US ECONOMICS
DoL. BLS. December 13, 2017. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX – NOVEMBER 2017
The Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) rose 0.4 percent in
November on a seasonally adjusted basis, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported today. Over the last 12 months, the all items index rose 2.2 percent.
The energy index rose 3.9 percent and accounted for about three-fourths of the
all items increase. The gasoline index increased 7.3 percent, and the other
energy component indexes also rose. The food index was unchanged in November,
with the index for food at home declining slightly.
The index for all items less food and energy increased 0.1 percent in November.
The shelter index continued to rise, and the indexes for motor vehicle insurance,
used cars and trucks, and new vehicles also increased. The indexes for apparel,
airline fares, and household furnishings and operations all declined in November.
The all items index rose 2.2 percent for the 12 months ending November. The index
for all items less food and energy rose 1.7 percent, a slight decline from the
1.8-percent increase for the period ending October. The energy index rose 9.4
percent over the last 12 months, and the food index rose 1.4 percent.
Table A. Percent changes in CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U): U.S. city
average
Seasonally adjusted changes from
preceding month
Un-
adjusted
12-mos.
May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. ended
2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 2017 Nov.
2017
All items.................. -.1 .0 .1 .4 .5 .1 .4 2.2
Food...................... .2 .0 .2 .1 .1 .0 .0 1.4
Food at home............. .1 -.1 .2 -.2 .0 .0 -.1 .6
Food away from home (1).. .2 .0 .2 .3 .3 .1 .2 2.4
Energy.................... -2.7 -1.6 -.1 2.8 6.1 -1.0 3.9 9.4
Energy commodities....... -6.2 -2.7 .0 6.1 12.6 -2.3 7.1 16.4
Gasoline (all types).... -6.4 -2.8 .0 6.3 13.1 -2.4 7.3 16.5
Fuel oil (1)............ -2.8 -3.7 -2.0 2.9 8.2 2.3 5.0 18.6
Energy services.......... .7 -.5 -.2 -.1 -.2 .4 .6 2.8
Electricity............. .3 -.6 .4 .0 .0 .5 .5 2.5
Utility (piped) gas
service.............. 1.9 -.2 -2.3 -.5 -.8 .3 .6 3.6
All items less food and
energy................. .1 .1 .1 .2 .1 .2 .1 1.7
Commodities less food and
energy commodities.... -.3 -.1 -.1 -.1 -.2 .1 -.1 -.9
New vehicles............ -.2 -.3 -.5 .0 -.4 -.2 .3 -1.1
Used cars and trucks.... -.2 -.7 -.5 -.2 -.2 .7 1.0 -2.1
Apparel................. -.8 -.1 .3 .1 -.1 -.1 -1.3 -1.6
Medical care commodities .4 .7 1.0 -.1 -.8 .0 .6 1.8
Services less energy
services.............. .2 .2 .2 .4 .2 .3 .2 2.5
Shelter................. .2 .2 .1 .5 .3 .3 .2 3.2
Transportation services .3 .2 .2 .4 .3 .2 .1 3.8
Medical care services... -.1 .3 .3 .2 .1 .3 -.1 1.6
1 Not seasonally adjusted.
Food
The food index remained unchanged in November. The index for food at home
declined 0.1 percent, with four of the six major grocery store food group indexes
falling. The index for nonalcoholic beverages, which was unchanged in October,
fell 0.6 percent in November. The fruits and vegetables index declined 0.5
percent in November after being unchanged in October. The index for meats,
poultry, fish, and eggs fell 0.3 percent, and the cereals and bakery products
index declined 0.2 percent.
The index for other food at home rose in November, increasing 0.4 percent. The
index for dairy and related products, which declined 0.3 percent in October,
increased 0.3 percent in November. The index for food away from home also
increased in November, rising 0.2 percent.
The food at home index increased 0.6 percent over the last 12 months. The index
for meat, poultry, fish, and eggs rose 1.4 percent over the span, the largest
increase among the six groups. The indexes for dairy and related products and
for nonalcoholic beverages were unchanged over the last 12 months, and the
index for cereals and bakery products declined 0.8 percent. The index for food
away from home rose 2.4 percent over the last 12 months.
Energy
The energy index rose 3.9 percent in November after falling 1.0 percent the prior
month. The gasoline index rose 7.3 percent in November after declining in October.
(Before seasonal adjustment, gasoline prices rose 2.6 percent in November.)The
other major energy component indexes also increased, with the electricity index
increasing 0.5 percent and the index for natural gas rising 0.6 percent.
The energy index increased 9.4 percent over the past 12 months, with all of the
major component indexes rising over the span. The fuel oil index rose 18.6
percent and the gasoline index increased 16.5 percent. The index for natural gas
advanced 3.6 percent, and the electricity index rose 2.5 percent.
All items less food and energy
The index for all items less food and energy increased 0.1 percent in November
after rising 0.2 percent in October. The shelter index rose 0.2 percent, with the
rent index increasing 0.3 percent and the index for owners' equivalent rent
rising 0.2 percent. The index for lodging away from home fell 1.3 percent in
November after rising in each of the three prior months.
The index for used cars and trucks increased 1.0 percent in November, and the
index for motor vehicle insurance rose 0.8 percent. The index for new vehicles,
which declined in September and October, rose 0.3 percent in November. The
indexes for wireless phones services, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco also
increased in November.
The index for medical care was unchanged in November, with the index for
prescription drugs increasing 0.6 percent and the hospital services index rising
0.1 percent, but the physicians' services index declining 0.8 percent. The
indexes for recreation and for personal care were also both unchanged in November.
The apparel index fell in November; its 1.3-percent decline was its largest
decrease since September 1998. The index for airline fares fell 2.4 percent in
November after rising the prior month. The index for household furnishings and
operations also declined, falling 0.1 percent.
The index for all items less food and energy increased 1.7 percent over the last
12 months. The 12-month change in the shelter index remained at 3.2 percent, and
the index for motor vehicle insurance rose 8.0 percent over the span. The indexes
for used cars and trucks, apparel, new vehicles, and airline fares all declined
over the past year.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf
BEA. December 13, 2017. Travel and Tourism Spending Accelerated in the Third Quarter 2017
Real spending (output) on travel and tourism accelerated in the third quarter of 2017, growing at an annual rate of 6.6 percent after increasing 6.0 percent (revised) in the second quarter, according to new statistics released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Real gross domestic product (GDP) for the nation also accelerated, increasing 3.3 percent in the third quarter (second estimate) after increasing 3.1 percent in the second quarter of 2017.
The leading contributors to the acceleration in real spending were traveler accommodations and food and beverage services. Traveler accommodations accelerated, growing 13.5 percent in the third quarter after increasing 3.8 percent (revised) in the second quarter. Food and beverage services increased 0.6 percent after decreasing 1.4 percent (revised) in the previous quarter.
Chart 1. Quarterly Growth in Real Tourism Spending
Tourism Prices. Prices for travel and tourism goods and services decreased 1.1 percent in the third quarter of 2017. This was a smaller decrease than the 3.2 percent (revised) decline in the second quarter. The decrease was largely attributable to the prices of traveler accommodations and passenger air transportation.
Prices for traveler accommodations decreased 9.9 percent in the third quarter, a larger decline than the 0.3 percent (revised) decrease in the previous quarter. In the third quarter, passenger air transportation prices decreased 6.7 percent after decreasing 3.4 percent (revised) in the second quarter of 2017.
Transportation-related commodity prices increased in the third quarter. This price, which includes gasoline, increased 7.4 percent in the third quarter after decreasing 11.2 percent (revised) in the previous quarter.
Chart 2. Tourism Prices
Tourism Employment. Employment in the travel and tourism industries decelerated, growing 1.2 percent in the third quarter of 2017 after increasing 2.1 percent (revised) in the previous quarter. Overall U.S. employment growth remained steady, increasing 1.3 percent in the third quarter after increasing 1.3 percent in the second quarter.
Traveler accommodations was the leading contributor to the deceleration, losing approximately 800 employees in the third quarter of 2017 after adding 6,400 employees in the second quarter.
Food and beverage services also contributed to the deceleration, adding approximately 5,600 employees in this quarter after adding 11,800 employees in the previous quarter of 2017.
Chart 3. Tourism Employment
Total Tourism-Related Output was $1.6 trillion in the third quarter of 2017, comprising $945 billion (58 percent) of direct tourism spending and $682 billion (42 percent) of indirect tourism-related spending.
Total Tourism-Related Employment was 7.9 million jobs in the third quarter of 2017, comprising 5.5 million (70 percent) direct tourism jobs and 2.4 million (30 percent) indirect tourism-related jobs.
These statistics are from BEA’s Travel and Tourism Satellite Accounts (TTSAs), which are supported by funding from the Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. The current-price statistics of direct tourism output were derived from BEA’s annual TTSAs and from current-price quarterly statistics of personal consumption expenditures from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs). The real statistics of direct tourism output were developed using price indexes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and real quarterly statistics of personal consumption expenditures from the NIPAs. The statistics of direct tourism employment were derived from the annual TTSAs from BEA, the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), and Current Employment Statistics (CES) from BLS.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/industry/tourism/2017/pdf/tour317.pdf
DoS. December 12, 2017. Department Press Briefing. Heather Nauert, Spokesperson. Washington, DC
MS NAUERT: Good afternoon. Good to see you all. A couple announcements I have to make. And the first -- you may recall the visa restrictions that were put on the country of Gambia earlier this year. We have an announcement to make on that.
On September 30, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security notified the Department of State that Gambia denied or unreasonably delayed the return of its nationals the United States ordered removed from the United States. Since then, the Government of Gambia has worked diligently toward addressing our concerns. We are pleased to announce that on December 8th, the Secretary certified that Gambia had met its international obligations concerning the repatriation of its citizens, and the United States has now ended visa restrictions and has resumed normal visa processing in all visa categories, effective December the 12th. Ensuring the countries facilitate the removal of their nationals who are subject to a final order of removal is a high priority for the Department of State and this administration, and we are pleased that The Gambia took proactive steps to address our concerns. So that’s a little update for you.
Secondly, something I’d like to mention on Yemen. The United States Government announced an additional $130 million in emergency food assistance to Yemen through USAID today. This now brings the total U.S. contribution in humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen to nearly $768 million since Fiscal Year 2016. The funding announced today will support the United Nations World Food Program to distribute food aid to Yemen’s most vulnerable populations. The United States remains gravely concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation in Yemen. We continue to call on the Saudi-led coalition to facilitate the free flow of humanitarian aid and commercial imports, especially fuel, through all Yemeni ports and on Houthi-led militias to allow unfettered access for food and humanitarian aid to reach all areas inside Yemen. Finally, we call on all parties to protect the civilians, including humanitarian aid workers, who work at great personal risk to deliver life-saving assistance to the people of Yemen.
And finally, many of you, I think, in the past have met Ambassador John Bass, or at least have heard of him. One, I’m pleased to announce today that Ambassador Bass has now arrived in Afghanistan over the weekend. Today he presented his credentials to Afghan President Ashraf Ghani today in Kabul. Ambassador Bass is a career Foreign Service officer with close to three decades of diplomatic service at the State Department. He most recently served as our U.S. ambassador to Turkey, which may be the reason his name is familiar to many of you. He’s also served as our ambassador to Georgia as well.
The U.S. mission in Afghanistan is one of our largest in the world, and I can’t think of a better person to serve and be the face of the United States in Afghanistan than Ambassador Bass. His continued economic and political development – he will continue to push that, including support for the rule of law in combating all forms of corruption in that country. A main focus of his tenure will be on efforts to bring peace, security, and stability to the country and the region as part of the U.S. South Asia strategy. And so we look forward to having him serving there in Afghanistan.
With that, I’d be happy to take your questions. Where would you like to start today?
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VENEZUELA
...
QUESTION: Just to follow up on that, he said that there would be no office closures. Does – is he saying now that there will be no closures of consulates in countries in Europe as part of this shift in resources?
MS NAUERT: I don’t think so. I think – and we’ve spoken about this in the past. I think he’s just looking at it, saying, hey, look. Look at Paris. Look at London, where – I don’t know what the numbers are, and you know we don’t announce those numbers anyway. But they’re – it’s a huge staff in some of these places. And if you look at that and compare it to – and this is just me saying this – if you compare it to a place like Pakistan, they might need more people in Pakistan. They might need more people in Venezuela. They might need more people elsewhere than they have in these beautiful postings like Paris.
QUESTION: Sure.
MS NAUERT: And so I think it’s just taking a look at the numbers and reconfiguring that.
QUESTION: But is he – was he making a commitment they’re not to close any consulates?
MS NAUERT: I know that – I know that that is a question that you all have asked before. I’m not aware of any consulates that we are looking at closing. Okay?
QUESTION: One of the embassies mentioned – oh, I’m sorry.
QUESTION: Okay, but he’s not – he’s not saying – because he said there will be no office closures. So --
MS NAUERT: If he says there will be no office closures, then I would take him at his word. Yeah? Hi.
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QUESTION: Quickly, thank you. A couple weeks ago from here you called on the Venezuelan Government to release Josh Holt, an American held in Venezuela for more than a year now, on humanitarian grounds. Since then – I believe yesterday – audio purportedly of him has been released indicating he is not well. Have you heard that audio tape and are there any developments on securing his release?
MS NAUERT: Here’s what I can say: Josh Holt, an American citizen, has now been detained in Venezuela for nearly 18 months. He has never formally been charged with a crime. We have consistently called on the Government of Venezuela to release Josh Holt on humanitarian grounds due to his ongoing health concerns. I am certainly aware of that tape. I know that some of my colleagues have listened to a tape. We can’t independently verify that that is his voice. However, we have no reason to believe that it was not his voice. For those who have heard the audio recording, it certainly describes his dire medical condition. We believe that he is in extremely poor health, which is why we continue to call on the government to release him.
He had preliminary hearings in Venezuela, and as many of you know, some of those hearings had been delayed. Some hearings have not been held at all. He had hearings on October the 10th and October the 24th. He has a hearing that is set to take place sometime today in Venezuela. We’ve had a representative at the previous two hearings – excuse me, is there something you need right now?
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U.S. Department of State. December 12, 2017. Secretary's Remarks: On "Meeting the Foreign Policy Challenges of 2017 and Beyond". Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State. The 2017 Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum. Washington, DC
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, thank you so much, Stephen, for that warm welcome. And we’ve known each other for a long time as well, and in my old life would often share perspectives on what I was seeing around the world and try to get some advice on whether I was leaning the correct way to the left or the right. And the advice was always sound and very appreciated. Thank you.
I also want to thank Ambassador Cho for his introduction and welcome, as well. And I do appreciate the opportunity to speak at the 2017 Atlantic Council-Korea Foundation Forum, and I’m really going to use this as an opportunity to reflect on the past 11 months. And so I’m going to take a bit of a walk through the year. I’m going to touch on a number of issues, some geographies, and I hope in doing so and laying out what the President’s priorities have been in the foreign policy arena that some of the – a lot of the intersections of these policies will become evident to you. I think, as was just stated by Steve Hadley, the world has become so interconnected that no part of the world can actually isolate itself or compartmentalize its foreign policy issues, because they all tend to touch one another at some point.
So it may come as a surprise to some, although it should not, that underlying all of our policies, our strategies, that it – and our tactics is a clear recognition that one of the advantages the U.S. takes into all of our various foreign policy arenas are that we have many, many allies. Many allies born of shared sacrifice, born of shared values, and none any more so than the Republic of Korea. Through our shared sacrifice on the peninsula and the shared values that have led to a vibrant, prosperous South Korea that we see today. And as President Trump highlighted in his remarks to the general assembly in Seoul in his recent trip to the Asia arena, what a stark difference when one goes to the DMZ and looks just across the DMZ a few miles to see what a difference the values that have been adopted by the Republic of Korea and what that has created in terms of the quality of life for Korean citizens, and also the contributions to the global quality of life as well compared to the choices that have been made by North Korea.
These large numbers of allies, which are a great strength of U.S. policy around the world, are not matched by any of our adversaries. None of our adversaries have such an advantage. So what I’m going to do is, I’m not going to walk because it’ll be – if I walk, it’ll take too long, but I’m going to jog a bit around the world. And I am going to touch on, obviously, the situation with the DPRK and our relations with China, but I’m going to touch on the efforts to defeat ISIS and, in particular, our efforts in Iraq and Syria; the broader counterterrorism policies that we are executing through the Middle East, many of which emerge from the President’s historic Riyadh summit. But how counterterrorism is playing out in other parts of the world – in the Sahel in Africa and Libya, but also we see it even in Asia in the region in Philippines and Mindanao.
I’m going to touch on South Asia and the President’s policy on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India; the EU-NATO relationship; Russia and our efforts to re-establish relations with Russia; and then I’m going to just pick very quickly at a few of the issues we’re dealing with in the Western Hemisphere. But I think it is not lost – and I think the point was made, and I’m not – will not be the last to appreciate the irony of the Atlantic Council hosting an event on U.S. partnership with South Korea, and I think that point’s been made. But in my view, it does make perfect sense because as you have seen, it takes unity and strong partnerships, those that span the Atlantic and Pacific, to counter the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea.
From his first day in office, this was the first policy President Trump asked the State Department to develop and put in place, and clear recognition that he was going to take this threat seriously, and he was not going to leave it unaddressed and was not going to accept the status quo. It does represent, and did represent then, the most immediate threat to our country, and that we would end the era of strategic patience and begin an era of strategic accountability. The threat is simply too large to ignore any longer.
Our policy with respect to the DPRK is really quite clear, and that is the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It is a policy that is shared by others in the region; in fact, that is China’s policy as well. And Russia has stated it is also its policy. So it is – while it is commonly held, our tactics for implementing the policy may differ a bit among parties in the region. Our approach, as you’ve seen, is to impose ever greater penalties and ever greater pressure on the regime in North Korea to persuade them to halt their current nuclear weapons development program and their systems by which they can deliver these weapons, and to change that course and choose a different course.
We have put in place now over the past many months the most comprehensive set of economic sanctions that I think have ever been assembled through two very comprehensive UN Security Council resolutions with the support, notably, of both China and Russia, clearly indications of how they view the seriousness of the threat as well.
These sanctions now have banned all coal exports from the North – from North Korea. They have ended their textile exports. They have put limits and will bring to an end the export of forced labor. They have also limited the imports of fuel and reduced all imports, each – with each action increasing the pressure on North Korea.
We do know that these are having effects on the North. This is evidence in terms of what we see happening with fuel prices for North Korean citizens, which initially jumped 90 percent. They’re now back to where they’re up only 50 percent. We also know there are shortages beginning to appear, and there’s also, though appearing on the shelves of North Koreans, products which previously had been exported. So now they have to be consumed internally.
These are combined with diplomatic sanctions where we have called on nations the world over to not just fully implement the UN Security Council economic sanctions, but where they have a sense and a desire to do so, to also isolate the North Korean regime further by recalling their diplomats, closing their offices, and letting North Korea know that with each one of these provocative tests, they only become more and more isolated.
More than 22 countries have sent North Korea’s diplomats back home. And for some, it may not seem significant, but for small countries that may not have a lot of economic influence, it is yet another important signal. So from nations like Peru to Spain to Italy to Portugal have cut off the diplomacy ties as well. And we know the regime notices when that ambassador comes home because they’re not representing that office elsewhere, further isolating them from their contact with the rest of the world.
These are all very important steps, again, to reinforce to the regime that with each step you take, you only isolate yourself further and you do not improve your security, but you degrade your own security. Important to the success of all of this is the very strong trilateral relationship that exists between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. This is a basis for the security structure of the region and it is one that we continue in place and we continue to exercise together so that we are ready for any possible military response that might be required.
The enforcement of these sanctions have also gone beyond the direct entities, but we’ve also sanctioned individuals and other entities, including banks – some banks within China and elsewhere – who are facilitating violations of these sanctions by North Korea. So anywhere we see North Korea attempting to exploit loopholes or attempting to exploit other avenues to skirt these sanctions, we attempt to close those off as well.
Time is marching on and with each additional test, North Korea does demonstrate the advancement of its program. The most recent intercontinental ballistic missile test, I think, demonstrates they certainly have capability to continue to advance their program, and we would expect they’re doing the same on other elements of an integrated nuclear weapons system. So we need the DPRK to come to the – come to the table for talks. We’re ready to talk anytime they’d like to talk, but they have to come to the table and they have to come to the table with a view that they do want to make a different choice.
In the meantime, our military preparedness is strong. Because of the situation, the President has ordered our military planners to have a full range of contingencies available, and they are ready. As I’ve told people many times, I will continue our diplomatic efforts until the first bomb drops. I’m going to be confident that we’re going to be successful, but I’m also confident Secretary Mattis will be successful if it ends up being his turn.
With respect to China, North Korea really represented our first engagement of this new administration with China. It was – the first trip I made overseas was to Japan, South Korea, and China to begin the first articulations of this policy on North Korea’s nuclear program, the end of the strategic patience. In many ways, this, I think, was fortuitous because it allowed this administration in its first engagements with China to find something that we could work together on. And when we understood that our policies were identical and our objectives were the same, then that gave us a platform from which to engage on a positive way from the outset.
The history, as all of you know, of U.S.-China relations has been defined since the historic opening of the relationship with Nixon’s visit. And that served the U.S. and the Chinese well and it served the rest of the world well. But times have changed. China has risen its economic power. And in many ways, the successful Beijing Olympics was perhaps the coming-out of China to the rest of the world with a new sense of confidence and a new sense of a way forward.
I think both of us, the U.S. and China, are now searching for what will define the U.S.-China relationship for the next 50 years, because that relationship that was defined by the “one China” policy and the three joint communiques has served everyone well. China has risen as an economic force in the world. And while they like to continue to describe themselves as a developing nation because they have hundreds of millions who still need to move out of poverty, they are not a developing nation in the traditional sense. They have an economy that is very large, and it certainly has its influence on global markets. But as China has risen, a number of disparities have now occurred between the U.S. and China trade relations and China and other nations in trade relations as well which have to be addressed.
So in engaging with China in the first summit with President Xi coming to Mar-a-Lago, we worked with the Chinese to find a way to begin an exchange of understanding in views at a much higher level than had previously been conducted. As many of you know, there were many, many dialogue mechanisms with China over the past several years. I think when we – when I got to State Department, we had 26 different dialogues at various levels. Our view was we needed to elevate these dialogues to a much higher level within our respective governments, closer to the ultimate decision makers.
So we created four significant high-level dialogues with representation from our side and from the Chinese side that is very close to President Trump and very close to President Xi. The four dialogues are led by cabinet-level secretaries on our side and equivalents on the Chinese side. This diplomatic and strategic Dialogue is chaired by Secretary Mattis and myself, and this dialogue is really to explore areas that we can work together and explore areas where we have differences, and in this exploratory process create results that will over time hopefully allow us to define what this new relationship will be. The other dialogues are economic and trade, law enforcement and cyber, and social people-to-people dialogues. All four of the dialogues met throughout the last year, and they are designed to be results-driven, and the results of those were reported out at President Trump’s summit in Beijing, his state visit plus.
So I think with respect to our relationship with China, we now have a very active mechanism in which we can put complex issues on the table. And we have differences, such as the South China Sea and China’s building of structures, militarization of these structures, and how that affects our allies in the region as well in terms of free and open trade. As we’ve said to the Chinese, we hope we can find a way to freeze this particular activity. Whether we can reverse it remains to seen. But it is not an acceptable – it’s not acceptable to us that these islands continue to be developed, and certainly not for military purposes.
In Southeast Asia, we had a – we put forth a policy here not too long ago of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and this was built on the back of some of our views about China’s One Belt, One Road policy. China’s One Belt, One Road, we understand, is a policy they have to continue their economic development, and our policies do not seek to contain China’s economic development. But China’s economic development, in our view, should take place in the system of international rules and norms, and One Belt, One Road seems to want to define its own rules and norms. I like to quote Secretary Mattis’ comment on One Belt, One Road. For China, he said: Well, the U.S. and the rest of the world has many belts and many roads, and no one country gets to decide what they are. So a free and open Indo-Pacific means all countries have access to continue their economic development and free access for trade through the region.
As part of the free and open Indo-Pacific, we have elevated our engagement with India. We’ve long had a trilateral relationship in the Indo-Pacific between Japan, Australia, and the U.S., and we’re now working towards whether this will become a quad relationship to include India because of the importance of India’s rising economy as well and I think shared national security concerns that we have with India.
In moving to the defeat ISIS campaign quickly, in Iraq and Syria, as the President entered office, he took a significant policy shift in the war to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria and ordered aggressive new strategies and empowered our military commanders on the ground to carry out battlefield decisions in a way that would win the war on the battlefield. After fully activating the DOD approach of buy, with, and through others, with his authorities the military has, in fact, begun to make significant gains. And as we know today, Prime Minister Abadi recently declared ISIS defeated in Iraq. We are still defeating ISIS in Syria, but significant progress has been made.
As a result of the military success, we in the State Department have really had to run fast to catch up with the military success with the diplomatic plans as to what comes after the defeat of ISIS, and we’ve executed much of this through the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, a coalition of 74 members, 68 countries and including organizations such as NATO, INTERPOL, EU, and others.
Seven and a half million people have now been freed of ISIS’ clutches in Iraq and Syria; 95 percent of territory previously controlled by their caliphate has now been liberated. Our efforts now are to stabilize these areas after liberation to avoid a re-emergence of ISIS but also to avoid a re-emergence of local conflicts between various groups.
So our work with the DOD is to deconflict the battlefield and to stabilize areas, and we’ve had success working with Jordan and with Russia in Syria to create de-escalation zones that prevent the re-emergence of a civil war – all directed towards moving the talks in Syria to Geneva to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a new Syrian constitution and elections be overseen by the United Nations in which all Syrian diaspora will vote. So this includes the voting of Syrians who have been displaced because of the fighting, whether it be due to the civil war or subsequently due to ISIS’ emergence.
A very important joint statement was issued by President Trump and President Putin on the margins of APEC in Danang, Vietnam, in which both leaders affirmed their commitment to this process as the way forward to ensure a unified, whole, democratic, and free Syria. Talks have begun in Geneva again with a reformed opposition representation. And we have asked Russia to ensure the regime participates in these talks, and the regime has been present at the talks. And now, we need to keep everyone at the table. We will continue to work with Russia in areas where we can and Syria to continue to promote a de-escalation of the violence, stabilization of the areas, and a resolution for Syria that will be a product of the Geneva process.
In Iraq, the liberation of all areas is now complete, and in both the campaigns we’ve now recaptured the caliphate’s capitals of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. I think the early engagement in Iraq with Arab neighbors has been important to the future of Iraq also being sustained with its democratic government and sustaining Iraq as a unified country. Having Arab neighbors engage early as the war to defeat ISIS progressed, importantly with the historic visit because it’s been more than three decades since the Arab world had relationships with Baghdad, the Saudis were the first to engage and have created now economic talks and consultative committees. They’ve reopened two border crossings, they’re resuming flights between Baghdad and between Riyadh, sending an important message to all Iraqis that – and reminding them that Iraqis are Arab, and you should re-engage and reunite with the Arab world.
There have been consultative councils set up with the Saudis and Iraqis, and there will be a second reconstruction conference hosted by the Kuwaitis in January – all intended to ensure that the government in Baghdad and Iraqis understand you have friends to the south who want to support your reconstruction and your re-establishment of your country.
Importantly, we also – the policy has always been a unified Iraq. And as you know, the independence referendum which was undertaken by the Kurdish Regional Authorities a few months back was disruptive to that unity. We’re working through that process now between Baghdad and Erbil to ensure the two parties remain unified, and we are supporting both deconfliction and we’re supporting a re-engagement around the Iraqi constitution which was never fully implemented. And we will stand and we have said we’ll stand with the Kurds to support them in the full implementation of the Iraqi constitution when – which, when it is fully implemented, will address a number of grievances that the Kurdish people have had for some time and we hope will lead to that unified Iraq.
In counterterrorism more broadly, again, I would take you back to the President’s historic summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he convened 68 leaders of Muslim countries around the world, making the case to them that the voices of violent extremism are a problem only you can solve. The United States cannot solve this. We can help you solve this, but this has to be something that Muslim leaders the world over address.
So out of that summit were two very important commitments: to create a center to counter violent extremism in Saudi Arabia and to create a center to disrupt counterterrorism financing networks. Both of those centers have now been established, and they are getting underway with work to not just defeat counterterrorism on the battlefield, as we say, or defeat terrorism on the battlefield, but to counter it in cyber space. The center for violent extremism has a large bank of individuals who monitor social media for messaging to disrupt the messaging, but also to develop counter-messaging to counter these messages of violent extremism.
This is also important – and we’ve had these conversations with the Saudis – that they must get these messages into the mosque, they must get these messages into the madrasas, and they must get these messages into the educational materials that are put into the schools. The Saudis are publishing new materials now. They are recalling materials. But we have a lot of work to do to overcome these messages of violent extremism.
The center to counter terrorism financing is also a big establishment to help with the Treasury Department, and it is linking up with other sources of information around the world to be able to track how funds are moved about to support terrorist activities the world over. Again, we can win on the battlefield, but if we don’t win in the cyber space and we don’t disrupt the networks’ abilities to re-establish themselves, we know they will appear elsewhere, as we have seen them appear in Libya, we’ve seen them appear in Mindanao, we see them appear in the Sahel.
The global effort to defeat ISIS and the global effort to defeat terrorism is one of the President’s top priorities, and that takes us to the South Asia policy and Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. And the approach to this policy really was a regional approach. The President made a decision and announced the policy that we would remain in Afghanistan, we would remain engaged in the fight to defeat the Taliban, and that the time and effort would be conditions-based. He didn’t – he said it’s not a blank check. It’s not forever, so the Government of Afghanistan needs to understand they must continue their reform journey and they must continue to create conditions that will be inclusive to all ethnic groups within Afghanistan, including a place for the Taliban to participate in a legitimate government when the Taliban is ready to renounce terrorism, renounce the fight, and come to the table.
So the conditions-based approach is to ensure the Taliban know, you will never win a battlefield victory, and the way forward is going to be by engaging in a reconciliation process and ultimately joining a government in Afghanistan.
An important part of the regional approach is our relationship with Pakistan. The U.S. and Pakistan have had a long history of good relations, but that relationship has really deteriorated over the past decade and so now we’re engaged with Pakistan in a conversation to ensure our expectations of them are clear, that our concern is really about Pakistan’s stability. Pakistan has allowed so many terrorist organizations to find safe haven within its territories, and these organizations are growing in size and influence, that at some point I have said to the leadership of Pakistan, you may be the target, and they turn their attention from Kabul and decide they like Islamabad as a target better.
We want to work with Pakistan to stamp out terrorism within their boundaries as well, but Pakistan has to begin the process of changing its relationship with the Haqqani Network and with others. I understand that this is a relationship that has emerged probably for, in their view, good reasons a decade ago, but now that relationship has to be altered because they – if they’re not careful, Pakistan is going to lose control of their own country. We want to work with them in a positive way. We’re willing to share information with them and we want them to be successful. But we cannot continue with the status quo, where terrorist organizations are allowed to find safe haven inside of Pakistan.
I want to touch a bit on the NATO and Europe relationship quickly, and this was an early trip of the President’s as well. And I think the important thing is that the Atlantic alliance is as strong as ever, notwithstanding what people may describe or want to write. And I just came back from a full week in Europe, two days in Brussels and NATO, and meetings with the EU member countries. I was in Vienna for the OSCE meetings, and then a full day in Paris. Everywhere that I went this past week and in every engagement, there are still very strong ties between the U.S. and all of our partners and allies within Europe. And there is great unity around issues of importance to both of us, which are security issues, economic and trade issues.
We have a lot that we have to work through, and the President’s message to our European allies has been, we’re there for you. We will be there for you. But at NATO in particular – and we will meet that Article 5 commitment – but to our NATO partners and member countries, you cannot ask the American people to care more about the security of your citizens than you care yourself.
And so the President has been very demanding on burden-sharing, that the American people simply cannot carry a disproportionate share of this burden for years to come, and everyone has to be willing to take their share of this. There are agreements in NATO for all countries to achieve a 2 percent of GDP defense spending, and the President is putting a lot of pressure on countries to meet that.
A number of countries have stepped up. NATO’s receipts and spending are up about 8 percent this year, and others have put in commitments and plans to increase their defense spending. This will give NATO a stronger defense posture to deal with threats from the south, which is an area we’ve asked NATO to focus on, counterterrorism, because European countries are – feel the greatest effects of the transmigration that has occurred as a result of ISIS, and also threats from the east, from Russia, which brings me to Russia.
I think the President has been quite clear that he views it as extremely important that the United States and Russia have a working relationship. Today we do not. And I’ve touched on areas where we are cooperating, in Syria. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is something that we cannot accept. As I’ve indicated to others in Europe last week, it’s one thing for countries to choose sides in conflicts. Russia wanted to choose the side of Bashar al-Assad; we chose not to. But when you invade another country and take their territory, we cannot – that cannot be left to stand. And that is the basis for the very stringent sanctions regime that the U.S. and Europe imposed on Russia as a result of that invasion, and that regime will not change until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is resolved and Ukraine’s territorial integrity is returned.
We are engaged in attempting to break the logjam for east Ukraine to implement the Minsk accords. These talks were frozen when the President took office. In our first meetings – in my first meeting with President Putin, he asked if we would appoint someone to work directly to – with him, with the Kremlin to see if we could restart these talks or restart some movement. I appointed former NATO Ambassador Kurt Volker to take that task on. The task we’re working on immediately is – and we’re focused on east Ukraine because the violence in east Ukraine continues. But we have higher incidents of civilian casualties and deaths in 2017 than we had in 2016, incidents of ceasefire violations are up 60 percent, and we must get the violence down in east Ukraine. And so our priority is to end the violence, stop the killing that’s going on in east Ukraine, and we are working with Russia to see if we can come to some agreement on the mandate for a UN peacekeeping force that will bring this violence to an end. Then we can turn to the other elements that have to be implemented.
The government in Kyiv has much to do to continue their own reforms and to meet their obligations under Minsk. Russia has to use its influence on the rebel forces it is supporting in east Ukraine to end this violence and move us back towards progress under the Minsk accords. We will return to the issue of Crimea. I know that President Putin’s made it clear that that’s not on the table for discussion. It will be at some point. But today, we want to stop the violence in east Ukraine and let’s see if we can solve that one.
In other areas with Russia, we are looking for possible cooperations where we have joint counterterrorism interest. We know we’re going to have to continue to deal with Russia’s hybrid warfare. We felt it in our elections and we now have reports from many European countries that they’re seeing the same effects. It is something I do not understand about why Russia thinks it’s in its interest to disrupt the free and fair elections of other countries. What do you hope to achieve? I don’t understand it and no one’s been able to answer that question for me. But we make it clear that we see it, it needs to end, it needs to stop, and it too stands in the way of renormalizing our relationships.
We maintain a very active dialogue with our Russian counterparts, very strong mil-to-mil dialogue, very strong diplomatic dialogue. And so we’re going to keep that dialogue underway, but as we’ve said to our Russian counterparts, we need some good news. We need something good to happen in this relationship, and today we can’t point to anything. We’re waiting. We’re waiting.
So lastly, in the Western Hemisphere, the things that we’ve been concerned with are obviously migration from Central America, from Mexico, transcriminal organizations, the narcotics trade in particular, which also supports human trafficking trade. But we do see many other opportunities with Central and South America. We have developed strong transcriminal organization dialogues with Mexico. We’re hosting another round this week at the ministerial level. We co-hosted an event in Miami this year to – on Central American security and prosperity. And we are working together on the situation in Venezuela, both through the OAS and through the Lima Group.
I could touch on Cuba and some other areas, but I’m not going to spend a lot of time there. I’m happy to take those in a question. And in Africa, our concentration has really been on two primary arenas: addressing the emergence of potential terrorism organizations in Africa, but also addressing the humanitarian crisis that we’re facing in the Sudan and other regions of Africa.
So it’s been a really busy year. It’s interesting to me that some people seem to want to observe that there’s nothing happening at the State Department because I’m walking through this hollowed-out building and listening to the echoes of the heels of my shoes as I walk down the halls. (Laughter.) I had a great town hall this morning with the State Department, all of our State Department colleagues. We talked about the year in review. We talked about the redesign of the State Department. And yes, I have a lot of open positions. I have nominees for them. I’d love to get them in place. It makes a big difference.
But I want to tell you the quality of the individuals and the career people at the State Department, the career Foreign Service officers, the people that have served in ambassadorial roles – they’re dedicated to the mission and they’re stepping up into these roles. They may be in an acting role. They own it. They dive right into these issues. They have been nothing but supportive of the President’s policies, the pivots that had to be made. And I know this is not easy for many of them because they’ve been executing a policy under the prior administration. We now are going to go a different direction. But I want to tell you, their ability and their nimbleness to quickly get behind and understand what the President’s objectives and priorities are – and then we will work hard to deliver on that mission – that’s something everyone at the State Department understands, and we talked a lot about it this morning. I couldn’t be more proud of their accomplishments. All these issues I just touched with – I went through and touched on with you – there has been some bureau over there working on this throughout this year to reposition the President’s policies and to execute against those. I feel very, very confident with the team we have in place now, and it’s only going to get stronger as we add some more people to it.
But I’m going to stop there and sit down with Stephen Hadley, my old friend, and we’ll have a conversation about what he wants to talk about, which may be more what you wanted to talk about. But I think the important thing I would say – and as I made that quick walk-around – I can take almost any two or three of those and we could put them on a whiteboard, and every one of them touches the other. And so a lot of people – it’s interesting when I have conversations with people about, well, what are you getting done in a particular arena, is to compartmentalize. And this is not a world that lends itself to compartmentalization any longer. There’s too many interconnections, there’s too many intersections, and recognizing those is important if you’re really going to solve some of these and solve them once and for all.
So it takes a little longer. It’s hard work. But that is the nature of diplomacy today in this very complicated world we find ourselves in, which has far too much conflict going on. Our mission in life is to calm down and put an end to some of these conflicts. As I tell people at the State Department, I’ve told others, the first question I ask myself every morning when I get up: How can I save a life today? Because we’ve got too many lives being lost in too many conflicts. Thank you. (Applause.)
MR HADLEY: Well, that was terrific.
SECRETARY TILLERSON: It was a jog. (Laughter.)
MR HADLEY: It was terrific, and it’s good to see you on a stage explaining the policies of this administration. I travel a lot around the country and around the world, and it’s the questions on everybody’s lips: What is the Trump administration on – policy on X, Y, and Z? And you’ve set it out in a very convincing way, and I must say, without the burden of a prepared text, which really shows your mastery of the issues. So congratulations, and it’s good to see you out communicating more. The country and the world wants to hear it and nobody can do it better than you.
I also want to point out that I think you’ve put a stake in the heart of this notion this is – administration does not believe in alliances. That’s been plaguing the administration for a while, and I think you made it very clear that you recognize that alliances are a unique resource for this country and something that you intend to use very actively in your diplomacy.
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Indeed.
MR HADLEY: The record on ISIS is obviously an impressive one. We have about 15 minutes before the Secretary has to leave, which is not a lot of time, and there are a number of questions that’s come in. So I’m going to try to group some of these questions together --
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Sure.
MR HADLEY: -- maybe get three or four of them, and let you go on your way.
Since this is a conference focused on South Korea and Asia, we should probably start with North Korea. I have probably 10 questions on that subject. They center on two things which I’d like to cover with you: One, how optimistic are you about being able to achieve denuclearization through diplomacy? And if you’re optimistic, then when do we start the diplomacy? There’s a view out among some that in fact the administration is and should be letting the pressure build on North Korea – ramping up the sanctions, putting pressure on China to put more pressure on North Korea, getting Russia into the tent so they don’t substitute for what China might be cutting off. And that may be the right approach, but in your view, when do we get to the negotiations? And is there any precondition? And the one, of course, people are concerned about: North Korea says they will not come to the table to talk about denuclearization; our position is that’s the only thing worth talking about.
How do you get over that? So can you talk about how the diplomatic process might unfold?
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, first I would say the diplomacy is underway. It has been underway. In fact, the entire sanctions regime, the pressure campaign, that is a piece of diplomacy, is – it is how to create an understanding on the part of the North Koreans that the world does not accept this, so that they understand that if they continue, the isolation just continues. So that in and of itself is diplomacy, and it was – and was a very deliberate decision taken at the outset of the policy itself, is that simply picking up the phone and calling Kim Jong-un back in February when – and March when we first were developing this and saying, “Hey, we really don’t like those nuclear tests you’re doing. Can we sit down and talk,” probably was not going to get anyone to the table.
So I think we took the view and we looked at the past efforts and talks, and the President has touched on this many times, that others – we’ve looked at what others tried and failed, and the North Koreans have been masters at always gaming those talks. And they have never proven to be a reliable counterparty. So we decided we were going to undertake this very intensive campaign of sanctions this time, but it was only going to be successful if first we built up very broad international participation. So this wasn’t just about the United States and a few other countries, but it was very broad-based in its participation, and it had to have the active engagement of China and Russia in a very serious way. And this really was the beginning of discussions with China, and much of the decision to go forward hinged on China’s telling us they would participate. And I will tell you, in our judgment, they have participated; they are fully implementing the sanctions. That’s why it is having an effect.
The President would like to see China cut the oil off. The last time the North Koreans came to the table, it was because China cut the oil off. Three days later, the North Koreans were at the table talking. And the President feels we’re really at that stage. So he’s putting a lot of pressure on the Chinese to do more with respect to oil.
When do the talks begin? We’ve said from the diplomatic side we’re ready to talk anytime North Korea would like to talk, and we’re ready to have the first meeting without precondition. Let’s just meet and let’s – we can talk about the weather if you want. We can talk about whether it’s going to be a square table or a round table if that’s what you’re excited about. But can we at least sit down and see each other face to face? And then we can begin to lay out a map, a roadmap of what we might be willing to work towards. I don’t think – it’s not realistic to say we’re only going to talk if you come to the table ready to give up your program. They have too much invested in it. And the President is very realistic about that as well.
And so it’s really about how do you even begin the process of engagement, because we’re dealing with a new leader in North Korea that no one’s ever engaged with. And he clearly is not like his father nor is he like his grandfather, and we don’t know a whole lot about what it will be like to engage with him. And that’s why I think my expectations of how to start are really framed around, first, I have to know who my counterpart is. I have to know something about them. I have to understand how do they process, how do they think. Because getting to an agreement, as all of us know, in negotiations means a willingness to talk about a lot of things. Let’s just put a lot of things on the table. And what do you want to put on the table? And we’ll tell you what we want to put on the table. And the important thing is that we get started.
The only – if there was any condition at all to this, it’s that, look, it’s going to be tough to talk if in the middle of our talks, you decide to test another device. It’s going to be difficult to talk if in the middle of our talks, you decide to fire another one off. So I think they clearly understand that if we’re going to talk, we have to have a period of quiet. We’ve got to have a period of quiet or it’s going to be very difficult to have productive discussions.
And so we continue to indicate to them we need a period of quiet. You need to tell us you want to talk. The door is open. But we’ll show up when you tell us you’re ready to talk.
MR HADLEY: Right. Let me ask you a second question. There is a lot of talk about use of force. Some people have said the likelihood of a use of force in a conflict on the peninsula is at 40 percent. I sometimes puckishly say to people, well, that’s an indication – that people are talking in that way is an indication of the success of the President’s policies, because he’s really convinced people that solving this problem is really important and it is part of the way of getting attention of both North Korea and China. On the other hand, there are a lot of people who have written risks and concerns, and a concern, for example, with someone like Kim Jong-un, who we do not know and who’s been pretty isolated, that he might at some point think the United States is coming for him militarily and then preempt.
So how do you look at this issue of the likelihood of military force when we hear from administration folk – spokesmen that there are military options? What are they talking about?
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, I think any successful diplomatic effort of this nature has to be backed up with some type of a military alternative, and it can’t just be a threat. It has to be a credible alternative. And the President also requested that from the outset, that the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea – now, I know many people have asked the question of, well, why can’t you live with a containment strategy? You lived with it with Russia; you lived with it with China; you lived with it with others. And the difference is that the past behavior of North Korea, it’s clear to us that they would not just use the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. This would become a commercial activity for them. Because we already see elements of it in the commercial marketplace. And in a world we live in today where our greatest threats are non-state actors, we simply cannot accept that. We can’t accept a nation that has no established record of abiding by any kind of international norms. That certainly was not the case with the Soviet Union. It’s certainly not the case with China. It’s certainly not the case with other nuclear countries that possess nuclear weapons. These are countries that have a history of abiding by certain international norms. North Korea has no such record. In fact, their record is quite contrary to that. And that’s the reason the President and I agree with his assessment that we simply cannot accept a nuclear-armed North Korea, and I think that’s why it is the policy of the neighborhood as well.
So it is important that the diplomatic effort be backed up by a very credible military alternative. And yes, there are – there are multiple military options that have been developed to deal with a failure on my part. That’s why I say we’re going to work hard to not fail. And the President wants that, and he has encouraged our diplomatic efforts. But I think he also takes his responsibilities to protect the U.S. and our allies from this kind of a threat seriously, and he intends to ensure that they do not have a deliverable nuclear weapon to the shores of the United States.
MR HADLEY: We’re running out of time and a lot of subjects we could cover. I’m going to stay on this one to try to cover it intensively and give you two things to respond to, and then we’ll wrap it up. One is respect to China. A number of people say that China is concerned that if it puts too much pressure on North Korea, the regime will collapse. That means refugees going across the border, and maybe the United States and South Korean forces moving into North Korean territory. And there have been a lot of people who have talked about the need for a strategic conversation at high levels with China to get an understanding about what would happen and not happen on the part of China and the United States in the event of those contingencies.
You’ve been public about some noes that I think have been reassuring. What are the prospects? Is the U.S.-China relationship – and I’m not asking you to go into any details – but is the U.S.-China relationship at a point where that kind of discussion is possible? And secondly, we haven’t talked about Russia because the more pressure China puts on North Korea and cuts off resources, it’s a potential that Russia would come in and fill those. Is Russia on side in this effort? And can you talk a little bit about the diplomacy with Russia regarding North Korea?
SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, let me address the Chinese question first. And one of the real values of these new high-level dialogues and the diplomatic and strategic dialogue that Secretary Mattis and I chair with our counterparts, and we actually have included Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Dunford, General Dunford, and his counterparts from China as well. These are the subjects of these dialogues, and to try – for us to gain an understanding of, first, how credible do we think the Chinese concern is about a mass flow of refugees across the border in the event of a regime collapse. China is taking steps to prepare for such an eventuality. I think it is something that they can manage. I don’t think the threat is as significant as perhaps others view it. I don’t want to be dismissive of it, but it’s not an unmanageable situation. And they already are taking preparatory actions for such an event.
We also have to – have had conversations about in the event that something happened – it could happen internal to North Korea; it might be nothing that we from the outside initiate – that if that unleashed some kind of instability, the most important thing to us would be securing those nuclear weapons they’ve already developed and ensuring that they – that nothing falls into the hands of people we would not want to have it. We’ve had conversations with the Chinese about how might that be done.
The four noes that I articulated in that first trip to Asia were intentional: that we do not seek regime change; we do not seek regime collapse; we do not seek an accelerated unification of the Korean Peninsula; we do not seek a reason to send our own military forces north of the demilitarized zone. We have had conversations that if something happened and we had to go across a line, we have given the Chinese assurances we would go back and retreat back to the south of the 38th parallel when whatever the conditions that caused that to happen. That is our commitment we made to them.
Our only objective is to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and that is all. And out of that and out of these discussions, perhaps we can create a different future for the North Korean people because the one they have right now is pretty dismal.
As to Russia’s participation, Russia has been very supportive of the UN Security Council resolutions. They could have vetoed them. They could have blocked them, but they didn't. I think on the sanctions implementation, it’s not as clear to us how fully those are being implemented. We know there are some violations. They’re not hard to see. We see what they are, and we, in particular, have had – I’ve had many conversations with Foreign Minister Lavrov about specific issues that we see that we would ask that they close those off. Forced labor is one in particular. There are a large number – something around 35,000 – North Koreans working in Russia to date. Russia has a labor shortage. They have economic development in the east in particular that they’re undertaking. So I understand why they have an economic stake in this. But it is also undermining the effectiveness of the sanctions. So we do talk very specifically with our Russian counterparts about what we ask that they do.
By and large at the Security Council, again, they’ve been very supportive of the sanctions. They voiced their view of how effective they think those may be. But we do need Russia’s support. And when we get to the point that we’re actually going to start solving this problem, we’re going to need everyone in the neighborhood, I call it. And it’s going to be important, obviously, first and foremost, to our allies in the Republic of Korea, but it’s going to be important to Japan, Russia, China, everyone is there to help ensure success around a diplomatic talk – around diplomatic talks.
MR HADLEY: We’ve come to the end of our program. I want to thank our Korean participants and partner, the Korea Foundation, and the Atlantic Council, of course. And a special – especially Dr. Miyeon Oh for her brilliant work in setting all this up today. I want to thank you all for coming, and please join me in thanking Secretary Tillerson for being with us. (Applause.)
DoC. USITC. 12/13/2017. U.S. Department of Commerce Issues Affirmative Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination on Cast Iron Soil Pipe Fittings from the People's Republic of China
Today, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross announced the affirmative preliminary determination in the countervailing duty (CVD) investigation of imports of cast iron soil pipe fittings from China.
“The Trump Administration will not sit back and watch as American companies and workers are harmed by unfair government subsidies,” said Secretary Ross. “The United States is committed to free, fair and reciprocal trade, and will continue to validate the information provided to us that brought us to this decision.”
The Commerce Department preliminarily determined that exporters from China received countervailable subsidies of 8.66 to 102.31 percent.
As a result of today’s decision, Commerce will instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to collect cash deposits from importers of cast iron soil pipe fittings from China based on these preliminary rates.
In 2016, imports of cast iron soil pipe fittings from China were valued at an estimated $8.6 million.
The petitioner is the Cast Iron Soil Pipe Institute (IL), the members of which are AB&I Foundry (CA), Charlotte Pipe & Foundry (NC), and Tyler Pipe (TX).
Enforcement of U.S. trade law is a prime focus of the Trump administration. From January 20, 2017, through December 11, 2017, Commerce has initiated 79 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations – a 52 percent increase from 52 initiations in the previous year.
The CVD law provides U.S. businesses and workers with an internationally accepted mechanism to seek relief from the harmful effects of foreign government unfair subsidization of imports into the United States. Commerce currently maintains 412 antidumping and countervailing duty orders which provide relief to American companies and industries impacted by unfair trade.
Commerce is currently scheduled to announce its final CVD determination on or about April 24, 2018. If Commerce makes an affirmative final determination and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) makes an affirmative final injury determination, Commerce will issue a CVD order. If Commerce makes a negative final determination or the ITC makes a negative final determination of injury, the investigation will be terminated and no order will be issued.
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Enforcement and Compliance unit within the International Trade Administration is responsible for vigorously enforcing U.S. trade laws and does so through an impartial, transparent process that abides by international law and is based solely on factual evidence.
Imports from companies that receive unfair subsidies from their governments in the form of grants, loans, equity infusions, tax breaks, and production inputs are subject to “countervailing duties” aimed at directly countering those subsidies.
Fact sheet: https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-prc-cast-iron-soil-pipe-fittings-cvd-prelim-121317.pdf
FED. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. Com expectativa de alta de juros, Fed pode dar indicações de efeitos de reforma tributária nos EUA
Por Howard Schneider
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - O Federal Reserve deve elevar a taxa de juros nesta quarta-feira, porém, mais do que isso, deve dar a mais forte indicação sobre como a reforma tributária da administração Trump pode afetar a economia dos Estados Unidos.
Os investidores vão observar com atenção como o banco central norte-americano buscará pesar um impulso econômico alimentado por estímulo diante da inflação e do crescimento do salário fracos que tem contido o apetite de algumas autoridades por juros mais altos.
O comunicado de política monetária do Fed e suas projeções serão divulgados às 17h (horário de Brasília), após dois dias de reuniões. A chair do Fed, Janet Yellen, dará entrevista à imprensa meia hora depois, sua última antes do final de seu mandato no início do próximo ano.
O sucessor dela, o diretor do Fed Jerome Powell, afirmou em sua recente audiência de confirmação no Senado que não tem a “sensação de uma economia superaquecida”, em um sinal de que pode não querer acelerar o ritmo de altas de juros até que haja evidências de uma aceleração da inflação e do aumento dos salários.
O Fed aumentou os juros duas vezes em 2017 e a expectativa atual é de mais três altas no próximo ano.
Grande parte do mandato de Yellen à frente do Fed foi marcada por um desejo de manter a política monetária frouxa por mais tempo possível na expectativa de que o desemprego continuasse a cair, que o trabalhadores voltassem à força de trabalho e que os salários subissem.
Powell, que trabalhou próximo a Yellen, disse sentir que esse processo ainda tem espaço.
Dados altistas recentes, como ganhos sólidos de emprego e um salto no crescimento econômico, levaram alguns analistas a especular que as novas projeções do banco central refletirão uma expectativa de quatro altas dos juros no próximo ano.
Também há sinais de que a inflação pode estar se firmando após uma longa fraqueza, após a alta dos preços terem permanecido persistentemente abaixo da meta do banco central de 2 por cento apesar da força do mercado de trabalho.
O plano tributário proposto pelo presidente Donald Trump, incluindo a redução no imposto corporativo, pode ajudar mais a economia dos EUA se for aprovado no Congresso, o que parece provável.
________________
ORGANISMS
IMF. December 13, 2017. Propping Up the Chinese Economy: Credit versus Fiscal Stimulus
By Sophia Chen and Lev Ratnovski
Credit booms are addictive. Credit supports growth and the perception of wealth. Yet credit booms are risky, and are often followed by financial busts and economic slowdowns. The challenge is taming credit without hurting growth.
Mainland China is experiencing a major credit boom. As of end-2016, total social financing—a broad measure of credit—exceeded 200 percent of GDP. The credit-to-GDP gap—a measure of financial vulnerability—is the second highest among 44 economies covered by BIS (after Hong Kong SAR).
How did credit growth contribute to output growth in China? Has credit allocation worsened as the economy became saturated with credit? Can output growth be supported by other means, such as fiscal stimulus?
These questions are critical for effective policy making in China today. But answering them rigorously is difficult. This is because credit and fiscal stance not only affect output growth but are also affected by it. Consequently, simple statistical methods may over- or under-estimate the true causal effects of credit or fiscal stance on output.
Recent IMF research deals with this challenge using an “instrumental variables” approach. The idea is based on the observation that provincial leaders tend to use more credit and fiscal stimulus later in their tenure independently of local economic conditions—possibly because higher growth outcomes increase the chances of their retention and/or promotion. The results are striking.
The paper estimates that, historically, credit indeed supported output growth in China. In 2001-2008, GDP increased by 2 percent in response to a 10-percentage point change in the ratio of credit to initial GDP. However, by 2010-2015, the effect of credit on output growth fell to almost zero. This might be the consequence of the economy becoming saturated with credit, with new credit being allocated inefficiently—for example to overheated housing markets , inefficient state-owned enterprises , or local government financing vehicles . The results suggest that, at present, credit cannot effectively support further growth of the Chinese economy.
In contrast, the paper finds that fiscal stimulus may be powerful, assuming it is done correctly. The fiscal multiplier for on-budget expenditure was 1.4 in 2010-2015. In other words, GDP increased by 1.4 percent in response to a 1-percentage point change in the ratio of on-budget expenditure to initial GDP. This multiplier is high in international comparison, and is also higher than the historic 0.7 multiplier in China in 2001-2008. Therefore, fiscal policy can effectively support growth in the face of possible shocks, including those caused by lower credit growth .
There are three caveats to our analysis. First, the off-budget expenditure fiscal multiplier is likely lower than the on-budget expenditure fiscal multiplier that we estimate. Consequently, the fiscal multiplier for a mix of on- and off-budget expenditure is also lower than our estimates. Future fiscal policy should be on-budget to be most effective.
Second, fiscal priorities matter. Historically, much of fiscal stimulus targeted infrastructure and manufacturing-related spending. As the IMF recently suggested , future fiscal stimulus should prioritize social expenditure and transfers, to foster the continued rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards services.
Third, credit allocation matters. While the overall effect of credit on growth appears very low, prudent credit to efficient firms remains desirable and growth-supporting.
Overall, the results of our analysis support the Chinese authorities' recent efforts toward addressing financial sector risks. These efforts, as well as the potential additional policies aimed at strengthening them, are reviewed in the recently completed IMF's Financial System Stability Assessment for China.
FULL DOCUMENT: https://blogs.imf.org/2017/12/12/propping-up-the-chinese-economy-credit-versus-fiscal-stimulus/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
THE WORLD BANK. December 12, 2017. World Bank Group Announcements at One Planet Summit
Paris, 12 December, 2017 - At the One Planet Summit convened by President Emmanuel Macron of France, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank Group made a number of new announcements in line with its ongoing support to developing countries for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement’s goals.
1. WBG and upstream oil and gas
As a global multilateral development institution, the World Bank Group is continuing to transform its own operations in recognition of a rapidly changing world. To align its support to countries to meet their Paris goals:
The World Bank Group will no longer finance upstream oil and gas, after 2019.
(In exceptional circumstances, consideration will be given to financing upstream gas in the poorest countries where there is a clear benefit in terms of energy access for the poor and the project fits within the countries’ Paris Agreement commitments.)
2. Ramping up WBG climate ambition through its Climate Change Action Plan
The WBG is on track to meet its target of 28% of its lending going to climate action by 2020 and to meeting the goals of its Climate Change Action Plan - developed following the Paris Agreement.
In line with countries submitting updated and potentially more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the World Bank Group will present a stock-take of its Climate Change Action Plan and announce new commitments and targets beyond 2020 at COP24 in Poland in 2018.
3. Transparency and disclosure to drive our own decarbonization
The World Bank Group is working hard to ensure that climate accountability is mainstreamed throughout its operations. In addition to measures already in place:
I) Starting next year, the World Bank Group will report greenhouse gas emissions from the investment projects it finances in key emissions-producing sectors, such as energy. The results will be published in late 2018, and annually thereafter.
II) The World Bank will be applying a shadow price on carbon in the economic analysis of all IBRD/IDA projects in key high-emitting sectors where design has begun since July 2017. IFC started using carbon pricing in key sectors in January 2017 and will mainstream the same starting January 2018"
4. Mobilizing Finance for transformation in mitigation and climate resilience
To accelerate the mobilization of finance:
I) IFC will invest up to $325 million in the Green Cornerstone Bond Fund, a partnership with Amundi, to create the largest ever green-bond fund dedicated to emerging markets. This is a $2 billion initiative aiming to deepen local capital markets, and expand and unlock private funding for climate-related projects. The fund is already subscribed at over $1 billion.
II) Last week, the World Bank and the Government of Egypt signed a $1.15 billion development policy loan aimed at reducing fossil fuel subsidies and creating the environment for low-carbon energy development.
III) The World Bank Group will continue to support investments highlighted at the One Planet Summit which demonstrate opportunities to crowd in different kinds of finance in transformational areas. This includes accelerating energy efficiency in India; scaling up solar energy in Ethiopia, Pakistan and Senegal among other countries; establishing a West Africa Coastal Areas investment platform to build resilience for coastlines of West African countries (partnering with WAEMU, NDF, GEF, GFDRR, AFD, AfDB); and introducing the City Resilience Platform (partnering with the Global Covenant of Mayors) so that up to 500 cities will have access to finance for resilience to climate change.
IV) The World Bank Group will continue to work with the United Nations and other partners on the implementation of the Invest4Climate platform, which will systematically crowd in multiple sources of finance, with a major event showcasing investment opportunities planned for May 2018 at the Innovate4Climate conference in Frankfurt.
V) IFC will work to set a single unifying global standard on green bonds, similar to the Equator Principles, as a means to facilitate the development of the green bond market to crowd in private finance into climate business. And to stimulate the greening of the financial sector, the World Bank Group will partner with the Sustainable Banking Network (SBN) to provide technical support to develop and implement national Roadmaps for Sustainable Finance in six countries. These roadmaps are based on a framework developed jointly with UN Environment.
VI) AXA Managed Co-Lending Portfolio Program (MCPP) will allocate a substantial portion of projects to climate-smart infrastructure investments. IFC and Finland launched the Finland-IFC Climate Change Program, a €114 million returnable capital contribution to spur private sector financing for climate-change solutions,targeting low-income countries focused on investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, green buildings, climate-smart agriculture, and forestry.
5. Working in partnership
To further accelerate climate action, the World Bank Group will be working with various partners to deepen climate action:
I) For the first time, all the Multilateral Development Banks and all International Development Finance Club Members issued a joint statement aligning their finance with the Paris Agreement and identifying areas where they will work together to advance climate-smart development.
II) Canada and the World Bank will work together to accelerate the energy transition in developing countries and, together with the International Trade Union Confederation, will provide analysis to support efforts towards a just transition away from coal.
III) Working with France’s AFD and the Kingdom of Morocco, the World Bank will work to accelerate adaptation in agriculture for Africa.
IV) The World Bank will support a unique partnership between Caribbean leaders and people, multilateral organizations, and local and international private sector to define a vision for the world’s first climate-smart zone. The key priority areas for action include renewable energy, resilient infrastructure, innovative financing, and capacity building.
V) The World Bank Group will support, through the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, the proposed Carbon Markets of the Americas initiative.
VI) Together with Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, the United Kingdom and other government, NGO and private sector partners so far, the World Bank will support the new InsuResilience Global Partnership with the goal of significantly scaling up climate risk finance and insurance solutions in developing countries, with a focus on poor and vulnerable people. It will stimulate the creation of effective climate risk insurance markets and the smart use of insurance-related schemes to protect lives and livelihoods from the impacts of disasters. More than $125million has been committed to the initiative so far. It is built on strong G20 and V20 support and has 40 members so far.
VII) The Principles on Blended Concessional Finance, first published in 2013, have been recently enhanced with more detailed guidelines developed by a working group (chaired by IFC) representing Development Finance Initiatives (DFIs) that annually invest more than $35 billion a year in private sector solutions. These principles include promoting commercially sustainable solutions so that the use of scarce public concessional finance is minimized; and state the need for high social, environmental, and governance standards.
FULL DOCUMENT: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-summit?cid=ECR_E_NewsletterWeekly_EN_EXT&deliveryName=DM1613
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ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA/BRAZIL ECONOMICS
BACEN. Apresentação do Presidente do Banco Central, Ilan Goldfajn, na coletiva Um Ano de BC+, no Edifício Sede do Banco Central em Brasília.
DOCUMENTO: http://www.bcb.gov.br/conteudo/home-ptbr/TextosApresentacoes/Apresentacao_Presidente_Ilan_Coletiva_BCmais_primeiro%20ano_13122017.pdf
BACEN. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. Economia brasileira tem vários colchões disponíveis para volatilidade com eleições, diz Ilan
Por Marcela Ayres
BRASÍLIA (Reuters) - A economia brasileira está se recuperando e tem vários colchões disponíveis para atravessar qualquer volatilidade futura por conta das eleições, avaliou nesta quarta-feira o presidente do Banco Central, Ilan Goldfajn, defendendo ainda os benefícios para a economia de uma inflação possivelmente abaixo do piso da meta neste ano.
Bastante questionado sobre as eleições presidenciais de 2018, Ilan citou conforto com os atuais níveis da inflação, das reservas internacionais e dos swaps cambiais.
“Começar o ano com inflação abaixo da meta é um colchão. Começar o ano com expectativas ancoradas para todos os anos é um colchão”, disse ele, afirmando que não faria comentários sobre a eleição porque a contribuição do BC é de “instituição técnica e neutra”.
A respeito da possibilidade de a inflação fechar o ano abaixo de 3 por cento, Ilan defendeu o lado positivo do legado. No último encontro de política monetária, o BC reduziu a projeção de inflação pelo cenário de mercado a 2,9 por cento em 2017, abaixo do piso da meta oficial deste ano --de 4,5 por cento pelo IPCA, com margem de 1,5 ponto percentual para mais ou menos.
“Considero que a inflação ter chegado a 2,9, 2,8 por cento é um grande ativo para a sociedade brasileira. O poder de compra aumentou. Em conjunto, permitiu a queda da taxa de juros a níveis mínimos históricos e contribuiu para a recuperação da economia”, disse ele.
Na mais recente pesquisa Focus, feita pelo BC junto a uma centena de economistas, a expectativa para o IPCA neste ano caiu a 2,88 por cento. Se o índice terminar 2017 abaixo de 3 por cento, será a primeira vez desde a criação do regime de metas que a inflação fica abaixo do piso e Ilan terá de justificar o resultado em carta aberta.
O presidente do BC voltou a pontuar que a inflação mais baixa neste ano teve relação com o choque deflacionário dos preços dos alimentos e que a política monetária não deve reagir diretamente ao movimento.
“Não se tenta combater queda de preços de itens que o BC não tem controle tentando subir o preço daqueles que o BC tem controle”, afirmou.
Ele também enfatizou que os ajustes e reformas do governo, em particular a da Previdência, são fundamentais para o equilíbrio da economia. A continuidade desse cenário, afirmou Ilan, garantirá trajetória de juros mais baixos.
No início do mês, o BC cortou a Selic em 0,5 ponto percentual, à mínima histórica de 7 por cento ao ano, deixando a porta aberta para nova redução adiante, mas ressalvando que encarará a investida com “cautela”.
Isso porque o BC deixou claro que os passos seguintes estão mais sensíveis a eventuais mudanças no cenário de riscos o que, para analistas, foi uma sinalização sobre como será o desfecho da reforma da Previdência.
Durante a coletiva, Ilan fez um balanço da atuação do BC em 2017, que considerou um ano “proveitoso” em termos macroeconômicos. Dentre as ações já divulgadas e que ainda não foram endereçadas pela autoridade monetária, Ilan afirmou que o BC segue estudando projeto para sua autonomia operacional.
Para ele, essa é uma investida que tende a reduzir o prêmio de risco da economia “com custo fiscal nenhum”.
Ilan também afirmou que o BC irá trabalhar para diminuir o custo do cartão de débito e fazer estudo sobre níveis estruturais de compulsórios, ambas novidades em relação às medidas apresentadas até então na Agenda BC+.
Reportagem adicional de Bruno Federowski
Previdência é fundamental para equilíbrio da economia, diz Ilan
BRASÍLIA (Reuters) - O presidente do Banco Central, Ilan Goldfajn, afirmou nesta quarta-feira que os ajustes e reformas do governo, em particular a da Previdência, são fundamentais para o equilíbrio da economia.
Em coletiva de imprensa, Ilan fez um balanço das ações do BC em 2017, que considerou um ano proveitoso em termos macroeconômicos. Sobre ações da agenda do BC que ainda não foram endereçadas, Ilan afirmou que a autoridade monetária segue estudando projeto para sua autonomia operacional.
Ele também pontuou que o BC irá trabalhar para reduzir o custo do cartão de débito e fazer estudo sobre níveis estruturais de compulsórios, ambas novidades em relação às medidas apresentadas até então.
IBGE. 13/12/2017. Em outubro, vendas no varejo recuam 0,9%
Em outubro de 2017, o comércio varejista nacional caiu (-0,9%) frente ao mês imediatamente anterior, na série livre de influências sazonais, após acréscimo de 0,3% em setembro último. Com isso, a média móvel trimestral para o volume de vendas no varejo recuou de -0,1% (trimestre encerrado em setembro de 2017) para -0,4% (trimestre encerrado em outubro de 2017).
Na série sem ajuste sazonal, no confronto com igual mês do ano anterior, o total do comércio varejista cresceu 2,5% em outubro de 2017, sétima taxa positiva seguida, porém em menor magnitude que a registrada em setembro (6,2%). O volume de vendas acumulado no ano foi de 1,4% e o acumulado nos últimos 12 meses teve variação de 0,3% em outubro, registrando o primeiro resultado positivo desde abril de 2015 (0,2%).
O comércio varejista ampliado (inclui veículos, motos, partes e peças e de Material de construção) recuou (-1,4%) em relação a setembro de 2017, após crescer por quatro meses consecutivos, período em que o varejo ampliado acumulou ganho de 3,5%, na série com ajuste sazonal. Frente a outubro de 2016, o varejo ampliado avançou 7,5%, sexta taxa positiva consecutiva, e com isso acumulando de janeiro-outubro 3,2%. O acumulado nos últimos 12 meses teve a primeira alta (1,4%) desde agosto de 2014 (0,6%).
Período
|
Varejo
|
Varejo Ampliado
| ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
Volume de vendas
|
Receita nominal
|
Volume de vendas
|
Receita nominal
| |
Outubro / Setembro*
|
-0,9
|
-0,5
|
-1,4
|
-1,4
|
Média móvel trimestral*
|
-0,4
|
0,1
|
-0,2
|
0,1
|
Outubro 2017 / Outubro 2016
|
2,5
|
1,0
|
7,5
|
5,4
|
Acumulado 2017
|
1,4
|
1,9
|
3,2
|
3,1
|
Acumulado 12 meses
|
0,3
|
2,1
|
1,4
|
2,5
|
Cinco das oito atividades pesquisadas recuam de setembro para outubro
O recuo no volume de vendas do comércio varejista (-0,9%) na passagem de setembro para outubro de 2017 mostrou predomínio de resultados negativos, que alcançaram cinco das oito atividades pesquisadas.
Os maiores recuos foram em: Outros artigos de uso pessoal e doméstico (-3,5%), Tecidos, vestuário e calçados (-2,7%) e Móveis e eletrodomésticos (-2,3%). Hipermercados, supermercados, produtos alimentícios, bebidas e fumo, com variação 0,3%, recua após sequência de seis taxas positivas, período que acumulou ganho de 5,3% e Artigos farmacêuticos, médicos, ortopédicos, de perfumaria e cosméticos (-0,7%), após avanço de 3,3% em setembro.
Com avanço nas vendas frente a setembro de 2017, estão os seguintes setores: Equipamentos e material para escritório, informática e comunicação (3,4%) e Combustíveis e lubrificantes e Livros, jornais, revistas e papelaria, ambos com aumento de 2,4%.
O comportamento de queda do comércio varejista ampliado (-1,4%) em relação a setembro de 2017 também foi observado nas vendas de Veículos, motos, partes e peças (-1,9%) e Material de construção (-1,0%).
Na comparação com outubro de 2016, o volume do varejo avançou 2,5%, com seis das oito atividades registrando aumento nas vendas. Móveis e eletrodomésticos (10,1%), Hipermercados, supermercados, produtos alimentícios, bebidas e fumo (1,5%) e Artigos farmacêuticos, médicos, ortopédicos, de perfumaria e cosméticos (6,2%) exerceram, nessa ordem, as principais contribuições positivas para o resultado global.
| BRASIL - INDICADORES DO VOLUME DE VENDAS DO COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA E COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA AMPLIADO, SEGUNDO GRUPOS DE ATIVIDADES: PMC - Outubro 2017 | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ATIVIDADES | MÊS/MÊS ANTERIOR (1) | MÊS/IGUAL MÊS DO ANO ANTERIOR | ACUMULADO | |||||
| Taxa de Variação (%) | Taxa de Variação (%) | Taxa de Variação (%) | ||||||
| AGO | SET | OUT | AGO | SET | OUT | NO ANO | 12 MESES | |
| COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA (2) | -0,5 | 0,3 | -0,9 | 3,6 | 6,2 | 2,5 | 1,4 | 0,3 |
| 1 - Combustíveis e lubrificantes | -3,2 | -0,7 | 2,4 | -2,9 | -4,1 | -0,9 | -3,0 | -3,6 |
| 2 - Hiper, supermercados, prods. alimentícios, bebidas e fumo | 0,3 | 1,0 | -0,3 | 1,7 | 5,8 | 1,5 | 0,5 | 0,0 |
| 2.1 - Super e hipermercados | 0,2 | 0,9 | 0,0 | 1,4 | 6,0 | 2,2 | 0,8 | 0,1 |
| 3 - Tecidos, vest. e calçados | -3,3 | 0,7 | -2,7 | 9,4 | 12,5 | 4,7 | 7,6 | 3,3 |
| 4 - Móveis e eletrodomésticos | 1,1 | -1,2 | -2,3 | 16,5 | 16,6 | 10,1 | 9,0 | 5,2 |
| 4.1 - Móveis | - | - | - | 11,4 | 10,5 | 8,3 | -4,6 | -5,3 |
| 4.2 - Eletrodomésticos | - | - | - | 18,0 | 18,3 | 10,0 | 9,6 | 5,6 |
| 5 - Artigos farmaceuticos, med., ortop. e de perfumaria | -1,1 | 3,3 | -0,7 | 4,3 | 7,0 | 6,2 | 1,4 | 0,3 |
| 6 - Livros, jornais, rev. e papelaria | -3,3 | -3,8 | 2,4 | -4,4 | -6,5 | -2,8 | -3,6 | -5,3 |
| 7 - Equip. e mat. para escritório, informatica e comunicação | -9,9 | 2,1 | 3,4 | -2,7 | -3,0 | 5,2 | -0,6 | -1,4 |
| 8 - Outros arts. de uso pessoal e doméstico | -0,3 | 2,6 | -3,5 | 6,4 | 10,7 | 2,7 | 1,8 | 0,7 |
| COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA AMPLIADO (3) | 0,2 | 0,7 | -1,4 | 7,7 | 9,2 | 7,5 | 3,2 | 1,4 |
| 9 - Veículos e motos, partes e peças | 3,0 | -0,4 | -1,9 | 14,1 | 10,7 | 13,6 | 1,7 | -0,8 |
| 10- Material de construção | 2,1 | 0,5 | -1,0 | 13,0 | 15,5 | 18,6 | 8,6 | 6,6 |
| Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Serviços e Comércio. | ||||||||
| (1) Séries com ajuste sazonal. (2) O indicador do comércio varejista é composto pelos resultados das atividades numeradas de 1 a 8. (3) O indicador do comércio varejista ampliado é composto pelos resultados das atividades numeradas de 1 a 10 | ||||||||
Equipamentos e material para escritório, informática e comunicação (5,2%), Tecidos, vestuário e calçados (4,7%) e Outros artigos de uso pessoal e doméstico (2,7%) também pressionaram positivamente o resultado global. Combustíveis e lubrificantes (-0,9%) e Livros, jornais, revistas e papelaria (-2,8%) permaneceram influenciando negativamente.
O segmento de Móveis e eletrodomésticos, com crescimento de 10,1 % no volume de vendas em relação a outubro do ano passado, foi responsável pelo maior impacto positivo na no total do varejo de outubro de 2017. Em termos acumulados, os avanços foram de 9,0% de janeiro-outubro e de 5,2 % nos últimos 12 meses. A redução da taxa de juros no crédito à pessoa física, além do impacto positivo da melhora observada no mercado de trabalho influenciaram o comportamento positivo deste setor.
O setor de Hipermercados, supermercados, produtos alimentícios, bebidas e fumo, com avanço de 1,5% frente a outubro de 2016, exerceu o segundo maior impacto positivo. O desempenho desta atividade vem sendo beneficiado pelo crescimento da massa de rendimento real habitualmente recebida e pela deflação do preço dos alimentos em domicílio. A taxa acumulada no ano ficou em 0,5% e o acumulado em 12 meses, com variação nula, interrompeu 30 meses seguidos de taxas negativas.
A atividade de Artigos farmacêuticos, médicos, ortopédicos e de perfumaria, com aumento de 6,2%, foi a terceira maior contribuição na taxa global do varejo. No acumulado janeiro-outubro a taxa foi de 1,4%, enquanto o indicador acumulado nos últimos 12 meses, com variação de 0,3%, interrompeu 14 meses de taxas negativas.
| BRASIL - COMPOSIÇÃO DA TAXA MENSAL DO COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA, POR ATIVIDADES: PMC - Outubro 2017 (Indicadores de volume de vendas) | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Atividades | COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA | COMÉRCIO VAREJISTA AMPLIADO | ||
| Taxa de variação (%) | Composição absoluta da taxa (p.p.) | Taxa de variação (%) | Composição absoluta da taxa (p.p.) | |
| Taxa Global | 2,5 | 2,5 | 7,5 | 7,5 |
| 1 - Combustíveis e lubrificantes | -0,9 | -0,2 | -0,9 | 0,0 |
| 2 - Hiper, supermercados, prods. alimentícios, bebidas e fumo | 1,5 | 0,8 | 1,5 | 0,7 |
| 3 - Tecidos, vest. e calçados | 4,7 | 0,3 | 4,7 | 0,4 |
| 4 - Móveis e eletrodomésticos | 10,1 | 0,9 | 10,1 | 0,8 |
| 5 - Artigos farmaceuticos, med., ortop. e de perfumaria | 6,2 | 0,5 | 6,2 | 0,5 |
| 6 - Livros, jornais, rev. e papelaria | -2,8 | -0,1 | -2,8 | 0,0 |
| 7 - Equip. e mat. para escritório informatica e comunicação | 5,2 | 0,0 | 5,2 | 0,2 |
| 8 - Outros arts. de uso pessoal e doméstico | 2,7 | 0,3 | 2,7 | 0,4 |
| 9 - Veículos e motos, partes e peças | 13,6 | 2,8 | ||
| 10- Material de construção | 18,6 | 1,7 | ||
| Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Serviços e Comércio. | ||||
| Nota: A composição da taxa mensal corresponde à participação dos resultados setoriais na formação da taxa global. | ||||
A atividade Outros artigos de uso pessoal e doméstico, que engloba segmentos como lojas de departamentos, ótica, joalheria, artigos esportivos, brinquedos, etc., com aumento de 2,7% em relação a outubro de 2016, exerceu a quarta maior contribuição positiva. O acumulado de janeiro a outubro foi de 1,8% e acumulado nos últimos 12 meses (0,7%) voltou a mostrar resultado positivo, após 22 meses de variações negativas seguidas.
O setor de Tecidos, vestuário e calçados, com variação de 4,7% em relação a outubro do ano passado, foi também a quarta maior contribuição na composição da taxa geral do varejo. O acumulado no ano foi de 7,6% e nos últimos 12 meses, 3,3%. Com o aumento da massa de salário real e os preços de vestuário abaixo da média geral de preços, o desempenho da atividade permanece acima da média geral do varejo.
O segmento de Equipamentos e material para escritório, informática e comunicação avançou 5,2% sobre igual mês do ano anterior. As taxas acumuladas ficaram em -0,6% no ano e -1,4% nos últimos 12 meses.
Combustíveis e lubrificantes, com recuo de -0,9% no volume de vendas em relação a outubro de 2016, exerceu maior contribuição negativa no total do varejo. Em termos acumulados, as taxas da atividade foram de -3,0% para os dez primeiros meses do ano e de -3,6% para os últimos 12 meses. A elevação dos preços de combustíveis acima da variação média de preços, é fator relevante que vem influenciando negativamente o desempenho do setor.
A atividade de Livros, jornais, revistas e papelaria apresentou variação no volume de vendas de -2,8% sobre outubro de 2016, com taxas acumuladas de -3,6% nos dez primeiros meses do ano e de -5,3% nos últimos 12 meses. A trajetória de recuo desta atividade vem sendo influenciada pela perda gradual de espaço do impresso para o eletrônico, além do impacto da elevação dos preços acima da inflação.
Com avanço de 7,5% frente a outubro de 2016, o comércio varejista ampliado registrou a sexta taxa positiva, acumulando de janeiro a outubro aumento de 3,2% nas vendas. Já a taxa acumulada nos últimos 12 meses ficou em 1,4%. Esse desempenho refletiu, sobretudo, o comportamento das vendas de Veículos, motos, partes e peças, que apresentaram avanço de 13,6% sobre outubro de 2016, exercendo a principal contribuição para o resultado geral do varejo ampliado e acumulando variação de 1,7% de janeiro a outubro e -0,8% nos últimos 12 meses. A segunda maior contribuição veio do segmento de Material de construção, com variação de 18,6% em relação a outubro de 2016. Em termos acumulados, as taxas ficaram em 8,6% nos dez primeiros meses e 6,6% nos últimos 12 meses.
Entre setembro e outubro, vendas caem em 22 das 27 unidades da federação
De setembro para outubro de 2017, na série com ajuste sazonal, o comércio varejista registrou recuo em 22 das 27 Unidades da Federação, Roraima (-5,2%), Alagoas (-4,5%) e Mato Grosso (-3,3%) registraram as menores taxas em termos de magnitude. Já Minas Gerais (2,1%) se destacou entre os estados que registraram variações positivas.
Em comparação a outubro de 2016, os resultados das vendas no varejo foram positivos em todas as 27 Unidades da Federação, com destaque, em termos de magnitude, para Rondônia (14,4%), Santa Catarina (13,7%) e Mato Grosso do Sul (11,9%). Quanto à participação na composição da taxa do varejo, destacaram-se, por ordem de influência: Santa Catarina (13,7%) e Rio Grande do Sul (9,6%).
No comércio varejista ampliado, todas as 27 Unidades da Federação também apresentaram variações positivas na comparação com o mesmo período do ano anterior, com destaque, em termos de volume de vendas, para Tocantins (26,0%); Amazonas (18,8%); e Mato Grosso (17,9%). Quanto à participação na composição da taxa do varejo ampliado, destacaram-se São Paulo (6,6%) e Rio Grande do Sul (17,8%).
Comércio varia 0,3% em 12 meses e reverte tendência de queda
O comércio varejista reverteu, em outubro, a tendência de queda registrada desde abril de 2015, no acumulado em 12 meses. Esse indicador variou 0,3%, influenciado pelas vendas de artigos farmacêuticos (0,3%) e outros artigos de uso pessoal e doméstico (0,7%), que contemplam vendas online de lojas de departamento.
As informações são da Pesquisa Mensal de Comércio (PMC), divulgada hoje pelo IBGE. A PMC destacou ainda que, se por um lado o comércio varejista caiu 0,9% frente a setembro, por outro, cresceu 2,5% diante de outubro de 2016, a sétima taxa positiva consecutiva.
Gráfico da Pesquisa Mensal do Comércio
De acordo com a gerente da pesquisa, Isabella Nunes, esses resultados permitem identificar uma recuperação mais nítida no comércio varejista, apesar da queda na comparação com setembro: “Uma explicação possível é os consumidores terem postergado suas compras, uma vez que outubro antecede um mês marcado pelas promoções”.
O varejo ampliado, que inclui veículos, motos, partes e peças e materiais de construção, também reverteu um longo período de queda no acumulado em 12 meses, com crescimento de 1,4%, o primeiro resultado positivo desde junho de 2014.
Isabella ressalta que as vendas de materiais de construção e de veículos estão crescendo dois dígitos desde agosto: “É uma melhora motivada pelo ganho de renda das famílias, que podem fazer reformas em seus domicílios. Enquanto a alta na venda de veículos é decorrência de melhores condições de financiamento para esse produto”.
Texto: Pedro Renaux
Imagem: Imprensa GPA/Flickr
Arte: Helga Szpiz
DOCUMENTO: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas-novoportal/economicas/comercio/9227-pesquisa-mensal-de-comercio.html
IPEA. 12/12/2017. Inflação dos mais pobres ficou menor em novembro. Indicador Ipea de Inflação por Faixa de Renda registra no mês 0,07% para a classe de renda mais baixa e 0,34%% na faixa mais alta
O Indicador Ipea de Inflação por Faixa de Renda de novembro de 2017 aponta que as parcelas da população de renda mais baixa foram as que apresentaram as menores taxas de inflação. Enquanto a inflação da população de renda muito baixa registrou alta de 0,07%, nas famílias de renda alta o crescimento foi de 0,34%. No ano, a inflação dos mais pobres acumula uma alta de 1,8%, inferior à registrada pela classe de renda mais alta (elevação de 3,2%).
“De fato, a significativa desaceleração no preço dos alimentos ao longo do ano se constitui no principal foco de alívio inflacionário em 2017, especialmente para as classes de menor poder aquisitivo”, explica Maria Andreia Parente Lameiras, pesquisadora do Grupo de Conjuntura do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. Os alimentos são o item com maior peso nos gastos totais das famílias mais pobres. A deflação dos alimentos contribuiu para diminuir em 0,16 p.p. a inflação dos mais pobres, ao passo que, para a classe mais alta, a ajuda foi de 0,05 p.p.
Em menor intensidade, os transportes também influenciaram, com a queda nas tarifas dos ônibus urbanos (0,6%) e interestaduais (1,6%), itens de grande peso na inflação dos mais pobres. Em contrapartida, nas classes mais ricas, para as quais o gasto com combustíveis é bem maior, a alta de 2,9% no preço da gasolina fez com que a contribuição do grupo transportes fosse positiva.
Entre os itens que tiveram impacto maior sobre as famílias menos abastadas, os reajustes das tarifas de energia elétrica (4,2%) e do gás de botijão (1,6%) significaram um aumento de 0,29 p.p. na inflação dos mais pobres – e de 0,11 p.p na dos mais ricos. Nos últimos meses, de acordo com a análise, a desaceleração da trajetória inflacionária ocorreu de modo significativo em todas as faixas de renda.
Indicador Ipea de Inflação por Faixa de Renda: http://www.ipea.gov.br/cartadeconjuntura/index.php/2017/12/12/inflacao-por-faixa-de-renda-novembro17/
MAPA. PORTAL G1. REUTERS. 12/12/2017. Ministro diz que Brasil está perto de retomar envio de carne in natura aos EUA. EUA decidiram suspender as compras de carne do Brasil em junho, menos de um ano após abrir o mercado ao país.
O Brasil está "muito próximo" de retomar as exportações de carne bovina in natura para os Estados Unidos, o que deve ocorrer no início do próximo ano, disse nesta terça-feira (12) o ministro da Agricultura, Blairo Maggi.
Ele disse ter falado com representantes dos EUA para que sejam "claros" se haveria "problemas políticos" que atrapalhariam essa retomada.
"Obviamente, eles não aceitaram essa argumentação. Nós vamos continuar a mandar carne para lá e, por razões técnicas, estamos muito próximos de resolver essas questões também", declarou Blairo a jornalistas.
"Todos os quesitos que foram pedidos pelos órgãos fitosssanitário dos Estados Unidos, nós conseguimos resolver e estamos prontos para mandar as plantas para lá. Já reabilitamos as plantas para a carne processada, agora queremos voltar a carne fresca", afirmou.
Os EUA decidiram suspender as compras de carne do Brasil em junho, menos de um ano após abrir o mercado ao país.
Autoridades dos EUA disseram que inspeções de carregamentos que chegavam ao país revelaram problemas na carne como abscessos e tecidos proibidos.
MAPA. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. ABPA diz que reabertura do mercado russo à carne suína do Brasil é iminente
SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - A reabertura do mercado russo à carne suína brasileira é iminente, disse nesta quarta-feira o presidente da Associação Brasileira de Proteína Animal (ABPA), Francisco Turra, durante uma conferência de imprensa em São Paulo.
A Rússia suspendeu temporariamente as compras de carnes bovina e suína do Brasil no fim de novembro, após encontrar vestígicios do aditivo alimentar ractopamina em alguns lotes importados.
A Rússia é o principal destino das exportações brasileiras de carne suína.
A iminente reabertura desse mercado foi relatada à ABPA na terça-feira pelo ministro da Agricultura, Blairo Maggi, disse Turra.
Por Ana Mano
MAPA. CANAL RURAL. 13 de Dezembro de 2017. COMERCIO EXTERIOR. Exportação de gado vivo sobe 30% em 2017. De acordo com o Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviço, os principais destinos dos animais foram a Turquia, Egito, Jordânia e Bolívia
O Brasil exportou 33,87 mil cabeças de bovinos vivos em novembro, de acordo com o Ministério da
Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços (MDIC). O faturamento no mês chegou em um total de US$
20,62 milhões.
Na comparação com o mês de outubro, os embarques caíram 41,5%, no entanto, quando comparado
ao mesmo período do ano passado, as exportações subiram 4,5%. Os principais destinos dos animais
foram a Turquia, Egito, Jordânia e Bolívia.
De janeiro a novembro deste ano o Brasil exportou 340,34 mil bovinos vivos, uma alta de 31,5%,
frente a igual período de 2016. Do total exportado até então, 47,5% foram enviados para a Turquia,
principal comprador do Brasil em 2017.
TOTAL. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Total diz que exportação de gás de campo no Mar do Norte ficará interrompida até janeiro
Por Susanna Twidale e Amanda Cooper
LONDRES (Reuters) - As exportações de gás natural de um dos principais campos do Mar do Norte ficarão interrompidas por pelo menos três semanas, até o início de janeiro, após o fechamento do maior oleoduto do Reino Unido, disse a Total, operadora da área, nesta quarta-feira.
A empresa de produtos químicos INEOS, que possui o Forties Pipeline System, afirmou nesta quarta-feira que ainda não tomou uma decisão sobre o conserto de rachaduras encontradas na estrutura durante uma inspeção de rotina na semana passada.
O oleoduto bombeia cerca de 450 mil barris por dia (bpd) de petróleo Forties, equivalente a cerca de um quarto de toda a produção diária da bacia do Mar do Norte, e é responsável por um terço da produção total de gás offshore do Reino Unido.
“Uma série de opções de reparo está sendo considerada, e estamos avançando”, disse o INEOS. “Por ora, ainda é cedo demais para dizer o quão rapidamente o reparo será realizado, mas espera-se que seja uma questão de semanas e não de dias.”
O INEOS disse aos clientes na terça-feira que esperava que qualquer trabalho de reparação durasse pelo menos duas semanas. A Total disse em um aviso ao mercado que espera que suas exportações de gás da plataforma Elgin-Franklin fiquem paradas até 2 de janeiro.
OPEP. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Opep vê mercado de petróleo equilibrado até o fim de 2018 com cortes reduzindo excesso
LONDRES (Reuters) - A Organização dos Países Exportadores de Petróleo (Opep) espera que o mercado mundial de petróleo fique equilibrado até o fim de 2018, em meio ao acordo com outros produtores para cortar a oferta e reduzir o excesso de estoque, mesmo com os Estados Unidos e outros produtores que não participam do acordo elevando a produção.
A Opep informou em um relatório mensal que reduziu sua estimativa para 2018 da demanda global por seu petróleo bruto em 270 mil barris por dia (bpd), para 33,15 milhões de bpd, em parte devido à maior oferta dos EUA.
Mas o grupo de produtores de 14 países disse que a sua produção de petróleo em novembro, avaliada por fontes secundárias, ficou em 32,45 milhões de bpd, uma queda de cerca de 133 mil bpd ante outubro e abaixo da previsão da demanda de 2018.
Por Alex Lawler
OMC. REUTERS. 13 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. OMC luta para aprimorar visão comercial global após pressões dos EUA
Por Luc Cohen
BUENOS AIRES (Reuters) - Os ministros do Comércio estavam prestes a encerrar sua reunião bianual na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) sem ter chegado a um único acordo nesta quarta-feira, ainda sofrendo com críticas trazidas pelos Estados Unidos, que já foram a força-motriz da OMC.
Não havia expectativas de que os ministros que se reuniram em Buenos Aires concordariam em grandes reformas, com propostas relativamente menores e sem relação na mesa, incluindo discussões sobre subsídios à pesca e comércio eletrônico.
Uma intervenção discordante feita pelo representante comercial dos EUA, Robert Lighthizer, na primeira manhã, deixou a conferência efetivamente à deriva, uma vez que a OMC exige consenso --unanimidade entre todos os 164 membros-- para chegar a um acordo.
Mesmo a superficial declaração ministerial conjunta parecia incerta.
Guiados pela estratégia de “EUA em primeiro lugar” do presidente Donald Trump e uma preferência por acordos bilaterais, os EUA já impediram que os embaixadores fizessem um esboço em Genebra rejeitando referências ao papel central da OMC no sistema de comércio global e no comércio como diretriz do desenvolvimento.
O porta-voz da OMC, Keith Rockwell, disse a repórteres que a chair da conferência, a ex-ministra de Relações Exteriores da Argentina, Susana Malcorra, ainda esperava que os ministros concordassem em um texto mais tarde nesta quarta-feira.
“Ainda parece haver lacunas significativas. Se eles conseguirão encontrar as palavras que preencherão estas lacunas, eu não sei”, disse Rockwell.
O fracasso em chegar a grandes acordos significa que as negociações sobre os mesmos tópicos continuarão em 2018, sem prazo e sem força ministerial para chegar a um acordo.
MERCOSUL-UE. REUTERS. 12 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2017. Acordo de comércio entre UE e Mercosul não deve sair este ano, diz fonte
BUENOS AIRES (Reuters) - A União Europeia e o Mercosul provavelmente não vão atingir um acordo comercial neste ano porque os negociadores europeus querem esperar até o próximo ano para discutir ofertas melhoradas, afirmou uma fonte próxima dos negociadores sul-americanos, nesta terça-feira.
A fonte afirmou que novas ofertas foram trocadas nesta terça-feira, durante negociações da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) em Buenos Aires. Apesar disso, as propostas não incluíram melhoria de ofertas da UE sobre carne e etanol cobradas pelo Mercosul.
“A UE afirmou que não está em posição para fazer uma recíproca e que terá melhor condições de responder no próximo ano”, afirmou a fonte.
Por Luc Cohen
União Europeia e Mercosul se aproximam de acordo durante reunião da OMC
BUENOS AIRES (Reuters) - As negociações comerciais entre a União Europeia e o bloco Mercosul, da América do Sul, estão perto de um acordo, paralelamente à reunião ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) em Buenos Aires, disseram negociadores de ambos os lados.
O acordo pode acontecer no início do novo ano, disse Cecilia Malmstrom, comissária de comércio europeia, a repórteres.
“Nós fizemos bons avanços, mas ainda há levantamentos hoje”, disse Malmstrom. “Nós vemos o fim disso.”
O ministro das Relações Exteriores do Brasil, Aloysio Nunes, disse a repórteres mais tarde que o Mercosul e a União Europeia trocaram notas sobre o quão disposto está cada lado a ceder para alcançar um acordo de livre comércio.
“Eles nos perguntaram quão longe poderíamos ir em sua direção e nós perguntamos o mesmo. Estamos esperando por sua reação à nossa proposta para ver se conseguimos concluir a parte mais difícil das negociações, que é o acesso mercado”, disse.
O chanceler afirmou ainda que o Mercosul se compromete a retirar tarifas de 90 por cento de seu comércio com a UE.
A resistência de alguns Estados membros da UE, como Irlanda e França, às importações agrícolas tem atrasado as negociações do acordo comercial que busca liberalizar o comércio e o investimento, os serviços e o acesso aos contratos públicos.
Os membros do Mercosul Brazil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai têm se esforçado por uma melhora na oferta da UE de importações livres de tarifa para 70 mil toneladas de carne bovina por ano e 600 mil toneladas de etanol por ano.
Por Eliana Raszewski, Luc Cohen e Anthony Boadle
MERCOSUL-UE. PORTAL G1. FRANCE PRESSE. 13/12/2017. Acordo entre União Europeia e Mercosul é adiado para 2018. Bloco formado por Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai esperava anunciar em Buenos Aires um acordo sobre as negociações, mas Bruxelas pediu mais tempo.
A União Europeia e o Mercosul vão continuar a tentar, em 2018, chegar a um acordo de livre-comércio, após as reuniões em Buenos Aires, disse o secretário Comércio Exterior da França.
"Não há acordo em Buenos Aires. Há trabalho a ser feito", afirmou à imprensa Jean Baptiste Lemoyne, nesta quarta-feira (13).
Por que 20 anos não foram suficientes para que Mercosul e UE concluíssem tratado
"A negociação vai continuar em janeiro", acrescentou Lemoyne, que encabeçou a delegação francesa na conferência ministerial da OMC em Buenos Aires.
O Mercosul esperava anunciar ali um acordo político sobre as negociações, mas Bruxelas pediu mais tempo para avaliar uma oferta apresentada pelos latinos.
O bloco sul-americano, formado por Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai, esperava que a UE se abrisse mais em rubricas que considera cruciais, como carne bovina e etanol.
O Uruguai disse que a UE não melhorou suas ofertas para essas categorias, mas disse que espera que os europeus façam isso em breve.
"Continuamos com a expectativa de que melhorem sua oferta, como o Mercosul melhorou a sua", indicou o chanceler uruguaio, Rodolfo Nin Novoa, que participou das negociações.
Lemoyne disse que a UE já chegou a 92% da abertura de seu comércio e o Mercosul a 90%.
Em Buenos Aires, o Mercosul apresentou uma oferta revisada sobre vários itens, entre eles a Indicação Geográfica de produtos e os refrigerantes. As propostas agora serão avaliadas em Bruxelas.
"Foram registrados avanços" nas negociações, segundo Lemoyne, mas "restam progressos a fazer em matéria de normas sanitárias".
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LGCJ.:
