US ECONOMICS
EMPLOYMENT
DoL. BLS. February 7, 2020. THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION - JANUARY 2020
Total nonfarm payroll employment rose by 225,000 in January, and the unemployment rate
was little changed at 3.6 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today.
Notable job gains occurred in construction, in health care, and in transportation and
warehousing.
This news release presents statistics from two monthly surveys. The household survey
measures labor force status, including unemployment, by demographic characteristics.
The establishment survey measures nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings by industry.
For more information about the concepts and statistical methodology used in these two
surveys, see the Technical Note.
Changes to The Employment Situation Data
Establishment survey data have been revised as a result of the annual
benchmarking process and the updating of seasonal adjustment factors. In
addition, several changes have been made to household survey data, including
the annual update of population estimates. See the notes at the end of the
news release for more information.
Household Survey Data
Both the unemployment rate, at 3.6 percent, and the number of unemployed persons, at
5.9 million, changed little in January. (See table A-1. For information about annual
population adjustments to the household survey estimates, see the note at the end of
the news release and tables B and C.)
Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for adult men (3.3 percent),
adult women (3.2 percent), teenagers (12.2 percent), Whites (3.1 percent), Blacks
(6.0 percent), Asians (3.0 percent), and Hispanics (4.3 percent) showed little or
no change over the month. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)
Among the unemployed, the number of reentrants to the labor force increased by
183,000 in January to 1.8 million but was little changed over the year. (Reentrants
are persons who previously worked but were not in the labor force prior to beginning
their job search.) (See table A-11.)
The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more), at 1.2 million,
was unchanged in January. These individuals accounted for 19.9 percent of the unemployed.
(See table A-12.)
After accounting for the annual adjustments to the population controls, the civilian
labor force rose by 574,000 in January, and the labor force participation rate edged
up by 0.2 percentage point to 63.4 percent. The employment-population ratio, at 61.2
percent, changed little over the month but was up by 0.5 percentage point over the year.
(See table A-1. For additional information about the effects of the population adjustments,
see table C.)
The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons, at 4.2 million, was
essentially unchanged in January. These individuals, who would have preferred full-time
employment, were working part time because their hours had been reduced or they were
unable to find full-time jobs. (See table A-8.)
The number of persons marginally attached to the labor force, at 1.3 million, changed
little in January. These individuals were not in the labor force, wanted and were available
for work, and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months. They were not counted
as unemployed because they had not searched for work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey
for a variety of reasons, such as belief that no jobs are available for them (referred
to as discouraged workers), school attendance, or family responsibilities. Discouraged
workers numbered 337,000 in January, little changed over the month. (See Summary table A.)
Establishment Survey Data
Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 225,000 in January, compared with an
average monthly gain of 175,000 in 2019. Notable job gains occurred in construction,
in health care, and in transportation and warehousing. (See table B-1. For information
about the annual benchmark process, see the note at the end of the news release and table A.)
In January, construction employment rose by 44,000. Most of the gain occurred in specialty
trade contractors, with increases in both the residential (+18,000) and nonresidential
(+17,000) components. Construction added an average of 12,000 jobs per month in 2019.
Health care added 36,000 jobs in January, with gains in ambulatory health care services
(+23,000) and hospitals (+10,000). Health care has added 361,000 jobs over the past 12 months.
Employment in transportation and warehousing increased by 28,000 in January. Job gains
occurred in couriers and messengers (+14,000) and in warehousing and storage (+6,000).
Over the year, employment in transportation and warehousing has increased by 106,000.
Employment in leisure and hospitality continued to trend up in January (+36,000). Over
the past 6 months, the industry has added 288,000 jobs.
Employment continued on an upward trend in professional and business services in January
(+21,000), increasing by 390,000 over the past 12 months.
Manufacturing employment changed little in January (-12,000) and has shown little movement,
on net, over the past 12 months. Motor vehicles and parts lost 11,000 jobs over the month.
Employment in other major industries, including mining, wholesale trade, retail trade,
information, financial activities, and government, changed little over the month.
In January, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by
7 cents to $28.44. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have increased by
3.1 percent. Average hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory employees
were $23.87 in January, little changed over the month (+3 cents). (See tables B-3 and B-8.)
The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls was unchanged at 34.3
hours in January. In manufacturing, the average workweek remained at 40.4 hours, while
overtime edged down 0.1 hour to 3.1 hours. The average workweek of private-sector production
and nonsupervisory employees edged up by 0.1 hour to 33.6 hours. (See tables B-2 and B-7.)
The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for November was revised up by 5,000 from
+256,000 to +261,000, and the change for December was revised up by 2,000 from +145,000 to
+147,000. With these revisions, employment gains in November and December combined were
7,000 higher than previously reported. (Monthly revisions result from additional reports
received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from
the recalculation of seasonal factors. The annual benchmark process also contributed to the
November and December revisions.) After revisions, job gains have averaged 211,000 over the
last 3 months.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf
ECONOMY
FED. February 06, 2020. Speech. The Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy, and the Demand for Reserves. Vice Chair for Supervision Randal K. Quarles. At the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, New York
I would like to thank the organizers for the opportunity to speak to you today. My plan is to address some topical and important issues, some of which are quite technical but technicalities that I think can have significant consequences.1 After providing my thoughts on where the economy and monetary policy are now, I will turn to what we can expect from monetary policy in the years to come.
Changes in the economic environment since the financial crisis, including an apparent decline in the equilibrium interest rate, have complicated the conduct of monetary policy as we work to achieve our dual mandate of maximum employment and stable prices. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is currently undertaking a review of its monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices to make sure we are best positioned to confront the challenges ahead. Since the Committee is still actively discussing the review, I have no intention of front-running the results. Instead, I would like to address a separate but not unrelated topic, the interaction of bank supervision and regulation with monetary policy, and how supervision and regulation might work to make monetary policy implementation more effective in the current environment, particularly as it relates to a bank's demand for reserves.2
But first, let me start with a brief take on the current economic outlook. There is much to be encouraged by in the nation's current economic performance even as some notable risks require careful monitoring.
The labor market continues to perform remarkably well, providing a key pillar of support for the rest of the economy. The unemployment rate is at a 50-year low. The labor force participation rate has been steady for some time now despite continued predictions for its decline premised on an aging population moving into retirement. Taken together, low unemployment and steady participation have boosted the employment-to-population ratio, which has finally surpassed its pre-crisis level. A strong labor market, in turn, supports a healthy pace of consumption growth and the economy more generally.
There has been some public discussion about what constitutes a tight labor market. I am in the camp that believes that some additional slack remains in the market, particularly in the potential for higher labor force participation. I have spoken for some time about my confidence that a strong labor market will continue to draw in workers—and lead other workers to delay retirement or otherwise remain in the labor force—and, so far, I remain optimistic.
Although I feel good about the outlook, a few developments give me pause. Significantly, investment continues to be weak, declining over the course of 2019. Increasing the capital stock and investing in new technologies are important for productivity growth, rising living standards, and the economy's long-run growth rate, so reversing the recent downward trend is essential for the overall health of the economy.
In part, the fall in investment likely reflects business concerns over the pace of global growth and risks to the outlook. In particular, 2019 was a bad year for economic growth among U.S. trading partners, and, as a consequence, our exports suffered. Recently, I have been encouraged by the progress in U.S. trade negotiations. I am hopeful that the recently signed phase-one deal with China will boost U.S. exports and lead to considerable reduction in the uncertainty that has been weighing on businesses, as will the continued progress in enacting the trade agreement with Canada and Mexico.
While the recent progress on trade should boost business confidence, the outbreak of the Wuhan coronavirus introduces a new element of uncertainty. In addition to the human toll, the virus also threatens significant economic disruption, particularly for China and its neighbors, as workers and consumers stay home and normal activities are otherwise disrupted. It is too early to say what the full economic effect of the outbreak will be, and this situation will require careful monitoring.
In summary, I remain optimistic about the outlook, but I am also highly aware that some notable risks still threaten growth, both overseas and at home.
A few words on inflation. Both headline and core inflation, as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures, or PCE, came in at 1.6 percent in December, somewhat below the FOMC's 2 percent objective. This deviation does not worry me that much, in part because I expect inflation to move back to target over the medium term, in part as some unusually low readings in early 2019 pass out of the data. Already, various trimmed price indexes are running much closer to 2 percent.
Monetary Policy Considerations
I view the current stance of monetary policy as appropriate given the economic outlook and relatively muted inflation pressures. Policy is in a good place to support continued economic growth, strong labor market conditions, and inflation returning to target. That said, now is a good time to be thinking about the challenges that monetary policy is likely to face in the coming years.
One important development, as I mentioned at the start, is that interest rates at home and abroad have declined significantly from their pre-recession levels. Policymakers, economists, and market participants see much of this decline as reflecting a permanent fall in the equilibrium rate of interest—that is, the level of the federal funds rate that keeps the economy at full employment with stable inflation in the longer run. For example, in the most recent Summary of Economic Projections compiling the individual forecasts of FOMC participants, the median estimate of the longer-run federal funds rate, a value that incorporates policymakers' assessments of the equilibrium rate, was 2-1/2 percent, down from 4-1/4 percent in early 2012.3
All else being equal, a fall in the equilibrium rate of interest lessens the scope for the FOMC to cut rates in response to a significant economic downturn, as the distance to zero shrinks. In the absence of compensating policy actions, this situation may aggravate economic downturns. Thankfully, in practice policymakers have several additional tools to ease financial conditions and support the economy.
One such tool is forward guidance: By credibly conveying to the public that policymakers will likely pursue a path for the policy rate that is lower than previously anticipated, policymakers can put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates. In addition, policymakers can implement policies such as large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) that affect the size and composition of the balance sheet: By purchasing longer-term securities in the open market, the Federal Reserve reduces the quantity of such assets available for purchase. The increased scarcity tends to raise the price of these securities and depress their yields. Balance sheet policies can put further downward pressure on longer-term yields by reinforcing the credibility of the forward guidance if these policies are seen as a signal that policymakers intend to keep the policy rate low for an extended period.4
The FOMC used both forward guidance and balance sheet policies in response to the financial crisis. Some observers argue that forward guidance and asset purchases fully offset the shortfall in policy accommodation caused by a lack of space to cut interest rates further, so that the limits on the Fed's policy rate did not ultimately constrain our policy response to the financial crisis. Other observers see these policy tools as having had, at best, a small positive effect on the economy. Somewhere between these two extremes, the majority view is that forward guidance and balance sheet polices likely made up for some, though not all, of the shortfall.5
The experience gained with these tools during and after the financial crisis will likely facilitate their prompt and effective deployment in future episodes when there is no longer space for further cuts in the policy rate.
In retrospect, many of the potential negative effects associated with forward guidance and LSAPs did not materialize. In particular, inflation remained contained, and longer-run inflation expectations did not become unanchored. A large balance sheet did not prevent the FOMC from raising the policy rate when it deemed such action was appropriate.
To gain the full benefit of our toolkit, it will be important to continue to communicate clearly about our willingness to use all of our tools in future downturns.6 The greater the public confidence that policymakers will use these tools in response to episodes when the ability to cut the policy rate is constrained, the more real longer-term interest rates will systematically decline in response to negative economic developments, providing an automatic stabilizer to the economy. Moreover, public confidence in the FOMC's ability to react to economic downturns—even when the policy rate is very low—will support the resilience of longer-term inflation expectations at levels consistent with the FOMC's objective. Keeping inflation expectations anchored will in turn further support the FOMC's ability to lower real interest rates if the economy were to weaken substantially.
Balance Sheet Policies and Reserve Demand
Taking stock, I note that one approach to the constraints on policy imposed by the current low level of interest rates is to make what were previously unconventional tools—balance sheet policies and forward guidance—as conventional as possible. Although I fully support the FOMC's current plan to purchase Treasury bills and increase the size of the balance sheet in the very short term, over the longer-term, I believe that the viability of balance sheet policies is enhanced if we can show that we can meaningfully shrink the size of the balance sheet relative to gross domestic product following a recession-induced balance sheet expansion. In effect, I believe that balance sheet policies are more credible if we can show that there is not a persistent ratcheting-up effect in the size of the Fed's asset holdings.
Of course, the balance sheet is not going back to pre-crisis levels, when the size was primarily determined by the Fed's currency liabilities. As the FOMC announced in January of 2019, the Committee intends to implement monetary policy in an ample-reserves regime.7 With that approach, control over the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates is exercised primarily through the setting of the Federal Reserve's administered rates and is not, over the longer term, reliant on frequent and large open market operations. The Committee also reiterated that it would assess the level of reserves most consistent with efficient and effective monetary policy implementation. Questions about this level have moved to the forefront following market dislocations and money market pressure amid a temporary, but pronounced, reduction in the supply of reserves as a result of an increase in our nonreserve liabilities in September. Indeed, this episode has been cited by a number of firms and analysts who estimate that the amount of reserves consistent with an ample framework was higher than they previously had thought.
Following the mid-September volatility, the Committee stated that it would seek to maintain, over time, a level of bank reserves at or above the level that prevailed in early September, a level that we believe is sufficient to operate an ample-reserves regime. Looking ahead, I judge that it is reasonable that we ask ourselves whether it may be possible to operate with a lower level of reserves and remain consistent with the ample framework.
I will spend the remainder of my time exploring possible means to enhance the efficiency of our monetary policy implementation, including reserve provision, through adjustments to our existing regulatory and supervisory regime. In particular, I will focus on liquidity regulation and supervision as well as interactions with monetary policy tools. And I will suggest a policy-based approach to some of the issues I identify.
Before going into more detail about what I mean, let me emphasize that I will be touching on some issues that the Federal Reserve is in the process of observing and evaluating and, in some cases, may be far from reaching any final decisions. As such, my thoughts on these issues are my own and are likely to evolve, benefiting from further analysis and monitoring of bank behavior and financial markets over time.
Let me take a step back to highlight some of the key features of the current liquidity regulation and supervision regime, features that have resulted in significant increases in the liquidity resilience and risk-management capabilities of our largest institutions. Taken together, these features—including the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), Regulation YY's enhanced prudential standards, and resolution planning—require large firms to demonstrate that they hold sufficient liquid assets to meet outflows in stressed scenarios and in resolution.
In short, we expect firms to manage their liquidity risk prudently—to self-insure—so they can withstand the types of runs we saw during the crisis without relying on taxpayer support. This outcome has contributed to a more resilient financial system and leaves taxpayers in a much better place today.
Following the implementation of these requirements, large banks have more than doubled their buffers of liquid assets. More specifically, our largest banks have significantly increased their holdings of assets known as Level 1 high-quality liquid assets (HQLA). Level 1 HQLA includes central bank reserves, Treasury securities, and Ginnie Mae securities.
As discussed in the original design for the LCR, all forms of Level 1 HQLA are treated as substitutes. There is no preference for reserves versus, say, Treasury securities in the calculation of the ratio.
Despite the regulatory text's equal treatment of Level 1 HQLA, we know that reserves have special characteristics when it comes to stress. Even though the Treasury market is the most liquid in the world, in an actual stress event, banks would still need to take steps to monetize Treasury securities to meet cash outflows.
However, it may be difficult to liquidate a large stock of Treasury securities to meet large "day one" outflows. For firms with significant capital market activities, wholesale operations, and institutional clients (such as hedge funds), this scenario is not just theoretical. In the global financial crisis, several firms experienced outflows exceeding tens of billions of dollars in a single day.
The LCR does not capture these on-the-ground realities. But supervision does. Under Regulation YY's enhanced prudential standards, large firms are required to conduct internal liquidity stress tests (ILSTs). Supervisors expect firms to estimate day-one outflows and to ensure that their liquidity buffers can cover those outflows without reliance on the Federal Reserve. For firms with large day-one outflows, reserves can meet this need most clearly.
Yet it is worth remembering that a principal reason for the Federal Reserve's creation was to facilitate the movement of reserves when needed from banks with an excess reserve position to those in need of reserves.8 Indeed, it is the reason we are called the Federal Reserve. I do not think that is a fact of purely historical interest. Excessive friction in the movement of cash in the financial system was likely a contributor to the market dislocations of last September. In that regard, I think it is worth considering whether financial system efficiency may be improved if reserves and Treasury securities' liquidity characteristics were regarded as more similar than they are today—that is to say, that reserves and Treasury securities were more easily substitutable in the context of liquidity buffers. To be clear, the ideas I will discuss do not involve any decrease in banks' liquidity buffers. Rather, I want to explore options that would maintain at least the level of resilience today while also facilitating the use of HQLA beyond reserves to meet the immediate liquidity needs projected in banks' stress scenarios.
My suggested options are grounded in the principle that the Federal Reserve has an important role in providing liquidity to depository institutions. Today this role is played by the discount window, through which Reserve Banks provide fully collateralized loans to healthy institutions. While the range of eligible collateral for such liquidity provision is very broad, it may be worthwhile to focus for the moment on the Federal Reserve's potential to provide liquidity that is collateralized only by Level 1 HQLA. With firms posting Level 1 assets as collateral, the Fed would be well positioned to provide liquidity to bridge the monetization characteristics of HQLA securities versus reserves. Acknowledging this potential role in stress scenarios, the Fed may promote efficient market functioning while assuming very limited risk. If firms could assume that this traditional form of liquidity provision from the Fed was available in their stress-planning scenarios, the liquidity characteristics of Treasury securities could be the same as reserves, and both assets would be available to meet same-day needs.
There are a variety of ways we could achieve this outcome. One approach would be to adopt a policy whereby firms are permitted to assume that the discount window can be used in their liquidity-planning stress scenarios under certain conditions.
The discount window is meant to be used by healthy banks when it is needed. While there has long been discussion about how the discount window is "broken" because of stigma about using it, we know it is still an important part of firms' contingency planning and preparations. Banks currently pledge over $1.6 trillion in collateral to the discount window, which means that banks have gone to the trouble of working with their local Reserve Bank to make sure they have access to the window, if needed, and they have set aside a portion of their balance sheets as collateral to do so.9
We have also already publicly clarified in the 2019 resolution planning guidance that firms can assume discount window access in their Title 1 plans if they can meet the terms for borrowing, such as recapitalizing the bank subsidiary.10
We could build on this approach by also allowing firms to rely on the discount window in their ILSTs as a means of monetizing, for example, Treasury securities in their scenarios. This approach would acknowledge a role for the discount window in stress planning, improve the substitutability of reserves and Treasury securities in firms' HQLA buffers, and maintain the overall level of HQLA that firms need to hold. Such an approach could improve the efficiency of monetary policy implementation, as firms might show a greater willingness to reallocate to Treasury securities, reducing reserve demand and improving market functioning.
An additional advantage of such an approach is that it could further improve the incentives of firms to be prepared to use the discount window, which we already know is important for contingency planning. If firms were to include the discount window in their plans for how they will weather a stress scenario, they would also need to demonstrate to supervisors that they are prepared to use it to ensure that their plans are credible. Also, with this approach, we would not need to set up any new programs. In connection with this, we are closely examining how international counterparts treat the equivalent of discount window access in their banks' stress-planning scenarios.
Another approach could be to set up a new program or facility: For example, there has been much discussion among market participants, as well as policymakers, about the potential benefits of setting up a standing repurchase agreement, or repo, facility for banks and how such a facility could improve the substitutability of reserves and Treasury securities for these firms.11 While this option is still of interest, there may be benefits to working first with the tools we already have at our immediate disposal.
Finally, some firms and industry observers have pointed to the surcharge for global systemically important banks, and its partial dependence on year-end inputs, as potentially exacerbating the issues I have discussed today. Preliminary analysis suggests that changing those inputs to averages may be helpful. If we were to propose that change, it would not alter the stringency of the surcharge. As such, this option is something that we are actively considering.
In summary, there are great benefits to safety and soundness and to financial stability for firms holding sufficient buffers of HQLA to meet potential outflows in stress. I am not proposing any changes to this basic framework. What I am proposing is that we can potentially improve the efficiency of monetary policy implementation by improving the substitutability of reserves and Treasury securities through adjusting our expectations for firms in stress-planning scenarios. There are a variety of approaches we could take, but I think the Fed has a role to play.
References
- Bernanke, Ben S. (2020). "The New Tools of Monetary Policy," (PDF) presidential address to the American Economic Association, San Diego, Calif., January 4.
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2019a). "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, June 18–19, 2019," press release, July 10.
- ——— (2019b). Quarterly Report on Federal Reserve Balance Sheet Developments (PDF). Washington: Board of Governors, November.
- ——— (2020). "Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, December 10–11, 2019," press release, January 3.
- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2019). "Final Guidance for the 2019 Resolution Plan Submissions by the Eight Largest, Complex U.S. Banking Organizations," final guidance (Docket No. OP-1644), Federal Register, vol. 84 (February 4), pp. 1438–64
- Debortoli, Davide, Jordi Galí, and Luca Gambetti (2019). "On the Empirical (Ir)Relevance of the Zero Lower Bound Constraint," NBER Working Paper Series 25820. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, May.
- Fischer, Stanley (2016). "Why Are Interest Rates So Low? Causes and Implications," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, October 17.
- Quarles, Randal K. (2018). "Liquidity Regulation and the Size of the Fed's Balance Sheet," speech delivered at the Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Conference, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., May 4.
- Sims, Eric, and Jing Cynthia Wu (2019). "Evaluating Central Banks' Tool Kit: Past, Present, and Future," (PDF) research prepared for the Conference on Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices (A Fed Listens Event), held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, June 4–5.
- Swanson, Eric T. (2018). "The Federal Reserve Is Not Very Constrained by the Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," NBER Working Paper Series 25123. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October.
- Warburg, Paul M. (1930). The Federal Reserve System, Its Origin and Growth: Reflections and Recollections, vol. 2: Addresses and Essays, 1907–1924. New York: Macmillan.
- Woodford, Michael (2012). "Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound," (PDF) paper presented at "The Changing Policy Landscape," a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, held in Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 30–September 1
- All of my remarks today represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Open Market Committee, or the Financial Stability Board. I would like to thank Courtney Demartini, Etienne Gagnon, Michael Hsu, and Laura Lipscomb for their assistance in preparing these remarks.
- This subject is one on which I have previously spoken. See Quarles (2018).
- The extent and origins of the global decline in neutral interest rates are much debated. Among the likely contributing factors are population aging, a slowdown in the rate of productivity growth, and changing attitude toward risk. For a discussion, see Fischer (2016).
- The most recent SEP appeared as an addendum to the minutes of the December 2019 FOMC meeting. See Board of Governors (2020).
- See Woodford (2012) for a discussion of the importance of the signaling channel.
- See, for example, Swanson (2018); Debortoli, Galí, and Gambetti (2019); Sims and Wu (2019); and Bernanke (2020).
- See the Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet Normalization, which is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20190130c.htm.
- See the Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet Normalization in note 6.
- See Edwin Seligman in the introduction to Warburg (1930): "Mr. Warburg recalled to our mind what had been forgotten by most of us, that the real pith of modern banking is the question of the reserve, and that the essential weakness of the American system was the extreme decentralization of resources, resulting in the time of stress or trouble in every individual bank attempting to secure its own solvency in disregard either of the welfare of other banks or of the needs of the business community." See also "A United Reserve Bank of the United States" in Warburg (1930).
- See the note to table 5 in Board of Governors (2019b, p. 14).
- See Board of Governors and FDIC (2019).
- For additional discussion on the possible role of a standing repo facility (SRF) as part of the monetary policy implementation framework, see Board of Governors (2019a). The discussion highlights how the design of an SRF would differ based on the objectives of the facility. The current repo operations are conducted with only primary dealers and are designed to ensure a consistently ample supply of reserves to the banking system and support better interest rate control. As designed, these repos may have little effect on bank demand for reserves because the repo operations do not provide liquidity against HQLA to a wide range of bank counterparties. A facility intended to affect reserve demand may therefore require different design features.
MONETARY POLICY
FED. February 7, 2020. Monetary Policy Report
The Federal Reserve Act requires the Federal Reserve Board to submit written reports to Congress containing discussions of "the conduct of monetary policy and economic developments and prospects for the future." This report—called the Monetary Policy Report—is submitted semiannually to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and to the House Committee on Financial Services, along with testimony from the Federal Reserve Board Chair.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr_default.htm
VENEZUELA
U.S. Department of State. 02/06/2020. Briefing With Special Representative for Venezuela Elliott Abrams. Elliott Abrams, U.S. Special Representative for Venezuela. Washington, D.C. Press Correspondents' Room
MS ORTAGUS: Hello, everybody. Okay, we’re going to jump right in. It’s going to be fully on the record. He’s got some opening remarks, and then we’ll go into Q&A. Per usual, try to give everybody a chance to ask a question, so please be respectful of your colleagues. And when I say last question, that means last question, so that way we don’t – avoid what happened yesterday with the confusion about what was off and what was on. Okay?
MR ABRAMS: Okay. To begin with, the safety and health of Americans is always a top concern for the Department of State. We’ve learned that the Citgo 6 have been taken from house arrest by the regime’s intelligence agency, SEBIN, and we believe they are now detained at its Helicoide prison.
QUESTION: Could you spell that?
MR ABRAMS: Yes. H-e-l-i-c-o-i-d-e.
QUESTION: Sorry, one more time?
MR ABRAMS: H-e-l-i-c-o-i-d-e. We condemn this cruel and indefensible action and demand that their long, unjust detention come to an end and they be allowed to leave Venezuela. We urge the regime to release unconditionally all persons who are being detained for political reasons, including National Assembly deputies Juan Requesens – he’s been held for 548 days, Gilber Caro, and Ismael Leon.
The past few weeks of meetings, from a meeting with Secretary Pompeo in Bogota on January 20th to those held this week with the Vice President and with Secretary Pompeo and, of course, most significantly the Oval Office meeting with the President, should make clear the commitment of the United States to support Juan Guaido as interim president of Venezuela and support the restoration of democracy to Venezuela.
The reception Juan Guaido received at the State of the Union speech was a reminder that support for him and for this cause remains an entirely bipartisan effort in Washington, and that display of support in the United States comes after Guaido’s visit to Europe and Canada, where strong support was demonstrated by a series of leaders of democratic nations. Our message to those nations is that increased and strengthened travel and financial sanctions on key figures in and around the Maduro regime will accelerate their abandonment of the regime and help to end it. But as Treasury always states, when imposing sanctions, sanctions need not be permanent for those who want to contribute to Venezuela’s democratic future.
As several administration officials have noted, the Russians may soon find that their continued support of Maduro will no longer be cost-free. Others who continue to profit from or support Maduro should take warning. And more generally, you will see steps unfold in the coming weeks that demonstrate the seriousness of our intentions in Venezuela.
What’s happening there is a great tragedy for the people of Venezuela and has imposed enormous costs on their neighbors as well. Venezuelans have the right to live in freedom, and we would be – will be taking additional actions to support them.
As Secretary Pompeo explained in his statement several weeks ago – I’m quoting here – “A swift negotiated transition to democracy is the most effective and sustainable route to peace and prosperity in Venezuela… 2020 presents the opportunity to provide the Venezuelan people with what they have been demanding for years: genuinely free and fair Presidential and National Assembly elections to choose their leadership and begin the long process of renewal.”
Thank you.
MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Matt.
QUESTION: So on the Citgo 6, can I just ask – I realize you can’t speak for Maduro and his people, but is it your sense or do you get the idea at all that this, that their return to prison, is at all like a retaliation for the State of the Union, the White House meeting, the kind of reception that he’s been getting?
MR ABRAMS: I would not speculate on that. I don’t know.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, the timing is interesting.
MR ABRAMS: The timing —
QUESTION: And how long have they been in house arrest? I mean, it’s been months, right? So —
MR ABRAMS: House arrest is —
MS ORTAGUS: Longer than that. Oh, house arrest.
MR ABRAMS: House arrest is not that long. It’s probably just a couple of months. The timing is suspicious, but I can’t speculate as to why it happened now.
QUESTION: Thanks.
MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Nick.
QUESTION: Elliott, two questions. One, you talk about Russia will find its support is not cost-free. So what are you going to do to the Russians? Would that include possibly sanctioning Rosneft, or is that even on the table despite the turmoil that it would cause?
And second, it just looks more and more like Maduro is entrenched in power. There is some indication that the economy is coming back a little bit. What are the – what are the pressure points? What do you – what do you do about the fact that he is more and more entrenched? Guaido looks further from the office of the presidency.
MR ABRAMS: That, of course, is not the way we see it. Nicolas Maduro is the successor of, the heir to, Hugo Chavez, and yet we see significant abandonment of Chavismo. All of a sudden, he decides dollarization is just fine. There is report after report of privatization of PDVSA or parts of PDVSA, of turning over joint ventures to the foreign oil company partner. This is a complete abandonment of Chavismo.
Why is this happening? It’s happening because their backs are against the wall. A lot of attention is paid, rightly, to what’s going on on the opposition side; but when we look at the regime side, we see that sanctions have had and are having a significant impact, and sanctions will increase. Every time I meet with the press, people say, “You’ve run out of sanctions,” and every time I say, “No, we haven’t.”
QUESTION: No, that’s North Korea. (Laughter.)
MR ABRAMS: So we – we’ll be taking – I have no announcement to make.
QUESTION: Embargoed until the end?
MS ORTAGUS: Yeah. Sorry.
MR ABRAMS: I think I’ve discussed Rosneft with the press previously and drawn attention to its growing role in Venezuela. The national security advisor mentioned them, I think, yesterday. When we have an announcement to make, we’ll make it, and that’s not today.
MS ORTAGUS: One quick thing. I forgot to say this at the beginning, but can we keep this embargoed till the end? Okay, great.
Carol, go ahead.
QUESTION: I have a timing question, too. With the high-profile visits that Guaido has had here with the Secretary, the Vice President, the President, the State of the Union, and some of the strong language of the Secretary and the – the Secretary of State and the President both saying they hope that this will lead to a transitional government, are you more concerned? What’s going to happen to him when he goes back to Venezuela? Is he more in danger now by the very warm reception he got here? Doesn’t this put him at greater risk?
MR ABRAMS: He got a very warm reception from Trudeau and Johnson and Merkel and Macron and Mark Rutte. It’s a very broad international coalition. I can’t speculate as to what’s in Nicolas Maduro’s mind. Every day that he is in Venezuela, Juan Guaido is at risk. So are all the members of the opposition. And all you have to do is to read the report of Michelle Bachelet to read that people are actually executed – they are murdered – by the regime.
So we do not underestimate the risks to Guaido, and that is why many people, starting with the President, have called him brave. It’s true. We, needless to say, hope that, as happened last time he left the country, he will be able to return unmolested, and we hope that the regime makes the calculation, particularly after this trip, that the support for Guaido is strong and that the counter-reaction to any move against him would make it a mistake for the regime. I won’t appeal to them morally because I think that would be an extremely foolish appeal. But we’re very concerned about it and we hope that he will return safely.
QUESTION: And if anything happens to him, is the U.S. prepared to do anything?
MR ABRAMS: We are prepared. I’m not going to discuss it today because we would – we wouldn’t want to discuss it publicly anyway, and of course, we strongly hope that it will not be necessary to face that.
MS ORTAGUS: Robbie.
QUESTION: Last month there was a small scandal in Spain that seemed to indicate the new government there is softening its support for Guaido. Have you been in contact with any of your Spanish colleagues since then, and is there any indication that their support for Guaido might be wavering?
MR ABRAMS: Have we been in contact, first? Yes. You would expect that. I mean, we were in touch with the European governments all the time about Venezuela among many other issues.
We are – we think it’s unfortunate that President Sanchez did not agree to meet with Guaido. We have received a number of assurances that Spain’s commitment to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela remains firm.
MS ORTAGUS: Humeyra.
QUESTION: Two questions. Alejandro Betancourt is someone under federal investigation here in the U.S., but he met with Guaido’s father, and Rudy Giuliani was also there. I am wondering if you are aware of this meeting, because this meeting has to do with Guaido’s finances, and I am wondering if you know where Guaido’s finances are coming from and whether you’ve got any worries about his funding.
And my second question is with regards to the warning to the oil companies. Did the U.S. Government at any point told Rosneft outright that it would be okay to lift Venezuelan crude if it’s only to pay for the debts of PDVSA?
MR ABRAMS: On the second point, let me say we have sanctions. If you’re not violating the sanctions, then what you’re doing is not contrary to the rules that the United States is trying to set out. And there are a number of companies – we can start with Chevron – that remain in Venezuela and that are clearly not violating U.S. sanctions today. The rules about sanctions can always change. The licenses that are given can be withheld; those that are withheld can be given. So the rules of the game can change.
As to private conversations with Rosneft officials, they’re private so I don’t want to answer that part of it.
The first part – we’ve been told by the Venezuelan embassy and by Venezuelan officials, and by that I mean legitimate officials not regime officials, that the facts as stated in the press are not correct and that Guaido’s father was not at that meeting. I don’t really know much more about it than I know in the press, except we’ve asked and been told he was not there.
QUESTION: Do you know —
QUESTION: You’ve been assured he wasn’t there? Because we’ve – if there was a videotape of him there, would that surprise you?
MR ABRAMS: We’ve been told he was not there. I get surprised by things every day.
QUESTION: That’s what – the videotape, would it surprise you? And also —
MS ORTAGUS: Wait, wait, wait. I’m sorry. I don’t know who you are, but this is not how we do things here. Thank you.
Lara, go ahead.
QUESTION: Thank you. Could you talk a little bit more about the Citgo 6, what kind of steps the United States is preparing to take if they are not released from the prison, what kind of conditions are in that prison, if you’ve had any kind of communications with them either directly or indirectly since they were taken from house arrest?
MR ABRAMS: We had – first, we have had communications with some family members, and indeed the first information we had about their being taken from house arrest – they’re not – I should say they are not in one place. They were in their houses where they didn’t all live together. So we heard first from one family member saying this had happened. And then, of course, the question was: Why this individual? Why this one of the six? We very quickly learned it’s not one of the six, it’s all of the six. Then the question was: Where are they? We think we know where they are.
The conditions of house arrest, while terrible in comparison with freedom, were better, obviously, than the conditions in the prison. We had real concerns about the health of all of the men in prison, questions about their access to doctors, their access to medicine, their diet, unsurprisingly, also their mood. And you can imagine that being returned to prison will raise in each of their minds, “How long will I be here?”
So we take this very seriously. And we’ve taken – we’ve made a number of efforts today that, for obvious reasons, I’m not going to talk about to find out more about what’s going on and to get them released from prison.
QUESTION: And they were moved exactly when? When did you first find out from that family member?
MR ABRAMS: Yesterday.
QUESTION: Okay.
MS ORTAGUS: Kylie.
QUESTION: With regard to Rosneft, what would be a tangible benefit of actually sanctioning them? I know you won’t talk about if you’re going to or not, but why would that be an effective measure? And then on the flipside of that, you’ve often discussed getting funding to those who are supporting Guaido in Venezuela. Is there any success on that front? Do you see anything coming?
MR ABRAMS: Yes. On the latter, I can start with that. Money did not flow immediately when Congress approved it, because we wanted to make sure we had a system in place. Actually, this goes through AID, and AID wanted to make sure that it had a system in place that would be fully accountable to Congress and could count for every penny, because it was obvious that the regime would start telling lies about this money. And they are, and you can read regime accusations about how millions and millions of dollars have gone into Guaido’s pocket, for example. These are all lies. No money goes to Juan Guaido; not one penny goes to Juan Guaido.
The money is being used – just to give you an example of something that happened recently, we – in one of the embassies of interim President Guaido there was no office. That is, he had appointed an ambassador, the ambassador was in that country, but they literally didn’t have an office at which they could do work, serve Venezuelans who happened to be in that country. And one of the things we can do with that money is rent an office. That is the kind of thing that’s being done. For more details, probably AID is the most up-to-date place to go.
I guess I will not answer the first part of the question. If sanctions are imposed on Rosneft, then – or as always happens with anybody, Treasury would make an announcement. They would explain what they were doing. We would have further explanations. So if and when it happened that we imposed additional sanctions, come back to us.
MS ORTAGUS: Okay.
QUESTION: Any update on the status of the U.S. embassy, the status of the protecting power being worked out for that? And can you give us kind of a summary of what the – for lack of a better term, the embassy in exile in Bogota is doing? I forget the name of the unit, the facility over there.
MR ABRAMS: Yeah. We call it the VAU, the Venezuelan Affairs Unit, V-A-U. They’re at work.
QUESTION: Doing?
MR ABRAMS: They keep in close touch with Venezuelans in the opposition, in civil society more broadly in the country. As you know, we have to have a certain minimal contact with the regime for things like UN affairs. They do that. They —
QUESTION: Who do they deal with in the regime? Lower-level guys like —
MR ABRAMS: They deal with people in the ministry of foreign affairs, as they did in Caracas. And they analyze. I mean, they offer cables, as any normal embassy unit would do. They send cables to Washington describing what they think is going on in Venezuela.
The first part?
QUESTION: The protecting power for the embassy, is that any —
MR ABRAMS: Yes. No change. I would like to thank the Swiss – because they are not our protecting power; the agreement did not go through – but they have been willing when we’ve asked them to undertake some tasks to protect Americans or to help the interests of the United States informally, and they have always been willing to do that. The reason the agreement has not gone through is that the Maduro regime is unwilling to accept the agreement, and I don’t expect that will change.
MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead.
QUESTION: Do you know how President Guaido paid for his travels around the world? Is any U.S. aid money being used to fund those travels? And then on the Citgo 6, one of their lawyers said he had raised concerns about their safety under house arrest to stakeholders. Do you know if the State Department had heard any of those concerns, and was anything done to try to address that before they were taken last night?
MR ABRAMS: They’re under – they were under constant surveillance. There were varying numbers of spies, of intelligence agents, constantly around the – their houses. It would not be unreasonable to assume that they’re being bugged, that they’re being eavesdropped on. So it’s a quite stressful situation in addition to being kept from their families by not being allowed to leave Venezuela.
So we’ve been aware of this, and the regime obviously has not been – has not been willing to let them leave the country or to improve their situation. Now we regress to their being in jail.
QUESTION: And then on the first, how is —
MR ABRAMS: Oh, sorry.
QUESTION: How are they funding the travels?
MR ABRAMS: In principle, paying for travel is a legitimate expense. Again, AID can tell you more, but in principle, this is something that we are able to do. Whether we did it for this particular travel, I don’t know.
MS ORTAGUS: Go ahead, Shaun.
QUESTION: Sure. Could I ask you about the talks with Guaido, whether there was any discussion about Venezuelans here in the United States, the issue of protected status for the Venezuelans? Was it something that he has raised – that he raised? Was that a discussion that you had? What message did you give on whether Venezuelans can actually stay and be protected?
MR ABRAMS: The Venezuelan officials, President Guaido, Ambassador Vecchio, Foreign Minister Borges always raise that question. And members of Congress raise it too, particularly those who have a lot of Venezuelans living in their districts, that is, to say – in mostly parts of Florida. Since I last talked to you, that situation has not changed. There is a – I wouldn’t say there is a complete freeze on the deportation of Venezuelans, but the number of deportations is extremely low. But no further steps have been taken with respect to regularizing their presence.
QUESTION: And why is that that no further steps have been taken? Is there an interest in doing that?
MR ABRAMS: Well, as I said previously, I would say the administration view is that TPS has been changed by the courts. And they have essentially removed the “T,” which makes it very unattractive, I would say, not only for this administration, but for its successors to grant TPS if it’s going to be permanent, because it’s not supposed to be. It’s supposed to be temporary. So we continue to discuss what the other options are.
MS ORTAGUS: Last one. You had your hand raised.
QUESTION: Oh, yes. I wanted to ask you: So, to follow up on Humeyra’s question before, do you have much insight into how Guaido and the opposition is funded and who funds them, and do you have some concerns about who funds them and how they’re funded and a lack of transparency?
MR ABRAMS: Well, I wouldn’t call it a lack of transparency. This is, as far as we’re concerned, a foreign government. You saw the treatment of President Guaido in Washington. It’s exactly the same treatment that any foreign head of state would get. I don’t remember ever asking a Mexican diplomat, “Tell me how your president funds himself, tell” – or a Spanish diplomat or a German diplomat. So I —
QUESTION: But they don’t control the government.
MR ABRAMS: I know that —
QUESTION: It’s a little different here, isn’t it?
MR ABRAMS: I know that we will be in a better – we are already in a better position, and we’ll continue to be in an increasingly good position to help them in ways that they need help. But I would – I hear all the time from ambassadors representing President Guaido who tell me, “I’m going to have to leave in two weeks or four weeks because there is no salary and I am running out of money.” I hear from Guaido representatives who say, “I don’t have an office. I’m working out of my bedroom, out of my living room.” So for anybody who thinks there’s a lot of money sloshing around, that’s completely, completely false.
MS ORTAGUS: Okay. Thank you.
MR ABRAMS: Thank you.
QUESTION: Thanks.
QUESTION: Thank you.
VENEZUELA. RÚSSIA. REUTERS. 7 DE FEVEREIRO DE 2020. Chanceler da Rússia visita Venezuela em meio a alerta de sanções pelos EUA
Por Brian Ellsworth
CARACAS (Reuters) - O presidente da Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, está reunido com o ministro das Relações Exteriores da Rússia nesta sexta-feira, conforme Moscou segue apoiando o governo da nação socialista sul-americana apesar dos alertas de Washington de que pode aumentar as sanções.
Sergei Lavrov chegou a Caracas na quinta-feira poucas horas depois de o Departamento de Estado norte-americano insinuar que seu programa de sanções contra a Venezuela pode começar a visar a Rússia, cujas petroleiras vêm ajudando Maduro ao comprar grande parte do petróleo cru do país-membro da Opep.
A assistência russa pode ser decisiva para Maduro intensificar a produção petrolífera e ressuscitar o crescimento econômico depois de uma surpreendente abertura econômica no ano passado, na sequência de anos de hiperinflação e um êxodo migratório de cerca de 5 milhões de pessoas.
Lavrov deve se encontrar com Maduro, com a vice-presidente, Delcy Rodríguez, e o chanceler Jorge Arreaza.
Nesta semana, o presidente dos Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, se reuniu na Casa Branca com o líder da oposição Juan Guaidó, que é reconhecido por mais de 50 países como presidente venezuelano legítimo.
E na quinta-feira, o representante especial dos EUA para a Venezuela, Elliott Abrams, alertou que o apoio da Rússia ao governo Maduro pode “não sair mais de graça”.
Lavrov, que estava no México como parte de uma turnê por nações latino-americanas, criticou na quinta-feira as “provocações” norte-americanas e disse que Washington busca um pretexto para uma intervenção militar.
COLOMBIA
U.S. Department of State. 02/07/2020. Assistant Secretary Denise Natali to travel to Florida and Colombia
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Assistant Secretary Denise Natali will travel to Miami, Florida and Bogota, Colombia from February 9–15. In Miami, she will meet with senior SOUTHCOM and State Department leaders to discuss stabilization issues and civil-military coordination in the Western Hemisphere. Assistant Secretary Natali will also engage with members of the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan diasporas to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to democracy and support for democratic transition.
Assistant Secretary Natali will then travel to Colombia from February 11–15. She will meet with Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and international partners to reinforce U.S. support for Colombia’s peace process implementation, assess CSO’s programs, and affirm the U.S.-Colombia partnership.
________________
ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS
INFLAÇÃO
IBGE. 07/02/2020. IPCA de janeiro fica em 0,21%
O Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA) de janeiro variou 0,21%, enquanto, em dezembro, havia subido 1,15%. Foi o menor resultado para um mês de janeiro desde o início do Plano Real. O acumulado dos últimos doze meses foi a 4,19%, abaixo dos 4,31% observados nos 12 meses imediatamente anteriores. Em janeiro de 2019, a taxa havia ficado em 0,32%. Esta é a primeira divulgação do IPCA / INPC com a nova estrutura de ponderação, atualizada a partir da Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF) 2017-2018.
| Período | TAXA |
|---|---|
| Janeiro de 2020 | 0,21% |
| Dezembro de 2019 | 1,15% |
| Janeiro de 2019 | 0,32% |
| Acumulado nos 12 meses | 4,19% |
O maior impacto no índice do mês, 0,08 ponto percentual (p.p.), veio do grupo Habitação, que também registrou a maior variação (0,55%) entre os nove grupos de produtos e serviços pesquisados. Outros cinco grupos também apresentaram alta, com destaque para Alimentação e bebidas (0,39% de variação e 0,07 p.p. de impacto) e Transportes (0,32% de variação e 0,06 p.p. de impacto). No lado das quedas, a contribuição negativa mais intensa (-0,04 p.p.) veio de Saúde e cuidados pessoais (-0,32%). Os demais grupos ficaram entre a queda de 0,48% em Vestuário e a alta de 0,35% em Despesas pessoais.
| IPCA - Variação e Impacto por grupos - mensal | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grupo | Variação (%) | Impacto (p.p.) | ||
| Dezembro | Janeiro | Dezembro | Janeiro | |
| Índice Geral | 1,15 | 0,21 | 1,15 | 0,21 |
| Alimentação e Bebidas | 3,38 | 0,39 | 0,83 | 0,07 |
| Habitação | -0,82 | 0,55 | -0,13 | 0,08 |
| Artigos de Residência | -0,48 | -0,07 | -0,02 | 0,00 |
| Vestuário | 0,00 | -0,48 | 0,00 | -0,02 |
| Transportes | 1,54 | 0,32 | 0,28 | 0,06 |
| Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais | 0,42 | -0,32 | 0,05 | -0,04 |
| Despesas Pessoais | 0,92 | 0,35 | 0,10 | 0,04 |
| Educação | 0,20 | 0,16 | 0,01 | 0,01 |
| Comunicação | 0,66 | 0,12 | 0,03 | 0,01 |
| Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Índices de Preços | ||||
Após a queda de 0,82% no mês de dezembro, o grupo Habitação subiu 0,55%, puxado pelos preços de condomínio (1,39%) e aluguel residencial (0,61%). A energia elétrica, por sua vez, registrou leve alta (0,16%), com as áreas variando entre a queda de 4,77% em Rio Branco – onde houve redução de 4,67% nas tarifas, a partir do dia 13 de dezembro - até a alta de 3,41% em Goiânia. Em janeiro, foi mantida a bandeira tarifária amarela, que acrescenta na conta de luz R$ 1,343 a cada 100 quilowatts-hora consumidos.
Ainda em Habitação, o resultado do item taxa de água e esgoto (0,30%) decorre dos reajustes de 18,00% em Belém (8,88%, vigente desde 14 de dezembro), e de 6,43% em Campo Grande (5,23%, válido desde 3 de janeiro). Já a variação do item gás encanado (0,64%) é consequência do reajuste de 2,45% observado no Rio de Janeiro (2,14%), em vigor desde 1º de janeiro. No que diz respeito ao gás de botijão (0,87%), vale ressaltar que a Petrobras anunciou um reajuste de 5,00% no preço do botijão de 13 kg, nas refinarias, a partir do dia 27 de dezembro de 2019.
A desaceleração no grupo Alimentação e bebidas (de 3,38% em dezembro para 0,39% em janeiro) deveu-se, principalmente, ao comportamento dos preços das carnes. Após a alta de 18,06% em dezembro, as carnes recuaram 4,03% em janeiro, contribuindo com o impacto negativo mais intenso sobre o índice do mês (-0,11 p.p.). Com isso, o grupamento da alimentação no domicílio registrou alta de 0,20%, frente aos 4,69% do IPCA de dezembro. No lado das altas, o destaque ficou com o tomate (13,72%) - cujos preços já haviam subido 21,69% no mês anterior - e com a batata-inglesa (11,02%).
A alimentação fora do domicílio (0,82%) também desacelerou em relação ao mês anterior (1,04%). A refeição passou de 1,31% em dezembro para 1,05% em janeiro, e o lanche, de 0,94% para 0,42%, no mesmo período.
No grupo dos Transportes (0,32%), o maior impacto positivo (0,05 p.p.) veio da gasolina (0,89%), embora esta variação tenha sido inferior à de dezembro (3,36%). O etanol (2,59%) também desacelerou em relação ao mês anterior (5,50%), contribuindo para que o IPCA dos combustíveis tenha ficado em 1,08%, abaixo dos 3,57% registrados em dezembro. Já o impacto negativo mais intenso (-0,05 p.p.) veio das passagens aéreas (-6,75%), que haviam subido 15,62% em dezembro.
Ainda em Transportes, o resultado do item táxi (0,40%) é consequência do reajuste de 2,20% nas tarifas no Rio de Janeiro (1,86%), em vigor desde o dia 2 de janeiro. Os ônibus intermunicipais (1,18%), por sua vez, sofreram reajustes em duas regiões: em Belo Horizonte (7,89%), houve aumento de 8,89% no valor das passagens, com vigência a partir de 29 de dezembro; já em São Paulo (1,35%), os aumentos variaram entre 4,85% e 6,47% e foram aplicados a partir de 26 de janeiro.
Os ônibus urbanos (0,78%) também tiveram seus preços reajustados nas seguintes regiões: Brasília (5,00%) - reajuste de 10,00%, a partir de 13 de janeiro; Vitória (4,08%) - reajuste médio de 5,43%, a partir de 5 de janeiro; São Paulo (2,09%) - reajuste de 2,32%, a partir de 1º de janeiro; Campo Grande (2,03%) - reajuste de 3,80%, a partir de 28 de dezembro.
Em Campo Grande, uma liminar revogou o reajuste no dia 9 de janeiro, porém ele voltou a vigorar a partir de 22 de janeiro.
As passagens de metrô (1,74%) também foram reajustadas em 2,32% em São Paulo (2,09%) e em 10,00% em Brasília (5,00%). Em São Paulo, o mesmo percentual de reajuste (2,32%) foi aplicado aos bilhetes de trem (2,09%), influenciando diretamente no resultado do subitem (1,31%).
No grupo Saúde e cuidados pessoais (-0,32%), houve deflação em janeiro, principalmente por conta dos itens de higiene pessoal (-2,07%). Os produtos para pele, que haviam subido 5,14% em dezembro, recuaram 6,51% em janeiro, contribuindo com -0,03 p.p. no índice do mês. Além disso, os preços dos perfumes (-4,66%) também caíram, contribuindo com -0,05 p.p. No lado das altas, os destaques foram o plano de saúde (0,60%) e os produtos farmacêuticos (0,33%), com impactos de 0,02 p.p. e 0,01 p.p. respectivamente.
O menor resultado regional do IPCA foi no município de Rio Branco (-0,21%), devido à queda na energia elétrica (-4,77%). A região metropolitana de Belém e o município de Aracaju apresentaram a maior variação (0,39%). No primeiro caso, devido às altas do açaí (13,44%) e da refeição (3,24%). No segundo, os maiores impactos (0,08 p.p. e 0,07 p.p., respectivamente) vieram da gasolina (1,55%) e do tomate (20,16%).
| Região | Peso Regional (%) | Variação mensal (%) | Variação Acumulada (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dezembro | Janeiro | 12 meses | ||
| Belém | 3,94 | 1,78 | 0,39 | 5,61 |
| Aracaju | 1,03 | 1,09 | 0,39 | 4,21 |
| Salvador | 5,99 | 1,26 | 0,34 | 3,90 |
| São Paulo | 32,28 | 0,93 | 0,33 | 4,55 |
| Recife | 3,92 | 0,96 | 0,30 | 3,74 |
| Vitória | 1,86 | 0,85 | 0,29 | 3,31 |
| Fortaleza | 3,23 | 1,28 | 0,28 | 5,14 |
| Belo Horizonte | 9,69 | 1,05 | 0,20 | 3,68 |
| Porto Alegre | 8,61 | 1,15 | 0,17 | 4,18 |
| Campo Grande | 1,57 | 1,32 | 0,13 | 4,57 |
| Goiânia | 4,17 | 1,40 | 0,10 | 4,65 |
| Curitiba | 8,09 | 1,35 | 0,05 | 4,02 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 9,43 | 1,19 | 0,05 | 3,60 |
| Brasília | 4,06 | 1,62 | -0,12 | 3,57 |
| São Luís | 1,62 | 1,47 | -0,19 | 3,99 |
| Rio Branco | 0,51 | 0,60 | -0,21 | 3,70 |
| Brasil | 100,00 | 1,15 | 0,21 | 4,19 |
O IPCA é calculado pelo IBGE desde 1980, se refere às famílias com rendimento monetário de 01 a 40 salários mínimos, qualquer que seja a fonte, e abrange dez regiões metropolitanas do país, além dos municípios de Goiânia, Campo Grande, Rio Branco, São Luís, Aracaju e de Brasília.
Para o cálculo do índice do mês, foram comparados os preços coletados no período de 28 de dezembro de 2019 a 28 de janeiro de 2020 (referência) com os preços vigentes no período de 28 de novembro a 27 de dezembro de 2019 (base).
INPC de janeiro fica em 0,19%
O Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor (INPC) de janeiro variou 0,19%, enquanto, em dezembro, havia subido 1,22%. Este resultado é o menor para um mês de janeiro desde o início do Plano Real. A variação acumulada nos últimos doze meses ficou em 4,30%, abaixo dos 4,48% registrados nos 12 meses imediatamente anteriores. Em janeiro de 2019, a taxa foi de 0,36%.
Os produtos alimentícios subiram 0,45% em janeiro enquanto, em dezembro, registraram 3,66%. O agrupamento dos não alimentícios, por sua vez, apresentou variação de 0,12%, enquanto, em dezembro, havia registrado 0,17%.
A região metropolitana de Belém (0,55%) apresentou o maior índice, principalmente por conta das altas dos itens refeição (3,24%) e açaí (13,44%). Já o menor resultado ficou com o município de São Luís (-0,28%), influenciado pelas quedas nos preços das carnes
(-3,29%) e dos perfumes (-5,75%).
| Região | Peso Regional (%) | Variação mensal (%) | Variação Acumulada (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dezembro | Janeiro | 12 meses | ||
| Belém | 6,95 | 1,90 | 0,55 | 5,96 |
| Aracaju | 1,29 | 1,07 | 0,31 | 3,96 |
| Salvador | 7,92 | 1,23 | 0,31 | 3,93 |
| Fortaleza | 5,16 | 1,29 | 0,30 | 5,00 |
| Belo Horizonte | 10,35 | 1,08 | 0,27 | 3,86 |
| Recife | 5,60 | 0,97 | 0,25 | 3,45 |
| Vitória | 1,91 | 0,67 | 0,25 | 3,57 |
| São Paulo | 24,60 | 1,02 | 0,25 | 4,58 |
| Porto Alegre | 7,15 | 1,14 | 0,25 | 4,29 |
| Campo Grande | 1,73 | 1,38 | 0,16 | 4,61 |
| Goiânia | 4,43 | 1,62 | 0,06 | 5,05 |
| Curitiba | 7,37 | 1,49 | -0,01 | 4,32 |
| Brasília | 1,97 | 1,36 | -0,04 | 3,37 |
| Rio Branco | 0,72 | 0,61 | -0,16 | 3,71 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 9,38 | 1,15 | -0,17 | 3,57 |
| São Luís | 3,47 | 1,82 | -0,28 | 3,99 |
| Brasil | 100,00 | 1,22 | 0,19 | 4,30 |
Para o cálculo do índice do mês, foram comparados os preços coletados no período de 28 de dezembro de 2019 a 28 de janeiro de 2020 (referência) com os preços vigentes no período de 28 de novembro a 27 de dezembro de 2019 (base).
O INPC é calculado pelo IBGE desde 1979, se refere às famílias com rendimento monetário de 01 a 05 salários mínimos, sendo o chefe assalariado, e abrange dez regiões metropolitanas do país, além dos municípios de Goiânia, Campo Grande, Rio Branco, São Luís, Aracaju e de Brasília.
Inflação desacelera para 0,21%, a menor para janeiro desde o início do Plano Real. Preços das carnes tiveram deflação de 4,03%, exercendo o maior impacto negativo no IPCA de janeiro
A inflação oficial, medida pelo Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA), desacelerou para 0,21% em janeiro, depois de registrar alta de 1,15% em dezembro, divulgou hoje (7) o IBGE. É o menor resultado para um mês de janeiro desde o início do Plano Real, em julho de 1994. No acumulado dos últimos 12 meses, o indicador registrou 4,19%. Em janeiro de 2019, a taxa havia ficado em 0,32%.
A variação dos preços no mês passado foi calculada com base na nova cesta de produtos e serviços, que foi atualizada, a partir da Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF) 2017-2018, para acompanhar mudanças nos hábitos de consumo da população brasileira. O IPCA de janeiro contém ainda preços do transporte por aplicativo, coletados pela primeira vez por um robô virtual.
Segundo o gerente de Índice de Preços do IBGE, Pedro Kislanov, o recuo no preço das carnes puxou o indicador para baixo. “A desaceleração no grupo alimentação e bebidas (de 3,38% em dezembro para 0,39% em janeiro) deveu-se, principalmente, ao comportamento dos preços das carnes. Após a alta de 18,06% no mês anterior, as carnes apresentaram queda de 4,03% no IPCA de janeiro, contribuindo com o maior impacto negativo no índice do mês (-0,11 p.p.)”.
“Tivemos uma alta muito grande no preço das carnes, nos últimos meses do ano passado, devido às exportações para a China e alta do dólar que restringiram a oferta no mercado interno. Agora, percebemos um recuo natural dos preços, na medida em que a produção vai se restabelecendo para atender ao mercado interno”, avaliou ele.
Outra contribuição negativa partiu de saúde e cuidados pessoais (-0,32%), principalmente por conta produtos para pele (-6,51%) e dos perfumes (-4,66%). No lado das altas, os destaques foram o plano de saúde (0,60%) e os produtos farmacêuticos (0,33%). Os demais grupos ficaram entre a queda de 0,48% em vestuário e a alta de 0,35% em despesas pessoais.
Já o maior impacto positivo no índice veio do grupo habitação, que também registrou a maior variação (0,55%) entre os nove grupos de produtos e serviços pesquisados, puxada pelos preços de condomínio (1,39%) e aluguel residencial (0,61%).
O resultado dos transportes (0,32%), que passaram a ter o maior peso na nova cesta, foi puxado pela gasolina (0,89%) e o etanol (2,59%). Os preços dos ônibus urbanos variaram 0,78%, devido aos reajustes nas tarifas em várias regiões. Já o maior impacto negativo (-0,05 p.p.) veio das passagens aéreas (-6,75%), que haviam apresentado alta de 15,62% no índice de dezembro.
Os demais grupos ficaram entre a queda de 0,48% em vestuário e a alta de 0,35% em despesas pessoais.
Kislanov observa que nenhum dos novos itens da cesta impactaram o indicador em janeiro, mas cita algumas variações: o transporte por aplicativo, cujos preços foram coletados pelo robô criado pelo IBGE, recuou 0,54%, com a maior queda em São Paulo (-2,89%) e maior alta em Goiânia (1,99%). Serviços de streaming não variaram. Higiene de animais domésticos recuou 0,19%, cabeleireiro e barbeiro avançou 0,20% e sobrancelha, recuou 0,26%.
Três regiões tiveram deflação
Entre as 16 regiões pesquisadas pelo IBGE, três tiveram deflação: Rio Branco (-0,21%), São Luís (-0,19%) e Brasília (-0,12%). Na capital do Acre, o recuo ocorreu por conta da queda na energia elétrica (-4,77%)
A região metropolitana de Belém e o município de Aracaju apresentaram a maior inflação (0,39%) entre as áreas pesquisadas. No primeiro caso, o índice foi influenciado pela alta nos preços do açaí (13,44%) e da refeição (3,24%). No segundo, os maiores impactos vieram da gasolina (1,55%) e do tomate (20,16%).
Na região metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro, o indicador ficou em 0,05%, e não foi impactado pelo aumento nos preços da água mineral, que provocou uma corrida aos supermercados, em janeiro, devido aos problemas de abastecimento. “O IBGE calcula a variação da água mineral junto com a dos refrigerantes. Em janeiro, o subitem ficou em 2,05%, acima dos -1,32% de dezembro”, comentou o gerente do Índice de Preços.
INPC registra menor variação para o mês desde 1994
O IBGE também divulgou hoje (7) o Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor (INPC), referente às famílias com rendimento de um a cinco salários mínimos. O INPC teve alta de 0,19% em janeiro, abaixo dos 1,22% registrados em dezembro. Esse também foi o maior resultado para um mês de janeiro desde o início do Plano Real. O acumulado nos últimos 12 meses ficou em 4,30%. Em janeiro de 2019, a taxa foi de 0,36%.
DOCUMENTO: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/26821-ipca-de-janeiro-fica-em-0-21
FGV. IBRE. 07/02/20. Índices Gerais de Preços. IGP-DI. IGP-DI varia 0,09% em janeiro
O Índice Geral de Preços – Disponibilidade Interna (IGP-DI) variou 0,09% em janeiro, percentual inferior ao apurado no mês anterior, quando o índice havia sido de 1,74%. Com este resultado, o índice acumula alta de 7,72% em 12 meses. Em janeiro de 2019, o índice havia subido 0,07% e acumulava elevação de 6,56% em 12 meses.
O Índice de Preços ao Produtor Amplo (IPA) caiu 0,13% em janeiro, ante alta de 2,34% em dezembro. Na análise por estágios de processamento, o grupo Bens Finais variou de 2,88% em dezembro para -1,42% em janeiro. O principal responsável por este recuo foi o subgrupo alimentos processados que passou de 5,86% para -4,09%. O índice de Bens Finais (ex), que resulta da exclusão de alimentos in natura e combustíveis para o consumo, caiu 1,30% em janeiro, contra alta de 2,11% em dezembro.
A taxa do grupo Bens Intermediários passou de 0,98% em dezembro para 0,73% em janeiro. O principal responsável por este movimento foi o subgrupo combustíveis e lubrificantes para a produção, cuja taxa passou de 4,58% para 1,70%. O índice de Bens Intermediários (ex), calculado após a exclusão de combustíveis e lubrificantes para a produção, subiu 0,54% em janeiro, ante 0,33% no mês anterior.
O estágio das Matérias-Primas Brutas variou para 0,38% em janeiro. Em dezembro, a taxa havia subido 3,25%. Contribuíram para o recuo da taxa do grupo os seguintes itens: bovinos (7,85% para -4,85%), soja (em grão) (0,86% para -2,66%) e café (em grão) (12,00% para -6,20%). Em sentido oposto, vale citar minério de ferro (1,89% para 3,40%), cana-de-açúcar (-0,25% para 1,86%) e leite in natura (0,18% para 1,41%).
O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPC) variou 0,59% em janeiro. Em dezembro, o índice subiu 0,77%. Seis das oito classes de despesa componentes do índice registraram decréscimo em suas taxas de variação: Alimentação (2,56% para 0,64%), Transportes (1,17% para 0,59%), Despesas Diversas (1,64% para 0,25%), Vestuário (0,36% para -0,35%), Saúde e Cuidados Pessoais (0,36% para 0,32%) e Comunicação (0,16% para 0,14%). Nestas classes de despesa, vale mencionar o comportamento dos itens: carnes bovinas (16,56% para -2,62%), gasolina (3,28% para 1,07%), jogo lotérico (10,21% para 0,00%), roupas (0,50% para -0,63%), perfume (0,70% para -0,44%) e mensalidade para internet (0,27% para 0,26%).
Em contrapartida, os grupos Habitação (-0,76% para 0,36%) e Educação, Leitura e Recreação (0,09% para 2,30%) apresentaram acréscimo em suas taxas de variação. Nestas classes de despesa, os maiores avanços foram observados nas taxas dos itens tarifa de eletricidade residencial (-5,32% para 0,97%) e cursos formais (0,00% para 4,67%).
O núcleo do IPC registrou taxa de 0,34% em janeiro, ante 0,36% no mês anterior. Dos 85 itens componentes do IPC, 52 foram excluídos do cálculo do núcleo. Destes, 23 apresentaram taxas abaixo de 0,13% linha de corte inferior, e 29 registraram variações acima de 0,53%, linha de corte superior. Em janeiro, o índice de difusão, que mede a proporção de itens com taxa de variação positiva, foi de 68,71%, ficando 2,00 pontos percentuais acima do registrado em dezembro, quando o índice foi de 70,71%.
O Índice Nacional de Custo da Construção (INCC) subiu 0,38% em janeiro, ante 0,21% no mês anterior. Os três grupos componentes do INCC registraram as seguintes variações na passagem de dezembro para janeiro: Materiais e Equipamentos (0,05% para 0,77%), Serviços (0,15% para 0,73%) e Mão de Obra (0,32% para 0,06%).
DOCUMENTO: https://portalibre.fgv.br/navegacao-superior/noticias/igp-di-varia-0-09-em-janeiro.htm
CONSTRUÇÃO CIVIL
IBGE. 07/02/2020. Índice Nacional da Construção Civil varia 0,30% em janeiro
O Índice Nacional da Construção Civil (Sinapi) teve variação de 0,30% em janeiro de 2020, ficando 0,08 ponto percentual acima da taxa de dezembro de 2019 (0,22%) e 0,12 p.p abaixo de janeiro de 2019 (0,42%). Nos últimos doze meses, houve aumento de 3,91%, resultado pouco abaixo dos 4,03% registrados nos doze meses imediatamente anteriores.
O custo nacional da construção, por metro quadrado, que fechou o ano de 2019 em R$ 1.158,81, passou em janeiro para R$ 1.162,24, sendo R$ 609,39 relativos aos materiais e R$ 552,85 à mão de obra.
A parcela dos materiais apresentou variação de 0,62%, registrando alta de 0,75 p.p. em relação a dezembro de 2019 (-0,13%) e de 0,43 p.p. em relação ao mesmo mês do ano anterior (0,19%).
Já o valor da mão de obra apresentou variação de -0,06%, caindo 0,65 p.p. em relação ao último mês do ano de 2019 (0,59%). Comparando com janeiro do ano anterior (0,68%), houve queda mais significativa, 0,74 ponto percentual, já que em janeiro de 2019 foram firmados três acordos coletivos, em contrapartida a nenhum dissídio observado nos estados em janeiro de 2020.
O resultado acumulado em doze meses registrou alta de 4,99% nos materiais, enquanto a parcela do custo referente aos gastos com mão de obra atingiu 2,71%.
Região Norte registra maior variação mensal
A Região Norte, com alta observada na parcela dos materiais em todos os estados, ficou com a maior variação regional, 0,54%, no primeiro mês do ano. As demais regiões apresentaram os seguintes resultados: 0,46% (Nordeste), 0,17% (Sudeste), 0,05% (Sul) e 0,45 (Centro-Oeste).
Os custos regionais da construção, por metro quadrado, em valores, foram: R$ 1.175,74 (Norte); R$ 1.072,56 (Nordeste); R$ 1.210,88 (Sudeste); R$ 1.223,27 (Sul) e R$ 1.171,04 (Centro-Oeste).
Entre os estados, Mato Grosso apresenta a maior alta
Mato Grosso, com 1,39%, foi o estado que apresentou a maior variação mensal, com alta na parcela de materiais, influenciada pela Lei Estadual Complementar nº 631/2019, que traz alterações na cobrança do Imposto sobre Operações relativas à Circulação de Mercadorias (ICMS) no estado.
Sinapi – Janeiro /2020 COM desoneração da folha de pagamento de empresas do setor
| ÁREAS GEOGRÁFICAS | CUSTOS MÉDIOS | NÚMEROS ÍNDICES | VARIAÇÕES PERCENTUAIS | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R$/m2 | JUN/94=100 | MENSAL | NO ANO | 12 MESES | |
| BRASIL | 1162,24 | 581,70 | 0,30 | 0,30 | 3,91 |
| REGIÃO NORTE | 1175,74 | 585,86 | 0,54 | 0,54 | 4,66 |
| Rondônia | 1226,48 | 683,90 | 0,40 | 0,40 | 5,34 |
| Acre | 1292,42 | 685,97 | 0,36 | 0,36 | 4,89 |
| Amazonas | 1145,69 | 560,97 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 5,61 |
| Roraima | 1229,68 | 510,69 | 0,44 | 0,44 | 4,59 |
| Pará | 1163,63 | 557,78 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 4,38 |
| Amapá | 1138,61 | 553,10 | 0,58 | 0,58 | 4,85 |
| Tocantins | 1190,47 | 625,86 | 1,21 | 1,21 | 2,46 |
| REGIÃO NORDESTE | 1072,56 | 579,38 | 0,46 | 0,46 | 3,19 |
| Maranhão | 1121,31 | 590,75 | 0,54 | 0,54 | 4,95 |
| Piauí | 1101,20 | 731,80 | -0,04 | -0,04 | 3,30 |
| Ceará | 1078,66 | 623,02 | 1,18 | 1,18 | 3,68 |
| Rio Grande do Norte | 1041,61 | 525,07 | 0,11 | 0,11 | 1,07 |
| Paraíba | 1109,48 | 613,65 | 0,72 | 0,72 | 2,09 |
| Pernambuco | 1042,52 | 557,43 | 0,67 | 0,67 | 3,02 |
| Alagoas | 1046,38 | 522,84 | 0,19 | 0,19 | 2,15 |
| Sergipe | 997,79 | 530,20 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 2,09 |
| Bahia | 1067,03 | 564,82 | -0,06 | -0,06 | 3,10 |
| REGIÃO SUDESTE | 1210,88 | 579,82 | 0,17 | 0,17 | 3,71 |
| Minas Gerais | 1117,18 | 614,76 | 0,48 | 0,48 | 4,59 |
| Espírito Santo | 1051,18 | 583,07 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 3,56 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 1291,72 | 588,63 | 0,21 | 0,21 | 4,96 |
| São Paulo | 1247,70 | 563,61 | -0,01 | -0,01 | 2,71 |
| REGIÃO SUL | 1223,27 | 585,01 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 5,50 |
| Paraná | 1189,01 | 568,55 | -0,12 | -0,12 | 4,91 |
| Santa Catarina | 1329,80 | 720,34 | -0,09 | -0,09 | 6,34 |
| Rio Grande do Sul | 1178,12 | 534,74 | 0,49 | 0,49 | 5,60 |
| REGIÃO CENTRO-OESTE | 1171,04 | 597,80 | 0,45 | 0,45 | 4,07 |
| Mato Grosso do Sul | 1118,65 | 526,11 | 0,08 | 0,08 | 2,28 |
| Mato Grosso | 1163,48 | 663,74 | 1,39 | 1,39 | 3,25 |
| Goiás | 1163,66 | 614,76 | 0,27 | 0,27 | 5,85 |
| Distrito Federal | 1227,41 | 542,09 | -0,24 | -0,24 | 3,97 |
SINAPI – Janeiro /2020 SEM desoneração da folha de pagamento de empresas do setor
| ÁREAS GEOGRÁFICAS | CUSTOS MÉDIOS | NÚMEROS ÍNDICES | VARIAÇÕES PERCENTUAIS | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R$/m2 | JUN/94=100 | MENSAL | NO ANO | 12 MESES | |
| BRASIL | 1247,22 | 623,90 | 0,27 | 0,27 | 3,82 |
| REGIÃO NORTE | 1255,42 | 625,64 | 0,51 | 0,51 | 4,61 |
| Rondônia | 1310,41 | 730,62 | 0,38 | 0,38 | 5,35 |
| Acre | 1380,42 | 732,69 | 0,34 | 0,34 | 4,89 |
| Amazonas | 1224,40 | 599,71 | 0,05 | 0,05 | 5,53 |
| Roraima | 1321,10 | 548,54 | 0,42 | 0,42 | 4,40 |
| Pará | 1240,99 | 594,63 | 0,70 | 0,70 | 4,32 |
| Amapá | 1214,55 | 589,82 | 0,54 | 0,54 | 4,83 |
| Tocantins | 1271,77 | 668,88 | 1,25 | 1,25 | 2,40 |
| REGIÃO NORDESTE | 1146,98 | 619,62 | 0,45 | 0,45 | 3,23 |
| Maranhão | 1196,61 | 630,55 | 0,50 | 0,50 | 4,88 |
| Piauí | 1176,39 | 781,57 | -0,03 | -0,03 | 3,33 |
| Ceará | 1150,57 | 664,04 | 1,15 | 1,15 | 3,78 |
| Rio Grande do Norte | 1111,99 | 560,34 | 0,13 | 0,13 | 0,93 |
| Paraíba | 1183,64 | 654,54 | 0,74 | 0,74 | 2,08 |
| Pernambuco | 1115,60 | 596,33 | 0,63 | 0,63 | 3,02 |
| Alagoas | 1119,13 | 559,24 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 2,30 |
| Sergipe | 1068,12 | 567,72 | 1,00 | 1,00 | 2,20 |
| Bahia | 1144,74 | 605,44 | -0,04 | -0,04 | 3,10 |
| REGIÃO SUDESTE | 1303,74 | 623,78 | 0,13 | 0,13 | 3,49 |
| Minas Gerais | 1196,90 | 658,38 | 0,32 | 0,32 | 4,32 |
| Espírito Santo | 1129,07 | 626,34 | 0,00 | 0,00 | 3,64 |
| Rio de Janeiro | 1393,90 | 635,61 | 0,20 | 0,20 | 4,79 |
| São Paulo | 1345,94 | 607,92 | 0,01 | 0,01 | 2,53 |
| REGIÃO SUL | 1318,19 | 630,27 | 0,04 | 0,04 | 5,49 |
| Paraná | 1284,57 | 614,28 | -0,11 | -0,11 | 4,86 |
| Santa Catarina | 1436,90 | 778,33 | -0,09 | -0,09 | 6,30 |
| Rio Grande do Sul | 1260,22 | 572,03 | 0,45 | 0,45 | 5,69 |
| REGIÃO CENTRO-OESTE | 1251,22 | 638,69 | 0,43 | 0,43 | 4,05 |
| Mato Grosso do Sul | 1197,71 | 562,82 | 0,08 | 0,08 | 2,50 |
| Mato Grosso | 1242,79 | 708,89 | 1,30 | 1,30 | 2,95 |
| Goiás | 1243,17 | 656,19 | 0,29 | 0,29 | 5,89 |
| Distrito Federal | 1310,45 | 578,77 | -0,24 | -0,24 | 4,06 |
Custo da construção civil cresce 0,30% em janeiro. Com alta em janeiro, custos da construção passaram para R$ 1.162,24 por metro quadrado
O Índice Nacional da Construção Civil (Sinapi), divulgado hoje (07) pelo IBGE, variou 0,30% em janeiro, ficando acima da taxa de dezembro de 2019, que havia sido de 0,22%. Esse indicador mede o custo nacional para o setor habitacional por metro quadrado, que passou para R$ 1.162,24, sendo R$ 609,39 relativos aos materiais e R$ 552,85 à mão de obra.
Os materiais apresentaram variação de 0,62%, registrando altas significativas tanto em relação a dezembro de 2019 (-0,13%), como em relação ao mesmo mês do ano anterior (0,19%). Já o valor da mão de obra teve queda de 0,06%, uma redução em relação a dezembro de 2019 (0,59%). Comparando com janeiro do ano anterior (0,68%), houve queda mais significativa devido à ocorrência de dissídios.
“Em janeiro do ano passado ocorreram três acordos coletivos, com um peso muito grande de Minas Gerais, cujo dissídio foi adiado de dezembro de 2018 para janeiro de 2019. Em contrapartida, não houve nenhum dissídio em janeiro de 2020, o que resultou numa redução nos custos da mão de obra”, explica o gerente do Sinapi, Augusto Oliveira.
Os acumulados em 12 meses ficaram em 4,99% (materiais) e 2,71% (mão de obra), respectivamente.
Os custos da construção subiram em todas as regiões em janeiro, sendo que o Norte, com alta observada na parcela dos materiais em todos os estados, ficou com a maior variação regional, 0,54%, no primeiro mês do ano. As demais regiões apresentaram os seguintes resultados: 0,46% (Nordeste), 0,17% (Sudeste), 0,05% (Sul) e 0,45% (Centro-Oeste).
Quanto aos custos da construção por região, os valores, em janeiro, por metro quadrado, foram de R$ 1.175,74 no Norte); R$ 1.072,56 no Nordeste); R$ 1.210,88 no Sudeste); R$ 1.223,27 no Sul) e R$ 1.171,04 no Centro-Oeste.
“Os custos de materiais estão sendo muito afetados pelas alterações na legislação do ICMS em Mato Grosso. Isso impactou os produtos de forma generalizada não só no estado, mas também na região e no Brasil”, reforça Oliveira.
DOCUMENTO: https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-sala-de-imprensa/2013-agencia-de-noticias/releases/26820-indice-nacional-da-construcao-civil-varia-0-30-em-janeiro
POUPANÇA
BACEN. PORTAL G1. 06/02/2020. Brasileiros resgatam R$ 12,3 bilhões da poupança em janeiro, maior valor da série histórica. Banco Central registra dados mensais desde 1995; recorde anterior tinha sido em janeiro de 2016. Quedas sucessivas da taxa Selic derrubaram rendimento das cadernetas.
Por Yvna Sousa, TV Globo — Brasília
Em janeiro, a poupança teve a maior retirada de recursos já registrada em um mês. Dados do Banco Central divulgados nesta quinta-feira (6) mostram que os saques superaram os depósitos nas cadernetas em R$ 12,356 bilhões.
A série histórica do BC começa em 1995. Até então, o maior saque líquido (diferença entre retiradas e depósitos) tinha sido registrado em janeiro de 2016, quando R$ 12 bilhões foram sacados das aplicações.
Em janeiro, foram aplicados na poupança R$ 216,9 bilhões. Já os saques totalizaram R$ 229,3 bilhões.
Baixo rendimento
Janeiro é um mês em que, tradicionalmente, há um grande volume de retirada de recursos da poupança.
Ainda assim, o saque recorde registrado no mês passado é fortemente influenciado pelo baixo rendimento da aplicação. Com a taxa básica de juros, a Selic, em 4,25% ao ano – o menor patamar desde 1999 – as cadernetas rendem menos.
Isso porque a regra em vigor prevê que, quando a Selic estiver abaixo de 8,5% ao ano, o rendimento da poupança será de 70% da taxa, mais a Taxa Referencial (TR), calculada pelo Banco Central.
Por isso, com juros em 4,25% ao ano, a correção da poupança é de 2,975% ao ano, mais a TR.
Como o Banco Central já indicou que a taxa Selic deve ser mantida neste patamar por um período, a previsão dos economistas é de que o rendimento das cadernetas fique abaixo da inflação em 2020 – o que desestimula novas aplicações.
A ampliação do acesso a investimentos mais rentáveis – como fundos, títulos públicos e de renda fixa –, mediada por bancos e corretoras, tem levado poupadores a retirar o dinheiro das cadernetas.
DOCUMENTO: https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/16967/nota
BACEN
BACEN. 06 Fevereiro 2020. Apresentações do Presidente Roberto Campos Neto, em reunião com o Deputado Federal Rodrigo Maia, Presidente da Câmara dos Deputados, e parlamentares sobre a Nova Lei Cambial e a Autonomia do Banco Central, em Brasília, DF.
DOCUMENTO: https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/16966/nota
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LGCJ.:
