US - IRAN

Dos. May 8, 2018. On President Trump's Decision to Withdraw From the JCPOA. Press Statement. Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State. Washington, DC

As we exit the Iran deal, we will be working with our allies to find a real, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Iranian threat. We have a shared interest with our allies in Europe and around the world to prevent Iran from ever developing a nuclear weapon. But our effort is broader than just the nuclear threat and we will be working together with partners to eliminate the threat of Iran’s ballistic missile program; to stop its terrorist activities worldwide; and to block its menacing activity across the Middle East and beyond. As we build this global effort, sanctions will go into full effect and will remind the Iranian regime of the diplomatic and economic isolation that results from its reckless and malign activity.

FACT SHEETS.  FOREIGN POLICY. President Donald J. Trump is Ending United States Participation in an Unacceptable Iran Deal

The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into.

President Donald J. Trump

PROTECTING AMERICA FROM A BAD DEAL: President Donald J. Trump is terminating the United States’ participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and re-imposing sanctions lifted under the deal.

• President Trump is terminating United States participation in the JCPOA, as it failed to protect America’s national security interests.
• The JCPOA enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons and allowing it to preserve nuclear research and development.
• The President has directed his Administration to immediately begin the process of re-imposing sanctions related to the JCPOA.
• The re-imposed sanctions will target critical sectors of Iran’s economy, such as its energy, petrochemical, and financial sectors.
  • Those doing business in Iran will be provided a period of time to allow them to wind down operations in or business involving Iran.
• Those who fail to wind down such activities with Iran by the end of the period will risk severe consequences.
• United States withdrawal from the JCPOA will pressure the Iranian regime to alter its course of malign activities and ensure that Iranian bad acts are no longer rewarded.  As a result, both Iran and its regional proxies will be put on notice.  As importantly, this step will help ensure global funds stop flowing towards illicit terrorist and nuclear activities.

IRAN’S BAD FAITH AND BAD ACTIONS: Iran negotiated the JCPOA in bad faith, and the deal gave the Iranian regime too much in exchange for too little.

• Intelligence recently released by Israel provides compelling details about Iran’s past secret efforts to develop nuclear weapons, which it lied about for years.
  • The intelligence further demonstrates that the Iranian regime did not come clean about its nuclear weapons activity, and that it entered the JCPOA in bad faith.
• The JCPOA failed to deal with the threat of Iran’s missile program and did not include a strong enough mechanism for inspections and verification.
• The JCPOA foolishly gave the Iranian regime a windfall of cash and access to the international financial system for trade and investment.
  • Instead of using the money from the JCPOA to support the Iranian people at home, the regime has instead funded a military buildup and continues to fund its terrorist proxies, such as Hizballah and Hamas.
  • Iran violated the laws and regulations of European countries to counterfeit the currency of its neighbor, Yemen, to support the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force’s destabilizing activities.

ADDRESSING IRANIAN AGGRESSION: President Trump is committed to ensuring Iran has no possible path to a nuclear weapon and is addressing the threats posed by the regime’s malign activities.           

• President Trump will work to assemble a broad coalition of nations to deny Iran all paths to a nuclear weapon and to counter the totality of the regime’s malign activities.
  • Nations must work together to halt the Iranian regime’s destabilizing drive for regional hegemony.
    • In Syria, the Iranian regime supports the Assad regime and is complicit in Assad’s atrocities against the Syrian people.
    • In Yemen, the regime has escalated the conflict and used the Houthis as a proxy to attack other nations.
    • In Iraq, Iran’s IRGC sponsors Shia militant groups and terrorists.
    • In Lebanon, the Iranian regime enables Hizballah to play a highly destabilizing role and to build an arsenal of weapons that threatens the region.
  • The Administration’s actions are directed against the malign behavior of the Iranian regime, not against the Iranian people, who are the regime’s longest-suffering victims.
• President Trump is making clear that, in addition to never developing a nuclear weapon, the Iranian regime must:
  • Never have an ICBM, cease developing any nuclear-capable missiles, and stop proliferating ballistic missiles to others.
  • Cease its support for terrorists, extremists, and regional proxies, such as Hizballah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qa’ida.
  • End its publicly declared quest to destroy Israel.
  • Stop its threats to freedom of navigation, especially in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
  • Cease escalating the Yemen conflict and destabilizing the region by proliferating weapons to the Houthis.
  • End its cyber-attacks against the United States and our allies, including Israel.
  • Stop its grievous human rights abuses, shown most recently in the regime’s crackdown against widespread protests by Iranian citizens.
  • Stop its unjust detention of foreigners, including United States citizens.

U.S. Department of State. May 8, 2018. Press Releases: Background Briefing on President Trump's Decision To Withdraw From the JCPOA. Special Briefing. Senior State Department Officials. Washington, DC

MODERATOR: All right, thanks everybody. So we are glad to have with us today two folks to talk about the President’s decision today to withdraw from the JCPOA. This will be on background, embargoed until the end. Our two speakers with us today are [Senior State Department Official One], and next to him is [Senior State Department Official Two]. And so they’ll start with a few comments and then we’ll take some questions.

I think – you’d like to start?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Great, yeah. Hi.

MODERATOR: Senior State Department Official Number One.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Hi. So I thought we would just start with a little bit more substance, going one level deeper. You all heard the President’s remarks; you saw the Secretary’s statement. So we wanted to put a little bit more meat on the bones and then open it up for questions and use the time the way that you think is most useful for you all.

So the sanctions reimposition that the President talked about is going to come in two phases. There’s going to be one period for wind down that lasts about – that lasts 90 days, and one period of wind down that lasts six months. The six-month wind down – wind downs are, by the way, pretty standard across sanctions programs. So this is not Iran-specific, but oftentimes when we either impose sanctions or reimpose sanctions, we provide a wind down to allow both U.S. companies but foreign companies as well to end contracts, terminate business, get their money out of wherever the sanctions target is – in this case, Iran. Because what we want – we don’t want to do is we don’t want to impact or have unintended consequences on our allies and partners. We want to focus the costs and the pain on the target. And in this case, that’s the Iranian regime.

So wind downs are pretty natural. In this case, we’re providing a six-month wind down for energy-related sanctions. So that’s oil, petroleum, petrochemicals, and then all of the ancillary sanctions that are associated with that. So, for example, banking; sanctions on the CBI in particular, because the Central Bank of Iran is involved in Iran’s export of oil and the receipt of revenues. Shipping, shipbuilding, ports – all of those sanctions that are related to both the energy sector and then the banking and the shipping or transportation of that energy will all have a six-month wind down. Everything else is going to have a 90-day wind down. So that’s – the architecture of the Iranian sanctions program was quite complex, but everything else includes things like dealing in the rial, providing metal – precious metals and gold to the Iranian regime, providing U.S. banknotes.

So there’s a whole kind of swath of other sanctions that are all going to have a 90-day wind down. In addition, within the first 90 days, the Treasury Department is going to work to end – to terminate the specific licenses that were issued pursuant to the statement of licensing policy on civil aviation. So Treasury’s going to be reaching out to those private sector companies that have licenses and work to end – terminate those licenses in an orderly way that doesn’t lead to undue impact on the companies.

The other big action that has to be done is the re-designation of all of the individuals that were delisted pursuant to the JCPOA. There are over – I think 400 and some odd were specifically designated for conduct, and another 200 or so were identified as part of the Government of Iran. Treasury – that’s obviously a big – it’s a lot of work for Treasury. Their aim is to relist all of those individuals and entities by the end of the six-month wind down. They’re not going to relist entities and individuals overnight, and – both for practical reasons, but also for policy reasons. If some of those individuals and entities were relisted right away, it would impact the wind down, right? So if we’re allowing a six-month wind down for energy-related or petroleum-related business, and then you designate – you re-designate tomorrow an Iranian-related petroleum entity, it makes null and void the six-month wind down that you just provided. So that’s all going to be done in a coherent way to provide a real wind down period.

So that’s kind of the – putting a little bit of meat on the bones of what it means to reimpose the Iran architecture, sanctions architecture.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: That’s great.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Do you want to open it up for questions?

QUESTION: I have a question. Lesley Wroughton from Reuters. You said it’s not meant to have unintended consequences, but it does. Nobody’s going to touch Iran or – and immediately I think the U.S. ambassador to Germany just said to – told all German companies to move out immediately, so it does have unintended consequences.

QUESTION: Do you have guarantees from the Europeans that they’re going to go along with this? Or like they have with the Cuba sanctions, are they going to fight it? Do you know?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So what we’re going to do and what we’ve already – since last December, when we started working with our European allies on both the nuclear file but then also the broader array of Iranian threats, we’re going to continue to work closely with them. We’re going to broaden that engagement. And like both the President said and I think the Secretary said in his statement, he’s going to lead an effort to build a global effort to constrain and to prevent, both on the nuclear front but then also on the ballistic missile front, support to terrorism and the – kind of the six or seven areas that the President has outlined as kind of the broad array of Iranian threats. We’re going to build a global coalition to put pressure on Iran to stop that behavior. That’s --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: And let me just --

QUESTION: What was the --

QUESTION: We’ve heard from the Brits –

QUESTION: Sorry, could you just respond to her?

QUESTION: I was going to say, I mean – go on, Matt.

QUESTION: We’ve heard from others that they not only are not going to --

QUESTION: Would you mind? I had the first question.

QUESTION: Oh, sorry. Okay. Yep, I apologize.

QUESTION: And they haven’t even answered it.

QUESTION: Yep.

QUESTION: If you don’t mind.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: So I just wanted to say that those are actually intended consequences. We do think that, given the IRGC’s penetration of the Iranian economy and Iran’s behavior in the region, as well as its other nefarious activities, that companies should not do business in Iran. That’s an intended consequence. And we thank our ambassador out there for reaffirming that message.

QUESTION: So all those companies that have gone in are moving out?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: We’re certainly going to encourage them to.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah.

QUESTION: Why --

QUESTION: And what if they don’t?

QUESTION: If they don’t, are you prepared to sanction German companies, French companies?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Those are discussions we’re going to have with the Europeans.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah.

QUESTION: I mean, you’ve been having discussions --

QUESTION: Sorry, just a point of clarification on that. That would begin after the 180-day period is over, correct?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: If it’s energy-related or banking-related. If it’s related to the provision of precious metals or gold or any of the sanctions that are being re-imposed after 90 days, then that would be --

QUESTION: So you are planning to sanction European companies, or you will have those discussions? Like --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We’ve already started the discussions this afternoon, right. The discussions are ongoing and the effort is ongoing. Hopefully we will build – and this is the Secretary and the President’s desire and focus, is to build this global effort to put renewed and strengthened pressure on Iran. And that will include trying to isolate Iran economically.

QUESTION: Well, why not keep the structure of the deal and address these concerns on the side, as has been discussed for the last few months?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, I think as the President laid out, that the problem with the deal was that it reduced our ability to pressure Iran, right. It essentially cordoned off this huge area of the Iranian economy and said, “Hey, we know about the IRGC’s penetration of the economy. We know Iran’s doing all this nefarious, malign activities in the region. But because of this nuclear angle, which is only one aspect of Iran’s behavior – a critical one, but just one – you essentially can’t sanction these entities that are involved in all this other stuff.”

QUESTION: So wait, just – so the United States has basically no economic relationships right now with the Iranians, right? So there is no power of U.S. sanctions to prevent – in preventing U.S. economic activity. The only power that U.S. sanctions have is in preventing European and other economic activity, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Secondary sanctions.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: The secondary sanctions, correct.

QUESTION: Why get out of the deal until you know for sure that Europe is going to go along with that secondary sanction activity or whether you’re – they’ll fight you? Because if they fight you, you’re going to be in a worse situation vis-a-vis Iran than you are now and than you are previously, right? So you don’t actually know – you’re saying that the President’s going to start this global coalition, but you don’t actually know whether even your closest allies are going to be part of that coalition, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The President made clear on January 12th that he was giving a certain number of months to try to – for – try to get a supplemental agreement with the E3. We didn’t get there. We got close. We made a – we had movement, a ton of good progress, which will not be wasted, but we didn’t get there. So he was clear January 12th that if we don’t get this supplemental, he’s withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA, and that’s what he did. That being said, you could even see that President Macron tweeted only a few minutes after the President finished his statement that France is eager to be part of an effort – I forget the exact words, but part of an effort on a broader deal that addresses the nuclear file but also --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Syria, Yemen.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: -- Syria, Yemen, and others. So you already see – you already see from President Macron a willingness to work on a broader deal; you see from the Saudis have also issued a statement supporting our withdrawal; the Israelis did as well. No one is saying this is going to be easy, right, but the President made clear his intention on January 12th. He made good on that – on that promise.

QUESTION: You don’t know right now whether you’re going to be in a better place or in a worse place; is that what you’re saying?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: No, we think we’re going to be in a better place.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: No, we know we’re --

QUESTION: But you don’t know.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We know we’re going to be in a better place because we don’t think that the current JCP – the JCPOA, as it is now, adequately protects U.S. national security. So --

QUESTION: Because?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Because it allowed Iran to enrich after sunsets, after those restrictions melted away --

QUESTION: In seven years.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes.

QUESTION: And even then, not enriching to a level where they could build a nuclear weapon.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Listen, after – after the Israelis revealed what they were able to find --

QUESTION: All old stuff, all old – before.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Listen, it was – we have acknowledged for quite some time that the Iranians had a nuclear weapons program, but nobody knew until the Israelis found it, this well curated archive, the level of detail, right. And the – I think it reinforced in a very meaningful way that all of the Iranian statements throughout the negotiations and after were lies.

QUESTION: So the President said that we would impose sanctions on countries who helped with Iran’s nuclear program, but actually, you will reimpose sanctions on companies and countries that do any – roughly any economic activity, no matter if it has anything to do with nuclear or anything, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: In the buildup – in the buildup to the negotiations that led first to the JPOA and the JCPOA, we had an extensive architecture of secondary sanctions that started more or less with CISADA in 2010. We had to use those secondary sanctions very, very rarely. In fact, we only ever sanctioned two banks with secondary sanctions, Kunlun and Elaf in Iraq. The leverage that we gained from the secondary sanctions is what we used throughout the world with engagement to get countries to partner with us to build the economic isolation of Iran. That’s what we want to do again. It’s not about sanctioning foreign companies; it’s about using the leverage and engaging the way we did before.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: That’s right.

QUESTION: When you say that the – when you --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: This is a long-established practice, I mean, since ILSA in the late ‘90s, this is something the U.S. has been doing. Sorry.

QUESTION: When you say that the effort that you had in the negotiations with the E3 will not be wasted, will you be implementing any of that? Because I mean, it was the supposition that the U.S. would stay in the deal if these areas were addressed by the E3. The U.S. isn’t staying in the deal, so --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So we made a ton of progress on ICBMs, on access, on missiles writ large, on regional issues, and then we got stuck on sunsets, right? We didn’t quite make it. That work – we’re not sure. We have to – we’re starting those conversations with the E3 today, tomorrow, so I can’t – we can’t tell you exactly how it’s going to be used, but I can tell you it will be used. That work is not going to be wasted.

QUESTION: So you think they’ll go forward.

QUESTION: But if a ton of progress was made, then why not give it more time? Why take such a dramatic action that’s going to have you basically starting over from square one?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The President made very clear on January 12th his intention. If we got a supplemental agreement before May 12th, he would consider it. We didn’t get there. He said this – on January 12th, he said that was his last time waiving sanctions. He followed through on that promise.

QUESTION: And what was the sticking point? Can you just sort of tell us what didn’t work?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: It was the one-year breakout.

QUESTION: The sunset program.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah.

QUESTION: [Senior State Department Official One], I wonder, just on Boeing quickly because I’m a little confused. So Boeing had the original export licenses were valid until September 2020. Are those going to be cancelled?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So Treasury – that is part – the civil aviation specific licenses are part of the 90-day wind down. Treasury will be reaching out to – I’m not going to name specific companies because I don’t think I’m allowed to, but they’re going to reach out to private companies that hold licenses and work on wind downs.

QUESTION: So are you considering any carveouts for individual companies or countries as you establish this wind-down period?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well so, the wind down is a carveout for everybody, right. The wind down carves --

QUESTION: No, but in that time you could say, okay, maybe Boeing is going to be a company that is not subject to these sanctions because of X, Y, or Z U.S. interests, or maybe a France railroad company is not subject to these sanctions because of X, Y, Z. Are those conversations possible or not?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I don’t want to speculate on the hypothetical, right, and Treasury’s going to be --

QUESTION: No, I mean are you open to the conversations or not? It’s not hypothetical.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I wouldn’t want to – I wouldn’t want to specifically name companies.

QUESTION: Fine. Are you open to carveouts for specific companies and countries?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I mean companies – U.S. companies are always – always have the option of coming into OFAC and asking for a specific license to do work that’s otherwise prohibited by sanctions. So there’s nothing that would stop any U.S. company from doing that regardless.

QUESTION: Okay. Foreign countries, can they ask for carveouts for companies in their country?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: They can ask for whatever they want.

QUESTION: So you’re open to having those conversations.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I didn’t say that. I said that we’re going engage – we’re going to engage our European allies and others, and I just don’t know. I can’t speculate as to what they are going to ask for. This 90-day wind down and 180-day or six-month wind down provides everyone with quite a bit of breathing room to wind down their activities. If there – and I just can’t – I don’t – I can’t speculate beyond that.

QUESTION: So you’re scuttling the – you reached agreement or near agreement on everything except a sunset clause, so what is the point of scuttling the entire deal just because of the one- year breakout?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, it’s a cost-benefit analysis, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: The one-year breakout was the key – that was the key to the whole thing.

QUESTION: So you can’t just keep --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: And plus it’s a cost-benefit analysis, right? I mean, if you get X value from the – where we got to with the Europeans and then you add the kind of negative value that Iran gets from using the protections alluded – endogenous to the deal to project power in the region, it comes out to less than the benefit you get from getting out. I think that’s – that’s the way we look at it.

QUESTION: But again, I just want to understand: You do not know at this point what the Europeans are going to do in terms of the entire ancillary agreement you’ve negotiated? You do not know at this point what the Europeans are going to do, whether they’re going to fight you and – and, like they do with Cuba, protect their companies against your secondary sanctions or what – you do not know what the Europeans, your closest allies, are going to do vis-a-vis any of the ancillary effects of getting out of this deal. Is that right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: We’re in constant conversations with the Europeans on this.

QUESTION: But you don’t know at this point? You don’t know? You didn’t get to that in your discussions, what’s going to happen?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We did not talk about a Plan B in our discussions because we were focused on negotiating a supplemental agreement, so we did not – we did not talk about Plan B.

QUESTION: And what makes you think that Iran is going to go along with a whole new renegotiation?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We don’t know if they will. We don’t know if they will, and the President said that in his statement. He doesn’t know if the Iranians are willing to talk, but he said at the end of the statement that he’s willing, able, and ready to talk.

QUESTION: Are there missile – Iran missile sanctions on the books in the meantime, can those come in, even the – the ballistic --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Ballistic – ballistic missile sanctions were never lifted under the JCPOA, so under Executive Order 13382, we’ve always had the authority and we’ve continued to designate under that authority throughout the JCPOA period, so that – those have not been affected.

QUESTION: Right.

QUESTION: Can I – on these wind downs --

QUESTION: Have you had conversations with Asian companies that are the primary purchasers of Iranian oil?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Excuse me?

QUESTION: Have you talked to the Asian companies like China, South Korea --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We haven’t talked to any private sector companies before the President’s announcement, so we are going to – ENR is the point, is the lead bureau for engaging in the energy sector, and they’re going to – they’re going to move out immediately and starting conversations on significant reduction on --

QUESTION: On the – sorry --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yeah, go ahead.

QUESTION: -- the wind down periods – so obviously, there was the NDAA sanctions that were set to – the waiver was set to expire this weekend, but then there was the other subset of sanctions that were set to expire --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right, in July.

QUESTION: -- in July.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right.

QUESTION: So are you immediately triggering that and it’s 90 days from this day forward --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes.

QUESTION: -- or is it 90 days from July 11th?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: No, the Secretary’s revoking all waivers today, and then he’s going to reissue wind down waivers today. So everything is going to be set as of today.

QUESTION: And can we just talk – is it possible, [Moderator], that we can talk just briefly about the Secretary’s trip to Pyongyang? Is that – can we --

MODERATOR: This is – these guys don’t have – that’s not their bailiwick.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: It’s not ours – I don’t know --

QUESTION: Okay. Can you – can you --

QUESTION: You guys going to respond to emails and texts about it now?

STAFF: Can we stay focused while we have our experts here on the JCPOA?

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Well, you guys have been hard to find the last couple of days, the last several days.

QUESTION: Okay. So anyway, we’ll do that later.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I’ve been in the building.

QUESTION: Well, yeah. Can we reach you?

QUESTION: Not everybody has.

QUESTION: Give us your number or --

QUESTION: Can I ask a clarification? Just on the – your discussions with the Europeans about a one-year breakout, was it specifically that they believed your goal of preventing a one-year breakout would violate the terms of the JPC – JCPOA itself?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: It was a third rail for them to get in a position of modifying a deal that was extant – their participation in which was extant at the time.

QUESTION: And you guys were open – you were trying to essentially change the terms of the deal with them?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, that’s not the way we viewed it. We were putting down a supplemental, a sort of parallel-track deal.

QUESTION: But how do you do that without violating the deal itself?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, now we’re reenacting – now we’re reenacting some of those talks at the moment.

QUESTION: Right, which is what I’m trying to get at.

QUESTION: But, I mean, they tell us that they want to stay in the deal as is. And so again, it’s all – this is all sort of fairly surprising that you guys are doing something so dramatic that affects your closest allies in a dramatic way. They see this deal as essential to their national security and you have no Plan B, you have no idea whether they will stay in the deal, whether they will defend the deal, whether they will fight you on the deal, whether they are going to go off with Iran against you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I mean, I think we have some idea because the President and President Macron, when he was here for the state visit, talked in their press availability about – President Macron called it a four-pillar new deal. What he tweeted today seemed to me – I think there were four pillars in what he tweeted today – seemed to me, again, to echo his desire for a broad new four-pillar deal.

QUESTION: But one of the pillars was keeping the JCPOA, which he made certain to emphasize repeatedly.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right, but he tweeted today something that seemed to indicate to me a French willingness to work with us.

QUESTION: So you guys have a positive tweet out of it. That’s amazing.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, as a heuristic of the French Government’s attitude, yeah, I think that’s fair.

QUESTION: A senior European diplomat who has been dealing with these talks described dealing with State today as the deafening sound of U.S. diplomats running for cover, unable to explain to allies and partners why this is happening, still less what happens next. So it doesn’t seem like you guys are nearly on the same page.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: That’s not true. That’s not true. I have already had, since the President finished his remarks, two calls with foreign counterparts. I have one today at 6:00. It’s just not true.

QUESTION: But for Pompeo to be in the air while all of this is happening, they can’t even call up the Secretary of State, why that planning?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Look, that’s a separate negotiation, right? That’s --

QUESTION: It’s still U.S. foreign policy.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well, and the Secretary was involved in it. I mean, the Secretary has comms on the plane. He was involved. I mean, he certainly was involved in the decision. He was involved in the rollout. He drafted his statement that he issued from the plane and was communicating. I mean, he’s not out of pocket. He’s – we have to be --

QUESTION: He’s out of – he’s absolutely out of pocket, isn’t he? What, like, out of --

QUESTION: Yeah.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Well --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) can you call him?

QUESTION: Can you give us any better sense of the calls he’s had and how he’s been framing this to counterparts both before and after this was announced?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I can’t.

QUESTION: [Moderator], could we get more on that?

MODERATOR: (Nodding.)

QUESTION: Was there any discussion – and I’m sorry I missed part of this – about Iranian actions in Syria, Iranian actions in other places? I mean, how risky – the risks of this, of provoking Iran in places where you don’t want them to be provoked?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: So I think this cuts to really the quick of the whole issue is that we’ve seen – and I’m not just going to regurgitate talking points at you – but the one is that we’ve seen since 2015 worsening Iranian behavior in the region and behavior that doesn’t quite internalize the risk of what they’re doing as much as we would have wanted to. So yes, I think exactly what you pointed out is one of the main driving elements behind this decision. We are alarmed by that behavior. The French are alarmed. I mean, you keep raising what --

QUESTION: Yeah, but it wasn’t the Iran deal that made them do those things.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: But again --

QUESTION: It was the Saudis bombing Yemen. It was – they have other interests in Syria.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I’m not sure --

QUESTION: They have interests in Iraq --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I’m not sure they’re in Syria --

QUESTION: -- that go back to when --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: -- because the Saudis are bombing Yemen.

QUESTION: -- the U.S. toppled Saddam.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Right? I’m not sure they support Hizballah because the Saudis are bombing Yemen and I --

QUESTION: They’ve always supported Hizballah.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: -- I don’t suppose they – I don’t think they support Badr or AAH or any of the – any of the Iraqi groups because – because the Saudis are bombing Yemen.

I think the problem with the Iran deal, as I talked about in the beginning, was that not only did it sort of decouple the consequences from Iran’s behavior – right? – by cordoning off a large part of Iran’s economy that simply the prejudice against which would be – the prejudice would be to not sanction that part. But indeed, it seemed to mandate a kind of top line of investment in the Iranian economy, which my gosh, totally decouples the consequences from Iranian behavior. That’s --

QUESTION: So the Israelis have now gone on high alert. They’ve – opening bomb shelters. There is this worry that the Iranians are going to attack from bases in Syria. Now that you’ve gotten out of the Iran deal, now that you may have provoked Iran, are you going to commit more troops to Syria? The President just said he wants to get the troops out of Syria. How – that seems a contradiction that you may be provoking more malign behavior on the part of the Iranians while the President is saying that he wants to get actually U.S. commitment to be less in the Middle East.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I think it’s a little – I think it’s a little tough to – I think it’s a little, well, tough to blame Iranian behavior in Syria and risk-taking in Syria – which has, if anything, worsened since the outbreak of the civil war and the introduction of Iranian forces, not just Iranian proxies – on the President’s Iran deal decision coming today. That doesn’t seem to follow to me at all.

QUESTION: Okay. So are you thinking about committing more troops to Syria that – because of what sounds like certainly Israeli concerns and other people’s concerns about Iran’s more aggressive behavior that they say is a result of this decision – whether it is or not, are you going to reverse the President’s decision recently that he’s going to pull troops out, or are you committing more troops? What is your Syria strategy in the wake of this?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, the President’s focus in Syria is on ISIS. That’s kind of – and I know Brett McGurk has talked to you probably endlessly about this, but that’s kind of a parallel discussion.

QUESTION: Okay. So it’s not on Iran then?

QUESTION: Sorry.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Can I just make one point though --

QUESTION: Yeah.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: -- that relates to your question and your question? It is clear to us and it’s clear to our European allies too that since the JCPOA Iranian malign behavior in the region has increased dramatically.

QUESTION: Yeah. But they disagree on what caused --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’m just saying it has gone up.

QUESTION: But they don’t agree that that’s because of the Iran nuclear deal. It’s – I mean, we’ve talked to European diplomats too, so.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right. It is our strong view that the JCPOA gave Iran room both for domestic internal political reasons in Tehran and regional reasons to increase their malign activity that helped to destabilize the region substantially.

So in responding to questions about how pulling out of the JCPOA will affect that, it just – I think it’s important for me to just say that we have seen a dramatic increase to a point where in Syria Iranian behavior – unrelated to the JCPOA but Iranian behavior – is so dangerous and reckless. That’s why Israelis – that’s why the Israeli – the IDF is opening shelters in northern Israel. It’s not because of the JCPOA. It is because of some really dangerous and reckless behavior, including capabilities and all kinds of other things that are going into Syria.

QUESTION: So if you think the JCPOA has given them the room to do this sort of reckless behavior, do you now believe that, as a result of getting rid of the JCPOA, Iran will get out of Syria and stop its reckless behavior?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We believe that by getting rid of the JCPOA, we can come up with a more comprehensive deal, a more comprehensive approach that doesn’t just focus on the nuclear file. The focus is on all of the threats together so that we don’t – the JCPOA tried to deal only with the nuclear file and left everything else off the table in the hopes that it would just kind of get better on its own or we wouldn’t have to worry about it as much. That strategy didn’t work. So what we hope to do is a much more comprehensive deal.

QUESTION: And can we judge the success of that --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Yeah, and just to be clear – sorry, can I just offer one thing?

QUESTION: Yeah.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: And just to be clear, it’s not only the JCPOA that contributed to the current situation in the Middle East.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: No, I’m not saying only.

QUESTION: Okay, so just – so for our purposes, let’s say in a year, if you guys – or six months – if you guys do not have a supplemental agreement with all of your allies about addressing this global problem, it will – can we then say that this strategy has not been successful, if in a year you don’t have it? When can we say, okay, you guys promised us a more comprehensive, more global strategy to deal with Iranian malign behavior after you got rid of the last one? When do we get to judge whether you succeeded or failed?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Well, I think you would have to make a cost/benefit decision, right, at six months, at 12 months.

QUESTION: So if you have – if you don’t have an arrangement --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Continually.

QUESTION: -- with your allies in six months, will this strategy have failed?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t want to put a timeframe on it, because the wind down is six months for energy sanctions. So part of the strategy is showing Iran that there is economic isolation as a result of its destabilizing activity, so I think we have to be able to build this coalition, build up some economic pressure. So that is the strategy, though, and at the end of the day, if that strategy is – you will judge us based on that strategy.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: But I wouldn’t be – I would not put a six-month or one-year timeline on it. I mean, CISADA was put in place in 2010 and took several years – between CISADA and TRA and IFCA and other economic pressure took quite a few years to get Iran to the negotiating table. So I don’t want to put a timeframe on it.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MODERATOR: Unfortunately, we have to wrap up here I think, you guys.

QUESTION: I really have a sanctions question.

MODERATOR: One last question, then.

QUESTION: Six – okay, after the six months, then you can impose new sanctions on Iran, right? Is that what you’re looking at?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: After the – after six months, we can re-impose the energy-related and banking-related sanctions. It’s not new. They’re re-imposed --

QUESTION: But you can impose --

QUESTION: You can impose --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Exactly.

QUESTION: You can impose other sanctions --

QUESTION: Others.

QUESTION: -- at will any time, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Exactly. Precisely. Precisely.

QUESTION: That’s what I’m asking, yeah.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Yes.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Precisely.

QUESTION: Any other things. And are you expecting that to come – I mean --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Non-nuclear sanctions.

QUESTION: Non-nuclear.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Defer to Treasury.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: On ballistic missile, counterterrorism, et cetera.

QUESTION: That – so that we can expect over the next few --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I’m not going to say. I mean, that’s --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Up to Treasury.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right.

QUESTION: Okay. Do you have an economic assessment as to what this impact is going to be on the Iranian economy, pulling out and --

QUESTION: And preventing (inaudible).

QUESTION: And preventing --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t have it with me, and maybe we can something back to you on that.

QUESTION: That would be useful.

QUESTION: How about on U.S. – on oil prices? I mean gas prices in the U.S.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: We can also get that to you. I don’t have that stuff with me, but we can get that.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Team can (inaudible) it out for them.

QUESTION: Just to do one North Korea question. He explicitly --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: But I don’t know the answer.

QUESTION: But he --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: You can ask me.

QUESTION: The President explicitly linked getting out of the JCPOA with negotiations in North Korea. He did that in his speech.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: Right.

QUESTION: So presumably you guys can explain somewhat to us how getting out of the JCPOA will help these negotiations that Pompeo is engaged in right now in Pyongyang.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: So at the end of the President’s remarks, he said I don’t know – I mean, I’m paraphrasing – I don’t know if the Iranians are ready to sit down, but I am ready, willing, and able. I think his – the point is that he has initiated an effort with Kim Jong-un to sit down and negotiate the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He is – we are ready to sit down – he said he’s ready, willing, and able to sit down with Iran to negotiate a comprehensive deal that addresses all of the threats together. So I think that was the comparison he was making.

QUESTION: And American detainees in Iran – what do you do about them? How many are there, first of all, and what do you do about it?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: There are five, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Let me offer that the security and safety of Americans is our top priority. Well, I know, you can make that face, but it’s true.

QUESTION: No, we’ve heard it before, we get it, we get it. So --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: I literally just came from here from – I came – went to the White House from a call with one of the families, right. This is – and they were asking exactly the same things. I don’t want to – this is going to be unsatisfying to you – I don’t want to get into it. That’s conversations we’re having with a number of parties to try and resolve those cases, but – so I’m leery. The – I’m leery about getting too much into that, and I know that’s unsatisfying, so I’m sorry.

MODERATOR: Thank you, guys. I’m sorry, we’re going to have to wrap it up now. We’ve got – these guys have to get somewhere else.

QUESTION: Wait, so is there no July deadline anymore? That’s out the door, right?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: They were on a July deadline.

QUESTION: Just making sure. Okay.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO: Did you have one other?

QUESTION: I did, but I think it’s just going to --

QUESTION: Well, and – just to clarify his question. So it would – a deal with Iran would require Iran to totally denuclearize as well, to have no nuclear program whatsoever?

QUESTION: -- bring us back to the same kind of (inaudible)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE: I don’t want to answer that.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

QUESTION: Thank you.


MODERATOR: Thank you, guys.

Global Affairs Canada. May 8, 2018. Canada reaffirms support for Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Ottawa, Ontario - The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:

“Canada supports an effective rules-based international order, and believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is essential to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability and to ensure greater regional and global security.

“Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. The JCPOA has subjected Iran’s nuclear program to a rigorous and unprecedented international verification regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“The JCPOA, agreed to with Iran in 2015 and endorsed by the UN Security Council, is not perfect. It has, however, helped to curb a real threat to international peace and security.

“At the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting two weeks ago, all countries agreed: 'We are committed to permanently ensuring that Iran's nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful, in line with its Non Proliferation Treaty obligations and its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.'

“Canada regrets that the United States has decided to withdraw from the JCPOA, particularly given that, according to the IAEA, Iran continues to implement its JCPOA commitments.

“Canada condemns Iran’s ongoing development of its ballistic missile program and its ballistic missile launches, which are destabilizing for the region. Canada maintains sanctions that target Iran’s ballistic missile programs.

“We continue to oppose Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, its threats toward Israel, and its support for the Assad regime in Syria. We will continue to work closely with our allies and partners to hold Iran to account.”

Quick facts

• Canada has provided $11.5 million in voluntary contributions in support of the IAEA’s JCPOA mandate.

G7 Foreign Ministers’ Communiqué

G7 FOREIGN MINISTERS’ COMMUNIQUÉ

April 23, 2018

1. We, the foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, gathered in Toronto on April 22 and 23, 2018, to exchange views and coordinate action with respect to building a more peaceful and secure world. Bound together by respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, we discussed four broad themes: (1) a rules-based international order, (2) non-proliferation and disarmament, (3) transnational threats to security and (4) conflict prevention and support for United Nations efforts and reform. We reaffirmed our belief in open economies, open societies and open governments where diversity is respected and inclusion is valued and embraced.
2. Throughout our discussions, we stressed the importance of protecting and promoting human rights, including gender equality and women’s empowerment, to sustainable peace and security. In this regard, we held productive discussions with women foreign ministers from Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Ghana, Guatemala and Panama. We recognized that to be effective and durable, initiatives addressing peace and security challenges need to support women’s equal and meaningful participation at all levels of decision-making processes, address women’s and girls’ needs and respect their rights, including their security and safety, and facilitate their access to and control of resources and the benefits of peace in line with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and other relevant resolutions. The G7 members are committed to implementing those resolutions and their respective National Action Plans on women, peace and security. We underscored the strategic importance of enhancing the integration of a gender perspective into policies and initiatives, and we look forward to the contributions of the Gender Equality Advisory Council to this endeavour. We expressed our will to support a concrete and transformative approach and identify policy options accounting for gender mainstreaming and inclusion.
3. In addition to exchanging views and coordinating actions, as set out below, we endorsed the G7 Statement on Non-proliferation and Disarmament and welcomed the Ise-Shima Cyber Group Chair’s report.

The rules-based international order

4. The G7 is united by its shared values and commitment to a rules-based international order. That order is being challenged by authoritarianism, serious violations of human rights, exclusion and discrimination, humanitarian and security crises, and the defiance of international law and standards.
5. As members of the G7, we are convinced that our societies and the world have reaped remarkable benefits from a global order based on rules and underscore that this system must have at its heart the notions of inclusion, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, diversity, and the rule of law. We understand that our full and meaningful engagement with civil society is an essential pillar of these concepts. We are deeply committed to the values of respect and mutual understanding and are dedicated to the application of equity to every person, including women and children, people with disabilities, Indigenous people and members of other minorities, including religious minorities, who are often marginalized in society. We recognize the key role played by human rights defenders in protecting and promoting human rights and in strengthening the rule of law. We are concerned about resurgent forms of racism, xenophobia and discrimination worldwide, including anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. We will work individually and collectively to combat such discrimination and ensure that diversity is recognized and leveraged as a strength for humanity. We also share the view that open, predictable and rules-based trade and investment can contribute to economic growth and job creation. International trade generates prosperity, and we underline the importance of seeking to ensure that all segments of society can take advantage of and benefit from the opportunities that flow from it. In turn, increased trade and investment that is mutually beneficial, sustainable and inclusive—and that facilitates a level playing field—can contribute to reducing poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable.
6. We are determined to work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against interference by hostile state and non-state actors. Such interference, undertaken through both traditional and digital means, seeks to create chaos and undermine public confidence in democratic institutions and processes. We have reached a common understanding of unacceptable actions by foreign actors, which are outlined in the G7 foreign and security ministers’ Toronto Commitments. We instruct our officials to work together in the coming months to develop responses for consideration by the G7 leaders at the Charlevoix Summit.
7. We condemn the pervasive and egregious violations of international humanitarian law, notably in protracted armed conflicts, including attacks on civilians, civilian objects, and humanitarian and medical personnel and their facilities, and the arbitrary denial of humanitarian relief to those in need. We are gravely concerned about sexual and gender-based violence, trafficking in persons and grave violations against children, including the unlawful use and recruitment of child soldiers, and attacks on schools and hospitals. We underline the need to further protect those in situations of vulnerability, especially women, children and persons with disabilities and other persons belonging to minorities who are often marginalized or excluded in society. As outlined in the Toronto Commitments, we intend to redouble efforts to achieve greater awareness of and respect for international humanitarian law among national and international partners.
8. We reiterate our commitment to promoting cooperative, international maritime governance, to maintaining a rules-based maritime order based on international law, including as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to building trust and ensuring security, and to the peaceful management and settlement of disputes without using the threat of force or coercion and in accordance with international law, including through internationally recognized legal dispute settlement mechanisms, including arbitration. We reiterate our commitment to the freedom of the high seas, including the freedom of navigation and overflight, and to other rights, including the rights and jurisdiction of coastal states and internationally lawful uses of the seas. In this context, we stress the importance of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region based on the rule of law, and express our intention to work together with ASEAN and other countries in this endeavour.
9. We remain concerned about the situation in the East and South China seas. We reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that escalate tensions and undermine regional stability and the international rules-based order, such as the threat or use of force, large-scale land reclamation and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purposes. We urge all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, and call for the full and effective implementation of the commitments in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in their entirety. We emphasize the importance of ongoing negotiations for an effective code of conduct and welcome an agreement that does not derogate from the rights parties enjoy under international law or affect the rights of third parties. We also recognize that in order to secure stability in the region, such diplomatic efforts should lead to demilitarization of disputed features and a peaceful and open South China Sea in accordance with international law. We consider the July 12, 2016, award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under the UNCLOS as a useful basis for further efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in the South China Sea. We reiterate our concern regarding the destruction of marine ecosystems in the South China Sea, which threatens their sustainability and regional fish stocks, and reaffirm our commitment to increasing international cooperation to enhance protection of the marine environment. We reaffirm our commitment to further international cooperation on maritime security and safety, as well as the protection and sustainable management of the marine environment.
10. We reiterate our commitment to combatting illegal activities at sea, including acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, transnational organized crime and terrorism in the maritime domain, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and illicit drugs, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. We commend the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Djibouti Code of Conduct States, the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea Group, and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia for their work in reducing illegal maritime activity and working toward more effective maritime governance, law enforcement capacity and regional cooperation in the maritime domain. We encourage further progress in advancing nationally and regionally led efforts to tackle maritime security challenges in Africa. We are committed to supporting regional maritime security in regions affected by illegal maritime activities through comprehensive capacity building assistance under existing instruments in areas such as maritime governance, coast guard authorities and functions, disaster relief, maritime search and rescue, and maritime information sharing and integration, including maritime domain awareness. Affirming the application of international law, we recognize the importance of reviewing and, where necessary, strengthening national legal frameworks to protect the critical infrastructure of subsea cables and improve national resilience, working with industry to establish standards and best practices.
11. We acknowledge both the benefits and the challenges of safe, orderly and regular migration, and the need for countries to share the burden and responsibility. While migrants and refugees may face many common challenges, we recognize that they are distinct groups governed by different frameworks. We stress the need to protect the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, particularly those in the most vulnerable situations, in accordance with international law. We acknowledge that each state maintains the sovereign right to manage and control its borders, including the admission of non-nationals, subject to their international obligations. We further acknowledge the importance for all countries to cooperate in facilitating the dignified and sustainable return and readmission of their nationals who want to return voluntarily or who, according to national and international law, do not have the right to stay in the country of destination, as well as the reintegration of these nationals. We further acknowledge that irregular migration poses a global challenge. Large movements of refugees and irregular migration can increase vulnerability to migrant smuggling, exploitation and trafficking in persons, all forms of slavery, including modern slavery, and forced displacement, and they require a coordinated response. We pledge to continue working in partnership, as appropriate, with countries of origin, transit and destination to address the factors that lead to irregular migration and forced displacement. We also recognize the need to eliminate the scourge of trafficking in persons, including by identifying and providing assistance to its victims, disrupting and prosecuting human traffickers and migrant smugglers, and providing protection for those fleeing torture and persecution, in accordance with our international obligations and applicable domestic laws.
12. We recognize the need to work together, as appropriate, to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, which can be a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development. We also acknowledge the link between migration and sustainable development, and recognize the need to cooperate to address the root causes that compel people to leave their own countries, as well as the importance of respecting human rights, the rule of law, good governance and promoting a strong civil society. We underscore the need for a gender-responsive approach to migration policy, noting that women and children have specific needs that should be taken into consideration, and that their inclusion and active engagement can strengthen the effectiveness of our responses. Further, we recognize the contributions of diasporas to the development of their countries of origin. Our collaboration with these communities, as appropriate, especially the younger generation, is also essential to strengthen their positive impact on their countries of origin and where they reside, including to support entrepreneurial initiatives and promote cheaper remittance transfers.
13. We emphasize the importance of improving connectivity for fostering sustainable and balanced growth and for bringing countries, people, societies and economies closer together, particularly through new transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, digital links and cultural exchanges, among others. We recognize the importance of working to bridge the gender digital divide and to increase women’s ability to be digitally engaged, including by promoting digital spaces that are respectful and do not enable or ignore the harassment of women or minority groups. When financing and building infrastructure, we stress the critical importance of promoting quality and open practices, such as non-discriminatory procurement, a level playing field, free and open trade, transparency, and interoperability, as well as fiscally, environmentally and socially sustainable growth.
14. We also discussed a number of regional and country situations. We are deeply concerned about the lack of respect for human rights and basic democratic principles in Venezuela, and about the ongoing economic crisis and its humanitarian repercussions that are severely affecting the population, particularly the elderly, women and children who are in situations of great vulnerability. This is resulting in large waves of people fleeing Venezuela, including refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, to other countries in the region. We highlight the importance of providing gender-responsive humanitarian assistance to help address the basic needs of crisis-affected people and call upon the government to accept humanitarian assistance from the international community. We underline that upcoming presidential elections cannot be considered as free and fair under the conditions implemented by Venezuelan authorities. We call upon the government to reconsider the convening of these elections and establish widely agreed conditions to ensure free, transparent and credible elections on the basis of a viable electoral calendar. We welcome the work of the Organization of American States, the Lima Group and other regional partners to contribute to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. We also call upon the international community to collectively take a strong, principled stance to help the Venezuelan people achieve a peaceful, democratic and sustainable solution to the worsening crisis.
15. We pledge to coordinate efforts to support building lasting peace and democratic transition in Myanmar, promote accountability for the human rights violations and abuses committed in Myanmar, particularly in northern Rakhine, and provide life-saving gender-responsive humanitarian assistance, especially for survivors of sexual violence. We are deeply concerned that the repatriation planning process and conditions in Myanmar for the repatriation of Rohingya are not sufficiently established. We emphasize that returns need to be voluntary, safe, sustainable and dignified, with the involvement of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, to ensure effective and sustainable implementation. Recognizing that the vast majority of the refugees and displaced people are women and children, we call upon the international community to prioritize their protection from sexual and gender-based violence, including child, early and forced marriage, trafficking in persons, and other human rights abuses and violations. We stress the importance of establishing a clear pathway toward accountability for the atrocities committed in Rakhine State. We call upon the Government of Myanmar to cooperate with all relevant UN bodies, mechanisms and instruments. We also reiterate our call for the provision of safe and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations in northern Rakhine, as well as unimpeded access for UN and international organizations to monitor returns, and the implementation of the recommendations of the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State without delay. Recognizing the burden on Bangladesh and welcoming its response to date, we encourage the Government of Bangladesh, in partnership with the UN and other international agencies, to continue to offer support to refugees and the communities that host them and to increase efforts to prevent a deterioration of the humanitarian situation during the cyclone and monsoon seasons. We call on the international community to provide assistance, including through the new humanitarian Joint Response Plan.
16. We reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, stability, prosperity, full sovereignty and European Union aspirations of the Western Balkans. To this end, we emphasize the importance of advancing the rule of law and respect for human rights, and confirm our shared commitment to tackling the full range of challenges and opportunities through a comprehensive approach.
17. We reiterate our enduring support for Ukrainian sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. This includes our non-recognition of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We decry the degraded human rights situation in the peninsula, and the violations and abuses committed against its population by Russia in Crimea. We fully support the efforts within the Normandy format and of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe for a solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. We are convinced that the only way a sustainable solution to the conflict can be reached is through the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. Given Russia’s responsibility in the conflict, we urge Russia to stabilize the security situation in the Donbas without delay. We recall that the duration of Donbas-related economic sanctions is clearly linked to Russia’s complete and irreversible implementation of the Minsk Agreements. These sanctions can be rolled back only if Russia truly fulfills its commitments, but we also stand ready to take further restrictive measures should Russia’s actions so require.
18. We reconfirm our support for Ukraine’s reform and are encouraged by steps taken to date, especially in the areas of decentralization and economic growth. We urge the Government of Ukraine to make continued, clear progress along the reform path on which it has embarked and which its people demand. This includes the creation of an anti-corruption court in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations, as well as progress on electoral reforms and the National Security Law. We reiterate our full confidence in the G7 Ambassadors Group in Ukraine and acknowledge the role of this group in monitoring and supporting the implementation of reforms.
19. We are committed to protecting and promoting the rules-based international system. This stands against the background of a pattern of irresponsible and destabilizing Russian behaviour, including interference in countries’ democratic systems. We call on Russia to cease this behaviour, which is highly detrimental to prospects for constructive cooperation.   We urge Russia to live up to its international obligations, as well as its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), to uphold international peace and security. Notwithstanding, we will continue to engage with Russia on addressing regional crises and global challenges. We will continue to bolster our capabilities to address hybrid threats, including in the areas of cybersecurity, strategic communications and counter-intelligence. We welcome national action taken to constrain Russian hostile-intelligence activity and to enhance our collective security. We will remain closely focused on this issue and its implications in anticipation of our Leaders’ Summit.
20. We remain gravely concerned about the documented accounts of human rights violations and abuses in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). We note that the precarious humanitarian situation there is exacerbated by the DPRK’s national policy priorities that, among others, prioritize military spending, especially nuclear and ballistic missile development, over citizens’ access to food, education and medicine. We urge all parties to fully implement all existing UN sanctions against the DPRK and once again call upon the DPRK to respect the human rights of its people and resolve the abductions issue immediately.
21. We encourage China’s responsible participation in the international rules-based system and note its capacity to make important contributions to global public goods and international security, such as peacekeeping. We wish to cooperate with China to resolve the challenges to regional and global peace and prosperity, notably on the Korean Peninsula. We also stress the need for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. We are concerned about the lack of freedom of expression, and about the situation of members of ethnic minorities and some religious groups in China. We are also concerned about the harassment and detention of human rights defenders and their families. We underscore the need to take into consideration the detrimental humanitarian situation in the DPRK when dealing with asylum seekers, including abstaining from forcibly repatriating asylum seekers to the DPRK and allowing safe passage for DPRK asylum seekers transiting through China.
22. We commend the ongoing democratic transition in countries like the Gambia, the policy of Uzbekistan focusing on reforms and regional cooperation and, notwithstanding shortcomings in some areas, countries like Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon and Bangladesh have shown commendable resilience in the face of great challenges in recent years. We also note commitments to reforms in Zimbabwe and are looking for substantive progress in areas such as elections, economic reform and socio-political freedoms and liberties, allowing for the holding of free and fair elections. We also welcome the recent commitments on reform within Saudi Arabia, particularly with regard to women and girls, but acknowledge the need for greater progress on human rights. We stand ready to assist these countries, as appropriate, to fulfill their positive ambitions.

Non-proliferation and disarmament

23. We are committed to working together and with our partners to promote international peace and security, and to create the conditions for a more secure, stable and safer world. The international security environment continues to present significant challenges in areas of non-proliferation and disarmament.
24. We condemn in the strongest possible terms any attempts to challenge the rules-based international order in dangerous and destabilizing ways. It is essential that we, together with the broader international community, adopt coordinated approaches to prevent the use and spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and reaffirm the importance of non-proliferation norms.
25. At the top of our agenda is the global threat to international peace and security posed by the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as its proliferation of these technologies. We remain deeply concerned by the challenge the DPRK presents to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to international efforts to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
26. We stand united behind the United States of America and the Republic of Korea as they undertake bilateral discussions with the DPRK. We reaffirm that we will never accept a nuclear-armed DPRK and remain committed to the goal of achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK’s WMDs, including biological and chemical weapons, missiles and related facilities, for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and beyond. We acknowledge the DPRK’s recent statement announcing the suspension of nuclear tests, intercontinental ballistic missile launches and the closing of its testing site (Punggye-ri) as a first step toward full denuclearization, assuming full implementation. Noting that meaningful negotiations must imply concrete actions by the DPRK toward denuclearization, we are committed to maintaining maximum pressure, including by cutting down or reducing DPRK diplomatic representation abroad and downgrading economic relationships. Until the DPRK denuclearizes, we further commit to countering the DPRK’s sanctions-evasion tactics, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum and sales of coal and other UN-banned commodities, as well as its malicious cyber activities. We reaffirmed that such measures will remain in place to urge the DPRK to change its course and take decisive, irreversible steps to denuclearize. We further resolve to make clear to the DPRK that a diplomatic solution leading to complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of WMDs and missiles, as well as related facilities, is the DPRK’s only viable option and would lead to a brighter future within the international community. To this end, we call on all states to fully implement relevant UNSCRs, including UNSCR 2397, and note with urgent concern that some countries still fail to implement these resolutions, as documented in the latest report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1874. We urge all states to consider pursuing actions beyond the UNSC resolutions to prevent the DPRK from further developing its WMD and ballistic missile programs, and we urge the DPRK to abandon those programs. We intend to continue our coordination on capacity building, counter-proliferation and proliferation financing.
27. We call for the full implementation of UNSCR 2231. We are committed to permanently ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful, in line with its NPT obligations and its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) never to seek, develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. We strongly support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its crucial monitoring and verification work to help ensure Iran’s compliance with its JCPOA and other commitments, including safeguard obligations. We call on UN member states to make voluntary contributions to the IAEA to ensure it has the resources necessary to fulfill this vital role.
28. We deeply regret Iran’s ballistic missile tests, which are inconsistent with UNSCR 2231 and which contribute to increased tensions and instability in the region. We call upon Iran to play a constructive regional role and urge it to cease its unlawful transfers of ballistic missile technology to states and non-state actors. We intend to continue to our work to counter Iran’s regional proliferation of ballistic missiles and its unlawful arms transfers.
29. We reaffirm our commitments to joint efforts to reinforce the goals of the NPT as the essential cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and as a foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We also welcome the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s potential contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and reaffirm our commitments to promote the International Monitoring System. We recognize that states should maintain all existing voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and that those states that have not instituted such moratoriums should do so. Likewise, we call for the commencement of the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). In the meantime, we urge all states to declare and maintain moratoriums on the production of such materials. We underscore the importance of progress toward verifiable nuclear disarmament through practical and inclusive initiatives, such as those developed by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. While recognizing the constraints of the current international security environment, we remain strongly committed to the goal of ultimately achieving a world without nuclear weapons, to be pursued using practical and concrete steps in accordance with the NPT’s emphasis on easing tension and strengthening trust among states.
30. Outer space plays a vital role in global prosperity and security but is increasingly congested and contested. We commit to respond to these threats by continuing to advance and develop norms of responsible behaviour to ensure the safety, stability and sustainability of space so that all countries can benefit from its peaceful use. We confirm our resolve in the face of threats in and from space, and our commitment to build collective resilience against such threats. We are committed to preventing conflicts from extending into outer space through voluntary, pragmatic transparency and confidence building measures and guidelines. We asked the Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group to develop shared positions on the responsible use and exploration of outer space and to further examine how the G7 can contribute to ensuring that the prosperity and security benefits of space are preserved through responsible use.
31. We are appalled by the re-emergence of chemical weapons use in the Middle East, Asia and now Europe. Noting the G7 leaders’ statement of April 16, we are united in condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the use of chemical weapons in the April 7 attack in Eastern Ghouta, Syria. We fully support all efforts made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France to alleviate the extreme suffering of the Syrian people by degrading the Assad regime’s ability to use chemical weapons and to deter any future use, as demonstrated by their action taken on April 13. This response was limited, proportionate and necessary—and taken only after exhausting every possible diplomatic option to uphold the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. We condemn the repeated and morally reprehensible use of chemical weapons in Syria by the Syrian regime and by Daesh, as confirmed by successive reports of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW-UN) Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM). We condemn this deliberate strategy of terrorizing local populations and forcing them into submission. We regret that Russia has vetoed the renewal of the mandate of the JIM and also vetoed the recent UNSC draft resolution, which aimed to establish an independent investigative mechanism for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We stress the importance of the establishment of a successor mechanism to the JIM specifically tasked by the UNSC with attributing chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The regime’s use of chemical weapons is illegal under UNSCR 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention. We urge them to respect their obligations under international law, to cease chemical weapons use and to declare and completely destroy their chemical weapons program pursuant to the obligation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We deplore the fact that Syria will assume the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in May, given its consistent and flagrant disregard of international non-proliferation and disarmament norms and agreements.
32. In this context, we reaffirm our support to the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and our solemn belief that there can be no impunity for the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks anywhere, by anyone, under any circumstances. We underline our commitment to ensuring accountability of those who use chemical weapons through all means available, including, as appropriatethrough the sharing of information, sanctions measures and strengthening the capacity of participating states. We will continue to ensure that the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone remains a taboo.
33. We reiterate our joint statement of April 16 on the Salisbury attack. We are united in condemning, in the strongest possible terms, the attack that took place in Salisbury, United Kingdom (U.K.), on March 4, 2018. This use of a military-grade nerve agent, of a type developed by Russia, constitutes the first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second World War and is a grave challenge not only to the security of the U.K. but also to our shared security. It is an assault on U.K. sovereignty. Any use of chemical weapons by a state party under any circumstances is a clear breach of international law and a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The OPCW has now independently confirmed the U.K.’s findings relating to the identity of the toxic chemical that was used in Salisbury. We share, and agree with, the U.K.’s assessment that it is highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible for the attack, and that there is no plausible alternative explanation. We call on Russia to urgently address all questions related to the incident in Salisbury. Russia should provide full and complete disclosure of its previously undeclared Novichok programme to the OPCW in line with its international obligations. We call on Russia to live up to its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, as well as its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UNSC to uphold international peace and security.
34. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as a proven and effective mechanism for addressing WMD proliferation threats that exist worldwide. We recognize the ongoing need for the Global Partnership, and we underscore the importance for the 31 active members to continue to deliver programming and coordinate activities to combat chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferation and terrorism. In its 15th anniversary year, we also reiterate our support for the complementary efforts of the Proliferation Security Initiative and we hope that the May 2018 High-Level Political Meeting in Paris will help the initiative to remain robust and relevant for tackling proliferators’ procurement strategies in the years ahead.
35. We recognize that the illicit transfer and destabilizing accumulation of conventional arms, in particular small arms and light weapons and related ammunition, continue to undermine global efforts to achieve peace and sustainable development in many parts of the world. We are committed to continuing to promote effective systems of national controls for exports and imports of conventional arms and dual-use goods, including those called for in the Arms Trade Treaty, and to supporting improvements in stockpile management and law enforcement cooperation. We support the full implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, in All Its Aspects, and we look forward to a productive review conference of the Program of Action in June 2018.
36. We recognize the 20th anniversary of the Ottawa Convention, which played a pivotal role in banning the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, and in addressing their crippling toll on human life. However, we note with alarm the reversal of this trend in the last three years with year-over-year increases in casualties as a result of conflicts, including those involving non-State armed groups in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and Ukraine. We also note with concern the continued use of anti-personnel mines in Syria and Myanmar. We remain committed to comprehensive mine action addressing mines, explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnance. We commend the work being done under the Ottawa Convention to address the gendered impacts of anti-personnel mines and leverage opportunities to empower women and girls as agents of change in their communities.

Transnational security threats

37. The issue of terrorism remains at the top of our agenda. We celebrate successes against Daesh, al Qaeda and other groups but are resolved to continue to fight them and all their affiliates through multilateral counterterrorism efforts, including the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and the Global Counterterrorism Forum, as well as continuing to tackle the threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. We emphasize the need for information sharing, cross-border cooperation and continued implementation of the Ise-Shima Action Plan on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, as well as support for the Taormina Statement on the Fight against Terrorism and Violent Extremism and the Ischia Communiqué. We welcome the establishment of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism and will work to ensure‎ that the review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy continues to promote balanced implementation across all four of its pillars and the recommendations of the Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. We reaffirm that effective and sustainable counterterrorism measures require a global approach that combines domestic and international efforts, while safeguarding the democratic character of our countries, promoting the rule of law, and upholding established national and international human rights norms and obligations. We recognize that violent extremists and terrorists manipulate and exploit gender stereotypes and dynamics to attract and maintain recruits and use sexual and gender-based violence, including trafficking in persons and rape, and we are committed to holding those responsible to account. Recognizing that gender-responsive measures that include women’s perspectives and participation to prevent and eradicate terrorism are vital to effective and sustainable results, we are committed to fully integrating the women, peace and security agenda into our counterterrorism policies and programs.
38. We are committed to developing and implementing common measures to address the risks posed by the international travel of terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), as outlined in the joint commitments of the G7 foreign and security ministers. We recognize the importance of holding returning FTFs accountable for their actions and are committed to providing appropriate disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programs, with special consideration afforded to children, youth and women based on their age and gender needs. We remain committed to enhancing our efforts, individually and collectively, to promote better implementation of effective aviation security measures. In this regard we welcome and offer our full support to the International Civil Aviation Organization to deliver early and substantive implementation of the new Global Aviation Security Plan. We strongly support the full implementation of UNSCR 2396 on measures to counter threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.
39. We continue to support measures to tackle terrorist financing, including via UNSCR 2368 on the Daesh and al Qaeda sanctions regime, UNSCR 1373, UNSCR 1267 and its successors, and UNSCR 2347 on the protection of cultural heritage from illicit trafficking, as well as UNSCR 2341 on the protection of critical infrastructure. We look forward to the Paris conference of April 25 and 26, 2018, on terrorist financing, which will further mobilize the international community on this important aspect of the fight against terrorism. In this context, we reiterate our resolve to prevent terrorist groups from using kidnap for ransom as a means of raising funds for their activities and harming our citizens at home and overseas, in accordance with the relevant international conventions.
40. We underscore the role that the G7 Roma-Lyon Group plays in fostering international cooperation to counter terrorism and combat transnational organized crime. We call for parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the protocols thereto to effectively implement these instruments. We welcome the Roma-Lyon Group taking a more active role in delivering practical outcomes in this area as well as on counterterrorism, including the implementation of relevant UNSCRs and strengthening border and aviation security (including through continued cooperation with INTERPOL). We reiterate our commitment to bringing perpetrators to justice, and to this end we intend to further enhance cooperation between law enforcement and criminal justice authorities, including in partnership with third countries with due regard for human rights. We remain concerned about the security threat posed by the sale of synthetic drugs on the Internet. We believe that the G7 Roma-Lyon Group should continue to build on cooperative efforts to promote an international response to this threat and to contribute to addressing challenges faced in placing new and emerging dangerous substances under control at the national and international levels, particularly new psychoactive substances, synthetic drugs and substances.
41. We recognize that the illegal wildlife trade is a serious organized crime  that poses a significant and growing threat. We are committed to working together to strengthen cross-border law enforcement and tackle associated corruption, to close markets for illegally traded wildlife and wildlife products, including elephant ivory. We will support the October conference in London as an important moment in strengthening the global fight against the illegal wildlife trade and threats to protected species.
42. The various dimensions of cyber cut across all our discussions. We remain committed to an accessible, open, interoperable, reliable and secure cyberspace for all. Stressing the need to develop further a global understanding of expectations of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, we are concerned about the malicious cyber activities of a growing number of state and non-state actors, for which coordinated responses in keeping with rules-based international order and fundamental human rights are needed. We stress the applicability of existing international law to State conduct in cyberspace.  We pledge support for the development and implementation of practical cyber confidence-building measures between states, as well as capacity-building support for their implementation. We reiterate our support for the G7 Lucca Declaration on Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace as well as “The Principles and Actions on Cyber” endorsed in Ise-Shima. We reaffirm our commitment to contribute to international cooperative action by working together to develop measures aimed at preventing, deterring, discouraging and countering malicious cyber acts and thus strengthen our collective resolve to deter malicious cyber actors by imposing costs in a timely manner. When appropriate, we will consider attributing malicious behaviour and taking action. We recognize the importance of working with the private sector and civil society in addressing these challenges.
43. We stress the importance of the Convention on Cybercrime (“Budapest Convention”) and the UNTOC (“Palermo Convention”) as effective global frameworks to support law enforcement cooperation against cybercrime. Further, we will continue working closely together to set out clear conditions for facilitating access to digital evidence for law enforcement and judicial authorities, including through the negotiation of an Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention with the necessary conditions and safeguards, and in full respect of human rights.
44. We also reaffirm our commitment to prevent the use of the Internet for terrorist and violent extremist purposes. We express our determination to continue to work in support of security ministers to encourage technology companies to implement measures necessary to prevent and counter radicalization to violence, terrorist recruitment and operational planning using the Internet and to counter violent extremist and terrorist narratives while fostering positive alternative narratives. To increase their effectiveness, these efforts must be coordinated with other counterterrorism and countering-violent-extremism interventions.
45. We also emphasize the importance of promoting and protecting the human rights of all women and girls and their ability to access information and communication technologies without being targeted by technology-facilitated harassment, violence and abuse.

Conflict prevention and support for UN efforts and reform

46. We stress the overriding importance of conflict prevention to reduce the unprecedented human and economic cost of violent conflicts around the globe. We emphasize the need for more innovative, integrated and flexible approaches to conflict management that encompass the whole peace continuum, including making better use of existing human rights mechanisms, and development activities that tackle root causes of conflict, instability and vulnerability. G7 members thank the Working Group on Climate Change and Fragility for its work, note with appreciation its report and remain seized of this issue.
47. Underscoring the central role of the UN in sustaining peace, we reaffirm our support to Secretary-General Guterres’ vision for UN reform and welcome efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN system. We commend the important role that the UN plays in preventing violent conflict and responding to international crises. We emphasize the need to ensure that peacekeeping missions are as effective and efficient as possible in responding to peace and security challenges, including through improved performance, greater participation of women, innovation and training, prioritized and phased mission mandates, appropriate troops and equipment, and adequate resources. We underline the role of peacekeeping operations in the protection of civilians, in particular from sexual violence, and the prevention of mass atrocities. We call on countries to continue considering innovative means of supplying personnel, assets and training in support of peacekeeping missions, including through the smart pledging approaches last discussed at the UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in Vancouver in November 2017. We also underscore the importance of effective transitions, including peacebuilding strategies, and the role of police in this regard. Further, we highlight the important role UN missions can play in the protection of cultural heritage and the need for peace operations to properly manage their environmental impact.
48. We stress the critical importance of fully implementing the UN’s zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse across the UN system and call on all countries to hold their personnel accountable, whether they work in civilian or peacekeeping roles.
49. We further stress the need to accelerate efforts to increase the number of women serving in a full range of peacekeeping roles, including leadership positions across the UN. We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda through national leadership and action in multilateral forums, such as the UN, the African Union (AU) and the European Union, and welcome the Secretary-General’s Gender Parity Strategy. We underline the important role of regional organizations in advancing the WPS agenda and acknowledge the crucial role of civil society in the development of National Action Plans and other initiatives for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and relevant resolutions. We also acknowledge that civil society, in particular local women’s organizations and movements, plays a central role in conflict prevention and often needs support to effectively carry out its functions. In this context, we welcome initiatives such as the WPS Focal Points Network, launched on the margins of the UN General Assembly in 2016. We are committed to demonstrating leadership in this area, notably by continuing to strengthen partnerships with international and regional organizations, as well as civil society organizations. As per our Toronto Commitments, we intend to build tailored partnerships based on mutual learning and approaches in order to address the challenges related to the situation and role of women in promoting peace and security. In this context, we recognize the importance of girls’ and women’s access to education in crisis and conflict-affected situations within the overall objective of providing the opportunity for 12 years of quality education for all, leading to improved learning outcomes. Recognizing the need to prioritize education systematically in the international response to complex emergencies, we invite collaboration with and between G7 development ministers to take this forward.
50. We confirm our intention to accelerate the global implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda, as set out in UNSCR 2250, including through investing in young people’s resilience and promoting their meaningful inclusion in all efforts for maintaining and promoting peace and security.
51. We reiterate our support for African-led peace and security initiatives and welcome the commitment of the AU and its member states to assume more responsibilities, including financial.
52. We also support both the accelerated implementation of the AU Roadmap for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s High-Level Revitalization Forum process for South Sudan. We call on all parties in South Sudan to reach an agreement within the framework of the High-Level Revitalization Forum. We also reiterate our support for the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and Daesh-West Africa. We support a phased and conditions-based transition of security responsibilities from the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to Somali security forces with clear target dates, and we stress the need for to identify sustainable funding for AMISOM. We welcome the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and continue to support the efforts of the G5 Sahel states in improving regional cooperation and the fight against terrorism, underscoring the need to respect human rights. We emphasize the need to implement the peace agreement in Mali and to accelerate reforms in order to allow for lasting improvement. We are concerned by the political crisis and deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. We urge credible, transparent and inclusive elections by December 23, 2018, that lead to a democratic, peaceful transition of power, in accordance with the Congolese constitution and fully respectful of human rights.
53. We recognize the considerable achievements of the Deauville Partnership since it was established in 2011 in improving governance and supporting sustainable economic growth, and reaffirm our commitment to support the efforts of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries to cope with stability, security, humanitarian and developmental challenges. While taking stock of the results achieved, we are considering new ways for the G7 to carry on its dialogue and cooperation with MENA countries in order to lay the foundations for a renewed engagement in the interest of promoting regional stability and prosperity.
54. We welcome the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ghassan Salamé, and support the UN-led Action Plan presented in September 2017 to support the stabilization of Libya through an inclusive Libyan political reconciliation process. We recognize and fully support the UN Support Mission in Libya’s efforts, which are working to prepare the ground for successful national elections. We call on all Libyan actors to rally toward this goal by showing restraint and willingness to compromise and by putting the interests of the Libyan people first. We reaffirm that there is no military solution to the conflict in Libya and call on all parties to work on the implementation of the UN Action Plan. We reiterate the need for the international community, regional partners and multilateral organizations to continue supporting these efforts toward a Libyan-owned solution. Such efforts should contribute to a stable, peaceful and united Libya with strong, meaningful institutions able to carry out economic reforms, end armed conflict among Libyan groups, partner with the international community to counter Daesh and other UN listed terrorist groups, and address migration challenges.
55. We are deeply concerned about the continuing and escalating violence in Syria, the use of “starve or surrender” tactics and the lack of humanitarian access. In light of this devastating humanitarian situation and ongoing violence in Syria, we call for the immediate and full implementation of a nationwide ceasefire in line with UNSCR 2401. Following the adoption of this resolution in February, we were gravely distressed by and condemn the ground offensive and aerial bombardment and the devastating attacks on civilians and medical infrastructure in Eastern Ghouta by the Syrian regime, supported by Russia and Iran. We urge the regime and its backers to secure the highest level of protection for civilians and to ensure medical evacuations and immediate, safe, sustained and unhindered humanitarian access on the ground. Protecting the civilian population, which is the primary responsibility of the Syrian regime, and ensuring aid is delivered in a timely manner and in accordance with humanitarian principles, are urgent priorities. We are firmly committed to promoting accountability for those responsible for chemical weapons use and other abuses of international human rights law and violations of humanitarian law, including by supporting prosecutions, where possible. There is no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all parties to seriously and fully engage in the UN process in Geneva toward a credible political solution in accordance with UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva communiqué, facilitated by the implementation of a safe and neutral environment. We reiterate that we will be ready to assist with the reconstruction of Syria only when a credible political transition is firmly under way. We look forward to the second conference on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region” in Brussels on April 24 and 25, 2018, aimed at securing pledges for humanitarian needs in Syria and in the region, supporting the resilience of neighbouring countries, and reaffirming international support for relaunching the UN-led intra-Syrian talks in Geneva.
56. We express our commitment to a long-term, broad partnership with Iraq, on the basis of shared economic, diplomatic, cultural and security cooperation. We also stress the importance of supporting and strengthening Iraqi sovereignty. We also recognize the importance of promoting inclusion within and reconciliation amongst all communities in Iraq. We support the efforts of the Iraqi authorities, the UN and the Global Coalition to restore security and basic services in liberated areas and provide assistance to internally displaced persons so that they can return to their homes in a safe, dignified and voluntary manner, should they choose to do so. We support the outcomes of the Kuwait conference, in particular the Iraqi commitment to strengthen the economy and business environment to support stabilization and reconstruction, as well as the focus on empowering women, girls and youth, as key to success. We look forward to the parliamentary elections in Iraq on May 12, 2018, and underscore the importance of them being peaceful, free and fair. We also welcome efforts by the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government to resolve their differences in line with the Iraqi constitution, commend the progress that has been made over the last few months and urge further progress.
57. We express our deep concern at the continuous deterioration of the situation in Yemen. As a consequence of the ongoing conflict, the humanitarian conditions of the civilians continue to worsen. From a political perspective, the country is increasingly fragmented, putting in danger the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen and creating the space for terrorist organizations to thrive. We renew our urgent call on all parties to the conflict in Yemen to agree on the modalities for a durable cessation of hostilities and engage constructively with the UN Special Envoy in order to reach an inclusive political settlement, which is the only sustainable solution. We renew our call for all parties to fully comply with international humanitarian law and human rights law, as applicable, including with respect to the protection of civilians, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian aid and commercial supplies to all ports of entry and to all regions of the country. We further call on all regional states to support the implementation of the targeted UN arms embargo. We applaud the result of the recent conference on Yemen in Geneva and call on all donors to fully fund the Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen for 2018.
58. We are concerned by Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region, in particular its support to non-state military actors. We note with deep concern the UN Panel of Experts’ reporting on Yemen regarding Iran’s failure to comply with UNSCR 2216 on the transfer of Iranian-origin arms, particularly ballistic missile components, to the Houthis. We call on Iran, as well as on other states in the MENA region, to contribute more actively to reducing tensions in Yemen, complying with all relevant UN resolutions, and to prevent all forms of direct or indirect proliferation of ballistic expertise and missile capabilities. We urge Iran to refrain from any action that could harm regional security and to contribute to efforts to achieve peaceful political solutions. We further call on Iran to comply with its international human rights obligations, including to ensure freedom of expression and to end arbitrary detentions.
59. We remain concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We support the resumption without delay of substantive peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians aimed at achieving a negotiated solution that ensures the peace and security of both parties and takes into account relevant UNSCRs. In this framework, regional stakeholders can play a pivotal role in the pursuit of peace. We call on both sides to avoid unilateral steps that may lead to escalation, prejudge the outcome of negotiations on the final status issues, generate further mistrust and make peace harder to achieve. We strongly condemn repeated incitements to acts of violence and terrorism. We stress the importance of addressing the dire and deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the Gaza Strip. We call for swift steps to improve the situation and emphasize the need for all sides to comply with international law. We call on the international community to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) equitably so services can be reliably provided. We also express our deep concern over the ongoing violence in Gaza and call for an end to the violence.
60. We are concerned by the continued threats to the stability of Afghanistan and its neighbourhood. As Afghanistan heads toward parliamentary elections in 2018 and presidential elections in 2019, there can only be a resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan through dialogue. We reiterate our commitment to a political and negotiated solution for Afghanistan, as part of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive process supported by all key regional and international stakeholders. We will respect any peace agreement between the Afghan parties that ends violence, cuts ties to transnational terrorism, and protects the rights of women and minorities enshrined in the Afghan constitution. We welcome and support the Afghan government’s initiatives, including its comprehensive offer for unconditional peace talks with the Taliban, announced by President Ghani at the second conference of the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation.
61. We look forward to meeting in New York in September 2018 on the margins of the UN General Assembly.

Global Affairs Canada. October 13, 2017. Statement by the Foreign Affairs Minister on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

Ottawa, Ontario - The Honourable Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs, today issued the following statement:

“Canada supports an effective rules-based international order, and is committed to a pragmatic approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed to with Iran in 2015 and endorsed by the UN Security Council, under the leadership of the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the U.K., the U.S., and Germany) and the European Union, has helped to curb a real threat to international peace and security.

“I am pleased to announce that Canada will provide an additional $1.5 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its Iran verification work.

“The JCPOA subjects Iran to an independent and extensive verification regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and provides the international community with a high degree of insight into Iran’s nuclear program. According to the IAEA, Iran continues to implement its JCPOA commitments. Canada believes that the JCPOA is essential in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability and in ensuring greater regional and global security.

“Canada is a leading contributor to the IAEA, which robustly monitors and verifies Iran’s implementation of its commitments. Since the JCPOA came into force, Canada has provided $11.5 million in voluntary contributions in support of the IAEA’s JCPOA mandate.

“Canada condemns Iran’s ongoing development of its ballistic missile program and its ballistic missile launches, which are destabilizing for the region.  Canada maintains sanctions that target Iran’s ballistic missile program.

“Canada is engaging with Iran in order to protect key Canadian interests, including Canadian consular interests, promote our values, and advance human rights. We continue to oppose Iran’s support for terrorist organizations, its threats toward Israel, its support for the Assad regime in Syria, and its ballistic missile program. We will continue to work closely with our allies and partners to hold Iran to account.”

The Globe and Mail. 9 May 2018. David Shribman: How Trump’s withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal could play out. U.S. President’s action represents fundamental shift in the profile of American leaders, who rarely retreat from world agreements
DAVID SHRIBMAN, Special to The Globe and Mail

President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accord produced an extraordinary moment in Washington, with an American leader keeping faith with his supporters even as he broke faith with America’s allies – and with a president keeping his campaign promise even as he broke precedent with U.S. history.

Those enigmatic combinations have been the hallmark of the Trump tenure, with the President a gyroscope possessed of his own inertial guidance system and free to alter his direction. This was never so evident as it was Tuesday, when he described Iran as “the leading state sponsor of terrorism” and vowed the “highest level of economic sanctions” against it.

The impact of Mr. Trump’s description of the accord as a “great embarrassment” struck with immediate force, although the implications of his withdrawal from the Iran pact – negotiated by former secretary of state John Kerry and endorsed by former president Barack Obama, a fact that in the current president’s mind almost certainly counted heavily against it – will take months, even years to discern. Here are some of those effects and their possible implications.

THE TRUMP BASE BUMP

Mr. Trump railed against what he described as ‘’the worst deal ever negotiated,’’ and his action this week redeemed his campaign promise to withdraw from it. That characterization, remarkably similar to his description of the North American free-trade agreement as the “single worst deal,” played well during the 2016 campaign among Americans who looked askance at establishment policy, especially in foreign affairs. Mr. Trump’s rejection of the agreement will surely please his political base even as it further alienates his opponents, including Republicans who, over the years, have played as much a role as Democrats in forming a national-security consensus in the U.S. capital and in academic circles across the country.

For that reason, Mr. Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran pact will likely have the effect of consolidating rather than altering public opinion. His supporters expected no less, and his opponents dreaded no more.

“The Trump supporters will cheer another rejection of the plodding, diplomatic status quo that was producing decline and was suggesting that weakness was strength,” Alex Castellanos, a Republican who was a top adviser to conventional Republican presidential nominees, such as Bob Dole, George W. Bush and Mitt Romney, said in an interview. “This was the Donald Trump his supporters voted for.” It is also the Donald Trump his rivals deplored.

THE UNITED STATES’ BELEAGUERED WESTERN ALLIES

From Ottawa to Paris, London to Berlin, leaders of the United States’ strongest allies have embraced the Iran pact. And from each of those capitals, prime ministers and presidents have approached Mr. Trump gingerly, using awkward combinations of flattery and frippery to win his confidence and probe his mind. Those allies now are disappointed by Mr. Trump’s decision and possibly undermined at home by their failure to persuade him. French President Emmanuel Macron led a public charm offensive in Washington on the Iran issue that got him nothing except a phone call from Mr. Trump giving him advance word on his decision.

One traditional ally will be relieved: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose disclosure of secret Iranian nuclear documents almost certainly steeled Mr. Trump’s resolve – confirmation bias, perhaps, but a powerful factor nonetheless.

Even so, the Trump action represents a fundamental shift in the profile of U.S. presidents, who rarely retreat from world agreements. One recent exception occurred when George W. Bush announced in December, 2001, that he would leave the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but he did so after giving notice to Russian President Vladimir Putin, the

leader of the other signatory. Mr. Putin called the decision a mistake but immediately indicated that he was not substantially discomfited from it.

President Woodrow Wilson helped mould the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War, insisting that the League of Nations be an indispensable part of the pact, but in a bitter Capitol Hill battle was unable to persuade the Republican-controlled Senate to ratify the treaty. Although Canada was a founding member of the League and served on its vital council from 1927 to 1930, the United States did not join the Geneva-based organization.

“We missed out on a whole generation of international diplomacy in Europe,” said Patricia O’Toole, a Columbia University historian whose new biography of Mr. Wilson won rave reviews this spring. “We were only involved on the sidelines, as observers.”

The difference in the 99 years that have passed since the Senate rejection: The United States’ role in the world has moved from peripheral power to principal power.

None of the traditional U.S. allies, including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, could have been surprised by the mid-afternoon announcement on the Iran pact, but the importance of relationships with Washington is so great that these world leaders, sadly confirmed in their assessments of the President, will continue to court Mr. Trump and count on the United States in other spheres.

NORTH KOREAN IMPACT

Mr. Trump’s rejection of the Iran deal will likely be an important factor in his looming negotiations on North Korean denuclearization with Kim Jong-un. His tough position will remind the North Korean leader that the U.S. President is willing to defy the voices prominent in the State Department, pressing for diplomatic solutions to nettlesome nationalsecurity threats. He said his actions against Iran displayed what he called a “critical message: The United States no longer makes empty threats.”

At the same time, however, the Trump decision may raise doubts about the President’s reliability, suggesting that if he is willing to remove the United States from one nuclear agreement (in the Middle East) he would not be reluctant to remove it from another (in Asia).

THE PRESIDENT AS DISRUPTION-IN-CHIEF PROFILE

Once again, Mr. Trump has shown that he is willing, if not eager, to be a disruptive force, not only in Washington but also around the globe. His defiance of convention – his inclination to veer from the customary pathways of Washington and the world’s diplomatic corridors – has been the distinguishing characteristic of his 16 months in the White House.

Indeed, in less than a year and a half, Mr. Trump has broken with conventional thought on the Iran nuclear deal (applauded by many establishment diplomats and academic experts); on the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem (promised by many of his predecessors but never actually implemented); on NAFTA (with roots in Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign, negotiated and signed in the George H. W. Bush years, and ratified in the Bill Clinton years); and on both the Paris climate-change pact and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (negotiated in the Obama years). In this context, the Iran decision is perfectly consistent with the President’s inclinations and actions.

CRAZY LIKE A FOX?

Although discouraged by Mr. Trump’s decision, some Republicans believe the President may in the end have produced a positive result. “This may be a win-win for Trump in the end,” said Mr. Castellanos, the Republican strategist. “The European nations will stay in the treaty and keep up the pressure for nuclear inspections. The United States will pull out and impose sanctions and put economic pressure on one of the weaker economies in the world. The mullahs do not want an angry [Iranian] middle class. This may be the best good cop/bad cop routine ever.”

The Globe and Mail. 9 May 2018. Trump withdraws U.S. from Iran nuclear deal
ADRIAN MORROW, WASHINGTON
ROBERT FIFE, OTTAWA

Canada regrets that the United States has decided to withdraw from the JCPOA, particularly given that, according to the IAEA, Iran continues to implement its JCPOA commitments.

CHRYSTIA FREELAND FOREIGN MINISTER

Tehran warns it’s ready to move on weapons program as U.S. prepares sanctions

U.S. President Donald Trump is pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, giving the theocratic regime in Tehran an opening to kick-start its nuclear weapons program and further distancing America from its key Western allies.

In a televised White House announcement on Tuesday afternoon, Mr. Trump said the agreement was “defective at its core” and that he would reimpose the “highest level” of sanctions.

“The fact is this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made,” he said.

“It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.”

The move comes even as Mr. Trump seeks a similar pact with North Korea. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to Pyongyang on Tuesday to lay the groundwork for a planned meeting between Mr. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jongun. The U.S. President is aiming to negotiate an agreement for the renegade country to give up its nuclear arsenal.

In the wake of the announcement, Iran threatened to restart its nuclear program unless it won further guarantees from the European countries that are also part of the deal; the leaders of those countries reiterated their commitment to the pact and said it was working; and Canada lamented Mr. Trump’s decision to pull out, arguing the deal has made the world safer.

The President’s move takes place amid growing tension in the Middle East, as the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia seek to roll back gains made by Iran and its allies.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, one of then-president Barack Obama’s key foreignpolicy achievements, saw the United States and Europe lift crippling sanctions on Iran in exchange for Tehran dramatically restricting its uranium enrichment program and the number of centrifuges, as well as allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into the country to verify it had shut down nuclear facilities.

Mr. Trump, however, argues the JCPOA did not go far enough because it did not stop the country from interfering in Syria’s civil war or building missiles that could one day carry nuclear warheads. He said on Tuesday that he would be willing to cut a new, more comprehensive deal. “Iran’s leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal. They refuse. And that’s fine. I’d probably say the same thing if I was in their position,” he said.

National security adviser John Bolton told reporters the sanctions will be phased back in over the next 180 days, giving companies time to wind up their business in Iran and leave.

Inspectors have certified that Iran has held up its end of the bargain, curtailing the possibility of the country developing a nuclear arsenal.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned Tuesday that he had put the country’s scientists on standby and they could “start enriching uranium more than before” within weeks. He signalled that he would demand more from the other Western countries in the agreement in exchange for staying in the pact.

“If we achieve the deal’s goals in co-operation with other members of the deal, it will remain in place,” Mr. Rouhani said on state television. “By exiting the deal, America has officially undermined its commitment to an international treaty.”

In a joint statement, the European signatories to the Iran deal expressed “regret and concern” about Mr. Trump’s decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron said they were committed to keeping the deal alive.

“Together, we emphasize our continuing commitment to the JCPOA. This agreement remains important for our shared security,” they said. “The world is a safer place as a result.”

Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland said Canada believes the deal is essential in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to ensure global security.

“Canada regrets that the United States has decided to withdraw from the JCPOA, particularly given that, according to the IAEA, Iran continues to implement its JCPOA commitments,” she said in a statement. “Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons.”

Ms. Freeland acknowledged that the deal is “not perfect,” but said it has helped curb what she called a threat to international peace.

A federal official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there had been no significant Canadian sales or investments in Iran since the lifting of economic sanctions in early 2016. A prospective deal between Bombardier and an Iranian airline, reported by Iranian media, had not materialized, the official said.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has promised to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran – suspended by the former Harper government in 2012 over the Syrian civil war and Iran’s nuclear program – but these efforts have been hampered by the death of an Iranian-Canadian academic in an Iranian prison.

Tehran’s next move could depend on whether it feels it is still benefiting from the lifting of sanctions, said Ellen Wald, a Middle East business and political analyst. She pointed to an investment by French energy firm Total to develop a gas field in Iran as a key test: If such business deals continue, Iran will have an incentive to stay in the pact; if they fail, it could leave.

“If Iran feels it wants to renew its nuclear program, it will use [Mr. Trump’s announcement] as an excuse. I’m not convinced Iran wants to,” said Ms. Wald, author of the book Saudi, Inc.

Mr. Trump repeatedly promised to quit the deal during his presidential campaign, portraying it as a generous giveaway to Iran by Mr. Obama.

Still, he hesitated for more than a year after taking office. Mr. Trump acted as Iran’s influence across the region appeared to grow: Tehran-aligned Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been pushing back opposition forces in his country’s long and bloody civil war, while Hezbollah, another Iranian ally, surged in Lebanese elections earlier this week.

“This wasn’t about Iran’s nuclear program; they were in compliance with the deal,” said Doga Eralp, an expert in international conflict resolution at American University in Washington. “It’s really about punishing Iran for turning itself into a kingmaker in Middle East politics.”

In a statement on Facebook, Mr. Obama slammed the move. “The consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America’s credibility, and puts us at odds with the world’s major powers,” he wrote.

And it risks making Washington seem an unreliable negotiating partner, even as it heads into talks with Pyongyang.


“The U.S., as the world’s superpower, is not able to keep its promises,” Prof. Eralp said of the message to Mr. Kim. “It is willing to change its positions.”

The Globe and Mail. 9 May 2018. OPINION. Trudeau stays silent on U.S. withdrawal from Iran deal
CAMPBELL CLARK, Columnist

Canada’s biggest allies, the ones it counts on in international security matters, are divided.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from a nuclear deal with Iran drove a wedge between Canada’s major allies, but Justin Trudeau’s reaction was muted.

This Prime Minister, it is fair to say, wasn’t looking to get mixed up in an international argument over the Middle East.

Mr. Trudeau’s Liberals have always argued the Iran deal is good for the world, but taking a pointed stand on it now means being at odds with Mr. Trump just when NAFTA talks might be reaching a critical juncture. The PM used a low-key tone.

“I hope the [agreement] stays in place,” Mr. Trudeau told reporters before Mr. Trump made his announcement. Afterward, he had nothing to add.

European leaders were vowing to work to keep the Iran deal alive without the United States and, hours later, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland issued a muted statement “reaffirming” support for the agreement, with no mention of what comes next.

Make no mistake, it’s a reasonable calculation. Canada didn’t have a big role to play anyway. Its relationship with Iran is basically frozen. Bigger allies who are actually parties to the Iran deal − Britain, France and Germany − had desperately lobbied Mr. Trump, to no avail.

And for Mr. Trudeau, there wasn’t much to gain politically from making a big noise about Iran.

But that doesn’t mean the fallout won’t trouble him. It might bring a new psychodrama about whether the United States will attack Iran. And Canada’s biggest allies, the ones it counts on in international security matters, are divided.

The Iran deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was the thing that stopped the highstakes drama last time. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had repeatedly warned Iran was getting close to nuclear weapons and hinted that if the United States didn’t strike Iran, Israel would.

Instead, sanctions were imposed and the P5-plus-one – the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany – brokered a deal. Iran would limit its nuclear capacity and sanctions would be lifted.

The deal had flaws, University of Ottawa professor Thomas Juneau said, but it did put real restraints on Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons. Scrapping the deal meant lifting those restraints.

As much as Mr. Trump insisted the deal should have gone farther, to place restrictions on Iranian missile development or its support for organizations such as Hezbollah, his biggest allies kept making the same point: If you scrap this agreement, you don’t have anything better.

The leaders of France and Germany went to Washington. British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson even appeared on Fox & Friends, and wrote an op-ed for the New York Times.

Now, Mr. Trump has decided and no one knows what’s next. A lot depends on the reaction.

Mr. Trump said he’d reimpose sanctions – but it seems the Europeans won’t.

For Iran, that’s not as bad as global sanctions. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani tentatively suggested Iran might stay in the deal, or perhaps start enriching uranium again. In Iran’s political system, as Prof. Juneau noted, it’s not Mr. Rouhani but Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who decides – probably after a tug-ofwar between hard-liners and moderates.

Mr. Trudeau will wait. While European leaders were shuttling to Washington the Canadian PM wasn’t calling world leaders about the Iran deal, according to his office.

Canada’s relationship with Iran is already dormant.

The Liberals promised to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran that were cut off in 2012.

But Prof. Juneau noted the talks have stalled for a long time, most recently because of Tehran’s refusal to allow Iranian-Canadian Maryam Mombeini, the widow of a university professor who died in an Iranian prison, to return to Canada.

Politically, there’s nothing but headaches for Mr. Trudeau in even talking about the Iran deal. Mr. Netanyahu sent a senior Israeli intelligence official to Canada last week to seek its support for scrapping the Iran deal, Mr. Trudeau’s government kept mum.

The Liberals rather they didn’t have to talk about it at all.

Still, the broader significance of what happened Tuesday will be worrying for Mr. Trudeau.

Mr. Trump, ostensibly the leader of the free world, split from the team.

In major global security issues, Canada’s influence comes from working with the United States and big European allies. It appears they don’t work well together.



And Mr. Trudeau is supposed to set a common agenda for this divided bunch next month, at the Group of Seven summit.

The Globe and Mail. 9 May 2018. EDITORIAL The Iran deal is hurt, but it’s not dead yet

Is President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal more evidence that the United States is a rogue actor among its traditional allies? Or is it a move that could potentially lead to an improvement of the terms of an agreement that many reasonable people saw as flawed from the beginning?

The answer to both questions is yes. This is not as simple as a spiteful and disruptive president undoing the work of his more reliable and traditional predecessor. It’s not Trump bad, Obama good.

The truth is, the Iran deal was never perfect, and its impact has been less than what was hoped for.

While it brought together the United States, Britain, Russia, France, China and the EU in an effort to curb Iran’s nuclear program, it also legitimized an oppressive regime and angered Israel and Saudi Arabia, two important allies.

And while it lifted painful economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for verifiable assurances that Tehran would not be able to produce a working nuclear weapon in short order, it never stopped Iran from making trouble in Syria and Iraq, from supporting terror groups, or from carrying out cyberattacks against Canada and other countries.

Above all, it did not end Tehran’s ability to build a bomb in the long term. It was a better-than-nothing deal that bought time in the hopes that the lifting of sanctions would benefit the people of Iran and make them more amenable to the West. Perhaps it would even lead to more co-operation between the United States and Iran.

But the fact is that, three years later, the Iranian people are barely better off economically and still live under the thumb of an oppressive theocratic dictatorship that routinely brutalizes its own people and continues to demonize the United States and its Western allies.

It is, of course, disturbing to see Mr. Trump act so unpredictably and be so indifferent to the consequences. Under him, America’s signature on an international agreement of any kind – trade, climate change, you name it – is hardly worth the ink it was written with.

That capriciousness could have consequences for Mr. Trump’s efforts to make a deal with North Korea on denuclearization. Pyongyang will understandably now have doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with the United States and won’t hesitate to bring them up.

There will be other consequences, too, at least in the short term. Barack Obama, the president who oversaw the Iran deal in 2015, called Mr. Trump’s decision “misguided” and a “serious mistake” – sentiments that will be shared by many.

After all, Iran will be free to develop nuclear weapons, and its people might well be even more open to the anti-American rhetoric of their leaders than before. Some worry an unchecked and isolated Iran could lead to a military confrontation in the region, if not an outright war.

But it’s also true that the Iranians, like the North Koreans, can’t challenge American nuclear supremacy without risking suicide, and that they likely don’t have the finances for a sustained military confrontation. As well, the country’s leaders are facing mounting anger from citizens who just want to be able to feed their families and are tired of being jailed and tortured for voicing their unhappiness.

There is no question Iran could turn further inward following Mr. Trump’s announcement. And for a while, that may be the result.

But Iran is far better off at the negotiating table, and the deal it reached in 2015 is evidence that it is predisposed to the idea, this setback notwithstanding.

Furthermore, the bottom line is that the current deal is not dead and buried. There is still time to talk, as the U.S. sanctions will only be reimposed over a period of months.

During that time, countries like France, Britain and Germany will be working hard to salvage the agreement. There are also supporters in the United States who will be making the case that their country and the world are better off when Iran is subject to close nuclear inspection on a regular basis.


That’s what the world must focus on. We all know by now that it is typical of Mr. Trump to make a dramatic show of ending an agreement only to bring it back under altered terms that he can sell to his voters as an improvement. He tried it with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and appears to be doing so with the North American free-trade deal. There is still an Iran deal to be had.

The Globe and Mail. 9 May 2018. OPINION. Donald Trump’s move to exit the Iran nuclear deal will likely increase global instability. Without a deal, the world is more dangerous. By withdrawing from the Iran agreement, Donald Trump has jeopardized our safety
DOUG SAUNDERS


The risk was understood from the beginning. When six countries signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 to ensure that Iran remains a verifiably non-nuclear country in exchange for an end to sanctions, everyone knew that all it would take to unravel a dozen years of work would be one country going rogue and failing to comply with the deal.

On Tuesday afternoon, that risk became reality.

U.S. President Donald Trump knew the risk. His allies had spelled out the dark consequences of a withdrawal. Mr. Trump’s own intelligence and defence officials had made it clear, as recently as a few weeks ago, that Iran has fully complied with the deal. A pullout could only be viewed by the wider world as a betrayal by the United States.

Withdrawal from the deal carries at least four major consequences:

1. Iran will become much more unstable and dangerous. This is a volatile moment in Iran. The economy is in shambles. The rial, its currency, plunged to a record low last week. Unemployment and private-debt levels are at unsustainable highs. Iranian economist Mehrdad Emadi described “a complete collapse of confidence” in the economy.

While sanctions imposed by the international community a decade ago had the effect of turning Iranians against their antiWestern leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this time around, it will be hard for ordinary Iranians to blame anyone but the United States.

This year has seen mass protests in Iran by both rights-seeking reformists and hard-liners seeking a more rigid and Islamic version of their country. President Hassan Rouhani’s more moderate administration has maintained legitimacy in part through the opening of business, banking and travel ties with the wider world.

The hard-liners now have a far greater claim to legitimacy and Tehran now has every reason to consider pursuing a nuclearweapons program. “Tehran may not react immediately, but the government of President Rouhani would be under intense domestic pressure to resume aspects of the nuclear program restricted by the JCPOA,” said Barbara Slavin, an Iran analyst at the Washington-based Atlantic Council. “Those that fear that the agreement would allow Iran to get close to a nuclear-weapons threshold in a decade or so would have to confront that possibility much sooner.”

2. Nuclear proliferation will be harder to prevent. The JCPOA was an unprecedented deal: For the first time, a country that was signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed to have constant high-tech inspections of all its facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure its compliance with the treaty. (The IAEA concluded, as recently as February, that Iran was in full compliance). Other nuclear-weapons powers, including Israel and North Korea, have not even signed the NPT, nor agreed to inspections. The Iran deal, by tying NPT compliance directly to one country’s connection to the world and its economy, was seen as a potential precedent.

After Tuesday, no nuclear weapons-seeking country has any reason to sign such an agreement. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un will pay particular attention to Iran’s ordeal: From Pyongyang’s perspective, Tehran abased itself, swallowed a key source of national pride and bent over backward for the Americans, only to have the United States’ side of the deal withdrawn. It is hard to see how any lasting North Korean disarmament deal could work now.

3. The transatlantic alliance will be crippled. The United States effectively imposed sanctions on Europe on Tuesday. While European leaders said on Tuesday that they would attempt to salvage the deal, the presence of U.S. sanctions on Iran – and promises to isolate companies that trade with Iran – means that European businesses, and entire economies, will suffer. Significantly, the withdrawal threatens to return much of the continent back into near-monopoly dependence upon Russia for heating fuel.

4. Regional conflicts will deepen. “Missiles, the region, human rights – let’s not fool ourselves. This is a major hardline win in Iran,” Ariane Tabatabai, a Georgetown University nuclear-diplomacy specialist, said on Tuesday.

It’s also a major win for Israel and Saudi Arabia, whose dictatorship is now fully ascendant for the first time since before the George W. Bush presidency.

Iran’s hard-liners have nothing restraining them from trying to seize control of Iraq, intensify the Syrian conflict, wreak worse havoc on Yemen and fight a more or less direct conflict with Israel in Syria.

Any last vestige of control and stability in the region had held on by a slender thread. That thread, until Tuesday, was known as the Iran deal.

THE GLOBE AND MAIL. MAY 9, 2018. Iran threatens to restart nuclear program after Trump pulls U.S. from ‘horrible’ deal

ADRIAN MORROW, WASHINGTON

ROBERT FIFE, OTTAWA

U.S. President Donald Trump is pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal, giving the theocratic regime in Tehran an opening to kick-start its nuclear weapons program and further distancing America from its key Western allies.

In a televised White House announcement on Tuesday afternoon, Mr. Trump said the agreement was “defective at its core” and that he would reimpose the “highest level” of sanctions.

“The fact is this was a horrible, one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made,” he said. “It didn’t bring calm, it didn’t bring peace, and it never will.”

The move comes even as Mr. Trump seeks a similar pact with North Korea. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to Pyongyang on Tuesday to lay the groundwork for a planned meeting between Mr. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The U.S. President is aiming to negotiate an agreement for the renegade country to give up its nuclear arsenal.

In the wake of the announcement, Iran threatened to restart its nuclear program unless it won further guarantees from the European countries that are also part of the deal; the leaders of those countries reiterated their commitment to the pact and said it was working; and Canada lamented Mr. Trump’s decision to pull out, arguing the deal has made the world safer.

The President’s move takes place amid growing tension in the Middle East, as the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia seek to roll back gains made by Iran and its allies.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, one of then-president Barack Obama’s key foreign-policy achievements, saw the United States and Europe lift crippling sanctions on Iran in exchange for Tehran dramatically restricting its uranium enrichment program and the number of centrifuges, as well as allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into the country to verify it had shut down nuclear facilities.

Mr. Trump, however, argues the JCPOA did not go far enough because it did not stop the country from interfering in Syria’s civil war or building missiles that could one day carry nuclear warheads. He said on Tuesday that he would be willing to cut a new, more comprehensive deal. “Iran’s leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal. They refuse. And that’s fine. I’d probably say the same thing if I was in their position,” he said.

National security adviser John Bolton told reporters the sanctions will be phased back in over the next 180 days, giving companies time to wind up their business in Iran and leave.

Inspectors have certified that Iran has held up its end of the bargain, curtailing the possibility of the country developing a nuclear arsenal.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned Tuesday that he had put the country’s scientists on standby and they could “start enriching uranium more than before” within weeks. He signalled that he would demand more from the other Western countries in the agreement in exchange for staying in the pact.

“If we achieve the deal’s goals in co-operation with other members of the deal, it will remain in place,” Mr. Rouhani said on state television. “By exiting the deal, America has officially undermined its commitment to an international treaty.”

In a joint statement, the European signatories to the Iran deal expressed “regret and concern” about Mr. Trump’s decision. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Theresa May and French President Emmanuel Macron said they were committed to keeping the deal alive.

“Together, we emphasize our continuing commitment to the JCPOA. This agreement remains important for our shared security,” they said. “The world is a safer place as a result.”

Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland said Canada believes the deal is essential in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to ensure global security.

“Canada regrets that the United States has decided to withdraw from the JCPOA, particularly given that, according to the IAEA, Iran continues to implement its JCPOA commitments,” she said in a statement. “Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons.”

Ms. Freeland acknowledged that the deal is “not perfect,” but said it has helped curb what she called a threat to international peace.

A federal official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said there had been no significant Canadian sales or investments in Iran since the lifting of economic sanctions in early 2016. A prospective deal between Bombardier and an Iranian airline, reported by Iranian media, had not materialized, the official said.

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has promised to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran – suspended by the former Harper government in 2012 over the Syrian civil war and Iran’s nuclear program – but these efforts have been hampered by the death of an Iranian-Canadian academic in an Iranian prison.

Tehran’s next move could depend on whether it feels it is still benefiting from the lifting of sanctions, said Ellen Wald, a Middle East business and political analyst. She pointed to an investment by French energy firm Total to develop a gas field in Iran as a key test: If such business deals continue, Iran will have an incentive to stay in the pact; if they fail, it could leave.

“If Iran feels it wants to renew its nuclear program, it will use [Mr. Trump’s announcement] as an excuse. I’m not convinced Iran wants to,” said Ms. Wald, author of the book Saudi, Inc.

Mr. Trump repeatedly promised to quit the deal during his presidential campaign, portraying it as a generous giveaway to Iran by Mr. Obama.

Still, he hesitated for more than a year after taking office. Mr. Trump acted as Iran’s influence across the region appeared to grow: Tehran-aligned Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has been pushing back opposition forces in his country’s long and bloody civil war, while Hezbollah, another Iranian ally, surged in Lebanese elections earlier this week.

“This wasn’t about Iran’s nuclear program; they were in compliance with the deal,” said Doga Eralp, an expert in international conflict resolution at American University in Washington. “It’s really about punishing Iran for turning itself into a kingmaker in Middle East politics.”

The policy dovetails with Mr. Trump’s “America first” move away from multilateral deal-making and the international order it has helped build since the Second World War.

In a statement on Facebook, Mr. Obama slammed the move. “The consistent flouting of agreements that our country is a party to risks eroding America’s credibility, and puts us at odds with the world’s major powers,” he wrote.

And it risks making Washington seem an unreliable negotiating partner, even as it heads into talks with Pyongyang.

“The U.S., as the world’s superpower, is not able to keep its promises,” Prof. Eralp said of the message to Mr. Kim. “It is willing to change its positions.”

REUTERS. MAY 9, 2018. U.S. exit from Iran deal puts pressure on European planemakers
Tim Hepher

PARIS (Reuters) - America’s withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accord signals the collapse of $38 billion in plane deals between Tehran and Western companies and leaves Airbus facing greater risks than arch-rival Boeing, according to people involved in the deals.

President Donald Trump announced on Tuesday he was pulling his country out of the 2015 accord, and his administration said it would revoke export licenses needed by planemakers to sell commercial planes - which require U.S. components - to Iran.

Tehran has ordered 200 passenger aircraft for state carrier IranAir worth $38.3 billion at list prices, including 100 from Europe’s Airbus (AIR.PA), 80 from U.S. rival Boeing (BA.N) and 20 from smaller Franco-Italian turboprop maker ATR (LDOF.MI).

Airbus is more exposed on wide-body jets, for which sluggish global demand forced it last month to revise down part of its production plans. Iran has ordered 53 wide-body jets from Airbus and 30 from Boeing, which are yet to be built.

Losing the order deals a further blow to Airbus’s newest wide-body jet, the A330neo, which faces weak demand months before it enters service, three industry sources said. IranAir is its second-largest airline buyer after AirAsia (AIRA.KL).

By contrast, Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg signaled last month that his company was no longer as dependent on the Iran orders as it had been, following an aggressive effort to improve sales of its current-generation 777-300ER wide-body jets which were part of the Iran deal.

Airbus and Boeing said they would study the U.S. decision, but declined to comment on the risks they faced.

“We will do the right thing,” Jeff Knittel, chairman of Airbus Americas, told Reuters.

Neither planemaker will be as concerned about the potential loss of a total of around 100 narrow-body plane orders from the Iranian deals, as demand for those jets is strong and they will have no problem in allocating production slots to other buyers.

Two European sources said Airbus was resigned to losing the historic Iran deals which had taken months of preparation, culminating in a Paris signing by President Hassan Rouhani in 2016. Rouhani said on Tuesday Iran was committed to the deal.

AIRBUS ‘COMES OUT WORSE’

A collapse of aircraft deals struck under the nuclear pact would also hit Airbus’s 2018 order book harder than Boeing’s.

A cancellation of Airbus’s Iranian orders - which it booked early to pip Boeing in the 2016 order race - could wipe out its entire tally of 86 net orders for this year. Investors keep an eye on new orders as a gauge of jet market confidence.

Boeing is ahead with 221 net orders for 2018, and had delayed booking the orders from its $16.5 billion Iran contract - Iran’s biggest with America since the 1979 revolution.

“Airbus was very aggressive about booking orders and delivering planes and Boeing were very conservative; Airbus gets hit a bit worse,” said Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia.

Still, Boeing’s wide-body portfolio is not without risk.

“In terms of optimistic expectations, Airbus comes out worse. In terms of hoping for (wide-body) revenue that won’t be there, neither feels good right now,” Aboulafia added.

The situation looks mixed for small but profitable ATR.

Analysts say the turboprop maker has had a good Iran deal so far, managing to deliver more aircraft than its larger rivals with 8 already in service.

It looked on course to deliver the remaining aircraft later this year and may just be able to squeeze one or two more into Iran before the end of a 90-day wind-down period in August.

However, it faces potentially costly industrial decisions over the rest of the 20-plane deal. Analysts say the deadline for deliveries suggests ATR had started building some of the remaining planes, potentially leaving it with unsold aircraft.

ATR was not available for comment.

Trump’s speech pulled the shutters down on the wider aircraft deals unexpectedly quickly and marked a sharp contrast with scenes over two years ago when plane sellers and leasing companies flocked to Tehran eager to drum up new business.

Although Airbus and Boeing are arch-foes in the $120 billion annual jet market, their deals with Iran had brought them into alignment because each depended on the same U.S. licenses.

But as opposition to the Iran accord mounted in the U.S. Congress, which holds the key to defense and other contracts, and as markets for its jets improved elsewhere, Boeing seemed to change its tone with the comments by Muilenburg last month.

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“It’s not just Trump but the anti-Iran mood in Congress,” explained a person familiar with the U.S. transactions.

Reporting by Tim Hepher; Editing by Pravin Char

REUTERS. MAY 9, 2018. China's ZTE Corp says main business operations cease due to U.S. ban
Sijia Jiang

HONG KONG (Reuters) - ZTE Corp’s (0763.HK)(000063.SZ) main business operations have ceased due to a ban imposed by the U.S. government, but the Chinese firm is trying to have the ban modified or reversed, it said in exchange filings late on Wednesday.

ZTE, China’s second biggest telecom equipment maker, was hit last month with a ban from Washington forbidding U.S. firms to supply it with components and technology after it was found to have violated U.S. export restrictions.

“As a result of the Denial Order, the major operating activities of the company have ceased,” ZTE said in the filing.

“As of now, the company maintains sufficient cash and strictly adheres to its commercial obligations subject to compliance with laws and regulations,” it said.

ZTE said it was actively communicating with the U.S. government “in order to facilitate the modification or reversal of the Denial Order by the U.S. government and forge a positive outcome in the development of matters.”

The ban that threatens to cut off ZTE’s supply chain came amid heightened tension over a possible U.S.-China trade war. The Chinese government raised the issue of ZTE last week with a visiting U.S. trade delegation.

ZTE said on Sunday it had submitted a request to the U.S. Commerce Department for the suspension of the ban.

ZTE appears to have suspended its online stores on its own website as well as on Alibaba Group’s e-commerce platform Taobao over the past few days, which display a “page being updated” message with no products to order.

The Chinese firm did not respond to calls and messages from Reuters seeking comment.

ZTE settled the sanction case with the U.S. government last March after admitting to illegally shipping products with U.S. technology to countries including Iran and paying a record fine of nearly $900 million.

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Last month, the U.S. government reactivated the ban after it said ZTE violated terms of the settlement and made repeated false statements, which ZTE disputed.

Reporting by Sijia Jiang; Editing by Jason Neely and Edmund Blair

REUTERS. MAY 9, 2018. EU defense of Iran deal brings companies little relief
John Irish, John Revill

PARIS/MUNICH (Reuters) - European governments vowed on Wednesday to try to shield their improved economic ties with Iran from the impact of renewed U.S. sanctions, but business leaders struck a more pessimistic note.

The EU said it remained committed to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and the suspension of its own sanctions, the day after President Donald Trump announced Washington’s withdrawal from the pact. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian also insisted the deal was “not dead”.

However, companies with active Iranian investments or plans mostly stayed quiet on the viability of those projects beyond a “wind-down” period of three to six months until the United States reimposes sanctions on entities doing business with Tehran.

Siemens is still “assessing the implications of the Iran decision”, the German industrial giant’s Chief Financial Officer Ralf Thomas told reporters on a call.

“One of the strongest industrialized countries in the world has made a political decision - as an industrial company we have to recognize that,” Thomas said. Existing projects will be completed “as far as legally possible”, he added.

Trump’s move will lead to the reimposition of U.S. penalties that were waived under the three-year-old nuclear deal, including financial sanctions that had made it extremely difficult for global companies to do business with or in Iran.

Companies worst affected are likely to include plane manufacturer Airbus (AIR.PA), Peugeot maker PSA Group (PEUP.PA) and its fellow French automaker Renault (RENA.PA).

France is seeking an understanding with the U.S. to safeguard its carmakers’ significant Iran investments, a government official said. PSA, which sold 445,000 vehicles in Iran last year, called on the European Union to maintain a united front in defense of the nuclear agreement.

RUFFLED FEATHERS

Germany’s BDI industry association also said the EU, Russia and China should commit clearly to the deal, after Washington’s new ambassador ruffled feathers by tweeting: “German companies doing business in Iran should wind down operations immediately.”

The nuclear detente had sparked great hopes for the opening of the Iranian market, BDI head Dieter Kempf said. “These hopes have now clearly been dimmed.”

Government and company officials said business with Iran had slowed recently in anticipation of Washington’s likely withdrawal from the deal.

France, Germany and Italy have introduced euro-denominated export guarantees designed to avoid U.S. dollar exposure and withstand sanctions, while the EU may resort to sanctions-blocking statutes ordering companies not to comply.

In updated advice to businesses, however, the British government said: “How UK companies act in response to U.S. sanctions is a commercial and legal decision for that company.”

The renewed sanctions “may have implications for UK businesses and individuals dealing with Iran”, it added.

British exports to Iran rose nearly 40 percent in 2016 to 262 million pounds ($356 million), dwarfed by the 3 billion euros of German exports recorded last year, up 15 percent.

Volkswagen, which resumed exports to Iran in 2017, said it was monitoring the situation closely.

ON HOLD

Some European banks that had resumed financing Iranian entities after the nuclear deal said they had already stopped doing so in anticipation of Trump’s move.

“During recent months the operational and reputational risks associated with doing business in Iran have increased,” Danske Bank’s spokesman Kenni Leth said.

“Earlier this year we decided to phase out and exit all activities to and from Iran and suspend our existing relations with Iran.”

Austria’s Oberbank decided last November not to provide financing to Iranian counterparts “due to the constantly changing political framework,” a spokesman said.

Germany’s Hermes export guarantee scheme for Iran remains in place for the time being, the country’s economy ministry said.

But France’s export finance program, which had been due to launch in May-June, has been “put on hold” in recent weeks pending Trump’s decision, several French officials told Reuters.

Euro-denominated export finance is still being discussed, an Elysee official said, “but it’s not necessarily that simple”.

The bpifrance sovereign fund, which was due to administer the scheme, declined to comment.

French officials will be focused on helping companies exit Iran within the wind-down periods, said one - or on seeking unlikely U.S. waivers or assurances for activities they want to pursue beyond the deadlines.

Companies “will have to choose between their Iranian economic interests and their potential U.S. interests,” said a senior diplomat. “Generally that decision is quickly made in favor of the U.S.”

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That is precisely the kind of risk calculation the Trump administration appears to be banking on.

“Companies should not do business in Iran,” a U.S. State Department official said in a phone briefing for reporters on Wednesday, when asked whether foreign business interests could be damaged as an unintended consequence of sanctions.

“That’s an intended consequence, and we thank our ambassador out there for reaffirming that message.”

Writing by Laurence Frost; Additional reporting by Gilles Guillaume, Michael Nienaber, Mathieu Rosemain, David Milliken, Teis Jensen and Kirsti Knolle; Editing by Sudip Kar-Gupta and Keith Weir

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