do Sul	1204,92	547,01	0,20	1,29	5,16
REGIÃO CENTRO-OESTE	1208,70	617,04	0,17	0,61	3,69
Mato Grosso do Sul	1162,30	546,14	-0,34	-0,44	2,32
Mato Grosso	1216,61	693,95	0,04	0,83	5,54
Goias	1179,07	622,30	0,04	0,72	2,02
Distrito Federal	1271,32	561,49	0,81	0,83	4,31

Custos da construção civil sobem 0,34% em abril. Os custos da construção acumulam alta de 1,50% no ano

O Índice Nacional da Construção Civil (Sinapi) aumentou 0,34% em abril, abaixo do 0,52% registrado em março pelo IBGE. Com isso, os custos do setor acumulam alta de 4,95% nos últimos 12 meses e de 1,50% no ano.

O custo por metro quadrado do setor subiu para R$ 1.130,67, sendo R$ 590,15 relativos aos materiais, com alta de 0,33%, e R$ 540,52 referentes à mão de obra, com aumento de 0,36%. Em março, esse valor havia sido de R$ 1.126,82.

As despesas da construção em abril, por metro quadrado, foram de R$ 1.135,07 no Norte, R$ 1.050,49 no Nordeste, R$ 1.180,74 no Sudeste, R$ 1.175,96 no Sul e R$ 1.131,69 no Centro-Oeste.

De acordo com o gerente da pesquisa, Augusto Oliveira, os acordos coletivos aumentaram os custos com mão de obra novamente: “este mês destacamos os dissídios no Amapá e no Maranhão, que fizeram com que Norte e Nordeste atingissem as maiores altas no mês”.

O Maranhão apresentou o maior crescimento nos custos da construção entre os estados, 2,75%, influenciado pela alta na mão de obra. A seguir veio o Amapá, com 1,81%, também com aumento nos gastos com profissionais.

DOCUMENTO: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/24382-indice-nacional-da-construcao-civil-tem-alta-de-0-34-em-abril

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LGCJ.: