US ECONOMICS

DoL. BLS. May 5, 2017. THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- APRIL 2017

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 211,000 in April, and the unemployment
rate was little changed at 4.4 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported
today. Job gains occurred in leisure and hospitality, health care and social
assistance, financial activities, and mining.

Household Survey Data

Both the unemployment rate, at 4.4 percent, and the number of unemployed persons,
at 7.1 million, changed little in April. Over the year, the unemployment rate has
declined by 0.6 percentage point, and the number of unemployed has fallen by 854,000.
(See table A-1.)

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rate for adult men declined to 4.0
percent in April. The jobless rates for adult women (4.1 percent), teenagers (14.7
percent), Whites (3.8 percent), Blacks (7.9 percent), Asians (3.2 percent), and
Hispanics (5.2 percent) showed little change. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)

The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more) was essentially
unchanged at 1.6 million in April and accounted for 22.6 percent of the unemployed. Over
the year, the number of long-term unemployed was down by 433,000. (See table A-12.)

The labor force participation rate, at 62.9 percent, changed little in April and has
shown little movement over the past year. The employment-population ratio, at 60.2
percent, was also little changed over the month but was up by 0.5 percentage point since
December. (See table A-1.)

The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons (sometimes referred to
as involuntary part-time workers) declined by 281,000 to 5.3 million in April. These
individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time
because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable to find full-time
jobs. Over the past 12 months, the number of persons employed part time for economic
reasons has decreased by 698,000. (See table A-8.)

In April, 1.5 million persons were marginally attached to the labor force, down by 
181,000 from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally adjusted.) These individuals
were not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a
job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they
had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. (See table A-16.)

Among the marginally attached, there were 455,000 discouraged workers in April, down
by 113,000 from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally adjusted.) Discouraged
workers are persons not currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are 
available for them. The remaining 1.1 million persons marginally attached to the labor
force in April had not searched for work for reasons such as school attendance or
family responsibilities. (See table A-16.)

Establishment Survey Data

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 211,000 in April. Employment rose in
leisure and hospitality, health care and social assistance, financial activities, and
mining. (See table B-1.)

In April, leisure and hospitality added 55,000 jobs. Employment in food services and
drinking places continued to trend up over the month (+26,000) and has increased by
260,000 over the year.

Employment in health care and social assistance increased by 37,000 in April. Health
care employment continued to trend up over the month (+20,000). This is in line with
the industry's average monthly job growth during the first quarter of this year but
below the average gain of 32,000 per month in 2016. Social assistance added 17,000
jobs in April, with all of the gain in individual and family services.

In April, financial activities added 19,000 jobs, with insurance carriers and related
activities accounting for most of the gain (+14,000). Over the year, financial
activities has added 173,000 jobs.

Employment in mining rose by 9,000 in April, with most of the increase in support
activities for mining (+7,000). Since a recent low in October 2016, mining has added
44,000 jobs, with three-fourths of the gain in support activities for mining.

Employment in professional and business services continued to trend up in April
(+39,000). The industry has added 612,000 jobs over the past 12 months.

Employment in other major industries, including construction, manufacturing, wholesale
trade, retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, and government,
showed little change over the month.

The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls increased by 0.1
hour to 34.4 hours in April. In manufacturing, the workweek edged up by 0.1 hour to
40.7 hours, and overtime edged down by 0.1 hour to 3.2 hours. The average workweek
for production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm payrolls edged up by
0.1 hour to 33.7 hours. (See tables B-2 and B-7.)

In April, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose
by 7 cents to $26.19. Over the year, average hourly earnings have risen by 65 cents,
or 2.5 percent. In April, average hourly earnings of private-sector production and
nonsupervisory employees increased by 6 cents to $21.96. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for February was revised up from +219,000
to +232,000, and the change for March was revised down from +98,000 to +79,000. With
these revisions, employment gains in February and March combined were 6,000 lower than
previously reported. Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from
businesses since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal
factors. Over the past 3 months, job gains have averaged 174,000.

DOCUMENTO: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

FED. Speech. May 05, 2017. Committee Decisions and Monetary Policy Rules. Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer. At "The Structural Foundations of Monetary Policy," a Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, California

It is a pleasure to be at the Hoover Institution again. I was privileged to be a Visiting Scholar here from 1981 to 1982. In addition, many of the researchers and practitioners with whom I have discussed monetary policy over the years have had affiliations with the Hoover Institution--including several people here today. It is a pleasure also to have been invited to speak at this Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Conference, for the Hoover conference series provides a valuable forum for policymakers and researchers to engage in dialogue about important monetary policy issues facing the United States and other countries.

Today I will offer some observations on monetary policy rules and their place in decisionmaking by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).1 I have two messages. First, policymakers should consult the prescriptions of policy rules, but--almost needless to say--they should avoid applying them mechanically. Second, policymaking committees have strengths that policy rules lack. In particular, committees are an efficient means of aggregating a wide variety of information and perspectives.

Monetary Policy Rules in Research and Policy
Since May 2014, I have considered monetary policy rules from the vantage point of a member of the FOMC. But my interest in them began many years ago and was reflected in some of my earliest publications.2 At that time, the literature on monetary policy rules, especially in the United States, remained predominantly concerned with the money stock or total bank reserves rather than the short-term interest rate.3 Seen with the benefit of hindsight, that emphasis probably derived from three sources: First, the quantity theory of money emphasized the link between the quantity of money and inflation; second, that research was carried out when monetarism was gaining credibility in the profession; and, third, there was a concern that interest rate rules might lead to price-level indeterminacy--an issue disposed of by Bennett McCallum and others.4

Subsequently, John Taylor's research, especially his celebrated 1993 paper, was a catalyst in changing the focus toward rules for the short-term interest rate.5 Taylor's work thus helped shift the terms of the discussion in favor of rules for the instrument that central banks prefer to use. His 1993 study also highlighted the practical relevance of monetary policy rules, as he showed that a particular simple rule--the rule that now bears his name--provided a good approximation to the behavior of the federal funds rate during the early Greenspan years. The research literature on monetary policy rules has experienced a major revival since Taylor's seminal paper and has concentrated on rules for the short-term interest rate.

Consideration of interest rate rules has also, as I will discuss, come to have a prominent role in FOMC discussions, with the Taylor rule being one benchmark that we regularly consult. But--building on recent remarks I made elsewhere--I will also indicate why policymakers might have good reasons for deviating from these rule benchmarks and why, in pursuing the objectives of monetary policy, they could appropriately behave in ways that are not very well characterized by simple monetary policy rules.6 In particular, I will point to reasons why the FOMC's discussions might lead to decisions that depart--temporarily or permanently--from the prescriptions of baseline monetary policy rules.

Rules as a Benchmark for Policy Discussions
Some perspective on the status of policy rules in FOMC discussions is provided by considering what has changed over the past 20 years. Donald Kohn, at a landmark conference organized by John Taylor in January 1998, described the role played by monetary policy rules in the FOMC briefing process.7 His account noted that Federal Reserve staff members presented FOMC participants with prescriptions from several policy rules, including the Taylor (1993) rule. This description remains true today. Publicly available Bluebooks and Tealbooks of successive years demonstrate that the coverage of policy rules in the briefing material provided by the Board staff expanded considerably in the years after Kohn spoke.8

Kohn noted that policy rule prescriptions served two functions: as a "benchmark for the stance of policy" and "to structure thinking about the implications of incoming information for the direction of policy action."9 These two functions continue to be important: Policy rule prescriptions provide a useful starting point for FOMC deliberations and a convenient way of organizing alternative arguments about the appropriate policy decision. Policy rule prescriptions, particularly prescriptions that are obtained from a dynamic model simulation, also help policymakers take to heart a key message of the literature on policy rules--namely, that monetary policy decisions should concern the appropriate path for the policy instrument and not merely the current setting of that instrument.

Kohn also observed, however, that "in truth, only a few members look at this or similar information regularly, and the number does not seem to be growing." That state of affairs has probably changed in the two decades since Kohn wrote. It is clear from transcripts in the public record that rule prescriptions have frequently been cited at FOMC meetings.10 The prominence that interest rate rules have achieved in Federal Reserve policymakers' analysis of monetary policy was underscored by Chair Yellen in her speech at Stanford University earlier this year.11

Further, as is clear from Taylor's econometric derivation of his 1993 rule, actual monetary policy decisions may--and probably should--exhibit systematic patterns that can be described as a rule. In fact, as I have already noted, one attraction of the 1993 Taylor rule was that it described U.S. monetary policy patterns well over a certain period, one that was associated with a reasonable degree of economic stability.

Nevertheless, central bankers who are aware of the merits of the arguments for policy rules have on occasion deviated substantially from the prescriptions of standard policy rules. Further, while the implications of different monetary rules are described in the Tealbook and typically referred to in the presentations by several FOMC participants, the overall discussion in FOMC meetings is not generally cast in terms of how it relates to one version or another of the Taylor or any other rule. The other set of rules mentioned frequently in FOMC discussions are Wicksellian, for there is often a discussion of r*, which in some formulations of the Taylor rule is also the constant term.

The period since 2008 bears testimony to central bankers' willingness to depart from the prescriptions of a pre-specified rule. In the wake of the financial crisis, policymakers found it necessary to follow a more accommodative monetary policy that was appropriate for the new economic conditions.12 In addition, structural changes in the U.S. economy have apparently lowered the value of the interest rate--that is, r*--consistent with neutral policy.13

Such structural changes were not anticipated in advance.14 Of course, once a structural change has occurred and been ascertained by policymakers, they will know what rules would likely have performed well in the face of that change. For this reason, policymakers might change their judgment about what monetary policy rules constitute reasonable benchmarks, or, over time, they might develop a procedure for revising the monetary rule. But a frequently revised rule does not really qualify as a rule in the sense that we currently use the term.

Consequently, when considering the relationship between monetary policy decisions and monetary policy rules, we can expect two regularities to hold. First, actual monetary policy will sometimes appropriately depart from the prescriptions of benchmark rules even when those benchmarks describe past decisions well. Second, in their use of rules, policymakers will from time to time change their assessment of what rule they regard as the appropriate benchmark. Both regularities have been amply observed in recent years, but they were also present 20 years ago, as reflected in Kohn's remark that policymakers "do not see their past actions as a very firm guide to current or future policy." Or, as a teacher of mine at the London School of Economics, Richard Sayers, put it much earlier, "There is no code of eternal rules. . . . We have central banks for the very reason that there are no such rules."15

As I will now elaborate, I believe the fact that monetary policy is made by committees in most economies is important in understanding both of these regularities.

The Role of Committees in Policy Formation
Monetary policy decisions in the United States and elsewhere typically arise from a discussion and vote of a committee.16 In principle, a monetary policy committee could decide to follow a rule. But a decision of this kind is unlikely to occur in practice. Committee discussions bring into policymaking features that a rule lacks. A committee-based decision process is, I suggest, likely to produce policy decisions that depart from the prescriptions of benchmark rules.

A policy rule prescription is more consistent with a single perspective on the economy than with the pooling of multiple perspectives that is associated with a committee policymaking process. Roger Lowenstein's book America's Bank details how the founding of the Federal Reserve involved reconciling a large number of interests in the United States.17 In a similar vein, the modern FOMC framework involves participation by 12 Reserve Bank presidents, each of whom represents a different district of the country. The FOMC framework also balances centralized and decentralized decisionmaking by having most of the permanent voting members--specifically, the Board of Governors--be based in Washington, D.C.

All of the FOMC participants have common goals--maximum employment and price stability--that are given by the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate. They have also agreed, for pursuing that mandate, on the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.18 But while they have this common ground, each FOMC participant brings to the table his or her own perspective or view of the world. Part of their role in meetings is to articulate that perspective and perhaps persuade their colleagues to revise their own perspectives--or vice versa.

A member of a committee may well have valuable economic information not known by their colleagues until he or she relays it. This point has been brought home to me by Reserve Bank presidents' accounts of recent economic developments in their Districts. These narratives shed light on the real-world developments that lie behind the recorded economic data. They also help shape my interpretation of what part of incoming data may be an important signal and what part may reflect transitory factors or mismeasurement.

The information underlying a policy decision is, therefore, crucially shaped by a committee system. Committees can aggregate a large volume of diverse information about current and expected future economic conditions. The information includes anecdotes and impressions gleaned from business and other contacts, which can provide insights that are not recorded in current data releases.

In practice, it is likely that the information obtained and processed by the Committee will leave the FOMC less inclined to follow a benchmark rule. For example, the Committee's discussions might point up factors that have not yet affected real economic activity and inflation. Such factors would not lead to an immediate change in the prescription for the federal funds rate obtained from a rule like the Taylor rule, as this prescription is a function of current values of the output gap and inflation. The Committee might nevertheless wish to adjust the federal funds rate immediately because the newly unearthed factors are likely to affect output and inflation in coming months.

In addition, and as I have suggested, policymakers might also encounter unexpected or unusual events, or both, or they might perceive changes in the structure of the economy. A committee process is conducive to assessing the appropriate policy response to these developments. A case in point is the decline, as I mentioned, in estimates of the neutral interest rate. The concept of the neutral interest rate is a way of summarizing the various forces, many of them unobservable, that shift the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity. Bringing to the table diverse perspectives is a pragmatic way of confronting such deep sources of uncertainty and deciding how to deal with them. A committee discussion can flesh out the factors behind changes in the neutral rate, and a committee would likely be able to identify such changes more promptly than would a statistical exercise, because of the wider set of information from around the country that the committee is able to process.

The decisionmaking environment that I have described involves more flexibility for FOMC members than they would have if they simply followed a policy rule. But transparency and accountability must figure heavily in this more flexible environment. The FOMC's policy communications include its postmeeting statement, the minutes of its meetings, the Chair's quarterly press conference, the Chair's semiannual monetary policy testimony to the Congress, and other public remarks by individual FOMC members. In this framework, policymakers articulate the reasoning behind each decision and, in particular, explain how the policy decision contributes to the achievement of the Committee's statutory mandate.

There remains a deeper question about committee decisionmaking: Why have almost all countries decided that monetary policy decisions should be made by a committee rather than by a rule? One answer is that laws in most countries are passed by institutions in which committee deliberation is the norm. Of course, we then have to ask why that has become a norm in almost all democracies. The answer is that opinions--even on monetary policy--differ among experts, while the economy is in a constant process of change.

Because opinions differ among experts, democracies tend to prefer committees in which decisions are made by discussion among the experts--and, in many cases, other representatives of the public--who discuss, try to persuade each other, and must at the end of their deliberations reach a decision. But those decisions have to be explained to the public and to other parts of the government--and hence the appropriate emphasis on transparency and accountability. That is the democratic way of making decisions when opinions differ, as they often do in the monetary field.

I have been a governor of two central banks and, even as the sole monetary policy decisionmaker in the Bank of Israel, would sometimes find that my initial view on the next decision changed as a result of discussions with the informal advisory committee with whom I consulted at that time. Those discussions, which recognize human frailty in analyzing a situation and the need to act despite considerable uncertainties, are the reason why committee decisionmaking is, on average, preferable to the use of a rule.19

Emphasis on a single rule as the basis for monetary policy implies that the truth has been found, despite the record over time of major shifts in monetary policy--from the gold standard, to the Bretton Woods fixed but changeable exchange rate rule, to Keynesian approaches, to monetary targeting, to the modern frameworks of inflation targeting and the dual mandate of the Fed, and more. We should not make our monetary policy decisions based on that assumption. Rather, we need our policymakers to be continually on the lookout for structural changes in the economy and for disturbances to the economy that come from hitherto unexpected sources.

Concluding Remarks
Let me now sum up. The prescriptions of monetary policy rules play a prominent role in the FOMC's monetary policy deliberations. And this is as it should be, in view of the usefulness of rules as a starting point for policy discussion and the fact that comparison with a benchmark rule provides a useful means of articulating one's own preferred policy action. But, for the reasons I have outlined, adherence to a simple policy rule is not the most appropriate means of achieving macroeconomic goals--and there are very good reasons why monetary policy decisions are typically made in committees whose structure allows them to assess the varying conditions of different regions and economic sectors, as well as to reflect different beliefs about the working of the economy.

References

• Ando, Albert (1981). "On a Theoretical and Empirical Basis of Macroeconometric Models," in J. Kmenta and J.B. Ramsey, eds., Large-Scale Macro-Econometric Models: Theory and Practice. New York: North-Holland, pp. 329-68.
• Blinder, Alan S., and John Morgan (2005). "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Monetary Policy by Committee," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 37 (October), pp. 789-811.
• Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2017). "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, December 13-14, 2016," press release, January 4.
• Cooper, J. Phillip, and Stanley Fischer (1972). "Stochastic Simulation of Monetary Rules in Two Macroeconomic Models," Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 67 (December), pp. 750-60.
• Currie, David, and Paul Levine (1987). "Does International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination Pay and Is It Sustainable? A Two-Country Analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 39 (March), pp. 38-74.
• DeRosa, Paul, and Gary H. Stern (1977). "Monetary Control and the Federal Funds Rate," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 3 (April), pp. 217-30.
• Dewald, William G., and Harry G. Johnson (1963). "An Objective Analysis of the Objectives of American Monetary Policy, 1952-61," in Deane Carson, ed., Banking and Monetary Studies. Homewood, Ill.: R.D. Irwin, pp. 171-89.
• Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Stanley Fischer (1978). Macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
• 
  
• -------- (1979). The Determinants and Effects of Changes in Interest Rates: A Study Prepared for the Trustees of the Banking Research Fund. Chicago: Association of Reserve City Bankers.
• 
  
• Engen, Eric M., Thomas Laubach, and David Reifschneider (2015). "The Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal Reserve's Unconventional Monetary Policies (PDF)," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-005. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February.
• Federal Open Market Committee (2017). Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy (PDF), amended effective January 31 (original version adopted effective January 24, 2012).
• Fischer, Stanley (1994). "Modern Central Banking," in Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart, Stanley Fischer, and Norbert Schnadt, eds., The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 262-308.
• -------- (2017a). "'I'd Rather Have Bob Solow Than an Econometric Model, But . . . ,'" speech delivered at the Warwick Economics Summit, Coventry, United Kingdom, February 11.
• -------- (2017b). "Monetary Policy: By Rule, by Committee, or by Both?" speech delivered at the 2017 U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, sponsored by the Initiative on Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, New York, March 3.
• Flemming, John (1993). "Money, Interest and Consumption in the General Theory," in Haim Barkai, Stanley Fischer, and Nissan Liviatan, eds., Monetary Theory and Thought: Essays in Honour of Don Patinkin. London: Macmillan, pp. 74-83.
• Friedman, Milton (1972). "The Case for a Monetary Rule," Newsweek, February 7, p. 67.
• Henderson, Dale W., and Warwick J. McKibbin (1993). "A Comparison of Some Basic Monetary Policy Regimes for Open Economies: Implications of Different Degrees of Instrument Adjustment and Wage Persistence," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp. 221-317.
• Keynes, John Maynard (1930). A Treatise on Money, 2 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
• Kohn, Donald L. (1999). "Comment," in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 192-99.
• Levin, Andrew T., and John C. Williams (2003). "Robust Monetary Policy with Competing Reference Models," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50 (July), pp. 945-75.
• Lombardelli, Clare, James Proudman, and James Talbot (2005). "Committees versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making," International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1 (May), pp. 181-205.
• Lowenstein, Roger (2015). America's Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve. New York: Penguin Press.
• McCallum, Bennett T. (1981). "Price Level Determinacy with an Interest Rate Policy Rule and Rational Expectations," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 8 (November), pp. 319-29.
• -------- (1988). "Robustness Properties of a Rule for Monetary Policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 29 (Autumn), pp. 173-203.
• Meade, James E. (1951). The Theory of International Economic Policy, vol. 1: The Balance of Payments. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Mundell, Robert A. (1960). "The Monetary Dynamics of International Adjustment under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 74 (May), pp. 227-57.
• Orphanides, Athanasios (2003). "The Quest for Prosperity without Inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50 (April), pp. 633-63.
• Reifschneider, David (2016). "Gauging the Ability of the FOMC to Respond to Future Recessions (PDF)," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-068. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August.
• Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace (1975). "'Rational' Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 83 (April), pp. 241-54.
• Sayers, R.S. (1958). Central Banking after Bagehot, rev. ed. Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press.
• Taylor, John B. (1993). "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 39 (December), pp. 195-214.
• --------, ed. (1999a). Monetary Policy Rules. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• -------- (1999b). "The Robustness and Efficiency of Monetary Policy Rules as Guidelines for Interest Rate Setting by the European Central Bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 43 (June), pp. 655-79.
• Warsh, Kevin M. (2016). "Institutional Design: Deliberations, Decisions, and Committee Dynamics," in John H. Cochrane and John B. Taylor, eds., Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, pp. 173-93.
• Wicksell, Knut (1936). Interest and Prices: A Study of the Causes Regulating the Value of Money, trans. R.F. Kahn. London: Macmillan.
• Woodford, Michael (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
• Yellen, Janet L. (2017). "The Economic Outlook and the Conduct of Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, Calif., January 19.

1. Views expressed in this presentation are my own and not necessarily the views of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. I am grateful to Ed Nelson of the Federal Reserve Board for his assistance. 
2. See, for example, Cooper and Fischer (1972). 
3. There was, however, a long tradition of monetary analysis in the United Kingdom and continental Europe that was centered on the authorities' use of the interest rate as an instrument. See especially Keynes (1930) and Wicksell (1936). In the post-World War II decades, this tradition continued in the U.K. research literature on monetary policy: Examples include Currie and Levine (1987) and Flemming (1993). In addition, an interest rate was the policy instrument in some key contributions to open-economy monetary theory, such as Meade (1951) and Mundell (1960). These traditions likely reflected the long-standing use of Bank Rate as a policy instrument in the United Kingdom and the fact that, for most of the period from the Treasury/Federal Reserve Accord of 1951 until the 1990s, central banks in countries other than the United States tended to be more explicit than the Federal Reserve chose to be about their use of short-term interest rates as their primary policy instrument. Even in the U.S. context, however, there was a certain amount of research on interest rate policies. For example, it was common practice among builders of large econometric models to consider different Federal Reserve interest rate strategies (see Ando, 1981). In addition, the empirical and simulation properties of the Federal Reserve's interest rate reaction function were the concern of such studies as Dewald and Johnson (1963), DeRosa and Stern (1977), Dornbusch and Fischer (1979), and Henderson and McKibbin (1993), while Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981) examined the analytical properties of interest rate rules. A later magisterial study of the analytics of interest rate rules was Woodford (2003). 
4. See McCallum (1981). I should add that when we presented work based on Cooper and Fischer (1972), we were urged by several economists to focus on the interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. Among these economists were Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani, who were then working with others on building the MPS (MIT-Pennsylvania-Social Science Research Council) model. 
5. See Taylor (1993). 
6. For my earlier speeches in this area, see Fischer (2017a, 2017b). 
7. See Kohn (1999). At the time, Donald Kohn was director of the Division of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board. The conference proceedings were published as Taylor (1999a). 
8. The Federal Reserve Board's website (https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical_year.htm) provides downloadable copies of the briefing books (the Greenbook and Bluebook, which were replaced in 2010 by the Tealbook) distributed to FOMC members and other participants ahead of each FOMC meeting. At present, the most recent year for which these materials are available on the site is 2011. The "Monetary Policy Strategies" portion of the Bluebook (and, later, the Tealbook) contains prescriptions from interest rate rules. 
9. See Kohn (1999, p. 195). The first of these functions of policy rule prescriptions was one I also had highlighted. In Fischer (1994, p. 289), when considering McCallum's (1988) proposed rule for monetary base growth, I described it as "a useful benchmark against which to judge policy." 
10. Searchable transcripts of FOMC meetings up to 2011 are available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc_historical.htm. 
11. See Yellen (2017). 
12. See especially Engen, Laubach, and Reifschneider (2015). Because the federal funds rate was at its effective lower bound from late 2008 to late 2015, policy choices about that rate largely involved decisions concerning the forward guidance provided by the FOMC. These decisions in turn rested on judgments regarding the period over which the rate should remain at its lower bound, as well as about the pace and magnitude of the subsequent policy firming. 
13. See, for example, Board of Governors (2017). 
14. Indeed, Milton Friedman's advocacy of a policy rule consisting of constant monetary growth rested in part on the existence of uncertainty, as he suggested that economists lacked the knowledge about economic relationships required to improve on that simple rule. See Friedman (1972) for a concise version of his case for the rule and Dornbusch and Fischer (1978, pp. 278-80, 516) for a textbook account of Friedman's rule that emphasized the uncertainty aspect of his argument for the rule. Of course, the fact that a policy rule is simple far from guarantees that the rule will generate satisfactory economic outcomes in the face of uncertainty and economic change. For example, Friedman's rule would likely perform poorly in an environment in which the trend rate of growth of monetary velocity underwent a major shift, while the Taylor rule could perform unsatisfactorily if the assumption about potential-output behavior embedded in the rule proved to be badly mistaken. The latter possibility was stressed in Orphanides (2003). 
15. See Sayers (1958, p. 7). 
16. I discussed some of the literature on monetary policy committees in Fischer (2017b). 
17. See Lowenstein (2015). 
18. See Federal Open Market Committee (2017). 
19. The existing literature on monetary policy committees has found that committee decisions tend to be better than decisions made by a sole policymaker. See, for example, Blinder and Morgan (2005); Lombardelli, Proudman, and Talbot (2005); and Warsh (2016).

DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/fischer20170505a.pdf

FED. May 5, 2017. Consumer Credit March 2017 

Consumer credit increased at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4-1/4 percent during the first quarter. Revolving credit was little changed, while nonrevolving credit increased at an annual rate of 5-3/4 percent. In March, consumer credit increased at an annual rate of 5-1/4 percent.

TABLES: https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm

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IPEA. 05/05/2017. Investimentos caem em março, após crescimento robusto em fevereiro. No primeiro trimestre de 2017, Indicador Ipea de FBCF indica estagnação em relação ao último trimestre de 2016

Depois de um crescimento de 4,3% em fevereiro de 2017, os investimentos caíram 2,1% em março, segundo o Indicador Ipea de Formação Bruta de Capital Fixo (FBCF) divulgado nesta sexta-feira (05.05). O resultado negativo decorre do mau desempenho de dois componentes principais da FBCF. O indicador de construção civil recuou 2,5% em março em relação ao mês anterior, após quatro variações positivas. Já o consumo aparente de máquinas e equipamentos (Came) caiu 2,4% no mesmo período. A estimativa dos investimentos em máquinas e equipamentos corresponde à produção industrial doméstica acrescida das importações e descontadas as exportações.

Entre os componentes do Came, a produção doméstica de bens de capital recuou 3,3% em março, explicando o mau resultado na comparação com fevereiro. Mas o comportamento das variáveis de comércio exterior ajudou a suavizar esta queda. Enquanto o volume de exportações de bens de capital cresceu 4,1% sobre o mês de fevereiro, as importações registraram alta de 9,1%, resultando numa contribuição líquida positiva para o resultado do Came.

Na comparação do primeiro trimestre deste ano com o do ano passado, houve redução de 2,1% no indicador de investimentos. Na comparação com o mesmo mês do ano anterior (março), os investimentos caíram 0,7%. O resultado acumulado em 12 meses terminados em março é uma queda de 6,3%.

Na avaliação do técnico de planejamento e pesquisa Leonardo Carvalho, o resultado de março reforça uma tendência de instabilidade no desempenho dos investimentos, que são a base do crescimento sustentado.

CNI. 04/05/2017. Investimento da indústria no exterior fortalece a economia brasileira. O segundo capítulo da série especial Brasil Internacional mostra a importância da internacionalização das empresas para o aumento da produção, do emprego e da renda no país

Os investimentos das empresas brasileiras no exterior dobraram entre 2000 e 2015. O estoque passou de US$ 140 bilhões para US$ 283 bilhões. Mas esta evolução esconde as oscilações dos investimentos no período. Enquanto as principais economias emergentes apresentaram crescimento regular entre 10% e 15%, os estoques brasileiros no exterior chegam a apresentar crescimento de 31% num ano e queda de 4% em outro. A volatilidade ocorre porque algumas políticas no Brasil desestimulam a internacionalização. A análise faz parte a Agenda Internacional da Indústria 2017, documento elaborado pela CNI e lançado no fim de abril.

"O Brasil precisa de uma política mais consistente que envolva os diversos órgãos do governo e a iniciativa privada. É necessário coordenar de forma mais produtiva as iniciativas e as ações públicas que existem hoje. Ainda falta entender com clareza que investir no exterior faz bem para a economia brasileira: a indústria consegue ganhar novos mercados para suas exportações, acessar tecnologias novas, aumentar sua produtividade e gerar mais emprego e renda”, diz o diretor de Desenvolvimento Industrial da CNI, Carlos Abijaodi.

A professora e pesquisadora do Núcleo de Estratégia e Negócios Internacionais da Fundação Dom Cabral Lívia Barakat verificou um aumento na internacionalização das empresas brasileiras nos últimos dez anos. Segundo a pesquisadora, a instabilidade recente da economia brasileira e a crise política contribuíram para que as empresas buscassem outros mercados.

Em 2006, o índice médio de internacionalização das multinacionais brasileiras era de 16%. Este percentual subiu de forma contínua e alcançou 26% no ano passado. Em seu levantamento, a Fundação Dom Cabral entrevistou 50 multinacionais e 14 companhias que atuam no exterior por meio de franquias em 2016.

Barakat explica que a empresa não faz uma escolha entre investir no Brasil e investir no exterior. “A empresa investe lá fora para se fortalecer. Em muitos casos, quando ela se concentra só no mercado interno, acaba perdendo força e mercado para uma estrangeira. Vimos empresas que foram perdendo market share até fecharem as portas”, diz a pesquisadora.

Em 2016, a Fundação Dom Cabral observou outro fenômeno. Foi a primeira vez que as empresas se mostraram mais satisfeitas com o desempenho no exterior do que no Brasil nos itens vendas, crescimento de vendas, market share e lucratividade. No índice que varia de 0 a 5, a lucratividade no exterior recebeu nota 4,2, enquanto no Brasil ficou em 2,9.

EXPERIÊNCIA INTERNACIONAL – A Iochpe Maxion, fabricante de autopeças e equipamentos ferroviários, é considerada uma das empresas mais internacionalizadas do Brasil. Fundada em 1918, começou o processo de implementação das unidades produtivas no exterior em 2002 como parte estratégica de crescimento da empresa. Naquele momento, o mercado doméstico já se mostrava limitado e as exportações haviam alcançado seu patamar máximo. Mas outro fator acabou pressionando a empresa.

As montadoras buscam adensar as cadeias produtivas nos países em que produzem para se aproximar de fornecedores e se adequar às exigências dos governos locais. Neste cenário, a Iochpe viu a abertura de novas unidades no exterior como uma forma de preservar seus mercados, além de poder acessar novos consumidores. Atualmente, a empresa tem unidades na África do Sul, Alemanha, Argentina, China, Espanha, Estados Unidos, Índia, Itália, México, República Checa, Tailândia, Turquia e Uruguai, que respondem por cerca de 60% das vendas da empresa.

Segundo o presidente do Conselho de Administração da Iochpe Maxion, Dan Iochpe, há duas questões essenciais para a internacionalização das empresas brasileiras. “Primeiro, ter acesso a novos mercados. O Brasil é um país relevante, mas as exportações têm limites, por isso o estabelecimento no exterior é muito importante. O segundo é aumentar a competitividade. Quando se expõe ao mercado externo, as empresas passam a compreender os requerimentos e a dinâmica competitiva para sobreviver”, disse Dan Iochpe em entrevista à Agência CNI de Notícias.

PRIORIDADES PARA 2017 – Dentro das políticas públicas necessárias para reduzir os obstáculos que as empresas enfrentam para se tornar e se manter multinacionais brasileiras, a CNI avalia que é importante alterar alguns aspectos da tributação dos lucros no exterior. Na Agenda Internacional da Indústria 2017, a entidade propõe regulamentar a Lei 12.973/2014, para incluir empresas controladas do setor de serviços no critério de crédito presumido e dar mais clareza sobre as regras de consolidação de resultados no exterior e compensação de prejuízos.

A CNI defende ainda uma melhoria no modelo brasileiro de Acordos para Evitar Dupla Tributação (ADTs), em temas como tratramento de serviços e royalties, e a ampliação da rede brasileira de ADTs e assinatura destes acordos prioritariamente com Estados Unidos, Colômbia, Reino Unido, Alemanha, Austrália, Uruguai, Paraguai e Suíça. No momento, a indústria aguarda a aprovação no Congresso Nacional do acordo com a Rússia, assinado em 2007.

Além disso, há propostas para reformular a legislação que trata dos expatriados; alterar a legislação de preços de transferência; eliminar o IOF na operação de aquisição e empréstimo intercompany; celebrar acordos de investimento entre os membros do Mercosul e com países da África, América Latina, Japão, além dos outros BRICS (Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul); e firmar acordos previdenciários com África do Sul, Angola, Áustria, China, Colômbia, Egito, Emirados Árabes Unidos, Índia, México, Holanda, Panamá, República Dominicana e Venezuela.

AGENDA INTERNACIONAL DA INDÚSTRIA 2017: https://static-cms-si.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/47/6b/476b8791-c77e-4641-b74b-f882f1cfd179/agendainternacionalindustria2017_web.pdf

MDIC. AGÊNCIA ESTADO. 05/05/2017. Brasil começa a recuperar vendas para o Mercosul
Lu Aiko Otta

Prioridade da política externa brasileira, o comércio do Brasil com o Mercosul começa a recuperar-se, segundo mostram os dados da balança comercial. De janeiro a abril deste ano, as vendas cresceram 20,5% sobre igual período do ano passado, segundo dados divulgados na última terça-feira, 2, pelo Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços (MDIC).

Essa recuperação, porém, poderia ser mais vigorosa. As relações comerciais no bloco ainda padecem de problemas burocráticos que atrapalham o dia a dia das empresas, segundo levantamento realizado pela Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) no estudo Agenda Econômica e Comercial do Mercosul - Documento de Posição da Indústria, ao qual a reportagem teve acesso. O texto também traz 25 propostas para superar esses problemas.

"O Mercosul é bom na concepção, porque os países precisavam se unir para ter mais força nas mesas de negociação", disse o diretor de Desenvolvimento Industrial da entidade, Carlos Eduardo Abijaodi. "Mas há muitas falhas."

Por exemplo: apesar dos discursos pregando a necessidade de buscar novos acordos comerciais, a burocracia do Mercosul deixa na gaveta entendimentos já fechados. Assinado há sete anos, o acordo com o Egito não foi colocado em prática até hoje. Isso porque o Brasil só obteve sua aprovação no Congresso Nacional em 2015. E ainda falta um decreto presidencial para regulamentar. O acordo tampouco foi aprovado pelo legislativo argentino.

Há problemas ainda mais antigos. O açúcar brasileiro ficou de fora da regra geral de ser exportado para os países do Mercosul sem tarifas. O mesmo vale para carros, que são submetidos a um regime de cotas.

E há entraves mais recentes. Em 2016, os membros do Mercosul aprovaram uma nova versão da Nomenclatura Comum do Mercosul (NCM), uma tabela que lista códigos para todos os produtos. Mas só o Brasil adotou a nova tabela. Resultado: as exportações por vezes ficam paradas por inconsistência de uso dos códigos. Cerca de 50% das normas aprovadas pelo Mercosul não estão internalizadas em todos os países.

Outro problema enfrentado pelas empresas é a demora na tomada de decisões. Segundo o estudo, há 19 pedidos do setor produtivo brasileiro para redução temporária de tarifa de importação, para contornar situações de desabastecimento. Ou seja, em tese são medidas a serem adotadas com urgência. Mas algumas solicitações já completaram um ano de espera.

"Precisava ter uma governança melhor. Da forma como está, cai a confiabilidade e a segurança jurídica", comentou Abijaodi. Nos últimos anos, acrescentou, esse problema foi agravado pelo fato de o Mercosul haver priorizado os temas políticos.

Essas dificuldades agravaram o quadro de encolhimento do comércio na região nos últimos anos, um processo provocado principalmente pela retração econômica.

As exportações dos sócios para dentro do próprio Mercosul caíram de US$ 54 bilhões em 2011 para US$ 36 bilhões em 2016, uma queda de 33%. No mesmo período, as vendas para fora do bloco tiveram queda de 26%, o que mostra uma perda de importância das relações comerciais intrabloco.

Propostas

Uma das principais propostas da CNI, dentre as 25 para destravar o comércio, é o reconhecimento mútuo de normas técnicas, sanitárias e fitossanitárias. Elas ditam se um produto pode ou não ser comercializado em outro país.

Outra proposta é flexibilização do processo negociador. A ideia é o bloco decidir conjuntamente se quer ou não um acordo com determinado país. A partir daí, cada sócio teria liberdade para negociar seus cronogramas de abertura de mercado.

BACEN. Relatório de Poupança de abril de 2017.

DOCUMENTO: http://www.bcb.gov.br/Pre/SalaImprensa/port/poupanca.asp

BACEN. PORTAL G1. 05/05/2017. Poupança perde R$ 1,27 bilhão em abril, informa Banco Central. Balanço foi divulgado nesta sexta-feira. BC disse ainda que R$ 18,67 bilhões foram retirados da poupança em 2017.
Por Laís Lis, G1, Brasília

A poupança perdeu R$ 1,27 bilhão em abril, informou nesta sexta-feira (5) o Banco Central do Brasil. Segundo o BC, no mês passado foram depositados R$ 153,35 bilhões na poupança e retirados R$ 154,62 bilhões.
A retirada registrada em abril é menor do que a registrada em abril de 2016, quando o saldo negativa ficou em R$ 8,246 bilhões. Em 2017, a poupança ainda não registrou nenhum mês com mais depósitos do que saques na poupança. O último mês que o saldo da poupança ficou positivo foi em dezembro do ano passado, quando registrou captação líquida de R$ 10,668 bilhões. No ano, a poupança registra retirada líquida de R$ 18,67 bilhões.
Resultado de 2016
Em todo o ano passado, R$ 40,7 bilhões foram retirados da poupança. O resultado foi o segundo pior da série histórica, que começou em 1995, atrás somente de 2015, quando foram sacados R$ 53,5 bilhões.
A retirada de recursos da caderneta de poupança acontece em um momento de baixo nível de atividade econômica, com aumento do desemprego e inadimplência em patamar elevado. Além disso, a poupança também tem registrado baixo rendimento se comparada a outras aplicações financeiras.
Saldo da poupança
Com a retirada líquida de recursos da poupança, no final de abril o estoque dos valores depositados, ou seja, o volume total aplicado, registrou queda.
No fim de dezembro de 2016, o saldo da poupança estava em R$ 664,9 bilhões. Ao fim de março de 2017, somava R$ 659,4 bilhões e no final de abril ficou em R$ 661,91 bilhões.
Além dos depósitos e das retiradas, os rendimentos creditados nas contas dos poupadores também são contabilizados no estoque da poupança. Em abril, os rendimentos totalizaram R$ 3,78 bilhões.

MF. SPE. 04/05/2017. Prisma Fiscal. SPE divulga atualização do Podium de curto prazo. Relatório elenca as três instituições com melhores previsões para cada variável fiscal

Secretaria de Política Econômica divulga a atualização do “Podium de curto prazo”, o ranking das previsões mensais das instituições participantes do Prisma Fiscal. Clique aqui para conferir a versão atualizada.

Entenda

Divulgado desde julho de 2016, o Podium de curto prazo é um ranking das três instituições com melhores previsões para cada variável fiscal nos últimos seis meses, com o percentual de erro de cada uma.

O ordenamento é feito com base em equações que determinam penalidades para cada instituição, considerando o desvio de suas projeções para o valor ocorrido e a regularidade de participação. Ou seja, quanto mais regular e mais precisa é a instituição, menor a penalidade e, consequentemente, melhor sua posição no ranking.

Além disso, é divulgado o percentual médio de erro das demais instituições. O percentual indica quanto a previsão da instituição desviou do valor realizado, em média, no período avaliado, levando em conta a magnitude da variável. Por exemplo, se o percentual de erro for 10% para uma instituição que participou em todos os meses, o tamanho médio do erro foi um décimo do valor realizado.

PRISMA FISCAL ABRIL/2017: https://www.spe.fazenda.gov.br/prisma-fiscal/historico-de-documentos/relatorio-mensal-2017_04.pdf

Nota Metodológica do Prisma Fiscal: http://www.spe.fazenda.gov.br/prisma-fiscal/historico-de-documentos/prisma-fiscal-nota-metodologica-novo-prisma.pdf

MF. STN. 03/05/2017. Tesouro publica relatório do FMI sobre transparência fiscal no Brasil. Documento avalia práticas e analisa as fontes de vulnerabilidade fiscal do país; missão oficial contou também com especialistas do BID

O Tesouro Nacional publica nesta quarta-feira (3) relatório elaborado pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) sobre a transparência fiscal no Brasil. No documento, elaborado pelo Órgão FMI a pedido do Ministério da Fazenda, foram evidenciadas as práticas do Brasil que atendem a vários princípios do Código de Transparência Fiscal daquele Órgão do Fundo em níveis bons ou avançados e os pontos de melhoria.

A avaliação de transparência fiscal é realizada pelo FMI a pedido dos países com o objetivo de fornecer a eles uma avaliação abrangente de suas práticas de transparência fiscal em comparação com os padrões estabelecidos pelo Código de Boas Práticas de Transparência Fiscal (FT-Code) daquele organismo, bem como uma análise rigorosa da escala e das fontes de vulnerabilidade fiscal baseada em um conjunto de indicadores de transparência fiscal.

Dentre as práticas de transparência fiscal mais bem avaliadas no documento destacam-se as estatísticas fiscais, que abrangem o setor do governo geral e reconhecem a maioria dos seus ativos e passivos; os relatórios fiscais, publicados de forma periódica e tempestiva, com demonstrações financeiras anuais auditadas pelo TCU; os documentos do orçamento, pela abrangência em termos institucionais, tempestividade e transparência por meio de websites e bancos de dados online; e a divulgação e a gestão dos riscos fiscais realizadas segundo a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF).

Ainda de acordo com o relatório, dentre as áreas em que a transparência fiscal do Brasil poderia ser melhorada destacam-se a produção de estatísticas fiscais abrangentes sobre o setor público, incorporando empresas públicas financeiras e não financeiras de acordo com a metodologia preconizada pelo FMI; o fortalecimento da divulgação e gestão dos riscos fiscais; o relacionamento entre o Tesouro Nacional e o Banco Central e a divulgação dos principais desafios fiscais de médio e longo prazo, o que contribuiria para a formação de um consenso em torno de reformas indispensáveis.

Os pontos indicados pelo FMI como passíveis de melhoria já passam por processos de mudança. Dentre eles, estão a alteração no relacionamento entre o Tesouro Nacional e o Banco Central, já formulada e pronta para divulgação; as melhorias na divulgação e gestão de risco fiscais, já realizadas no Projeto de Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias (LDO) 2018 para melhor caracterizar o risco fiscal envolvido em cada tema; padronizar conceitos e aprimorar metodologias. A divulgação dos riscos fiscais de médio e longo prazo tem sido feita com sucesso. A aprovação da PEC do teto dos gastos e a discussão sobre a Reforma da Previdência são resultado deste trabalho.

Processo de avaliação

A avaliação foi solicitada pelo Ministério da Fazenda ao FMI em setembro de 2015 e faz parte de um processo de aperfeiçoamento e ampliação da transparência fiscal brasileira. Vários países de diferentes regiões ou níveis de renda já realizaram esse processo, dentre eles a Finlândia, Albânia, Bolívia, Costa Rica, Irlanda, Moçambique, Peru, Portugal, Roménia, Rússia e Filipinas.

A missão oficial de avaliação de transparência fiscal foi conduzida pelo FMI no período de 1 a 14 de junho de 2016, contando também com a participação de especialistas do Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID).

Neste período, foram apresentados o relatório e os resultados preliminares da avaliação. Além da Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional, que coordenou o processo, participaram da avaliação da transparência fiscal diversas outras instituições governamentais, como o Banco Central do Brasil, o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), a Secretaria de Orçamento Federal (SOF), a Receita Federal (RFB), a Secretaria de Política Econômica (SPE), a Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econômico (SEAE), o Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), o Ministério de Minas e Energia – MME, a Agência Nacional de Petróleo – ANP e Casa Civil.

Relatório final de Avaliação da transparência fiscal no Brasil: http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/documents/10180/318974/Relat%C3%B3rio+de+transpar%C3%AAncia+-+Portugu%C3%AAs/39be20dd-3846-4f8b-9dd4-429a207b8b68

FGV. IBRE. 05/05/2017. Índices Gerais de Preços. IPC-C1. Inflação para famílias com renda entre 1 e 2,5 salários mínimos recua em abril

O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor - Classe 1 (IPC-C1) do mês de abril apresentou variação de 0,11%, taxa 0,45 ponto percentual (p.p.) abaixo da apurada em março, quando o índice registrou variação de 0,56%. Com este resultado, o indicador acumula alta de 1,30%, no ano e, 3,64%, nos últimos 12 meses.

Em abril, o IPC-BR registrou variação de 0,12%. A taxa do indicador nos últimos 12 meses ficou em 4,17%, nível acima do registrado pelo IPC-C1.

Três das oito classes de despesa componentes do índice apresentaram decréscimo em suas taxas de variação: Habitação (1,22% para -1,00%), Vestuário (0,11% para -0,65%) e Despesas Diversas (1,01% para 0,02%). Nestes grupos, os destaques partiram dos itens: tarifa de eletricidade residencial (5,75% para -7,83%), roupas (-0,27% para -0,73%) e cigarros (1,33% para 0,00%), respectivamente.

Em contrapartida, os grupos: Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais (0,61% para 1,27%), Comunicação (-1,53% para 0,58%), Alimentação (0,60% para 0,71%), Transportes (-0,15% para 0,12%) e Educação, Leitura e Recreação (-0,19% para -0,02%) apresentaram acréscimo em suas taxas de variação. Nestas classes de despesa, destacam-se os itens: medicamentos em geral (0,12% para 2,46%), tarifa de telefone residencial (-3,40% para -0,24%), hortaliças e legumes (3,97% para 14,42%), tarifa de transporte de van e similares (0,20% para 5,94%) e passagem aérea (-5,75% para -4,10%), respectivamente.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C5593FD36B015BD825A84413E5

DMI-Viva Real. REUTERS. 05/05/2017. Aluguel residencial no Brasil tem queda nominal de 8,56% em abril, diz DMI-Viva Real

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O preço médio do aluguel residencial no Brasil em abril teve queda nominal de 8,56 por cento na comparação anual, atingindo 22,86 reais por metro quadrado, de acordo com o levantamento DMI-Viva Real.

Na comparação com março, o recuo foi de 0,95 por cento, mostrou a pesquisa, que contempla mais de 2 milhões de imóveis usados em 30 cidades de diferentes regiões do país.

Niterói foi a cidade que em abril apresentou a maior redução no valor médio da locação residencial, com baixa de 2,22 por cento ante março, para 20 reais por metro quadrado, informou o DMI-Viva Real. Londrina aparece na sequência, com queda mensal de 1,73 por cento, e Rio de Janeiro teve desvalorização de 1,69 por cento.

Entre as registraram alta no preço do aluguel, os destaques foram Salvador (+6,98 por cento), Curitiba (+1,30 por cento) e Sorocaba (+0,57 por cento), de acordo com a pesquisa.

O levantamento apontou, ainda, São Paulo como o município com o metro quadrado mais caro para locação (35,09 reais), seguido por Rio de Janeiro (32,50 reais) e Brasília (31,82 reais).

VENDA

O preço médio de venda de imóveis residenciais no Brasil em abril caiu 0,37 por cento em termos nominais frente ao mesmo mês de 2016, mas subiu 0,21 por cento na comparação com março, para 4.810 reais por metro quadrado, segundo o DMI-Viva Real.

Ainda conforme a pesquisa, Brasília foi a cidade com o metro quadrado mais caro para venda no mês passado (8.043 reais). Rio de Janeiro ocupava a segunda posição (7.200 reais), e São Paulo ficou em terceiro (6.857 reais).

Além disso, Vitória da Conquista, Florianópolis, Curitiba e Salvador foram os municípios com maior alta nominal no preço de venda de imóveis residenciais na comparação com março. Na outra ponta, Joinville, Porto Alegre, Brasília e Santos foram as que tiveram maior desvalorização mensal no valor do metro quadrado.

(Por Gabriela Mello)

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LGCJ.: