US ECONOMICS
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DoS. May 14, 2019. Assistant Secretary Kevin E. Moley Travel to the United Kingdom
Washington, DC - Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Kevin E. Moley is on travel to London, United Kingdom from May 14-18. While in London, Assistant Secretary Moley will attend meetings with his P5 counterparts. Topics will include a broad range of multilateral challenges from Venezuela to Iran to UN reform.
In addition to P5 meetings, Assistant Secretary Moley will meet with the Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization Kitack Lim, as well as officials from the U.S. Embassy to the United Kingdom.
DoS. May 14, 2019. Press Availability With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. Rus Hotel. Sochi, Russia
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a joint press conference. Secretary of State, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, please.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to once again welcome Mike Pompeo on Russian soil. This is his first visit to Russia in his capacity of Secretary of State of the U.S., though he used to come here in his other capacities before. Today we have had negotiations as a follow-up to a meaningful one-hour-and-a-half telephone conversation between our presidents which took play on the 3rd of May. And following up on that conversation, heads of state instructed us to intensify our dialogue.
We have started to tackle this task several days ago in Rovaniemi in Finland on the margins of the ministerial council of the Arctic Council. That was a very useful meeting. And today in the wake of that dialogue we have verily discussed the situation in our bilateral affairs, as well as exchanged opinions on the most relevant issues of international and regional issues – first and foremost Venezuela, Korean Peninsula, Syria, Middle East on the whole, and North Africa as well, Ukraine, Afghanistan, and the situation around Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on settling the Iranian nuclear deal.
And as a result of our negotiations, we’ll report to President Putin in a few hours. But overall, I would like to say that this was a frank and a useful conversation. It is clear that our relations have seen better times and there is a potential for mutually beneficial cooperation, and it largely remains untapped. And a certain role is played in that by the legacy from the predecessors that was inherited by this administration, and I mean anti-Russian sanction policy.
Since we are talking about major nuclear powers, the tension between Russia and the United States unavoidably has a negative impact on global affairs. Therefore we, together with the Secretary, have agreed that we need to take practical steps to amend the current situation. Russia is interested in normalizing our dialogue, and we are convinced that it is quite possible and real if we hold this dialogue based on mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests.
We have agreed that it’s important to rebuild the channels of communications. Lately, these channels were frozen, largely due to a wake of baseless accusations against us in attempts to influence American elections and certain collusion of high-ranking officials of the incumbent administration, and it is clear that such insinuations are absolutely fake.
The report was published recently by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, and we hope that this tumultuous situation will die down and we can finally move on to building more professional, constructive dialogue between Russia and the U.S. I believe that we have all the basic understandings that were discussed by our presidents at their meeting last year in Helsinki at the summit and several times over the phone. Right now, all these understandings are not fully being implemented.
As for tangible results, we can say that December last year saw rebuilding of the working group on counterterrorism at the level of deputy secretary of state and deputy foreign minister. That’s a good step, but it’s not enough. We expect that it’ll be possible to implement other ideas that were reviewed in Helsinki and recently by us in Finland as well as today here in Sochi.
First and foremost, I’d like to highlight that it is – it would be useful to create a nongovernmental expert council of famous political analysts, ex-military and diplomats, specialists for bilateral relations, and they could have a fresh take, and they would – could help us decide how to overcome the accumulated mistrust in order to have the right interpretation of each other’s actions in military sphere and to prevent arms race, and in the future to create sustainable and normal cooperation in other spheres as well.
We believe it is also useful to create a business advisory council that could unite representatives of larger – of major businesses from both countries, and they could draft recommendations how the governments could create conditions for a conducive environment for economic cooperation. We have also discussed what could give a positive impetus to Russian-American relations. We have given a memo to the Secretary of State, and we hope that Washington will carefully review that.
As for international agenda, we had a frank conversation on many issues, including the situation around Venezuela. Russia is for the nation of Venezuela to define its own future. And in this regard, it is extremely important that all patriotic and responsible political stakeholders in this country to start a dialogue between themselves. And a number of countries in the region call for the same thing within the mechanism of Montevideo. The government, as Nicolas Maduro has said, is prepared for such a dialogue.
We spoke about Syria and the need to fully implement the Resolution 2254. The key clause there is the respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. We have agreed to continue consultations based on the context that we have, and we have compared notes on a number of specific aspects, including those that have to do with the final eradication of terrorism on the Syrian soil, ensuring the return of refugees, solving humanitarian issues, as well as launching of political process in establishing a constitutional committee. And we hope that this committee in the nearest future will be able to start its work in Geneva under the aegis of the UN.
We spoke about Middle East, about the situation that is taking place around JCPOA on ensuring the peaceful nature of Iranian nuclear program. We have many differences here, but the fact that we talk on this topic and will continue to discuss this situation, that gives us hope that certain agreements could be reached with the support of the U.S. and Russia.
As for the situation in the Ukraine, there is also a UN Security Council resolution that endorsed Minsk agreements, and we expect that the new administration in Ukraine will be able to define their position on Minsk agreements basing their actions on the fact there is no alternative to political settlement of this inner Ukrainian crisis.
As for other issues, I would like to highlight the situation around Korean Peninsula. Our presidents discussed that thoroughly in their conversation on the 3rd of May. President Putin told President Trump about the summit which took place in Vladivostok on the 25th of April. We are promoting dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. We are prepared to support such a dialogue, and we are positive that in the end we should strive to create a strong mechanism of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
Naturally, we highlighted that the leadership of DPRK expects certain guarantees of security of their country reciprocated by denuclearization, and that denuclearization should be expanded over the whole of the Korean Peninsula.
We highlighted very useful cooperation that’s happening on Afghanistan, including the trio format – Russia, United States, and China.
We paid special attention to the issues of strategic stability. We have reviewed the situation that’s taking place around intermediate-range force – nuclear forces treaty. We spoke about the promise of the New START Treaty, considering that it is going to expire in February 2021. We are interested in renewing a professional and specific dialogue on all aspects of arms control. I hope that such an agreement will be positively received by our two nations and the global community on the whole.
Overall, I’d like to say once again that this conversation was a frank one, meaningful, detailed. And I hope that the visit of Mike Pompeo would not only help improve the atmosphere of Russian-American relations, but it would also allow to move on maybe through small steps, but with specific, concrete steps, in solving practical issues that require to be settled both in bilateral sphere and in regional and international agenda.
I would like to thank my counterpart for good negotiations, and please, you have the floor.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Sergey, thank you. Good afternoon. I want to first of all say that I appreciate President Putin and Prime[i] Minister Lavrov for hosting me today. Thank you, sir. We had a frank discussion about many issues, including many places where we disagree. The United States stands ready to find common ground with Russia, as long as the two of us can engage seriously on those issues.
We discussed, as Foreign Minister Lavrov said, many important topics. We talked about terrorism. We talked about Afghanistan. President Trump has made clear that his expectation is that we will have an improved relationship between our two countries. This will benefit each of our peoples, and I think that our talks here today were a good step in that direction.
A few subjects that we talked about. Foreign Minister Lavrov mentioned that we spoke about Syria. We both want to move forward on the political track to bring the suffering of the Syrian people to an end, and we want to do so in a way that ensures that Syria will never again be a haven for Islamist terrorist groups. I also raised our concern about the escalation of the situation around Idlib in the northwest of Syria.
We also discussed North Korea and its nuclear program. The United States and Russia agree on the goal of the denuclearization, and we’ll continue to discuss it. I underscored that we must maintain full implementation of the UN sanctions until the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea is achieved. And our two teams have been working very closely together on this in a very productive fashion.
On Venezuela, we have disagreement. I urged my Russian colleagues to support the Venezuelan people as they return democracy to their country. The United States and more than 50 other nations agree that the time has come for Nicolas Maduro to go. He has brought nothing but misery to the Venezuelan people, and we hope that the Russians’ support for Maduro will end. But despite our disagreements, we’ll keep talking. I hope we can find a way forward that ends with the humanitarian and political crisis that is happening. On this we both agree.
We also discussed the situation in Ukraine. The Trump administration has been clear that we do not recognize Russia’s attempted annexation in Crimea, and we hope that we can continue to move forward. Our sanctions have remained in place. I urged Russia to reach out to Ukraine’s new president to demonstrate leadership by taking a step towards breaking the stalemate. We would, in particular, welcome the release of the Ukrainian crewmen detained near the Kerch Strait last year, and we talked about implementation and how we might move forward in obtaining a ceasefire in the Donbas region.
We spoke a bit about the activities that are taking place in the Middle East today, with particular focus on the actions that Iran is taking. I made clear that the United States will continue to apply pressure to the regime in Tehran until its leadership is prepared to return to the ranks of responsible nations that do not threaten their neighbors or spread instability or terror.
As Foreign Minister Lavrov alluded to, very much on President Trump’s mind is arms control. Our actions on the INF Treaty have demonstrated that we’re committed to effective arms control that advances U.S. allied and partner security that is verifiable and enforceable. The President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, to include countries beyond our traditional U.S.-Russia framework and a broader range of weapon systems. The President wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people. And we know – and I think we agree on this – to achieve these goals, we’ll have to work together, and that it would be important that, if it’s possible, we get China involved as well. We’ll have a more extensive set of conversations, both about arms control and a opportunity to discuss all broad strategic security issues between our two countries in the weeks ahead.
I also raised the issue of U.S. citizens who have been detained in Russia, making sure that our citizens are not unjustly held abroad. It is one of President Trump’s highest priorities.
And we spoke, too, about the question of interference in our domestic affairs. I conveyed that there are things that Russia can do to demonstrate that these types of activities are a thing of the past and I hope that Russia will take advantage of those opportunities.
Finally, I wanted to emphasize the American friendship with the Russian people. Our two nations share proud histories and respect for one another’s cultures. We seek a better relationship with Russia and we urge that it work alongside us to change the trajectory of the relationship, which will benefit each of our peoples. Thank you, Sergey.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Dear colleagues, we are moving on to Q&A. Kommersant newspaper, please. You have the floor.
QUESTION: (Via interepreter) Vladimir Solovyov, Kommersant newspaper. You mentioned the New START Treaty, which is expiring in 2021, but it is still unclear whether it will be surely prolonged. Therefore, the question to Secretary Pompeo: Is Washington prepared to extend New START Treaty for five years, as Moscow is proposing? Whether U.S. is prepared to discuss concerns of Russia of that conversion of launchers and heavy bombers as well?
And a question to Mr. Lavrov: If the U.S. did not alleviate concerns of Russia, will Moscow continue to want to prolong the treaty? Thank you.
SECRETARY POMPEO: So Foreign Minister Lavrov raised the issue of concerns about compliance with New START today. We’ll continue to work to allow that treaty to be verified exactly as the verification regime exists. As for its extension, what we’ve agreed that we will do is we will gather together teams that will begin to work not only on New START and its potential extension, but on a broader range of arms control issues that each of our two nations have, I think, in our shared best interest achieving an agreement on.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Now, as for our position, indeed we have concerns that have to do with the claimed refitting of the U.S. launchers of Trident SLBMs as well as heavy bombers – of converting them to non-nuclear forces. The START – the treaty foresees certain procedures that allow for the second party – should allow for the second party to verify that this conversion, refitting of equipment, is done in such a way that it is impossible to return the nuclear warheads to the launchers on the bombers. We are discussing that at Bilateral Consultative Commission, which oversees the implementation of the treaty, and we expect that this discussion will yield positive result in the end.
As for the question of what Russia will do if these concerns remain in place, I’d prefer not to respond to that, because right now we proceed from the assumption that we can agree within the Bilateral Consultative Commission, and guessing – doing the guesswork what will happen, what will not, that’s possibly not the diplomatic task. Our task is to achieve a result, and that’s what we will do.
MS ORTAGUS: Okay. Thanks. We’re going to go to Guy Benson from Fox News.
QUESTION: Thank you very much. I want to follow up on Venezuela. Mr. Secretary, what was the message from the Trump administration specifically in regards to the Russian Government and their continued support of Nicolas Maduro and their active involvement in the Western Hemisphere?
And Mr. Foreign Minister, why is it that the Russian Government persists in supporting Mr. Maduro when virtually every democracy in Latin America has recognized Mr. Guaido as the legitimate interim leader of that country? Thank you.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Guy, we talked about this for some time. We made clear the U.S. position. We want every country that’s interfering in Venezuela to cease doing that. We want the Venezuelan people to get their democracy back. We want them to have a fair, free election, elect their own leadership, not in the way that the sham election took place with Mr. Maduro. So whether it’s Iranian forces or Chinese or Cubans, the Trump administration’s position is that they all need to cease having an impact in supporting Maduro and allow the Venezuelan people not only to get their democracy back but give them an opportunity to rebuild this country that has tremendous wealth. There are Russian companies operating there that are successful businesses as well. We want those countries – we want that country to get a chance to rebuild its economy, too, so that it isn’t dependent on humanitarian assistance from anywhere in the world, but rather they can begin to deliver economic outcomes for themselves. And to do that, the central point is that we need free and fair elections there, not interfered by any other nation.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) As for our position, and in response to your question why Russia is taking such a stance in support of dialogue, of viewing all the issues by Venezuelans themselves with no ultimatums and no preconditions – well, this position stems from the fact that democracy cannot be done by force. The threats that we hear against Maduro government, threats that come from the mouths of official representatives of the U.S. administration and from Mr. Guaido, who always mentions his right to invite military intervention from outside – this has nothing in common with democracy.
We remember back in 2003 – I think that was May – the President of the United States, George W. Bush, on the board of aircraft carrier declared the democracy in Iraq. We remember 2011. It was declared that the leader of Libya Muammar Qadhafi was ousted and now Libya is a democracy. I don’t think I should go into more detail on how the democracy fuels itself in Iraq and Libya and other places where such attempts of coup d’etat took place and it brought nothing good about.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Russia 24 Channel, please.
QUESTION: (Via interpreter) Thank you. Natalia Litovko, Russia 24 Channel. Question to both ministers about possible personal meeting between President Putin and President Trump. We see contradictory information there. Could you please clarify whether such a meeting will take place? We hear about Osaka, but is it planned and when and where?
A second question to Secretary Pompeo. You just came back from Brussels, where you discussed with your European colleagues the nuclear deal with Iran. Well, the latest news about possible relocation of troops to the Middle East – that sounds concerning. Does it mean that Washington chose a strategy of force against Iran? Are European leaders on board with you on that?
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Well, naturally, we heard statements by President Trump that he expects to hold a meeting with President Putin, including during the G20 summit in Osaka. We heard a proposal. Well, if we receive such an official invitation, we’ll respond positively, and we talked about that today with Michael Pompeo.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Let me talk about my conversations in Brussels and then more broadly about the United States policy with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. So I went to Brussels to share with our European friends the threats and concerns we have about actions that the Iranians are taking or are potentially taking, and we wanted to make sure they understood the risks as we saw them, and I shared that with them in some detail.
As for our policy, it’s been consistent now for the entire Trump administration. And the decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, now just over a year ago, made clear what our objectives are. We laid them out in May of last year. We’re looking for Iran to behave like a normal country, and that’s our ask. And we have applied pressure to the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran to achieve that.
We fundamentally do not seek a war with Iran. We’re looking for the regime to simply stop conducting assassination campaigns throughout Europe, to cease their support of Hizballah that threatens interests all across the Middle East, their support for the Houthis that are launching missiles into areas where there are Russians and Americans traveling. These missiles could easily kill a Russian or an American. We laid them out in some detail. Our position hasn’t changed.
And the movement of troops that you described I’ll leave to the Department of Defense, but we’ve also made clear to the Iranians that if American interests are attacked, we will most certainly respond in an appropriate fashion.
MS ORTAGUS: Shaun Tandon, AFP.
QUESTION: Great. Thank you. Thanks for you time. I wanted to follow up on a couple of statements that you’ve said. First, for Foreign Minister Lavrov, you mentioned that despite the disagreements with Iran that there’s a possibility of certain agreements on Iran going forward. Could you explain what you see in common with the U.S. on Iran, where you can go?
Secretary Pompeo, if I could ask you about the mysterious incidents in the UAE, regarding the oil tankers, have you pinpointed responsibility for that? And if I could follow up on your statement about the election, you said that there are things that Russia could do to show that election interference is a thing of the past. What are those things? What do – what would you like Russia to do? Thank you very much.
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) As for situation in Iran, Iran and JCPOA, on the settlement of Iranian nuclear issue, I hope that reason will gain the upper hand and that rumors about the ostensibly planned of 120,000 strong army of the U.S., what we spoke about today, is just a rumor. And Mike said that it’s a ministry of defense thing, and these are just rumors which are baseless, because this region is so tense with different conflicts and difficult situations. And on the margin, I say that we spoke about the future of Palestinian-Israeli settlement as well. I said that we hope to find a political solution to the situation around Iran. Indeed, we’ll try to facilitate for the situation not to tip over to the military scenario. And how we do it, that’s the task for diplomats. And I felt that the U.S. side has a commitment to finding a political solution.
The situation is a complex one. As you know, we did not support and we believe that it is a mistake that the U.S. decided to withdraw from JCPOA. And those measures that the U.S. Government is undertaking right now by introducing sanctions which prohibit to have any deals with Iran – you cannot buy oil; you cannot trade with Iran at all – I hope that we together, with our European colleagues, with our Chinese colleagues, who are also a party to the agreement on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, will keep in touch with our American colleagues and try to find ways out of this crisis. Because right now we have only entered this spiral and we’re getting sucked into it.
I’d like to use this opportunity that I have the floor – I wanted to talk about the topic that you – the question that you addressed to Secretary Pompeo about the interference of the Russian Federation in the election process in the U.S. I gave Mike today a copy of an article that was published in the United States in 1987 with a warning that the Soviet Union is going to influence the elections, the presidential elections which were planned for 1988. The article actually mentioned for the first time about the political ambition of then successful businessman Donald Trump. So we can discuss this topic forever, but until we have cold, hard facts on the table, we cannot have a grown-up discussion about it. The facts tell us that there is no proof of those who are trying to hype up this topic. We have mentioned several times that we could have renewed professional contact in cybersecurity, and within this context we could discuss any concerns that one party has to another. Attacks against our internet resources, they – the lion’s share of those attacks come from the United States soil.
And when we talk about the latest presidential campaign in the U.S., since 2013, we used to have, and we still have, a channel of exchange on information about possible indeliberate risks in cyberspace. And since October 2016, when the Democratic administration of the United States raised this issue for the first time, till January 2017, till Donald Trump inauguration, we used to have a traffic of response and requests of information, and we have offered recently – when the verbal attacks against Russian Federations that had to do with alleged interference in elections reached their ceiling, we suggested that we could use this traffic between these two special centers that deal with cyberspace threats. We suggested to publish that, and I mentioned that to Mike. Administration refused to do so. I don’t know who made this decision. However, the publication of this data was blocked by the American side, but we believe that making them public would alleviate a lot of those deliberations that have been spread right now.
Naturally, we will not act unilaterally, we will not publish them, we will not make them public. But I’d like to just – to flag this fact: Once again, I’m saying we are prepared. We are ready. We want to deal with our American colleagues with the issues that appear in the cyberspace through professional dialogue with no emotions, no political jaundice, with no ideology, with no attempts to make this topic the main one in the domestic policy in the U.S.
And I’m sorry, by the way, I gave Mike an unofficial – a non-paper, a non-official memo, and it lays out the relevant – the actual information of U.S. interference in the domestic policy of the Russian Federation, including the notorious law on support of freedom in the Ukraine – it was adopted by the Congress – where the Secretary of State is instructed, he’s obligated to promote democracy in Russia directly through working with Russian NGOs, and $20 million have been earmarked for that annually. That’s not contemplations or a deliberation. This is a real law. We are prepared to talk on this topic.
And His Excellency much respected by me, Mr. Huntsman, knows how hard it is to work in Russia sometimes, and our ambassador in the U.S. also knows that about the issues that arise, and we want to alleviate those issues for – all that accumulation of mutual negative actions, which was initiated by the United States that we had to reciprocate, to alleviate that all, for the diplomats to work transparently, openly, according to the Viennese Conventions on Diplomatic Relations, without equating perception from the other side that someone is trying to influence a domestic political process.
By the way, once again, we gave an example of 1933, when the United States spearheaded through – President Roosevelt and People’s Commissioner Mr. Litvinov exchanged notes where they committed to non-interference in each other’s processes. I’d like to highlight once again, this action was initiated by the U.S. for several years now, starting with the Obama administration. We suggested to our partners to reconfirm that commitment. Right now, they are not prepared for that, so draw your own conclusions.
SECRETARY POMPEO: You can see we have some disagreements on this issue. I promise not to go back to history from the early ’30s, but I made clear to Foreign Minister Lavrov, as we’ve made clear for the past months, that interference in American elections is unacceptable. If the Russians were to engage in that in 2020, it would put our relationship in an even worse place than it has been, and encourage them not to do that, that we would not tolerate that. We’ve said this not only about the Russians but about other countries as well. Our elections are important and sacred, and they must be kept free and fair and with no outside country interfering in those elections.
Your first question was about what we know about the attacks that took place off of the United Arab Emirates. I don’t have any information that I can share with you yet about the nature of what took place there. We’re working diligently to get answers to what caused those ships to have the problems that they have today.
MODERATOR: (Via interpreter) Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes our press conference. Thank you for taking part in it.
DoS. May 14, 2019. Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Before Their Meeting. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. Rus Hotel. Sochi, Russia
FOREIGN MINISTER LAVROV: (Via interpreter) Mr. Secretary of State, (inaudible) welcome to Sochi.
We had a chance to hold the discussion on the 6th of May, when we had our negotiations in Finland on the margins of the Arctic Council. We covered and we had an exchange of opinions on the international agenda and several bilateral issues. And I hope that today we’ll have a chance to discover them and to discuss them in more detail.
I hope that we’ll be able to come up with specifics of ways how to get U.S.-Russian relations out of that regrettable state that they happen to be, due to several objective and subjective reasons involved, considering that this is the task, the instructions coming from our presidents that was confirmed during the Helsinki summit, as well as in their conversation on the 3rd of May.
We have multiple issues that require both urgent methods as well as long-term, sustainable solutions.
That has to do with the situation in strategic stability sphere, as well as more efficient ways to tackle terrorism, as well as finding solutions to different clashes in different regions of the world.
We see that there are certain suspicions and prejudice on both sides, but this is not a way for – have a win-win situation because that mistrust that we have hinders both your security and our security, and causes concern around the world.
I believe that it is time to build new, more constructive and responsible metrics of our relationship, of our mutual perception, and we are prepared to do that if our U.S. colleagues and counterparts readily support that. I believe that a requisite – an important requisite for success of our dialogue is to rebuild trust at all levels of our dialogue – in the highest level, at the working level, (inaudible). And considering that we have met over the past two weeks for two times, that’s a reason for some optimism. Let’s try it and see what happens.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Sergey, thank you for hosting me. I appreciate it. It’s great to see you again, twice in a couple weeks. I’m excited about that. And I know we’ll see you too (inaudible), we’ll have many more opportunities for conversation.
I’m here today because President Trump is committed to furthering this relationship. As I think you said, we have differences. We – each country will protect its own interests, look out for its own interests of its people. But – it’s not (inaudible) that we’re adversaries on every issue, and I hope that we can find places where we have a set of overlapping interests and can truly begin to build out strong relationships, at least in those particular – on those particular issues.
I’ve seen it myself. We worked closely with you on counterterrorism during my time and service in the Executive Branch very successfully. We’ve saved American lives, we’ve saved Russian lives, as we’ve (inaudible) good, honest, sincere work together. And I think on issues such as arms control and nuclear proliferation, we’ve talked about some of the regional conflicts and terrorism, I think there are spaces where we can get our teams and begin to build out a common set of understandings. I hope too that we can begin to build out our strategic security dialogue, as you and I spoke about when we were in Finland a couple weeks back.
And I hope this effort, I hope this good-faith effort on the part of each of our two nations, as directed by President Trump and President Putin, will stabilize the relationship and put it back on a trajectory that I think will be good for not only each of our two countries and each of our peoples, but for the world as well. I know we’ll have frank discussions, and I’m sure there will be places where we just can’t find common ground, but I look forward to our time together.
DoS. May 14, 2019. Remarks With Russian President Vladimir Putin. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. Bocharov Ruchey. Sochi, Russia
PRESIDENT PUTIN: (Via interpreter) Mr. Secretary of State, dear colleagues, we are glad to welcome you in Russia. As you know, several days ago I had the pleasure of talking to the President of the United States on the phone, and I had the impression that the President intends to rebuilding – intends to rebuild U.S.-Russian relations and contacts in order to solve the issues of mutual interest.
On our behalf, we have said it multiple times that we also would like to rebuild fully fledged relations, and I hope that right now a conducive environment is being built for that, because, though, however exotic the work of Special Counsel Mueller was, I have to say that on the whole he had a very objective investigation and he confirmed that there are no traces whatsoever of collusion between Russia and the incumbent administration, which we’ve said was absolutely fake. As we’ve said before, there was no collusion from our government officials and it could not be there. Still, that was – that was one of the reasons certainly breaking our (inaudible) ties.
I am hoping that today the situation is changing (inaudible), maintaining strategic stability, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on solving regional crises, fighting criminal gangs, environmental issues, eradicating poverty, and other threats in modern times, (inaudible) solutions on economic matters. (Inaudible) trade was quite low in – for the past years (inaudible) last year we saw some increase in trade. I think it has grown by 5 percent (inaudible).
We know the United States (inaudible) a major oil producer. In this regard, Russia has something to discuss regarding the stability of global energy markets. There are also other facets for our cooperation in economic security. I hope that all the (inaudible) be (inaudible) reason for our discussion.
My foreign minister reported to me a brief about your negotiations, and I wanted your visit as Secretary of State, your first time here, would benefit our bilateral ties and would facilitate their development. We are very happy to see you here.
SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you for spending some time with me this evening. We did have a productive set of conversations this afternoon between us. There’s places we disagree; there’s places I think there are truly overlapping interests that we can build on, and most importantly, President Trump very much wants to do that. Always, just as you will, we’ll protect our nation’s interests, but there are places that our two countries can find where we can be cooperative, we can be productive, we can be cumulative, we can work together to make each of our two peoples more successful and, frankly, the world more successful too.
And so President Trump wants to do everything we can, and he asked me to travel here and communicate that – when we have a chance in a little bit, a couple other ideas to suggest. But some of our cooperation has been excellent, on North Korea, on Afghanistan. We’ve been doing work, counterterrorism work, together. These are things we can build upon, and I know we’ll get a chance to talk about our strategic security dialogue as well and the hopes that we have for that to work alongside you, and that’s very, very global in (inaudible).
Thank you again for having me here this evening.
DoS. May 14, 2019. Remarks to Traveling Press. Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State. Bocharov Ruchey. Sochi, Russia
SECRETARY POMPEO: So we had – I don’t know – an hour-and-a-half, almost two-hour meeting. President Putin was there, Foreign Minister Lavrov was there, a couple others in attendance as well. And we talked about nearly every issue facing our two countries, all the challenges and all the opportunities between us as well. We had a very productive conversation on pathways forward in Syria, things that we can do together where we have a shared set of interests, how to move the political process forward. So I’m very excited about that part of the conversation.
And we were also able to make some, I think, truly constructive process points with respect to how Afghanistan might roll out. We each have histories – Russia has a history in Afghanistan; we now have been there for 17 years – how we can move forward on that.
And then we talked – we spent a fair amount of time thinking about North Korea, how we might unlock the denuclearization. I think we share the same objective, and I hope we can find ways that we can work together on that. He understands that the U.S. is going to be in the lead, but I think there’s places we can work together.
Then we spent a lot of time talking about the strategic dialogue and arms control and how we would move that process forward too.
Happy to take a couple questions before we all head on the plane.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you talked a little bit about this during the briefing, but on Iran, did you – do you see any link between Iran and the events in the last couple days? Do you have any evidence to suggest that Iran was in some way responsible for that?
And then second, on Ukraine, do you still believe that it is a precondition for a meeting between the two presidents that Russia release the Ukrainian sailors from the Kerch Strait?
SECRETARY POMPEO: With respect to your second question, I’ll leave that answer to the White House. With respect to the first question, I don’t have anything to add concrete about the connection between the actions and Iran. I think in the coming hours and days we’ll know the answer to that, but I don’t have anything this evening.
QUESTION: Could I ask you a broader question about how you found President Putin? You’ve had sharp words for him before, even at the Claremont Institute the other day. Do you fundamentally see him in a different way after today, or do you still have the same view on the behavior and how his government acts?
SECRETARY POMPEO: This is about the relationship with the United States and Russia and how we move forward together. It’s not about personalities. It’s not about people. It’s about how do you take the interests of our two countries. We’re going to protect our interests doggedly. They are going to do their best to protect their interests in that same way.
So no, we had a good conversation. He was fully engaged. He obviously knows these issues very, very well, and so we were able to have – quickly get down into the context and concrete components of the various elements of the relationship. So in that sense, it was really – really very productive.
QUESTION: A similar question to that. There’s a lot of folks who back home don’t think it’s time to move on in the relationship, still holding on to what happened in the 2016 election. Do you think that the U.S. is ready to move past that and begin repairing the relationship, as you said?
And then secondly, you’ve made clear and Sergey Lavrov made clear that you don’t share an understanding of what happened in 2016. Do you think that the message got through, though, on 2020? Do you think they understand that there would be real repercussions?
SECRETARY POMPEO: I said it as clearly as I could, so yes, I think so. By the way, we have another election in the middle of that. We had one in 2018, where we had some good success at making sure that we kept our election safe and secure and free from interference. So we have another data point after 2016 that we can turn to to gain even more confidence. We’ll continue to do the things we need to do to protect our elections in 2020, and I don’t think you could be mistaken about America finding that Russian interference is unacceptable in the 2020 election.
What was your first question, Guy? Your first question was about – oh, is it time to move on.
QUESTION: Yes.
SECRETARY POMPEO: It’s not about – I don’t see it as moving on. It’s the case that we have places where we just have very different views. You mentioned Ukraine. Look, we have different views on how Ukraine ought to proceed. So it’s not about moving on; it’s about trying to find solutions, compromises, places where there are overlapping interest so you can make progress at unlocking some of the most difficult problems that are facing us.
And so you try to keep the process on high ground, and you try and keep the relationships on the high ground. That’s important. President Trump has made very clear that he wants us all to do that, and we – I strove to do that today with Foreign Minister Lavrov and President Putin. But each of us was very clear about the places we were prepared to go and the things we weren’t prepared to do, and we’ll keep working on each of those.
QUESTION: You mentioned some shared interest in Syria. Were there any concrete steps taken on that front?
SECRETARY POMPEO: There were, but nothing that I can really share with you. But there were. There were some things that I think we can both go do. I guess I can talk about one of them.
So there’s the political process associated with UN Security Council Resolution 2254 that has been hung up, and I think we mutually now can begin to work together in a way to unlock that, to get that process to at least take the first step of forming that committee. It’s not done. It’s not – I’m not sure we have all the capacity of that, but I think we now have a common understanding of the places we were hung up, which I think we can work our way through.
U.S. Department of State. May 11, 2019. Secretary Pompeo's Call With Panamanian President-Elect Laurentino Cortizo
Washington, DC - The below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke yesterday with Panamanian President-Elect Laurentino Cortizo to congratulate him on his electoral victory May 5. The Secretary expressed his appreciation of the U.S.-Panama relationship and his desire to see it grow stronger. The United States enjoys excellent cooperation with Panama on counternarcotics, illegal immigration, and counterterrorism. The Secretary recognized Panama’s partnership in promoting stability in the region, including its vital role as an advocate for democracy in Venezuela and Nicaragua. The Secretary urged President-Elect Cortizo to prioritize transparency and sustainable, broad-based economic growth.
MONETARY POLICY
FED. May 13, 2019. Speech. The Federal Reserve’s Review of Its Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices. Vice Chair Richard H. Clarida. At "New England Perspectives on Fed Policymaking: A 'Fed Listens' Conference" hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts
I am pleased to attend this Fed Listens event providing a New England perspective for the Federal Reserve's review of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.1 We are bringing open minds to our review and are seeking a broad range of perspectives. To us, it simply seems like good institutional practice to engage with a wide range of interested individuals and groups as part of a comprehensive approach to enhanced transparency and accountability.2
Motivation for the Review
The Congress charged the Federal Reserve with achieving a dual mandate—maximum employment and price stability—and this review will take this mandate as given. We will also take as given that a 2 percent rate of inflation in the price index for personal consumption expenditures is the operational goal most consistent with our price-stability mandate. While we believe that our existing strategy, tools, and communications practices have generally served the public well, we are eager to evaluate ways they might be improved. That said, based on the experience of other central banks that have undertaken similar reviews, our review is more likely to produce evolution, not a revolution, in the way we conduct monetary policy.
With the U.S. economy operating at or close to our maximum-employment and price-stability goals, now is an especially opportune time for this review. The unemployment rate is at a 50-year low, and inflation is running close to our 2 percent objective. We want to ensure that we continue to meet our statutory goals in coming years. In addition, we will evaluate the new policy tools and enhanced communication practices the Federal Reserve deployed in response to the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession. Furthermore, the U.S. and foreign economies have evolved significantly since before the crisis.
Perhaps most importantly, neutral interest rates appear to have fallen in the United States and abroad.3 This global decline in neutral rates is widely expected to persist for years and likely reflects several factors, including aging populations, changes in risk-taking behavior, and a slowdown in technology growth. These factors' contributions are highly uncertain, but, irrespective of their precise role, the policy implications of the decline in neutral rates are important. All else being equal, a fall in neutral rates increases the likelihood that a central bank's policy rate will reach its effective lower bound in future economic downturns. That development, in turn, could make it more difficult during downturns for monetary policy to support household spending, business investment, and employment and keep inflation from falling too low.4
Another key development in recent decades is that inflation appears less responsive to resource slack, implying a change in the dynamic relationship between inflation and employment.5 This change is, in a sense, a proverbial double-edged sword. It permits the Federal Reserve to support employment more aggressively during downturns—as was the case during and after the Great Recession—because a sustained inflation breakout is less likely when inflation is less responsive to employment conditions.6 However, that dynamic also increases the cost, in terms of economic output, of reversing unwelcome increases in longer-run inflation expectations. Thus, it is all the more important that longer-run inflation expectations remain anchored at levels consistent with our 2 percent inflation objective.7
Activities and Timeline for the Review
Our monetary policy review will have several components.8 The Board and the Reserve Banks are hosting Fed Listens events—such as this one in Boston—in which we are hearing from, among others, business and labor leaders, community development advocates, and academics. Next month, we are holding a System research conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, with speakers and panelists from outside the Fed. The program includes overviews by academic experts of themes that are central to the review.
Building on the perspectives we hear and on staff analysis, the Federal Open Market Committee will perform its own assessment of how it conducts monetary policy, beginning around the middle of the year. We expect to make our conclusions public in the first half of 2020.
Concluding Thoughts
The economy is constantly evolving, bringing with it new policy challenges. So it makes sense for us to remain open minded as we assess current practices and consider ideas that could potentially enhance our ability to deliver on the goals the Congress has assigned us. For this reason, my colleagues and I do not want to preempt or to predict our ultimate finding. What I can say is that any changes to our conduct of monetary policy that we might make will be aimed solely at improving our ability to achieve and sustain our dual-mandate objectives in the world we live in today.
References
- Bank for International Settlements (2017). 87th Annual Report (PDF). Basel, Switzerland: BIS, June.
- Blanchard, Olivier, Eugenio Cerutti, and Lawrence Summers (2015). "Inflation and Activity—Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications," (PDF) IMF Working Paper WP/5/230. Washington: International Monetary Fund, November.
- Boivin, Jean, and Marc P. Giannoni (2006). "Has Monetary Policy Become More Effective?" Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 88 (August), pp. 445–62.
- Boivin, Jean, Michael T. Kiley, and Frederic S. Mishkin (2010). "How Has the Monetary Transmission Mechanism Evolved over Time?" in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 369–422.
- Brand, Claus, Marcin Bielecki, and Adrian Penalver (2018). "The Natural Rate of Interest: Estimates, Drivers, and Challenges to Monetary Policy," Occasional Paper Series 217. Frankfurt: European Central Bank, December.
- Bullard, James (2018). "The Case of the Disappearing Phillips Curve," speech delivered at the 2018 ECB Forum on Central Banking, Sintra, Portugal, June 19.
- Cecchetti, Stephen G., Michael E. Feroli, Peter Hooper, Anil K. Kashyap, and Kermit L. Schoenholtz (2017). Deflating Inflation Expectations: The Implications of Inflation's Simple Dynamics (PDF), report prepared for the 2017 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, sponsored by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, held in New York, March 3.
- Chung, Hess, Etienne Gagnon, Taisuke Nakata, Matthias Paustian, Bernd Schlusche, James Trevino, Diego Vilán, and Wei Zheng (2019). "Monetary Policy Options at the Effective Lower Bound: Assessing the Federal Reserve's Current Policy Toolkit," (PDF) Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-003. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January.
- Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (2000). "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 115 (February), pp. 147–80.
- Erceg, Christopher, James Hebden, Michael Kiley, David López-Salido, and Robert Tetlow (2018). "Some Implications of Uncertainty and Misperception for Monetary Policy," (PDF) Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-059. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August.
- Faust, Jon, and Jonathan H. Wright (2013). "Forecasting Inflation," in Graham Elliott, Clive Grander, and Allan Timmermann, eds., Handbook of Economic Forecasting, vol. 2A. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 2–56.
- Fuhrer, Jeffrey, Giovanni Olivei, Eric Rosengren, and Geoffrey Tootell (2018). "Should the Fed Regularly Evaluate Its Monetary Policy Framework?" (PDF) paper presented at the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Conference, Fall, held at the Brookings Institution, Washington, September 13–14.
- Holston, Kathryn, Thomas Laubach, and John C. Williams (2017). "Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants," Journal of International Economics, vol. 108, Supplement 1 (May), pp. S59–75.
- Kiley, Michael T., and John M. Roberts (2017). "Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (PDF), Spring, pp. 317–96.
- King, Mervyn, and David Low (2014). "Measuring the 'World' Real Interest Rate," (PDF) NBER Working Paper Series 19887. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, February.
- Rachel, Lukasz, and Thomas D. Smith (2017). "Are Low Real Interest Rates Here to Stay?" (PDF) International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13 (September), pp. 1–42.
- Roberts, John M. (2006). "Monetary Policy and Inflation Dynamics," International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2 (September), pp. 193–230.
- Simon, John, Troy Matheson, and Damiano Sandri (2013). "The Dog That Didn't Bark: Has Inflation Been Muzzled or Was it Just Sleeping?" (PDF) in World Economic Outlook: Hopes, Realities, Risks. Washington: International Monetary Fund, April, pp. 79–95.
- Swanson, Eric T. (2018). "The Federal Reserve Is Not Very Constrained by the Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," NBER Working Paper Series 25123. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October.
- Yellen, Janet (2015). "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, September 24.
Notes
- Additional information about Fed Listens, including background information on the initiative and a listing of events around the country, is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-events.htm.
- Fuhrer and others (2018) explore the desirability of comprehensive reviews of the monetary policy framework. They argue that such reviews may help the Fed more effectively identify and implement needed changes.
- For evidence of a fall in neutral rates of interest in the United States and abroad, see, among several contributions, King and Low (2014); Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2017); Rachel and Smith (2017); and Brand, Bielecki, and Penalver (2018).
- For assessments of the risks that U.S. monetary policy will be constrained by the effective lower bound and its implications for economic activity and inflation, see Kiley and Roberts (2017), Erceg and others (2018), Swanson (2018), and Chung and others (2019).
- The apparent diminished responsiveness of inflation to resource slack is known in economic research as a flattening of the short-run Phillips curve. For evidence of this flattening in the slope of the Phillips curve in the United States and abroad, see, among others, Simon, Matheson, and Sandri (2013); Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers (2015); and Bank for International Settlements (2017).
- One potential contributor to the flattening of the Phillips curve is a change in the conduct of monetary policy since the 1980s toward greater stabilization of inflation and economic activity; for evidence of such a change, see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000); Boivin and Giannoni (2006); and Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin (2010). As discussed in Roberts (2006) and Bullard (2018), greater stabilization on the part of a central bank can lead to the estimation of flatter Phillips curves in reduced-form regressions. Similarly, the adoption of an explicit inflation objective, along with greater certainty regarding the conduct of monetary policy, can help anchor longer-term inflation expectations and stabilize actual inflation in response to shocks.
- See Yellen (2015) for a discussion of inflation dynamics and monetary policy; see Erceg and others (2018) for a quantitative exploration of the monetary policy implications of a flat Phillips curve in an uncertain economic environment. Since the mid-1980s, movements in both realized inflation and measures of longer-term inflation expectations have been somewhat muted, complicating the task of extracting the precise role of inflation expectations as a determinant of realized inflation. Faust and Wright (2013) review the literature on inflation forecasting and present evidence in support of the conclusion that measures of inflation expectations help predict the trend in inflation. Cecchetti and others (2017) showed that while the level of realized inflation and four-quarter-ahead inflation expectations are positively correlated, changes in these variables have been largely uncorrelated since the mid-1980s. These authors suggest that, in a low and stable inflation environment, policymakers should pay attention to a wide array of other indicators in determining the implications of movements in realized inflation and measures of inflation expectations.
- Information about the review and the events associated with it are available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications.htm.
INDUSTRY
FED. May 15, 2019. Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
Industrial production fell 0.5 percent in April, and the rates of change for previous months were revised down on net. Output is now reported to have declined 1.9 percent at an annual rate in the first quarter. Manufacturing production moved down 0.5 percent in April after being unchanged in March. The index for mining advanced 1.6 percent in April, while the index for utilities fell 3.5 percent. At 109.2 percent of its 2012 average, total industrial production was 0.9 percent higher in April than it was a year earlier. Capacity utilization for the industrial sector decreased 0.6 percentage point in April to 77.9 percent, a rate that is 1.9 percentage points below its long-run (1972–2018) average.
Market Groups
Most major market groups posted decreases in April. The production of consumer goods fell 1.2 percent, with declines for both durables and nondurables. The index for durable consumer goods moved down 0.8 percent, mostly because of a drop in the output of automotive products, while the output of nondurables was held down by sizable declines for both chemical products and consumer energy products. Production decreased for business equipment, construction supplies, and business supplies, but output advanced for defense and space equipment and for materials. Among the components of materials, a drop for durables was more than offset by gains for nondurable and energy materials.
Industry Groups
Manufacturing output declined 0.5 percent in April after having decreased about 0.4 percent per month, on average, during the previous three months. In April, the production of durable goods fell almost 1 percent, but the index for nondurable goods only edged down. Among durables, losses of 2 percent or more were posted by machinery; electrical equipment, appliances, and components; and motor vehicles and parts. Among nondurables, the results were mixed—the largest gains were recorded by apparel and by paper and products, and the largest declines were recorded by textile and product mills and by plastics and rubber products. The index for other manufacturing (publishing and logging) declined 0.3 percent and was well below its year-earlier level.
The output of utilities fell 3.5 percent in April, with declines in the indexes for both natural gas and electric utilities; demand for heating decreased last month because of temperatures that were warmer than normal. After having fallen for three consecutive months, mining output stepped up 1.6 percent in April and was 10.4 percent above its level of a year earlier. The increase in the mining index for April reflected gains in the oil and gas sector as well as a jump in coal mining that followed a few months of declines.
Capacity utilization for manufacturing dropped 0.5 percentage point in April to 75.7 percent, a rate that is 2.6 percentage points below its long-run average. The utilization rate for durable manufacturing declined, while the rates for nondurable manufacturing and for other manufacturing (publishing and logging) were little changed. Capacity utilization for mining increased to 91.4 percent and remained well above its long-run average of 87.1 percent. The utilization rate for utilities dropped to 76.2 percent and was more than 9 percentage points below its long-run average.
Revision of Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization
The Federal Reserve Board issued its annual revision to the index of industrial production (IP) and the related measures of capacity utilization on March 27, 2019. The Economic Census for 2017 was not available from the U.S. Census Bureau, so no new annual benchmark data were included for manufacturing. Other annual data, including information on the mining of metallic and nonmetallic minerals (except fuels), were incorporated. The updated IP indexes included revisions to the monthly indicator (either product data or input data) and to seasonal factors for each industry. In addition, the estimation methods for some series were changed. Modifications to the methods for estimating the output of an industry affected the index from 1972 to the present.
Capacity and capacity utilization were revised to incorporate data through the fourth quarter of 2018 from the U.S. Census Bureau's Quarterly Survey of Plant Capacity Utilization along with new data on capacity from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Department of Energy, and other organizations.
Note
The statistics in this release cover output, capacity, and capacity utilization in the U.S. industrial sector, which is defined by the Federal Reserve to comprise manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities. Mining is defined as all industries in sector 21 of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS); electric and gas utilities are those in NAICS sectors 2211 and 2212. Manufacturing comprises NAICS manufacturing industries (sector 31-33) plus the logging industry and the newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing industries. Logging and publishing are classified elsewhere in NAICS (under agriculture and information respectively), but historically they were considered to be manufacturing and were included in the industrial sector under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. In December 2002 the Federal Reserve reclassified all its industrial output data from the SIC system to NAICS.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/g17.pdf
CAPITAL DATA
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 05/15/2019. Treasury International Capital Data for March
Washington – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released Treasury International Capital (TIC) data for March 2019. The next release, which will report on data for April 2019, is scheduled for June 17, 2019.
The sum total in March of all net foreign acquisitions of long-term securities, short-term U.S. securities, and banking flows was a net TIC outflow of $8.1 billion. Of this, net foreign private inflows were $13.6 billion, and net foreign official outflows were $21.7 billion.
Foreign residents decreased their holdings of long-term U.S. securities in March; net sales were $30.3 billion. Net sales by private foreign investors were $20.6 billion, while net sales by foreign official institutions were $9.7 billion.
U.S. residents decreased their holdings of long-term foreign securities, with net sales of $1.9 billion.
Taking into account transactions in both foreign and U.S. securities, net foreign sales of long-term securities were $28.4 billion. After including adjustments, such as estimates of unrecorded principal payments to foreigners on U.S. asset-backed securities, overall net foreign sales of long-term securities are estimated to have been $40.6 billion in March.
Foreign residents increased their holdings of U.S. Treasury bills by $23.9 billion. Foreign resident holdings of all dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities and other custody liabilities increased by $69.7 billion.
Banks’ own net dollar-denominated liabilities to foreign residents decreased by $37.2 billion.
Complete data are available on the Treasury website at: www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/index.aspx
TIC Data
The monthly data on holdings of long-term securities, as well as the monthly table on Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, reflect foreign holdings of U.S. securities collected primarily on the basis of custodial data. These data help provide a window into foreign ownership of U.S. securities, but they cannot attribute holdings of U.S. securities with complete accuracy. For example, if a U.S. Treasury security purchased by a foreign resident is held in a custodial account in a third country, the true ownership of the security will not be reflected in the data. The custodial data will also not properly attribute U.S. Treasury securities managed by foreign private portfolio managers who invest on behalf of residents of other countries. In addition, foreign countries may hold dollars and other U.S. assets that are not captured in the TIC data. For these reasons, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from TIC data about changes in the foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets by individual countries.
| TIC Monthly Reports on Cross-Border Financial Flows | |||||||||||||
| (Billions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted) | |||||||||||||
| 12 Months Through | |||||||||||||
| 2017 | 2018 | Mar-18 | Mar-19 | Dec | Jan | Feb | Mar | ||||||
| Foreigners' Acquisitions of Long-term Securities | |||||||||||||
| 1 | Gross Purchases of Domestic U.S. Securities | 31501.7 | 36563.5 | 32937.9 | 37454.9 | 3103.0 | 3453.8 | 3198.6 | 3497.1 | ||||
| 2 | Gross Sales of Domestic U.S. Securities | 31096.3 | 36409.6 | 32482.3 | 37449.6 | 3194.5 | 3473.4 | 3156.2 | 3527.4 | ||||
| 3 | Domestic Securities Purchased, net (line 1 less line 2) /1 | 405.4 | 153.9 | 455.6 | 5.3 | -91.4 | -19.6 | 42.4 | -30.3 | ||||
| 4 | Private, net /2 | 510.5 | 254.6 | 442.2 | 202.2 | -68.6 | -6.4 | 52.8 | -20.6 | ||||
| 5 | Treasury Bonds & Notes, net | 169.3 | 181.1 | 117.4 | 215.5 | -52.5 | 12.3 | 36.4 | 0.0 | ||||
| 6 | Gov't Agency Bonds, net | 93.0 | 140.2 | 105.1 | 135.3 | 13.0 | 10.1 | 13.1 | 1.6 | ||||
| 7 | Corporate Bonds, net | 129.8 | 56.1 | 130.2 | 53.4 | -10.0 | 3.1 | 12.2 | 2.2 | ||||
| 8 | Equities, net | 118.3 | -122.8 | 89.4 | -202.0 | -19.1 | -31.9 | -9.0 | -24.5 | ||||
| 9 | Official, net /3 | -105.1 | -100.7 | 13.4 | -197.0 | -22.8 | -13.1 | -10.4 | -9.7 | ||||
| 10 | Treasury Bonds & Notes, net | -149.4 | -179.5 | -54.6 | -265.1 | -24.8 | -24.3 | -16.5 | -12.6 | ||||
| 11 | Gov't Agency Bonds, net | 42.0 | 89.9 | 65.4 | 85.4 | 2.0 | 12.9 | 9.4 | 3.1 | ||||
| 12 | Corporate Bonds, net | 1.7 | -4.1 | 3.9 | -12.0 | -0.8 | -2.4 | -1.6 | -1.1 | ||||
| 13 | Equities, net | 0.5 | -7.0 | -1.3 | -5.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | -1.7 | 0.8 | ||||
| 14 | Gross Purchases of Foreign Securities from U.S. Residents | 13711.0 | 17128.2 | 14976.4 | 17350.1 | 1240.1 | 1540.9 | 1366.8 | 1608.0 | ||||
| 15 | Gross Sales of Foreign Securities to U.S. Residents | 13584.1 | 16759.5 | 14861.4 | 16991.6 | 1197.0 | 1528.5 | 1357.3 | 1606.1 | ||||
| 16 | Foreign Securities Purchased, net (line 14 less line 15) /4 | 126.9 | 368.7 | 115.0 | 358.5 | 43.1 | 12.4 | 9.5 | 1.9 | ||||
| 17 | Foreign Bonds Purchased, net | 233.2 | 324.8 | 213.8 | 311.0 | 31.1 | 20.9 | 1.1 | 6.9 | ||||
| 18 | Foreign Equities Purchased, net | -106.3 | 43.9 | -98.8 | 47.5 | 11.9 | -8.4 | 8.3 | -5.0 | ||||
| 19 | Net Long-term Securities Transactions (line 3 plus line 16): | 532.3 | 522.6 | 570.5 | 363.7 | -48.4 | -7.1 | 51.9 | -28.4 | ||||
| 20 | Other Acquisitions of Long-term Securities, net /5 | -224.9 | -74.4 | -197.4 | -75.4 | -12.7 | -12.3 | -18.6 | -12.2 | ||||
| 21 | Net Foreign Acquisition of Long-term Securities | ||||||||||||
| (lines 19 and 20): | 307.4 | 448.2 | 373.2 | 288.3 | -61.1 | -19.4 | 33.2 | -40.6 | |||||
| 22 | Increase in Foreign Holdings of Dollar-denominated Short-term | ||||||||||||
| U.S. Securities and Other Custody Liabilities: /6 | 190.2 | 419.7 | 243.0 | 416.0 | 15.5 | -12.2 | -11.0 | 69.7 | |||||
| 23 | U.S. Treasury Bills | 34.3 | 42.6 | 48.0 | 46.7 | 2.1 | -12.5 | 6.6 | 23.9 | ||||
| 24 | Private, net | 14.7 | 49.5 | 47.3 | 51.9 | 3.5 | -7.2 | -3.6 | 25.8 | ||||
| 25 | Official, net | 19.5 | -6.8 | 0.7 | -5.2 | -1.4 | -5.3 | 10.2 | -2.0 | ||||
| 26 | Other Negotiable Instruments | ||||||||||||
| and Selected Other Liabilities: /7 | 155.9 | 377.0 | 195.0 | 369.3 | 13.5 | 0.2 | -17.7 | 45.8 | |||||
| 27 | Private, net | 154.9 | 381.0 | 197.1 | 366.1 | 15.7 | -1.1 | -17.3 | 41.9 | ||||
| 28 | Official, net | 1.0 | -4.0 | -2.1 | 3.2 | -2.3 | 1.4 | -0.4 | 4.0 | ||||
| 29 | Change in Banks' Own Net Dollar-denominated Liabilities | 80.2 | -109.6 | -68.4 | -240.2 | -62.1 | -112.2 | -43.7 | -37.2 | ||||
| 30 | Monthly Net TIC Flows (lines 21,22,29) /8 | 577.7 | 758.3 | 547.8 | 464.1 | -107.6 | -143.9 | -21.5 | -8.1 | ||||
| of which | |||||||||||||
| 31 | Private, net | 758.7 | 913.3 | 627.9 | 720.0 | -76.8 | -123.9 | -11.4 | 13.6 | ||||
| 32 | Official, net | -181.0 | -155.0 | -80.1 | -255.9 | -30.8 | -20.0 | -10.1 | -21.7 | ||||
| /1 | Net foreign purchases of U.S. securities (+) | ||||||||||||
| /2 | Includes international and regional organizations | ||||||||||||
| /3 | The reported division of net purchases of long-term securities between net purchases by foreign official institutions and net purchases | ||||||||||||
| of other foreign investors is subject to a "transaction bias" described in Frequently Asked Questions 7 and 10.a.4 on the TIC website. | |||||||||||||
| /4 | Net transactions in foreign securities by U.S. residents. Foreign purchases of foreign securities = U.S. sales of foreign securities to foreigners. | ||||||||||||
| Thus negative entries indicate net U.S. purchases of foreign securities, or an outflow of capital from the United States; positive entries | |||||||||||||
| indicate net U.S. sales of foreign securities. | |||||||||||||
| /5 | Minus estimated unrecorded principal repayments to foreigners on domestic corporate and agency asset-backed securities + | ||||||||||||
| estimated foreign acquisitions of U.S. equity through stock swaps - | |||||||||||||
| estimated U.S. acquisitions of foreign equity through stock swaps + | |||||||||||||
| increase in nonmarketable Treasury Bonds and Notes Issued to Official Institutions and Other Residents of Foreign Countries. | |||||||||||||
| /6 | These are primarily data on monthly changes in banks' and broker/dealers' custody liabilities. Data on custody claims are collected | ||||||||||||
| quarterly and published in the TIC website. | |||||||||||||
________________
ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS
BRASIL - EUA
PR. 14/05/2019. Presidente receberá homenagem em segunda visita oficial aos Estados Unidos
Durante a viagem, Jair Bolsonaro também se encontra com o ex-presidente George W. Bush
O presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, embarca nesta terça-feira (14) para Dallas, estado do Texas, nos Estados Unidos, onde receberá o prêmio de Personalidade do Ano da Câmara de Comércio do Brasil e Estados Unidos.
A homenagem será feita em almoço, nesta quinta-feira (16,) oferecido pelo World Affairs Council (Conselho de Assuntos Mundiais da América). Participarão do encontro presidentes de instituições financeiras e empresários com interesse em investir no Brasil.
O presidente do World Affairs Council, James Falk, em entrevista ao Portal Planalto, disse que a visita do presidente brasileiro ao Texas é uma oportunidade de os americanos mapearem as oportunidades no Brasil. “O estado do Texas exporta mais do que qualquer estado nos EUA. Isso é uma oportunidade, não só para nossos membros mas também para nossa cidade e estado, de ouvir quais são as oportunidades econômicas no Brasil.” Falk enfatizou que a organização está ansiosa ouvir os planos e objetivos de Bolsonaro para o país.
Segundo Falk, o World Affairs Council em Dallas foi estabelecido em 1951 com o objetivo de engajar o público americano num debate inteligente sobre o que acontece ao redor do mundo. Todos os World Affairs Councils são sem fins lucrativos e neutros, ou seja não representam partidos políticos.
“Nosso objetivo é dar a oportunidade aos nossos membros de ouvirem os assuntos de diferentes perspectivas e tomarem suas próprias decisões.”, explicou. Ele acrescentou que “muitas novas amizades serão criadas com a visita da delegação brasileira”.
Compromissos
Na agenda do presidente, estão previstas ainda reuniões com o ex-presidente americano, George W. Bush, com o governador do Texas, Greg Abbott, e com o prefeito de Dallas, Mike Rawlings. O retorno da comitiva brasileira está previsto para sexta-feira (17). Esta é a segunda viagem oficial que o presidente Jair Bolsonaro faz aos Estados Unidos. Em março, Bolsonaro reuniu-se com o presidente americano Donald Trump, com quem selou diversas parcerias.
TAXA BÁSICA DE JUROS SELIC
BACEN. 14/05/2019. BC divulga Ata da 222ª reunião do Copom
O Banco Central divulgou a Ata da 222ª reunião do Copom, realizada nos dias 7 e 8 de maio de 2019.
Íntegra da Ata: https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/publicacoes/atascopom/COPOM222-not20190508222.pdf
ECONOMIA
BACEN. 15/05/2019. BC divulga IBC-Br de março. Índice de Atividade Econômica do Banco Central (IBC-Br) de março de 2019.
DOCUMENTO: https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/16749/nota
FGV. IBRE. 14/05/19. Sondagens e Índices de Confiança. IACE e ICCE. Indicador Antecedente recuou em abril
O Indicador Antecedente Composto da Economia Brasileira® (IACE), publicado em parceria entre a FGV IBRE e The Conference Board (TCB), caiu 0,1% em abril, para 116,6 pontos. Apenas dois dos oito componentes contribuíram para a queda no mês, com destaque para o Índice de Expectativas do Consumidor, com recuo de 2,7%.
O Indicador Coincidente Composto da Economia Brasileira (ICCE), que mensura as condições econômicas atuais, também caiu 0,1% em abril, para 102,5 pontos.
“As quedas do IACE e ICCE em abril refletem um quadro de frustração com a retomada do nível de atividade, e com as perspectivas para o restante do ano”, segundo Paulo Picchetti do FGV IBRE. “A probabilidade de uma reversão de ciclo econômico está mais que nunca condicionada à aprovação nos próximos meses das reformas propostas pelo governo”, diz Picchetti.
O Indicador Antecedente Composto da Economia agrega oito componentes econômicos que medem a atividade econômica no Brasil. Cada um deles vem se mostrando individualmente eficiente em antecipar tendências econômicas. A agregação dos indicadores individuais em um índice composto filtra os chamados “ruídos”, colaborando para que a tendência econômica efetiva seja revelada.
Indicador Antecedente Composto da Economia (IACE)
O Indicador Antecedente Composto da Economia (IACE)™ para o Brasil foi lançado em julho de 2013 pelo FGV IBRE e pelo The Conference Board. Com uma série desde 1996, o IACE teria antecipado, de maneira confiável, todas as quatro recessões identificadas pelo Comitê de Datação de Ciclos Econômicos do IBRE (CODACE) durante este período. O indicador permite uma comparação direta dos ciclos econômicos do Brasil com os de outros 11 países e regiões já cobertos pelo The Conference Board: China, Estados Unidos, Zona do Euro, Austrália, França, Alemanha, Japão, México, Coréia, Espanha e Reino Unido.
Os oito componentes do IACE são:
- Taxa referencial de swaps DI pré-fixada - 360 dias (Fonte: Banco Central do Brasil)
- Ibovespa – Fechamento do mês (Fonte: BOVESPA - Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo)
- Índice de Expectativas da Indústria (Fonte: FGV IBRE)
- Índice de Expectativas dos Serviços (Fonte: FGV IBRE)
- Índice de Expectativas do Consumidor (Fonte: FGV IBRE)
- Índice de produção física de bens de consumo duráveis (Fonte: IBGE)
- Índice de Termos de troca (Fonte: FUNCEX - Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior)
- Índice de quantum de exportações (Fonte: FUNCEX - Fundação Centro de Estudos do Comércio Exterior)
THE CONFERENCE BOARD
O The Conference Board (TCB) é um think tank, com foco em seus afiliados, que produz reflexões confiáveis sobre o futuro. Fundado em 1916 o TCB é uma entidade apartidária, sem fins lucrativos, possuindo status de isenção fiscal 501 (c) (3) nos Estados Unidos da América. www.conference-board.org
DOCUMENTO: https://portalibre.fgv.br/navegacao-superior/noticias/noticias-1512.htm
INDÚSTRIA
IPEA. 14/05/2019. Indicador Ipea de Consumo Aparente de Bens Industriais registra queda de 2,7% em março. Resultado mostra queda nas exportações e alta nas importações de bens industriais
O Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea) divulgou nesta terça-feira, dia 14/05, o Indicador Ipea de Consumo Aparente de Bens Industriais, que mede a produção industrial interna líquida (descontadas as exportações), acrescida das importações. Em março deste ano, o indicador apontou queda de 2,7% em relação ao mês de fevereiro, na comparação com ajuste sazonal. Na análise trimestral, o indicador registrou retração de 2,8% nos primeiros três meses de 2019.
Em março, enquanto a produção interna líquida (nacional) recuou 4,3%, as importações de bens industriais vieram na contramão e apontaram alta de 5% em relação a fevereiro. Na comparação com o mesmo mês do ano passado, a demanda interna por bens industriais teve queda de 7,2%, resultado pior do que a produção industrial, que caiu 6,1% segundo o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).
Na análise das grandes categorias econômicas, o resultado também foi negativo, com exceção do segmento bens de capital, que cresceu 2,1% em março deste ano contra o mês de fevereiro. Na comparação com março do ano passado, o setor bens de capital também foi o único a crescer, ficando 3,1% superior ao mesmo período. As maiores quedas em março deste ano na comparação com o mesmo período do ano passado estão nos segmentos de bens de consumo duráveis (queda de 15,4%) e bens semi e não duráveis (com queda de 5,7%).
Com relação às classes de produção, divididas em 22 categorias, a demanda interna por bens da indústria de transformação teve queda de 2,9% em relação ao mês de fevereiro. Em compensação, após o desastre na barragem de Brumadinho ter influenciado negativamente o indicador do mês de fevereiro, a indústria mineral mostrou recuperação e atingiu alta de 9,1% em março. Nove segmentos também mostraram crescimento, com destaque para o consumo aparente do segmento de produtos farmoquímicos, que cresceu 4,2%.
Numa comparação com o mês de março de 2018, seis segmentos registraram alta, principalmente os segmentos de produtos de metal (4%) e metalurgia (3,8%). Já a maior oscilação negativa foi no setor de gravações, que teve queda de 27,8%.
No acumulado em 12 meses, o consumo aparente de bens industriais teve ritmo de crescimento mais intenso (1,3%) que a variação do índice na produção industrial (-0,1%). Na análise por setores, onze dos 22 segmentos apresentaram variação positiva nos últimos 12 meses.
Carta de Conjuntura: http://www.ipea.gov.br/cartadeconjuntura/index.php/2019/05/14/indicador-ipea-de-consumo-aparente-de-bens-industriais-marco-de-2019/
FGV. IBRE. 13/05/19. Conjuntura Econômica entrevista Gustavo Barbosa, secretário da Fazenda de Minas Gerais
O que falta para Minas aderir ao Regime de Recuperação Fiscal (RRF)?
Estamos coordenando as ações obrigatórias, que estão na Lei Complementar 159, e as adicionais, necessárias devido ao tamanho do problema de Minas. Primeiro trabalhamos na elaboração do plano sob a perspectiva econômico-financeira, para depois adequá-la para aprovação no Legislativo. São mais de uma dezena de projetos de lei, projetos de emenda constitucional, que agora em maio vamos enviar para discussão na Assembleia Legislativa.
Quais pontos são mais sensíveis de aprovação?
Invertendo a perspectiva, não há um ponto que eu possa dizer que seja de fácil discussão, pois o plano envolve privatizações, sobre as quais há senões; redução de pessoal e adaptação de regras de aposentadoria, que são temas sensíveis. Mas a situação de Minas é complexa, e entendo que os deputados se sensibilizarão com essa necessidade. Temos reiterado que não há um plano B, nenhuma situação que nos permita sair de um déficit estrutural em torno de R$ 13 bilhões por ano, fora restos a pagar de R$ 20 bilhões. Precisamos de uma ação mais contundente, profunda e perene, e isso só ocorrerá com a adesão ao RRF.
Quais as principais ações realizadas no primeiro trimestre de governo para conter a crise fiscal?
O primeiro esforço foi aprimorar nosso conhecimento da situação, e confirmamos a solicitação de uma missão do Tesouro, que esteve em Minas no final de janeiro. Em relação ao serviço da dívida, a postergação prevista no RRF vai gerar um alívio de caixa de R$ 26 bilhões em três anos, que é o tempo previsto de suspensão de pagamento. Em contrapartida, o RRF contempla a implementação do teto de gastos, o aumento da alíquota da contribuição previdenciária e a redução de incentivos fiscais.
Quanto às ações objetivas de curto prazo, temos buscado uma importante redução de custeio, que inclui 15% na despesa com comissionados. Vale ressaltar as vedações que temos, pois não se pode exonerar servidor. Esperamos que, com os cortes previstos no projeto de reforma administrativa, haja uma economia total de R$ 1 bilhão em quatro anos (a reforma foi aprovada no Legislativo dia 30 de abril). O corte está na carne, e é um trabalho dinâmico. A cada dia se busca alternativas para fechar mais a torneira, no limite de não prejudicar muito os serviços a serem prestados.
Junto à proposta da reforma da Previdência, começa a ganhar espalho o debate sobre a reforma tributária. Qual sua expectativa a respeito?
Ainda é um debate incipiente, e por isso não temos análises suficientes para aprofundar a discussão. Por enquanto, minhas preocupações se resumem a algumas perguntas. Por exemplo: a criação de um IVA irá concentrar ainda mais recursos na União? É preciso avaliar. Até agora, o mote do ministro da Economia Paulo Guedes foi o de menos Brasília e mais Brasil. Precisamos de um projeto coerente com esse enfoque. Outra questão é quanto à perspectiva tributária em si. Já declarei publicamente minha posição contra a guerra fiscal travada pelos estados em torno do ICMS. Por outro lado, hoje convivemos em um ambiente em que é preciso reconhecer as peculiaridades de cada ente. Por isso, também tenho minhas restrições quanto a um projeto que retire totalmente a capacidade de ação dos estados. Mas, como disse, ainda há muito a analisar.
Qual a meta para Minas daqui a quatro anos?
Esperamos ter o plano de recuperação fiscal cumprindo seu papel, que é o de dar estabilidade econômico-financeira e previsibilidade de gestão. E que isso seja razoável sob a perspectiva do gasto, pois hoje estamos fazendo um contingenciamento para o qual apertamos muito a porca, com o risco de ela estourar. A ideia é garantir um direcionamento adequado de recursos para saúde, educação, segurança, que supra as necessidades e faça com que o estado preste um serviço melhor. E queremos ter um estado menor, pois hoje está muito grande, e isso tem implicação fiscal.
DOCUMENTO: https://portalibre.fgv.br/navegacao-superior/noticias/noticias-1511.htm
SERVIÇOS
IBGE. 14/05/2019. Setor de serviços cai 0,7% em março
O volume de serviços caiu 0,7% em março de 2019, na comparação com fevereiro. Com isso, o setor acumula queda de 1,7% nos três primeiros meses do ano e elimina a alta de 0,9% entre outubro e dezembro de 2018.
| Período | Variação (%) | |
|---|---|---|
| Volume | Receita Nominal | |
| Março 19 / Fevereiro 19* | -0,7 | -0,6 |
| Março 19 / Março 18 | -2,3 | 1,1 |
| Acumulado Janeiro-Março | 1,1 | 4,3 |
| Acumulado nos últimos 12 meses | 0,6 | 3,5 |
| * Série com ajuste sazonal | ||
Na comparação com março de 2018, o volume de serviços caiu 2,3%, a queda mais intensa desde maio de 2018 (-3,8%). Esse resultado interrompeu sete taxas positivas seguidas nessa comparação.
O setor acumula alta de 1,1% no ano, com melhora de dinamismo frente ao terceiro (0,7%) e quarto (0,9%) trimestres de 2018. O acumulado em 12 meses passou de 0,7% em fevereiro para 0,6% em março, interrompendo a trajetória ascendente iniciada em abril de 2017 (-5,1%).
A queda de 0,7% do volume de serviços em março, na comparação com fevereiro, foi acompanhada por três das cinco atividades, com destaque para a pressão negativa de serviços de informação e comunicação (-1,7%). Houve variações negativas também em serviços profissionais, administrativos e complementares (-0,1%) e outros serviços (-0,2%). Já os transportes, serviços auxiliares aos transportes e correio (0,5%) e os serviços prestados às famílias (1,4%) ficaram positivos.
A média móvel trimestral caiu 0,6% no trimestre encerrado em março, frente ao trimestre terminado em fevereiro. Entre os setores, o ramo de transportes, serviços auxiliares aos transportes e correio (-1,0%) teve a queda mais intensa, seguido por serviços de informação e comunicação (-0,5%). Em contrapartida, as maiores altas vieram dos setores de serviços prestados às famílias e de serviços profissionais, administrativos e complementares, ambos com avanço de 0,5%, seguidos por outros serviços (0,3%).
Na comparação com março de 2018, o setor de serviços recuou 2,3%, com queda em três das cinco atividades e em 56,0% dos 166 tipos de serviços. O fato de março de 2019 ter tido dois dias úteis a menos do que março de 2018 contribuiu para um menor número de contratos de prestação de serviços. Entre as atividades, o ramo de transportes, serviços auxiliares aos transportes e correio (-7,1%) exerceu a maior influência negativa. Os demais resultados negativos vieram de serviços profissionais, administrativos e complementares (-2,7%) e de outros serviços (-1,3%). Em sentido oposto, as contribuições positivas ficaram com os ramos de serviços prestados às famílias (4,4%) e de serviços de informação e comunicação (0,8%).
No acumulado do primeiro trimestre, frente a igual período do ano anterior, o setor de serviços cresceu 1,1%, com altas em três das cinco atividades e em 46,4% dos 166 tipos de serviços. Entre os setores, os serviços de informação e comunicação (3,4%) exerceram o principal impacto positivo sobre o índice total. Os demais avanços vieram de serviços prestados às famílias (4,4%) e de outros serviços (3,2%). As influências negativas nessa comparação ficaram com os segmentos de transportes, serviços auxiliares aos transportes e correio (-1,6%) e de serviços profissionais, administrativos e complementares (-0,7%).
| Pesquisa Mensal de Serviços Indicadores do Volume de Serviços, segundo as atividades de divulgação Março 2019 - Variação (%) | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atividades de Divulgação | Mês/Mês anterior (1) | Mensal (2) | Acumulado no ano (3) | Últimos 12 meses (4) | ||||||||
| JAN | FEV | MAR | JAN | FEV | MAR | JAN-JAN | JAN-FEV | JAN-MAR | Até JAN | Até FEV | Até MAR | |
| Volume de Serviços - Brasil | -0,4 | -0,6 | -0,7 | 2,0 | 3,8 | -2,3 | 2,0 | 2,9 | 1,1 | 0,2 | 0,7 | 0,6 |
| 1. Serviços prestados às famílias | 1,0 | -0,8 | 1,4 | 4,4 | 4,5 | 4,4 | 4,4 | 4,4 | 4,4 | 0,8 | 1,6 | 1,9 |
| 1.1 Serviços de alojamento e alimentação | 0,6 | -0,5 | 1,7 | 5,0 | 4,9 | 5,8 | 5,0 | 4,9 | 5,2 | 1,5 | 2,3 | 2,6 |
| 1.2 Outros serviços prestados às famílias | 1,8 | -1,1 | 0,7 | 0,9 | 2,3 | -2,7 | 0,9 | 1,6 | 0,1 | -3,0 | -2,2 | -2,0 |
| 2. Serviços de informação e comunicação | -0,2 | 0,4 | -1,7 | 3,4 | 6,2 | 0,8 | 3,4 | 4,7 | 3,4 | 0,3 | 1,2 | 1,3 |
| 2.1 Serviços TIC | 0,0 | 0,5 | -0,7 | 4,7 | 7,2 | 1,9 | 4,7 | 5,9 | 4,5 | 1,0 | 2,0 | 2,2 |
| 2.1.1 Telecomunicações | 2,0 | -1,5 | -1,4 | 1,2 | 1,1 | -1,5 | 1,2 | 1,1 | 0,3 | -1,9 | -1,3 | -1,0 |
| 2.1.2 Serviços de tecnologia da informação | -3,8 | 4,6 | -2,0 | 12,8 | 21,6 | 9,0 | 12,8 | 17,1 | 14,1 | 7,7 | 9,5 | 9,2 |
| 2.2 Serviços audiovisuais | -3,4 | 0,4 | -0,5 | -5,2 | -0,5 | -7,0 | -5,2 | -2,9 | -4,3 | -4,6 | -4,3 | -4,2 |
| 3. Serviços profissionais, adm. e complementares | 1,7 | 0,0 | -0,1 | -0,6 | 1,5 | -2,7 | -0,6 | 0,4 | -0,7 | -1,6 | -1,4 | -1,4 |
| 3.1 Serviços técnico-profissionais | 3,4 | 1,4 | 0,0 | -2,0 | 4,0 | -2,8 | -2,0 | 1,0 | -0,3 | -1,1 | -0,8 | -0,8 |
| 3.2 Serviços administrativos e complementares | -1,0 | -0,5 | -1,4 | -0,2 | 0,6 | -2,7 | -0,2 | 0,2 | -0,8 | -1,8 | -1,6 | -1,6 |
| 4. Transportes, serv. aux aos transp. e correio | -0,9 | -2,5 | 0,5 | 0,6 | 2,4 | -7,1 | 0,6 | 1,5 | -1,6 | 0,9 | 1,1 | 0,5 |
| 4.1 Transporte terrestre | -1,1 | -0,6 | -1,9 | 1,2 | 3,7 | -6,5 | 1,2 | 2,4 | -0,8 | 2,0 | 2,2 | 1,5 |
| 4.2 Transporte aquaviário | 2,4 | -0,7 | -2,0 | 1,2 | 5,8 | 0,7 | 1,2 | 3,5 | 2,5 | -1,5 | -1,9 | -2,0 |
| 4.3 Transporte aéreo | 3,4 | -15,8 | 12,2 | 5,6 | 10,7 | -8,9 | 5,6 | 7,9 | 1,9 | 4,5 | 6,9 | 7,7 |
| 4.4 Armazenagem, serv. aux. aos transp. e correio | -0,3 | -5,0 | 2,1 | -1,8 | -2,5 | -9,5 | -1,8 | -2,1 | -4,7 | -1,2 | -1,7 | -2,4 |
| 5. Outros serviços | 5,0 | -3,8 | -0,2 | 5,7 | 5,5 | -1,3 | 5,7 | 5,6 | 3,2 | 2,2 | 2,5 | 2,2 |
| Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Indústria (1) Base: mês imediatamente anterior - com ajuste sazonal (2) Base: igual mês do ano anterior (3) Base: igual período do ano anterior (4) Base: 12 meses anteriores | ||||||||||||
Volume de serviços cai em 16 das 27 unidades da federação
Das 27 unidades da federação, 16 tiveram queda no volume dos serviços em março, na comparação com fevereiro, acompanhando a retração de 0,7% do índice nacional. Entre as localidades com resultados negativos, destaque para São Paulo (-0,9%), Rio Grande do Sul (-4,0%) e Mato Grosso (-7,7%). Já o principal resultado positivo veio do Rio de Janeiro (1,0%).
Na comparação com março de 2018, a queda de 2,3% no volume de serviços foi acompanhada por 23 das 27 unidades da federação. A principal influência negativa ficou com Rio de Janeiro (-7,4%), com quatro dos cinco setores em recuo, seguido do Paraná (-6,7%), do Rio Grande do Sul (-6,2%) e de Minas Gerais (-3,6%). Já a contribuição positiva mais importante para a formação do índice global veio de São Paulo (1,4%), que apontou expansão em três das cinco atividades investigadas.
No acumulado de janeiro a março de 2019, frente a igual período do ano anterior, o avanço de 1,1% no volume de serviços ocorreu de forma mais concentrada, já que 11 das 27 unidades da federação tiveram alta de receita real. O principal impacto positivo em termos regionais ocorreu em São Paulo (4,6%), enquanto Rio de Janeiro (-4,2%) registrou a influência negativa mais relevante sobre índice nacional, seguido por Paraná (-2,7%), Ceará (-5,7%) e Rio Grande do Sul (-2,0%).
Atividades turísticas crescem 4,8%
O volume de atividades turísticas cresceu 4,8% em março, em relação a fevereiro, após recuar 4,2% no mês anterior. Regionalmente, 11 das 12 unidades da federação acompanharam esse crescimento observado no país, com destaque para São Paulo (3,0%), Rio de Janeiro (7,9%), Distrito Federal (18,2%) e Santa Catarina (12,2%). Em sentido contrário, a única influência negativa veio do Espírito Santo (-0,1%).
Na comparação com março de 2018, o volume de atividades turísticas aumentou 1,9%, impulsionado pelo aumento de receita das empresas de hotéis, de restaurantes e de locação de automóveis. Em sentido oposto, o segmento de transporte aéreo de passageiros exerceu a influência negativa mais importante sobre os serviços turísticos. Em termos regionais, sete das 12 unidades da federação avançaram nos serviços de turismo, com destaque para São Paulo (3,8%), Rio de Janeiro (3,7%), Bahia (7,1%) e Ceará (10,4%). Em contrapartida, os impactos negativos mais importantes vieram do Rio Grande do Sul (-6,5%) e do Paraná (-4,2%).
No acumulado em 2019, as atividades turísticas cresceram 3,5%, frente a igual período do ano passado. Regionalmente, apenas cinco dos 12 locais investigados registraram taxas positivas, com destaque para São Paulo (9,8%), seguido por Ceará (10,6%) e Pernambuco (2,2%). Já Rio Grande do Sul (-3,4%), Santa Catarina (-3,0%) e Distrito Federal (-3,0%) assinalaram as principais influências negativas no acumulado do ano para as atividades turísticas.
Setor de serviços cai 0,7% em março e acumula três meses de resultados negativos. Mesmo com a queda no total de serviços, transporte aéreo aumentou 12,2% em março
Em março, o setor de serviços caiu 0,7%, a terceira queda consecutiva na comparação com o mês anterior, após recuar 0,6% em fevereiro e 0,4% em janeiro. A queda foi pressionada, principalmente, pelos serviços de informação e comunicação (-1,7%). Já os resultados positivos ocorreram nos transportes (0,5%) e nos serviços prestados às famílias (1,4%), que incluem restaurantes e hotelaria.
Apesar do resultado negativo no índice geral, as atividades turísticas cresceram 4,8% em março, recuperando totalmente as perdas de 4,2% em fevereiro. Os dados são da Pesquisa Mensal de Serviços, divulgada hoje pelo IBGE.
Índice de volume de serviços (%)
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Fonte: IBGE - Pesquisa Mensal de Serviços
O crescimento das atividades turísticas em março foi observado em 11 das 12 unidades da federação em que esse indicador é estudado, com destaque para São Paulo (3%), Rio de Janeiro (7,9%), do Distrito Federal (18,2%) e Santa Catarina (12,2%). “Houve crescimento nas atividades hoteleiras e de restaurantes, que estão nos serviços prestados às famílias, bem como na locação de automóveis, que faz parte dos serviços complementares”, explica o gerente da pesquisa, Rodrigo Lobo.
Índice de volume das atividades turísticas (%)
Clique e arraste para zoom
Fonte: IBGE - Pesquisa Mensal de Serviços
Outro indicador de que as atividades relacionadas ao turismo tiveram peso positivo está nos transportes aéreos, que tinham registrado -15,8% em fevereiro e subiram 12,2% em março. “É preciso levar em consideração a base de comparação baixa do mês anterior, mas o Carnaval certamente teve um peso positivo nas viagens de avião”, conclui Rodrigo.
Feriado favorece o turismo, mas pressiona demais serviços
Frente a março de 2018, os serviços em geral registraram -2,3%, a queda mais intensa desde maio de 2018, explicada, em parte, pela influência de dois dias úteis a menos. Já o turismo avançou 1,9% no mesmo tipo de comparação. “Nesse caso específico, o feriado prolongado pode ter um efeito positivo nas atividades analisadas, porque as famílias aproveitam para viajar e comer fora”, avalia o gerente da pesquisa.
No confronto com março de 2018, contribuíram para os -2,3% os serviços de transportes e correio (-7,1%), pressionados pela queda na receita das empresas de transporte rodoviário de cargas, gestão de portos, transporte rodoviário coletivo e correios, por conta dos dois úteis a menos no mês. Já os hotéis, restaurantes e empresas no ramo de entretenimento influenciaram positivamente os serviços prestados às famílias (4,4%), principal indicador positivo dessa comparação.
DOCUMENTO: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/24414-setor-de-servicos-cai-0-7-em-marco
AGRICULTURA
IBGE. 14/05/2019. Trimestrais da pecuária – primeiros resultados: abate de bovinos e suínos mantém crescimento
Não é a primeira vez que a produção de ovos cai em um trimestre, conforme divulgado anteriormente. A informação foi corrigida às 11h55 do dia 14/05/2019.
O abate de bovinos teve alta de 0,3%, o de suínos teve alta de 5,2% e o de frangos caiu 2,0% no 1º trimestre de 2019, em comparação com o 1º trimestre de 2018. Na comparação entre o 1º tri de 2019 e o 4º trimestre de 2018, o abate de bovinos caiu 4,6%, o de suínos cresceu 0,7% e o de frangos aumentou 2,3%. A aquisição de leite foi de 6,18 bilhões de litros, aumento de 2,8% em relação ao 1° trimestre de 2018. A produção de peças de couro teve quedas de 6,9% frente ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e 3,5% frente ao 1º trimestre de 2018, totalizando 8,37 milhões de peças inteiras de couro. No 1º trimestre de 2019, foram produzidos 908,43 milhões de dúzias de ovos de galinha. A produção aumentou 5,6% frente ao mesmo trimestre do ano anterior, porém houve queda de 3,0% em relação ao 4° trimestre de 2018.
Abate de bovinos tem aumento de 0,3% no 1º tri de 2019 frente ao 1º tri de 2018
No 1º trimestre de 2019, foram abatidas 7,77 milhões de cabeças de bovinos, uma queda de 4,6% em comparação com o trimestre imediatamente anterior e aumento de 0,3% em relação ao 1º trimestre de 2018.
A produção de 1,91 milhões de toneladas de carcaças bovinas no 1º trimestre de 2019 indica redução de 7,4% em relação ao último trimestre do ano anterior e alta de 1,4% em relação ao apurado no 1º tri de 2018.
| Número de animais abatidos e peso das carcaças de bovinos, suínos e frangos, aquisição de leite cru, aquisição de couro cru e produção de ovos de galinha - Brasil - 1º Trimestre de 2019 | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abate de animais, aquisição de leite, aquisição de couro cru e produção de ovos de galinha | 2018 | 2018 | 2019 | Variação (%) | |
| 1º Trimestre | 4º Trimestre | 1º Trimestre | 3 / 1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | |||
| Número de animais abatidos (mil cabeças) | |||||
| Bovinos | 7 745 | 8 142 | 7 771 | 0,3 | -4,6 |
| Suínos | 10 719 | 11 190 | 11 272 | 5,2 | 0,7 |
| Frangos | 1 478 794 | 1 416 479 | 1 448 925 | -2,0 | 2,3 |
| Peso das carcaças (toneladas) | |||||
| Bovinos | 1 885 369 | 2 063 235 | 1 910 862 | 1,4 | -7,4 |
| Suínos | 954 602 | 980 760 | 989 102 | 3,6 | 0,9 |
| Frangos | 3 461 973 | 3 336 768 | 3 392 652 | -2,0 | 1,7 |
| Leite (mil litros) | |||||
| Adquirido (cru) | 6 013 787 | 6 702 110 | 6 181 879 | 2,8 | -7,8 |
| Industrializado | 6 007 659 | 6 687 874 | 6 173 546 | 2,8 | -7,7 |
| Couro (mil unidades) | |||||
| Adquirido (cru) | 8 674 | 8 996 | 8 374 | -3,5 | -6,9 |
| Curtido | 8 619 | 8 889 | 8 259 | -4,2 | -7,1 |
| Ovos (mil dúzias) | |||||
| Produção | 860 494 | 936 315 | 908 429 | 5,6 | -3,0 |
| Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Agropecuária, Pesquisa Trimestral do Abate de Animais, Pesquisa Trimestral do Leite, Pesquisa Trimestral do Couro e Produção de Ovos de Galinha. Notas: 1. Os dados do 1º trimestre de 2019 são referentes ao primeiros resultados das respectivas pesquisas. 2. Os primeiros resultados das pesquisas trimestrais da pecuária passaram a ser divulgados a partir do 1º trimestre de 2018 apenas no nível Brasil. São dados prévios, que podem sofrer alterações até a divulgação dos resultados do trimestre de referência. 3. Os dados do ano de 2019 são preliminares até a divulgação dos dados do 1º trimestre de 2020. | |||||
Abate de suínos totaliza 11,27 milhões de cabeças
No 1º trimestre de 2019, foram abatidas 11,27 milhões de cabeças de suínos, representando aumentos de 0,7% em relação ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e de 5,2% na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018.
O peso acumulado das carcaças foi de 989,10 mil toneladas no 1º trimestre de 2019, representando altas de 0,9% em relação ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e de 3,6% em relação ao mesmo período de 2018.
Abate de frangos cai 2% no 1º tri de 2019 frente ao 1º tri de 2018
No 1º trimestre de 2019, foi abatido 1,45 bilhão de cabeças de frangos, um aumento de 2,3% em relação ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e queda de 2,0% na comparação com o mesmo período de 2018.
O peso acumulado das carcaças foi de 3,39 milhões de toneladas no 1º trimestre de 2019. Esse total representou acréscimo de 1,7% em relação ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e queda de 2,0% frente ao mesmo período de 2018.
Aquisição de leite tem retração de 7,8% em comparação ao 4º tri de 2018
A aquisição de leite cru feita pelos estabelecimentos sob inspeção sanitária (federal, estadual ou municipal), no 1º trimestre de 2019, foi de 6,18 bilhões de litros. O valor correspondeu a uma retração de 7,8% em comparação ao volume registrado no 4º trimestre de 2018, e a um aumento de 2,8% em relação à quantidade captada 1° trimestre de 2018.
Aquisição de couro cai 6,9% em relação ao trimestre anterior
Os curtumes investigados pela Pesquisa Trimestral do Couro – aqueles que efetuam curtimento de pelo menos 5 mil unidades inteiras de couro cru bovino por ano – declararam ter recebido 8,37 milhões de peças inteiras de couro no 1º trimestre de 2019. Essa quantidade foi 6,9% menor que a registrada no trimestre imediatamente anterior e 3,5% abaixo da registrada no 1º trimestre de 2018.
Produção de ovos cai 3,0% em comparação ao último trimestre de 2018
A produção de ovos de galinha foi de 908,43 milhões de dúzias no 1º trimestre de 2019. O resultado representou retração de 3,0% em relação ao 4° trimestre de 2018. Por outro lado, o montante representa um aumento de 5,6% em comparação à produção do mesmo trimestre do ano anterior.
COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR BRASILEIRA
MEconomia. 13/05/2019. Comércio exterior. Balança comercial apresenta superávit nas duas primeiras semanas de maio. Média diária de exportações foi de R$ 1,147 bilhão, 24,7% acima no mesmo período de 2018
A balança comercial brasileira apresentou superávit de US$3,027 bilhões, resultado de exportações de US$ 8,034 bilhões e importações de US$ 5,007 bilhões nas duas primeiras semanas de maio de 2019 (sete dias úteis). No ano, as vendas externas brasileiras já somam US$ 80, 183 bilhões e as compras no exterior, US$ 60,772 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 19,411 bilhões.
Balança comercial
A média diária de exportações até a segunda semana de maio de 2019 (US$ 1,147 bilhão) comparada com a de maio de 2018 (US$ 920,6 milhões), teve aumento de 24,7%, em razão da elevação nas vendas das três categorias de produtos: manufaturados (36,6% por conta de óleos combustíveis, autopeças, partes de motores e turbinas para aviação, laminados planos de ferro/aço, máquinas e aparelhos para terraplanagem), semimanufaturados (28,8%, por conta, principalmente, de semimanufaturados de ferro/aço, celulose, ferro-ligas, ferro fundido bruto e ferro spiegel, ouro em formas semimanufaturadas) e básicos (23%, por conta, principalmente, de carnes de frango, bovina e suína, carnes salgadas, café em grãos, algodão bruto, milho em grãos, fumo e folhas).
Relativamente a abril de 2019, houve crescimento de 22,4% em virtude do aumento das vendas de produtos básicos (33%), semimanufaturados (20,7%) e manufaturados (7,2%). Nas importações, a média diária até a segunda semana de maio deste ano (US$715,3 milhões), ficou 13,3% acima do mesmo período de 2018 (US$ 631,5 milhões).
Nesse comparativo, cresceram gastos, principalmente, com cereais e produtos da indústria da moagem (96,8%), adubos e fertilizantes (39%), químicos orgânicos e inorgânicos (25,7), equipamentos mecânicos (18,1%), equipamentos eletroeletrônicos (16%).
Em relação a abril último, houve crescimento nas importações de 10,2%, pelo aumento nas compras de adubo e fertilizantes (44,8%), químicos orgânicos e inorgânicos (22%), veículos automóveis e partes (16,4%), equipamentos mecânicos (12%) e equipamentos eletroeletrônicos (7,5%).
FGV. IBRE. 15/05/19. ICOMEX: cai o superávit, mas as commodities garantem o crescimento do volume exportado
O saldo da balança comercial de abril foi de US$ 5,9 bilhões, o que levou a um saldo acumulado no primeiro quadrimestre do ano de US$ 16,4 bilhões, inferior ao registrado em igual período de 2018 que foi de US$ 18,2 bilhões. A queda no saldo é explicada principalmente pela piora na balança comercial com a Argentina que passa de superavitária para deficitária, uma perda de US$ 3,1 bilhões, seguida da perda com a União Europeia (queda de US$ 1,4 bilhões entre o superávit do primeiro quadrimestre de 2019 e o de 2018) e da China, perda de US$ 900 milhões. Em sentido oposto, o déficit registrado com os Estados Unidos em 2018 passa para um superávit de US$ 500 milhões no acumulado até abril de 2019 e aumenta em US$ 900 milhões, o superávit com o Oriente Médio.
Observa-se que a piora do saldo com a China em relação ao resultado com os Estados Unidos está associado a um recuo das importações oriundas do mercado estadunidense em 3,5%, enquanto as importações chinesas aumentaram 27%, na comparação do primeiro quadrimestre de 2018 e 2019. Nesse mesmo período as exportações brasileiras para a China aumentaram em 10,3% e para os Estados Unidos, em 9,3%.
Em termos de valor, tanto as exportações como as importações brasileiras na comparação mensal ou quadrimestral registraram queda. No caso do quadrimestre a queda foi de 3% nas exportações e de 0,8% nas importações. No entanto, os dados dos índices de preços e volume mostram que essa retração é explicada pelos preços, pois os volumes aumentaram nas duas bases de comparações. As exportações cresceram 6,4% e as importações 2,6% entre os meses de abril, depois de terem recuado entre os meses de março de 2018 e 2019. No acumulado até abril, as importações se mantêm estagnadas e as exportações aumentaram 3,4%.
A análise desagregada das exportações mostra que o crescimento em volume das exportações é explicado pelo desempenho favorável das commodities, que aumentou 13,2% na comparação mensal e 12,2% entre os dois primeiros quadrimestres de 2018 e 2019. As exportações de não commodities recuam em ambas as comparações e no acumulado até abril cai 7,3%. Observa-se que a queda nos preços das commodities atinge as principais exportações brasileiras, exceto o minério de ferro que teve aumento de 4,1 % entre o acumulado do ano até abril de 2018 e 2019. No caso do aumento no volume exportado, a liderança coube ao grupo de petróleo e derivados (31,8%), seguido do complexo soja (13,8%).
O comportamento dos preços é refletido nos termos de troca que caíram 2,6% na comparação entre os meses de abril e 5,5% na comparação dos primeiros quadrimestres de 2018 e 2019. trimestres. Quando se destaca a série mensal dos termos de troca é registrado um aumento de 3% entre janeiro e abril de 2019 que é liderado pelo preço do minério e do petróleo e, mais recentemente pelo preço das carnes. No entanto, como ressaltado, a melhora desses resultados ainda não assegurou um aumento nos termos de troca em relação ao primeiro quadrimestre de 2018. Achamos pouca provável, no entanto, que esses aumentos levem a uma nova escalada de elevação nos preços das commodities.
Os índices de preços e volume agregados e por tipo de indústria
O mês de abril trouxe um fato novo. Após registrar sucessivas quedas no volume exportado e importado, exceto em janeiro, na comparação mensal entre 2018 e 2019, as exportações da indústria de transformação aumentaram 6,5% e as importações 2,5% no mês de abril. Observa-se que as variações são iguais com ou sem as plataformas de petróleo e, logo, essas não influenciaram o resultado do mês de abril. As exportações da indústria extrativa lideraram o desempenho dos setores, com aumento de 17,6% e as da agropecuária cresceram 2,3% com a redução no volume embarcado do complexo soja.
A melhora do desempenho exportador da indústria de transformação, porém, não foi suficiente para reverter os resultados negativos das exportações e importações do setor na comparação do acumulado do ano até abril de 2018 e 2019. As exportações recuam em 4% e as importações em 0,4%. As exportações da indústria extrativa lideraram as exportações com aumento de 19,5%, seguida da agropecuária (16%). Nas importações a liderança passou para a agropecuária (7,6%) seguida da extrativa (4,6%).
Índices de volume e categoria de uso
O desempenho favorável das exportações da indústria de transformação em abril é explicado pelo aumento do volume exportado dos bens de capital, bens de consumo não durável e bens intermediários. Os bens duráveis onde se inclui o setor automotivo continua em queda. Nesse caso, as exportações das máquinas agrícolas (bens de capital), tubos de aço (bens intermediários), “demais manufaturados” (uma hipótese serem bens de consumo não duráveis) confirma as observações antes feitas. Quando se analisa, porém, a variação entre os quadrimestres, todas as categorias registram queda, exceto os bens intermediários, sendo que a maior queda se refere às exportações de não duráveis – 33,3%.
O baixo dinamismo da indústria de transformação refletidoem sua taxa de crescimento das exportações se repete nas importações. Exceto pelos bens de consumo não duráveis e os bens intermediários, todas as categorias de uso queda entre os meses de abril de 2018 e 2019 e na comparação entre os quadrimestres, as importações caem 0,4% e somente bens de capital (1,5%) e bens de consumo não duráveis (3,4%) registraram aumento. O resultado não surpreende, em especial, na indústria de transformação onde as trocas são majoritariamente de caráter intra-indústria. Se as exportações do setor automotivo caem, caem também as importações do setor.
A diferença do comportamento entre o setor agropecuário e o da indústria de transformação em termos de sinalização via indicadores de comércio exterior. Na comparação mensal, as importações de bens intermediários aumentam na indústria de transformação e caem no setor de agropecuária. Os bens de capital recuam na indústria de transformação e aumentam na agropecuária. Os índices sugerem, portanto, que o nível de atividade está crescendo na indústria de transformação e recuando na agropecuária. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, a indústria deve ter mais capacidade ociosa e não requer investimentos para aumentar sua capacidade produtiva. Na comparação entre os quadrimestres de 2018 e 2019, o aumento nas importações de bens de capital da indústria de transformação confirma esse resultado. Ao mesmo tempo, a queda na compra de bens intermediários indica que o mês de abril seria uma indicação de uma possível reversão na tendência de queda de importações de bens intermediário e do nível de atividade.
Em síntese, as exportações brasileiras repetem o mesmo comportamento de anos anteriores, onde o crescimento das vendas externas do Brasil depende do setor agropecuário e da indústria extrativa. Além disso, os dados de importações não sinalizam uma recuperação imediata da indústria de transformação.
Por último, o comportamento da taxa de câmbio real efetiva impacta, em especial, a indústria de transformação. No entanto, a percepção dos agentes que operam no comércio exterior que esses movimentos têm sido muito influenciados por expectativas seja de caráter doméstico (reformas) ou internacional (guerra comercial Estados Unidos e China) levam a comportamentos de “cautela”. Nesse cenário, tanto as exportações e as importações da indústria de transformação são afetadas. Num cenário de incertezas, as decisões de exportar e importar que levam em consideração perspectivas não imediatistas e não lidam com movimentos especulativos tendem a ser de “cautela” e se traduzem em menos compromissos de exportações e importações.
Uma nota adicional
O recrudescimento da guerra comercial entre os Estados Unidos e a China no começo do mês de maio suscita questões sobre o impacto nas exportações brasileiras. O tema ganha relevância, em especial, quando uma parte dos produtos que a China planeja elevar as tarifas são produtos agropecuários que o Brasil é exportador, como soja e carnes. Ganhos pontuais podem ocorrer, mas dois pontos devem ser ressaltados. Primeiro, que o acirramento da guerra comercial pode levar a uma retração do comércio mundial, o que prejudica a todos os países. Segundo, na mesa de negociações, é mais provável que a China ceda preferências para os Estados Unidos na área agropecuária, o que pode ter um impacto negativo nas exportações do Brasil.
DOCUMENTO: https://portalibre.fgv.br/navegacao-superior/noticias/noticias-1513.htm
TURISMO
MTurismo. 14 de Maio de 2019. Brasil é o país mais procurado, na América Latina, para a realização de reuniões de negócios. Apesar de manter a liderança na região, o país perdeu uma posição no ranking mundial em relação a 2017
Por Victor Maciel
O Brasil segue líder no ranking dos países latino-americanos que mais realizaram congressos e eventos de negócios em 2018. A constatação é de um estudo, divulgado nesta segunda-feira (13), pela Associação Internacional de Congressos e Convenções (ICCA). Em todo mundo, o país está entre os 20 destinos mais procurados pelos executivos para a realização desse tipo de evento, ocupando a 17ª posição, uma a menos que a obtida em 2017. São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Foz do Iguaçu foram os principais destinos brasileiros.
“Esse resultado confirma o potencial que o Brasil tem para ser um dos principais destinos de negócios do mundo. Isso nos anima a fazer mais, já que eventos desse tipo são muito importantes para o turismo do país, reduzindo a sazonalidade do setor, atraindo turistas especializados que tem um gasto médio acima do esperado e geram emprego e renda”, celebrou o ministro do Turismo, Marcelo Álvaro Antônio.
Dados do Ministério do Turismo apontam que, do total de turistas internacionais que visitaram o Brasil em 2017, 15,6% foram motivados por negócios, eventos e convenções. Os principais destinos foram: São Paulo (44,4%), Rio de Janeiro (23,6%), Porto Alegre (4,2%), Curitiba (4,1%), além de Brasília e Campinas com 3,3% cada. O gasto médio per capita, por dia, desses viajantes foi de US$ 90,10.
O Ministério do Turismo tem destinado investimentos importantes para o desenvolvimento de projetos de infraestrutura em espaços para a realização de eventos desse porte. Desde sua criação, a Pasta já investiu mais de R$ 770 milhões na construção, reforma e compra de equipamentos para centros de convenções, viabilizando a ampliação do turismo de negócios e eventos em centros urbanos de médio e grande porte.
MAIS DADOS - O relatório apontou, ainda, que em 2018 foram realizadas 12.937 reuniões em todo o mundo, um aumento de 3%, comparando com o ano passado quando o número foi de 12.558. Este foi o maior número de eventos registrado desde que o instituto começou a realizar o levantamento. O Estados Unidos continua sendo o país que mais recebe congressos e convenções de negócios seguido por Alemanha, Espanha e França.
ICCA – A Associação Internacional de Congressos e Convenções representa os principais fornecedores mundiais no manuseio, transporte e acomodação de reuniões e eventos internacionais, e inclui mais de 1.100 empresas e organizações associadas em quase 100 países em todo o mundo.
O documento anual de classificação de países e cidades da ICCA é a comparação global mais respeitada do desempenho dos destinos na atração eventos internacionais. Ele abrange um segmento restrito da indústria de reuniões, incluindo encontros de associações que alternam entre pelo menos três países, tendo, ainda, comprovação de pelo menos 50 participantes e sendo realizados regularmente. A ICCA também identificou uma tendência de 50 anos de crescimento exponencial no número de reuniões de associações, pois a estimativa dobrou a cada 10 anos, representando o fortalecimento desse mercado.
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LGCJ.:
