US ECONOMICS

U.S. Department of State. November 29, 2017. A Step Back for Democracy in Bolivia. Statement. Heather Nauert, Department Spokesperson

Washington, DC - The United States is deeply concerned by the November 28 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia to declare inapplicable provisions of the country’s constitution that prohibit elected officials, including the President, from serving more than two consecutive terms. The decision disregards the will of the Bolivian people as confirmed in recent referenda.

Twice in the last decade, the Bolivian people have expressed their opposition to the concept of indefinite reelection for elected officials: first in 2009, through their overwhelming vote in favor of the current constitution; and again in a 2016 referendum, when they rejected an initiative to overturn the constitutional provision that imposes the two-term limit on the President. The Bolivian people have spoken clearly on this question. The United States stands with them in calling on the current Bolivian government to respect the outcome of those referenda, as the voice of the people, consistent with their constitutional requirements.

DoS. November 29, 2017. Briefing for Foreign Media. Heather Nauert, Department Spokesperson. The Washington Foreign Press Center

Washington, DC - MS NAUERT: Hey, everybody. Dmitry, how you been? Hi, everyone. How are you today? It’s nice to see you, and thank you so much for having me over here again. Always look forward to our chats together.


A couple things I’d like to start out with today, a few announcements of sorts. First off is I want to talk a little bit about the elections that took place in Honduras. The Honduras people – the people of Honduras exercised their democratic rights by taking part in elections on Sunday, November the 26th. The United States looks forward to working with the democratically elected leaders of Honduras. We await the final tabulation of results by election authorities and urge the authorities to complete their work without undue delay. The United States urges calm and patience as the results are tabulated. It’s critical that Honduran election authorities be able to work in a free and transparent manner without interference. We urge all candidates to respect the results once those results are announced. The United States commends the efforts of the independent election observers from the Organization of American States and the European Union and awaits their final assessment of the Honduran electoral process.

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U.S. Department of the Treasury. November 30, 2017. ​Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Marshall Billingslea House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade 

Chairman Barr, Vice Chairman Williams, Ranking Member Moore, and distinguished members of the Committee, as Treasury’s Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing, thank you for inviting me here today to offer testimony on the effectiveness of sanctions, which are an important tool for safeguarding our security and protecting the U.S. financial system from abuse. 

At the Treasury Department, under Secretary Mnuchin and Under Secretary Mandelker’s leadership, we have deployed our tools and authorities strategically in order to counter the greatest threats to U.S. and global security.  Our sanctions tools range from full trade embargoes to highly targeted financial measures against named individuals and entities who pose a threat to U.S. national security and to the U.S. and international financial systems.  We target terrorists associated with al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, ISIS, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to name a few, and entities associated with Iranian and North Korean weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, among many others.  Other recent examples include actions against Nicolas Maduro and other members of the dictatorial regime in Venezuela, drug kingpins, and last week – for instance – a currency counterfeiting ring associated with the IRGC-QF.

The Treasury Department has pioneered the use of targeted sanctions as a tool of statecraft, and we continually refine how we employ financial pressure.  Our approach integrates agencies, authorities, and partners to ensure maximum economic pressure on sanctions targets and violators.  In recent years, we have developed new methods for targeting malign actors, including restricting certain classes of business transactions with foreign entities and jurisdictions, instead of targeting transactions with specific entities.  For instance, we have deployed sectoral sanctions to prohibit the provision of loans to state-run energy companies in Russia as a consequence of Russian aggression against Ukraine.  Recently, we also severely restricted transactions in new debt or equity issued by the regime in Venezuela.  We have found these types of targeted, sophisticated actions to be highly effective at imposing specific, selective consequences on regimes that pose a threat to international security.

I could name numerous examples in which our sanctions have been effective.  This Administration has aggressively targeted ISIS leaders and operatives for their financial and operational support to ISIS around the world, resulting in sanctions against over 70 ISIS senior leaders, financial facilitators, recruiters, and affiliated money services businesses.  U.S. and UN designations, along with close cooperation between the U.S. and Iraqi authorities, have effectively shut down exchange houses that were functioning as key nodes of ISIS’s financial facilitation networks, both by exposing their ties to the group and freezing millions of dollars in tainted assets.  Separately, we have also continued efforts to financially isolate al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups through unilateral and multilateral sanctions.  Secretary Mnuchin recently announced the opening of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) in Saudi Arabia; in conjunction with that announcement, the six Gulf Cooperation Council member-states imposed sanctions on a network of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS-Yemen (ISIS-Y) financiers and weapons brokers in Yemen.  This Administration has targeted dozens of North Korean individuals and entities, including coal companies, banks, and individuals who help North Korea evade international sanctions, in order to constrict North Korea’s revenue sources.  Any revenue that North Korea generates can be used to support, directly or indirectly, its weapons development programs.  Finally, sanctions were the dominant factor in forcing Iran’s leaders to the negotiating table over their nuclear weapons program.  Even Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has acknowledged that donors have been scared to continue remitting funds as a result of U.S. sanctions.   

There are several reasons why sanctions are effective tools.  First, we employ these tools against the backdrop of an international financial system that is increasingly attuned to the threats posed by illicit finance, and one that is better able to identify and counter illicit activity.  Over the past many years, we have worked tirelessly to bolster the capacity of all countries to establish and enforce financial transparency obligations.  By strengthening anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes across the globe, and by working with other countries to ensure strict and consistent implementation, we have created an environment in which UN sanctions have real effects on the targeted individuals and entities, rather than simply functioning as a list of bad actors.  Separately, financial institutions around the world routinely voluntarily screen their customers and transactions against the U.S. sanctions list, which is widely considered to be a key resource for combating illicit finance.  The private sector is therefore a critical partner in our efforts to detect and counter illicit activity.  Further, as a preventative measure, our partners frequently address a wide range of threats before they ever reach the U.S. financial system.  

Perhaps the most important intergovernmental partner we have in this endeavor is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard-setting organization for national efforts to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and proliferation financing.  The FATF holds all countries accountable for establishing the infrastructure to prevent, detect, and investigate such activity, as well as to prosecute and punish the perpetrators.  To accomplish this, the FATF and its global network continually evaluate all countries’ AML/CFT regimes – including their laws and efforts to disrupt terrorist financing, combat corruption, and implement national and international sanctions – and then leverage the possibility of public identification to pressure those falling behind to fulfil their commitments.  Because the international financial community closely follows the work conducted by FATF, and makes business decisions accordingly, finance ministries and central banks around the world take FATF assessments very seriously.  The Treasury Department is a major participant in these assessments, and through the FATF process, we also build and maintain a network of relationships which are critical to employing and maintaining financial pressure on dangerous and irresponsible actors.

This leads me to a key reason that the U.S. government is so effective in countering illicit finance: “financial diplomacy.”  A specific Treasury action is often preceded by, and almost always followed up with, engagement by the Treasury and State Departments with our allies and partners in the public and private sectors.  We also use relationships painstakingly built over many years to coordinate with other countries, or pre-notify them of our actions.  As a general proposition, sanctions can be more effective when they are implemented multilaterally.  That said, this Administration will not hesitate to take unilateral action, as necessary, to combat threats to our security or to the integrity of the international financial system.  But when and where possible, we work with friendly nations to amplify our message and drive concerted action.  For instance, Treasury, in coordination with the State Department, shares detailed information regarding North Korean activities with friends and allies to assist them in disrupting sanctions evasion and illicit trade.  This engagement at multiple levels helps partner nations to conduct detailed forensic investigation and analysis and target North Korean financial networks where they exist.  

The United States also pursues this financial diplomacy through multilateral organizations.  We are the leading proponent of sanctions at the UN.  This Administration’s leadership at the UN to combat the threat posed by North Korea, for example, resulted in the unanimous passing of two UN Security Council resolutions that struck at the core of North Korea’s revenue generation.  These resolutions include embargoes on all importation of North Korean coal, iron, lead, seafood, and textiles; restrict North Korea’s ability to acquire revenue from overseas laborers; cut off over 55 percent of refined petroleum products going to North Korea; and ban all joint ventures with North Korea to cut off foreign investments.  These resolutions are central to our efforts to mobilize the international community and to deny funds to Kim Jong-Un’s weapons programs.

As I mentioned earlier, we are also a co-chair of the newly-established TFTC in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  In addition to the multilateral sanctions imposed on leaders, financiers, and facilitators of ISIS-Y and AQAP, the TFTC enhances information sharing, institutionalizes capacity-building to target terrorist financing networks that pose national security threats to the United States and the Gulf, and deepens existing cooperation by coordinating disruptive action such as designations.  In fact, the United States is the most active sponsor of joint designations, whether with our allies in the Gulf, the European Union, or with the United Kingdom.  And, we have strongly encouraged our partners to use their own unilateral and multilateral sanctions authorities when applicable.  For instance, the European Union designated Hizballah’s military wing in 2013, and in March 2016, the Gulf Cooperation Council designated the entire group.  When our allies take leading roles in addressing threats to peace and security, as France recently did at the UN with respect to Mali, and as Canada has done with sanctions on Venezuela, we actively support them.  

But an additional dimension to our financial diplomacy is that there are certain situations where an action other than U.S. financial sanctions may do more for our national security.  In certain cases, we work with foreign partners to support their designations and enforcement actions.  In others, while we may have ample grounds to take our own action, from a messaging standpoint it may prove to be more advantageous for another nation to lead.  Or yet in other circumstances, merely providing financial intelligence to a trusted foreign partner is all it takes to shutter a terrorist exchange house or freeze a proliferator’s bank account.  Finally, there are times and places where certain individuals, fearing the threat of Treasury action, will voluntarily change their behavior.  In all of these situations, the ability and the willingness of Treasury to impose financial sanctions is a factor in the deliberations of others.  In other words, the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions is undeniable, given that even the implied threat of imposition can spur the results we want.    

A third reason our sanctions are so effective is the clarity and consistency of our message.  When engaging in designations, the U.S. Government leaves no doubt as to why we are imposing sanctions, and what change we expect.  For example, our sanctions on corrupt and dictatorial Venezuelan officials, and our refusal to participate in the wholesale looting of the Venezuelan economy, are clearly aimed at the regime and not the Venezuelan people.  We have made clear that sanctions will be removed once democratic order is restored, but we will not stand by as the Maduro kleptocracy drives the country into chaos.  

A fourth important factor that influences the effectiveness of sanctions is the extent to which the target actually uses the international financial system, or has assets under the jurisdiction of the United States or friendly nations.  Of course, even when this is not the case, there can be important value to a designation, particularly if it inhibits attempted transactions and other malign activity.  However, sanctions cause the most immediate, tangible effect when they result in the blocking of attempted transactions and/or the freezing of assets.  One could cite a number of examples of effectiveness, such as over $30 billion in assets controlled by the regime of former Libyan dictator Mu’ammar Qadhafi that were frozen, or more recently, the hundreds of millions that we blocked which were associated with Tareck El Aissami, the Venezuelan Vice President and a narcotics trafficker. It is standard practice at Treasury to work with our law enforcement and intelligence partners, both within and outside the U.S. Government, to identify any assets owned or controlled by designated persons.  For example, Treasury just recently designated a Chinese coal company that was laundering money for North Korea.  As part of our disruptive action, the Department of Justice filed a complaint to seize more than $4 million related to the company. 

A key element of Treasury’s continued success in countering national security challenges is the collaboration of our various components in order to use our tools and authorities best suited for each challenge.  We use intelligence to inform our strategies, effectively deploy our tools, ensure actions are calibrated for maximum impact, and measure effectiveness and inform follow-on strategies and actions.  We are constantly thinking through which complement of tools is most effective to counter national security threats, requiring all of Treasury’s components to work closely together to achieve strategic objectives.  An example of such teamwork was our determination of the Bank of Dandong as a primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which clearly explained the threat this bank posed to the U.S. financial system.  We likewise explained to financial institutions both through formal guidance and through informal outreach how North Korea launders money and evades sanctions.  This outreach has put financial institutions on notice to North Korea’s illicit activities, and has made it harder for the Kim regime to raise revenue and move money.  The message was clear, to quote Secretary Mnuchin: foreign financial institutions “can choose to do business with the U.S or North Korea, but not both.”

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is clear that targeted financial sanctions have been, and will continue to be, effective.  But their impact derives from a host of other actions that both precede, and follow upon, the act of designation.  Sanctions are at the height of effectiveness when they are part of a broader, national security strategy that brings to bear the many different instruments of power available to the U.S. Government, our partners, and key multilateral organizations and initiatives.  


I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Committee today on this most important topic, and welcome any questions that you may have.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. November 30, 2017. Testimony of John E. Smith Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control U.S. Department of the Treasury House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade
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Introduction

Chairman Barr, Vice Chairman Williams, Ranking Member Moore, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the important role of sanctions in addressing some of our nation’s most complex and challenging national security and foreign policy issues.  As the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), I will speak to the sanctions my office has imposed against terrorists, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics kingpins, human rights abusers, supporters of the destabilizing and provocative actions of governments such as North Korea, Iran, Syria, Russia, and Venezuela, and other actors engaged in conduct antithetical to our nation’s ideals and interests.

When deployed strategically and with precision, sanctions are a highly effective way of pressuring regimes and malign actors to change their behavior.  These regimes and actors ultimately rely on funding to operate and to carry out their activities, and our sanctions are high-impact.  By freezing the assets of illicit actors, cutting them off from the U.S. financial system, and restricting their ability to interface with the international financial system, the choice to them becomes clear: either modify your behavior or accept the isolation and negative economic effects of remaining on our financial blacklist.  At OFAC, we focus our targeting on those sanctions expected to generate the most impact in achieving our national security and foreign policy goals, denying illicit actors access to the U.S. and international financial systems, disrupting their revenue streams, and degrading their capabilities.

As noted by Under Secretary Mandelker before the House Financial Services Committee a few weeks ago, a key element of Treasury’s continued success in addressing national security challenges is ensuring that the components of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, including OFAC, are properly integrated, working closely together, and deploying the tools and authorities best suited to each challenge.  Under the leadership of Secretary Mnuchin and Under Secretary Mandelker, OFAC is employing powerful sanctions in conjunction with the tools and authorities of the other offices, such as anti-money laundering measures, foreign engagement, PATRIOT Act Section 311 actions, and private sector outreach – in a strategic manner to address threats from rogue regimes, terrorists, weapons proliferators, and human rights violators, to name just a few. 

As part of the Administration’s approach, the career professionals at OFAC have been working tirelessly to fulfill our important responsibilities and address some of our greatest national security threats.  And we are not slowing down.

North Korea

One of our highest priority efforts at OFAC is targeting the North Korean regime and its key financial vulnerabilities.  This year, we have issued eight rounds of sanctions related to North Korea, adding 63 individuals and 49 entities to our Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List).  The regime requires revenue to maintain and expand its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and we have focused our targeting efforts on areas where our measures will have the maximum disruptive impact, such as on those individuals and companies involved in generating significant amounts of revenue for the regime by trading coal, other commodities, and labor, and individuals and entities who have facilitated North Korea’s wide-scale sanctions evasion.  The regime needs to be able to move funds through the international financial system in order to acquire foreign currency and pay for goods and services.  To counter that, we recently sanctioned dozens of North Korean financial representatives across the world, and nine of the country’s banks.

To cite one example of the impact of these measures, this year OFAC designated several Chinese companies that were collectively responsible for importing nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of North Korean coal between 2013 and 2016.  These actions, combined with sustained diplomatic pressure from the United States and tough new United Nations Security Council Resolutions, helped to pressure China to announce that it would halt all coal imports from North Korea.  This halt, if implemented fully and effectively, represents a significant blow to the regime’s revenue-generation capabilities and demonstrates the positive effects sanctions can achieve.  OFAC continues to closely monitor coal exports from, and other trade with, North Korea and identify and disrupt instances of sanctionable conduct, wherever we may locate it.

Just last week, OFAC sanctioned one individual, 13 trading, labor, and shipping companies, and 20 associated vessels in an action targeted at disrupting North Korea’s illicit funding of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  We designated several Chinese trading companies that were responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars of imports from and exports to North Korea over the last few years.  We also sanctioned transportation networks that facilitate North Korea’s revenue generation and operations, and we highlighted the deceptive shipping practices that North Korea engages in, despite prohibitions in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375.  As Secretary Mnuchin made clear, “we are steadfast in our determination to maximize economic pressure to isolate [North Korea] from outside sources of trade and revenue while exposing its evasive tactics.”

OFAC’s actions are a critical component in Treasury’s campaign to restrict North Korea’s ability to raise and move money through the international financial system, and we will continue aggressively enforcing these sanctions and ramping up economic pressure on the Kim regime.

Iran

Addressing the full range of threats from the Iranian regime is another top priority, and OFAC has significantly increased the pressure on Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for its malign activities.  Since this Administration took office, OFAC has issued eight tranches of sanctions, designating 78 targets in Iran, China, Germany, Lebanon, and Ukraine in connection with the IRGC and Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for terrorism, human rights abuses, cyber-attacks, transnational criminal activity, and other destabilizing regional activities.  

Just last month, consistent with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), OFAC designated the IRGC itself under our counter-terrorism authority, Executive Order 13224.  Last week, OFAC sanctioned an IRGC-Qods Force counterfeiting ring that deployed deceptive measures to circumvent European export control restrictions and procure advanced equipment and materials to print counterfeit Yemeni bank notes potentially worth hundreds of millions of dollars for the IRCG-Qods Force.  As part of the Administration’s Iran strategy, and in particular our effort to deny Iran and especially the IRGC funding for its malign activities, OFAC continues to investigate networks vulnerable to disruption and aggressively target Iran’s illicit conduct across the board. 

We are focusing our energy and attention on Iran’s threatening activities, which includes its continued development and testing of ballistic missiles.  We have targeted key procurement networks supplying technology and goods used in Iran’s ballistic missile program, and we have encouraged our partners and allies to join us in addressing these and other threats. 

We have also consistently raised concerns with the private sector regarding the IRGC’s malign behavior and its level of involvement in the Iranian economy.  We have pointed out that the IRGC continues to be an integral part of the Iranian economy, including in the energy, construction, mining, and defense sectors.  As we have urged the private sector to recognize that the IRGC permeates much of the Iranian economy, we have emphasized that those who transact with IRGC-controlled entities do so at their own risk.

Venezuela

The Administration remains deeply concerned about the situation in Venezuela, where the Maduro regime continues its assault on democracy in the country. In recent months, the Venezuelan government held elections for a Constituent Assembly that Venezuelans and democratic governments worldwide overwhelmingly opposed as undermining democracy and the rule of law.  Likewise, in late October the regime held sham local elections that were neither free nor fair.  The erosion of democracy in the country coincides with the continued collapse of the Venezuelan economy and a deepening humanitarian crisis exacerbated by Maduro’s irresponsible economic policies.

As the Maduro regime destroys democratic order in the country, OFAC has sanctioned 40 individuals and entities this year for undermining democratic processes, engaging in media censorship, or otherwise supporting Maduro’s dictatorial regime – as well as Maduro himself.  Additionally, in February 2017 OFAC designated Tareck El Aissami, the Executive Vice President of Venezuela, for playing a significant role in international narcotics trafficking.  The action also targeted his primary front man, Samark Lopez Bello, and a number of affiliated companies.  Hundreds of millions of dollars in assets tied to El Aissami and Lopez Bello have been blocked as a result of this action, and their ability to launder illicit proceeds has been significantly disrupted, highlighting the powerful impact of our authorities. 
           
This summer, in conjunction with our other interagency partners, Treasury developed novel financial sanctions to pressure the Venezuelan regime via the measures included in Executive Order 13808.  The sanctions include prohibitions on U.S. persons dealing in new long-term Venezuelan debt and bonds previously issued by the Venezuelan government.  While continuing to allow for critical humanitarian imports, our sanctions play a significant role in disrupting the government’s ability to conduct financial transactions and participate in international financial markets.  As part of our efforts to target and calibrate our sanctions pressure, we published multiple rounds of guidance.

Our sanctions have galvanized partners and allies to respond with complementary measures.  The European Union recently adopted its own restrictive measures, including banning arms sales to Venezuela and adopting a legal framework to impose travel bans and asset freezes.  The EU’s decision follows two rounds of targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials by the Government of Canada.

We are continuously evaluating the situation in Venezuela and we will use all of our authorities to maintain pressure on the Maduro regime and its supporters to change their behavior.  As Secretary Mnuchin has made clear, “we will maintain our vigorous efforts to sanction Venezuelan government officials who are complicit in Maduro’s attempts to undermine democracy, violate human rights, inhibit the freedom of expression or peaceful assembly, or engage in public corruption, unless they break from Maduro’s dictatorial regime.” 

Syria

OFAC continues to increase pressure on the Assad regime in Syria by designating its financial facilitators and restricting the regime’s ability to procure materiel for its machines of war.  We have sanctioned regime-based financial and procurement facilitators, front companies, their proxies, and others associated with the regime’s chemical weapons attacks against Syrian civilians.  In April of this year, in one of the largest sanctions actions in our history, OFAC sanctioned 271 employees of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the government agency responsible for developing and producing non-conventional weapons and the means to deliver them.  These sanctions are intended to hold the Assad regime and those who support it accountable for the regime’s violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Shortly afterwards, in May 2017 OFAC designated five individuals and five entities in response to continued acts of violence committed by the Government of Syria against its own citizens.  We sanctioned a number of financial facilitators and supporters of the regime, as well as a contracts director for the SSRC and an entity subordinate to the Syrian Ministry of Defense.  These actions demonstrate our resolve to target anyone who is enabling Assad and his regime, and we will continue to deploy our authorities to pressure the regime to end the conflict in Syria.

Russia

Another significant priority for OFAC is addressing Russia’s destabilizing activities in Ukraine.  This summer, we designated 38 individuals and entities involved in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, including Russian government officials.  More recently, OFAC has been hard at work implementing in a timely manner the multiple Russia-related statutory requirements of CAATSA.  We modified OFAC Directives 1, 2, and 4, which target certain transactions in the energy and financial services sectors of the Russian economy, within the deadlines set by Congress, and we also published extensive guidance related to CAATSA and changes to existing authorities made pursuant to the law.  This guidance is meant to help allies and industry better understand how OFAC intends to implement the relevant provisions.

  I want to be clear and emphasize that Treasury has fully implemented every CAATSA requirement delegated to it within the statutory deadlines.  We are committed to the full implementation of the law, and we are wholly aligned with Congress’ goal of addressing the serious threats emanating from Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Our sanctions against Russia are having an impact.  In October, Russian oil company Rosneft announced a hold on a major South Black Sea oil project, citing sanctions as limiting its ability to obtain modern extraction technology and equipment.  Rosneft is subject to our “sectoral” sanctions, which limit its ability to obtain financing, goods, technology, and non-financial services for a range of projects that have the potential to produce oil.  This puts further pressure on the Russian government to re-consider its actions, and evaluate whether its involvement in Ukraine is worth the financial damage inflicted by our sanctions.  We have coordinated our measures closely with the European Union, and other like-minded partners and allies have remained steadfast in their commitment to avoid backfilling U.S. and EU companies that exited certain Russian-related business, which further amplifies the impact of our measures.

Terrorism Financing

OFAC plays an important role in the coordinated U.S. government effort to combat terrorism, and has taken significant actions to target individuals and entities associated with ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and Hizballah, among others.  Just last month, in conjunction with the launch of the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), a joint effort between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to better share information and coordinate joint disruptive actions against terrorism, OFAC imposed sanctions against eight leaders, financiers, and facilitators of ISIS in Yemen and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and one affiliated entity.

We continue to address the threat posed by ISIS, and use targeted sanctions as part of a whole-of-government effort to counter its capabilities and reach.  Since 2014, the Departments of the Treasury and State have sanctioned more than 90 ISIS senior leaders, operatives, financial facilitators, recruiters, and affiliated money services businesses.  In 2017, OFAC designated over 20 ISIS-affiliated individuals and entities, including an Iraq-based money exchange that was part of an ISIS financial facilitation network.  These actions have inhibited ISIS’ access to the international financial system, denying it the ability to use its money to expand its presence around the world or procure goods or fighters for its central operations in Iraq and Syria.

We are also targeting Hizballah and other terrorist actors. In February of this year, OFAC sanctioned a key Lebanon-based IRGC-Qods Force network that was working with Hizballah.  As part of that action, we designated an IRGC-QF official that had facilitated cash transfers to Hizballah worth millions of dollars, including through a U.S.-designated Hizballah construction firm.  We also sanctioned a related company that was used to launder funds and smuggle goods to Hizballah.  We will continue to expose, block, and disrupt Hizballah’s finances and deny it access to the U.S. and international financial systems.

OFAC also works closely with our partners within Treasury and the U.S. Government (USG), as well as internationally through bilateral or multilateral actions, to combat terrorism financing.  Throughout 2017, we have partnered with the United Nations (UN) to increase designations under the UN’s counter-terrorism regime.  Such designations are important as all UN member states are required to block designated terrorists’ assets and prohibit their travel.  Other efforts included co-sponsoring a resolution under which the first two ISIS-related money services businesses were designated at the UN. In addition to these multilateral efforts, my office works closely with our law enforcement and interagency partners to support their investigations and work.  This approach ensures that OFAC’s actions complement and augment the impact of the broader USG’s actions. 

Narcotics Trafficking

Likewise, OFAC has targeted a number of major narcotics trafficking networks, with eight rounds of sanctions this year against individuals and entities located in Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.  This includes the September 2017 designation of long-time Mexican cocaine trafficker Raul Flores Hernandez, the Flores Drug Trafficking Organization, and another 21 individuals and 42 entities that constituted his vast network.  This action was the single largest Kingpin Act action against a Mexican drug cartel network by OFAC, and was the result of a multi-year investigation undertaken in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Government of Mexico. 

Additionally, OFAC is closely coordinating with U.S. law enforcement to counter the heroin epidemic.  In May 2017, OFAC sanctioned Mexican heroin trafficker Jose Luis Ruelas Torres and his criminal organization, including nine other individuals who supported his heroin trafficking into the United States.  Since 2015, OFAC has targeted Mexico’s Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) and its counterpart Los Cuinis with eight rounds of sanctions.  CJNG is one of the largest and most violent Mexican poly-drug trafficking organizations and its leader Nemesio “Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes is one of the Drug Enforcement Agency’s top three most wanted fugitives.  In September 2017, OFAC continued its focused targeting of key CJNG assets when it sanctioned a popular restaurant and other businesses in Guadalajara, Mexico that were managed by key associates of Cervantes.

Human Rights Abuses

Treasury is committed to taking action, in conjunction with our interagency and international partners, to protect and promote human rights globally.  To this end, OFAC continues to identify and sanction those involved in human rights abuses across the world.  Many of the sanctions programs administered by OFAC include criteria to designate persons for human rights abuses, and we have used these authorities to sanction human rights abusers in countries around the world, including through several actions this year.

In late October, we sanctioned seven individuals and three entities in North Korea in response to the regime’s serious and ongoing human rights abuses, and in April of this year we sanctioned the Tehran Prisons Organization and a senior official within Iran’s State Prison Organization in connection with serious human rights abuses in the country.  We have also taken action against individuals in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo whose actions included various human rights abuses, or who obstructed related investigations.

In a robust action on September 6, OFAC designated two South Sudanese government officials and one former official for their roles in destabilizing South Sudan.  One of these officials, Malek Reuben Riak Rengu (Malek Reuben), was reportedly one of a group of senior security officials responsible for planning an April 2015 offensive that reportedly included widespread destruction, targeting of civilians, large population displacement, and numerous human rights abuses.  In addition to designating Malek Reuben himself, we also targeted his network of business interests, designating three companies that are owned or controlled by him.  We have heard from NGOs operating on the ground in South Sudan that these designations – together with a simultaneous advisory by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) regarding proceeds of corruption in South Sudan – were an impactful response to the atrocities ongoing in South Sudan.

We will continue to use our authorities, including the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and CAATSA, to target the parties responsible for serious human rights abuses worldwide.  These actions are part of the U.S. government’s overall efforts to stand up to human rights abuses throughout the world.

Enforcement and Compliance

OFAC is aggressively enforcing our sanctions, as designations and prohibitions must be supplemented by enforcement actions in order to be effective.  In the last year, OFAC has finalized over 600 investigations – an increase of nearly 10% from the year before – including a number of public enforcement actions against individuals and entities that have violated our laws.  These enforcement actions have focused on both bank and non-bank entities, here and abroad, that engaged in non-transparent transactions threatening the integrity of our sanctions programs, including foreign individuals and entities that cause U.S. businesses and financial institutions to process transactions in violation of our sanctions.   

One particularly notable example this year was the settlement agreement for over $100 million with the Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE that had, for years, surreptitiously supplied Iran and North Korea with U.S.-origin goods.  This action was taken in conjunction with the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Homeland Security.  This coordinated action is particularly important, showcasing not only OFAC’s close work with other agencies and partners to bring economic pressure on sanctions targets and violators, but also that we will pursue sanctions violators no matter where—or who—they are.

 While adopting this aggressive enforcement posture, we also cooperate closely with the private sector, making our expectations as clear as possible through guidance and FAQs. We also encourage transparency and self-reporting, and consistent with our published Enforcement Guidelines, we provide a reduction in the potential penalty amounts for firms that voluntarily report potential violations.  OFAC spends a significant amount of time conducting outreach to and responding to feedback from the private sector to ensure that they fully understand our sanctions and their implications, as the private sector is at the front lines of implementing these measures.  This includes engaging in more than 70 outreach events to the financial and trade industries each year, including an OFAC-sponsored symposium attended by more than 800 representatives from domestic and foreign financial institutions, multinational companies, and foreign governments.

Balancing Priorities and Cooperation with Congress

Though I have touched on a number of important sanctions programs today, OFAC administers approximately 30 separate programs and maintains over 5,800 entries on our SDN List, a list that identifies persons subject to U.S. economic sanctions.  The scope and frequency of our actions demonstrate the critical importance of sanctions in achieving U.S. national security and foreign policy goals and the extent to which policymakers rely on our targeted financial measures.  

We are focusing the bulk of our resources and attention on the issues most pressing to our nation’s security, while maintaining focus on the threats that may not be as high profile or in the news.  OFAC – along with all of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence – has continued to accelerate the pace of our activity, and implement new authorities and respond to Congressional requirements, while operating under a relatively flat budget over the past few years.  We have a cadre of extremely talented and dedicated career professionals who work tirelessly to protect our financial system and advance our national security interests.  As OFAC Director, I have focused on maximizing our existing resources and deploying our sanctions authorities in an integrated and aggressive manner.

OFAC has broad powers under existing Executive Orders and statutes that enable us to target a variety of illicit conduct.  We greatly appreciate Congress’ partnership and continued efforts to ensure that OFAC is equipped with adequate tools and authorities.  I will note that in order to adjust our strategy for maximum impact, we need flexibility in administering and enforcing our sanctions programs.  Limitations on waivers, licensing, or de-listings can constrain this flexibility and unduly hamper us as we adjust our powerful economic pressure tools in line with developments on the ground.  So too can the increased reporting requirements – with no expiration dates – contained in various statutes  that mandate that we draft scores of reports to Congress every year, drawing substantial resources away from our primary sanctions activities.  

Conclusion

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today about this important topic.  Our adversaries will continue to attempt to circumvent our measures, but OFAC will remain vigilant in stopping them at every turn.  Targeted sanctions – when deployed strategically and in concert with other tools – can play a key role in keeping our country safe and secure.  I look forward to working with the Committee and other Members of Congress as we further refine the implementation of our financial measures for maximum impact.

DoC. BEA. November 30, 2017. PERSONAL INCOME AND OUTLAYS, OCTOBER 2017

Personal income increased $65.1 billion (0.4 percent) in October according to estimates released today
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Disposable personal income (DPI) increased $66.1 billion (0.5 percent)
and personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased $34.4 billion (0.3 percent).

Real DPI increased 0.3 percent in October and Real PCE increased 0.1 percent. The PCE price index increased
0.1 percent. Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index increased 0.2 percent.

                                                                  2017

                                                June     July     Aug.     Sept.     Oct.
                                                   Percent change from preceding month
Personal income:
 Current dollars                                 0.0      0.3     0.2       0.4      0.4
Disposable personal income:
 Current dollars                                 0.0      0.2     0.1       0.4      0.5
 Chained (2009) dollars                         -0.1      0.1    -0.1       0.0      0.3
Personal consumption expenditures (PCE):
 Current dollars                                 0.1      0.4     0.2       0.9      0.3
 Chained (2009) dollars                          0.1      0.3     0.0       0.5      0.1
Price indexes:
 PCE                                             0.0      0.1     0.2       0.4      0.1
 PCE, excluding food and energy                  0.1      0.1     0.1       0.2      0.2

Price indexes:                                     Percent change from month one year ago
 PCE                                             1.4      1.4     1.4       1.7      1.6
 PCE, excluding food and energy                  1.5      1.4     1.3       1.4      1.4

The increase in personal income in October primarily reflected increases in wages and salaries
and personal interest income (table 3).

The $13.1 billion increase in real PCE in October reflected an increase of $11.4 billion in spending
for goods and a $2.7 billion increase in spending for services (table 7). Within goods, other nondurable
goods, which includes prescription drugs and recreational items, was the leading contributor to the
increase. Within services, the largest contributor to the increase was spending for other services,
which includes passenger fares for foreign travel and communication services. Detailed information on
monthly real PCE spending can be found in Table 2.3.6U.

Personal outlays increased $38.7 billion in October (table 3). Personal saving was $457.3 billion in
October and the personal saving rate, personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income,
was 3.2 percent (table 1).

                                Updates to Personal Income and Outlays

Estimates have been revised for April through September. The percent change from the preceding month
for current-dollar personal income, and for current-dollar and chained (2009) dollar DPI and PCE  --
revised and as published in last month's release -- are shown below.

                                                        Change from preceding month

                                                August                                   September
                                Previous   Revised   Previous   Revised   Previous   Revised   Previous   Revised
                               (Billions of dollars)      (Percent)      (Billions of dollars)      (Percent)
Personal income:
 Current dollars                    29.2      36.8        0.2       0.2       66.9      69.1        0.4       0.4
Disposable personal income:
 Current dollars                    14.6      21.1        0.1       0.1       53.0      54.8        0.4       0.4
 Chained (2009) dollars            -13.2      -8.2       -0.1      -0.1       -0.9      -1.9        0.0       0.0
Personal consumption expenditures:
 Current dollars                    17.6      25.5        0.1       0.2      136.0     119.2        1.0       0.9
 Chained (2009) dollars             -8.7      -2.5       -0.1       0.0       76.0      58.5        0.6       0.5

FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2017/pdf/pi1017.pdf

________________

ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA

IBGE. 30/11/2017. PNAD Contínua: taxa de desocupação foi de 12,2% no trimestre encerrado em outubro

A taxa de desocupação (12,2%) no trimestre móvel de agosto a outubro de 2017 recuou 0,6 ponto percentual em relação ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017 (12,8%). Na comparação com o mesmo trimestre de 2016 (11,8%), houve aumento de 0,4 ponto percentual.

Indicador / Período	ago-set-out 2017	mai-jun-jul 2017	ago-set-out 2016
Taxa de desocupação	12,2%	12,8%	11,8%
Rendimento real habitual	R$2.127	R$2.119	R$2.076
Variação do rendimento real habitual em relação a:		0,4% (estabilidade)	2,5% (estabilidade)

A população desocupada (12,7 milhões) teve queda de 4,4% no confronto com o trimestre anterior (menos 586 mil pessoas). Em relação a igual período de 2016, houve aumento de 5,8% (mais 698 mil pessoas).

A população ocupada (91,5 milhões) aumentou 1,0% (868 mil pessoas a mais) em relação ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017. Em relação ao mesmo trimestre de 2016, houve alta de 1,8% (mais 1,7 milhão de pessoas).

O número de empregados com carteira de trabalho assinada (33,3 milhões de pessoas) ficou estável frente ao trimestre anterior. No confronto com o mesmo trimestre de 2016, houve queda de 2,2% (menos 738 mil pessoas).

O contingente de trabalhadores por conta própria (23,0 milhões) cresceu 1,4% na comparação com o trimestre anterior (326 mil pessoas a mais). Em relação ao mesmo período de 2016, houve alta de 5,6% (aumento de 1,2 milhão de pessoas).

O rendimento médio real habitual (R$ 2.127) ficou estável nas duas comparações. Já a massa de rendimento real habitual (R$ 189,8 bilhões) subiu 1,4% em comparação ao trimestre anterior. Frente ao mesmo trimestre de 2016, o aumento foi de 4,2%.

A taxa de desocupação foi estimada em 12,2% no trimestre móvel referente aos meses de agosto a outubro de 2017, com redução de 0,6 ponto percentual em relação ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017 (12,8%). Na comparação com o mesmo trimestre móvel do ano anterior, agosto a outubro de 2016, quando a taxa foi estimada em 11,8%, o quadro foi de elevação (0,4 ponto percentual).

No trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017, havia 12,7 milhões de pessoas desocupadas no Brasil. Este contingente apresentou queda de 4,4%, ou seja, menos 586 mil pessoas, frente ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017, ocasião em que a desocupação foi estimada em 13,3 milhões de pessoas. No confronto com igual trimestre do ano anterior, quando havia 12,0 milhões de pessoas desocupadas, essa estimativa subiu 5,8%, significando um adicional de 698 mil pessoas desocupadas na força de trabalho.

 Quadro 1 - Taxa de Desocupação - Brasil - 2012/2017

Trimestre móvel		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1º	nov-dez-jan	...	7,2	6,4	6,8	9,5	12,6
2º	dez-jan-fev	...	7,7	6,8	7,4	10,2	13,2
3º	jan-fev-mar	7,9	8,0	7,2	7,9	10,9	13,7
4º	fev-mar-abr	7,8	7,8	7,1	8,0	11,2	13,6
5º	mar-abr-mai	7,6	7,6	7,0	8,1	11,2	13,3
6º	abr-mai-jun	7,5	7,4	6,8	8,3	11,3	13,0
7º	mai-jun-jul	7,4	7,3	6,9	8,6	11,6	12,8
8º	jun-jul-ago	7,3	7,1	6,9	8,7	11,8	12,6
9º	jul-ago-set	7,1	6,9	6,8	8,9	11,8	12,4
10º	ago-set-out	6,9	6,7	6,6	8,9	11,8	12,2
11º	set-out-nov	6,8	6,5	6,5	9,0	11,9
12º	out-nov-dez	6,9	6,2	6,5	9,0	12,0
Fonte: IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua. Nota: Somente os dados destacados são comparáveis.

O contingente de pessoas ocupadas foi estimado em 91,5 milhões no trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017, representando aumento de 1,0% (868 mil pessoas) em relação ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017. Em comparação ao mesmo trimestre de 2016, quando havia no Brasil 89,9 milhões de pessoas ocupadas, este indicador apresentou, também, variação positiva (1,8%).

O nível da ocupação (indicador que mede o percentual de pessoas ocupadas na população em idade de trabalhar) foi estimado em 54,2% no trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017, apresentando um incremento de 0,4 ponto percentual frente ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017 (53,8%). Em relação a igual trimestre do ano anterior, este indicador não apresentou variação estatisticamente significativa.

A força de trabalho (pessoas ocupadas e desocupadas), no trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017, foi estimada em 104,3 milhões de pessoas. Essa população permaneceu estável quando comparada com o trimestre de maio a julho de 2017. Frente ao mesmo trimestre do ano anterior, houve expansão de 2,3% (mais 2,4 milhões de pessoas).

O contingente fora da força de trabalho no trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017 foi estimado em 64,5 milhões de pessoas e ficou estável em ambas as comparações.

O número de empregados no setor privado com carteira de trabalho assinada (exclusive trabalhadores domésticos), estimado em 33,3 milhões de pessoas, ficou estável frente ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017. No confronto com o mesmo trimestre de 2016, houve queda de -2,2% (redução de 738 mil pessoas).

A categoria dos empregados no setor privado sem carteira de trabalho assinada (11,0 milhões de pessoas) cresceu 2,4% em relação ao trimestre anterior (mais 254 mil pessoas). Em relação ao mesmo trimestre de 2016, houve alta de 5,9% (mais 615 mil pessoas).

O número de trabalhadores por conta própria (23,0 milhões de pessoas) cresceu 1,4% na comparação com o trimestre de maio a julho de 2017 (mais 326 mil pessoas). Em relação ao mesmo período de 2016, houve alta de 5,6% (mais 1,2 milhão de pessoas).

O contingente de empregadores, se manteve em 4,3 milhões de pessoas, ficando estável frente ao trimestre imediatamente anterior e em relação ao mesmo período do ano anterior.

A categoria dos trabalhadores domésticos (6,3 milhões de pessoas) apresentou crescimento de 2,9% no confronto com o trimestre de maio a julho de 2017. Frente ao trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2016, houve estabilidade.

Os empregados no setor público (inclusive servidores estatutários e militares), estimado em 11,5 milhões de pessoas, apresentou estabilidade em ambos os trimestres comparativos.

A análise do contingente de ocupados, segundo os grupamentos de atividade, do trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2017, em relação ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017, mostrou aumento nas categorias: Construção (2,5% ou mais 169 mil pessoas), Informação, Comunicação e Atividades Financeiras, Imobiliárias, Profissionais e Administrativas (3,2% ou mais 311 mil pessoas) e Serviços domésticos (2,8% ou mais 173 mil pessoas). Os demais grupamentos não apresentaram variação estatisticamente significativa.

Em relação ao mesmo trimestre de 2016, houve quedas nos seguintes grupamentos: Agricultura, Pecuária, Produção Florestal, Pesca e Aquicultura (-4,7% ou menos 419 mil pessoas). Houve aumentos nos grupamentos: Indústria Geral (2,5% ou mais 290 mil pessoas), Comércio, reparação de veículos automotores e motocicletas (2,3% ou mais 392 mil pessoas), Alojamento e Alimentação (10,4% ou mais 494 mil pessoas), Informação, Comunicação e Atividades Financeiras, Imobiliárias, Profissionais e Administrativas (5,6% ou mais 540 mil pessoas) e Outros serviços (6,2% ou mais 269mil pessoas). Os demais grupamentos não tiveram variação estatisticamente significativa.

O rendimento médio real habitualmente recebido em todos os trabalhos pelas pessoas ocupadas foi estimado em R$ 2.127, registrando estabilidade frente ao trimestre de maio a julho de 2017 e em relação ao mesmo trimestre do ano anterior.

Quadro 3 - Rendimento real habitualmente recebido em todos os trabalhos - Brasil - 2012/2017 

Trimestre móvel		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1º	nov-dez-jan	...	2 046	2 105	2 150	2 084	2 112
2º	dez-jan-fev	...	2 058	2 127	2 149	2 066	2 116
3º	jan-fev-mar	2 026	2 070	2 150	2 150	2 081	2 133
4º	fev-mar-abr	2 041	2 077	2 148	2 140	2 069	2 124
5º	mar-abr-mai	2 028	2 087	2 142	2 134	2 076	2 124
6º	abr-mai-jun	2 029	2 105	2 109	2 140	2 050	2 112
7º	mai-jun-jul	2 046	2 118	2 080	2 121	2 057	2 119
8º	jun-jul-ago	2 049	2 126	2 089	2 110	2 073	2 112
9º	jul-ago-set	2 048	2 125	2 113	2 113	2 069	2 119
10º	ago-set-out	2 043	2 131	2 128	2 104	2 076	2 127
11º	set-out-nov	2 041	2 124	2 121	2 087	2 078
12º	out-nov-dez	2 039	2 111	2 133	2 076	2 105
Fonte: IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua. Nota: Somente os dados destacados são comparáveis.

Na comparação com o trimestre de maio a julho de 2017, o rendimento médio real habitual não apresentou variação estatisticamente significativa da renda média nos grupamentos de atividade. Frente ao trimestre de agosto a outubro de 2016, o grupamento de atividade (Agricultura, pecuária, produção florestal, pesca e aquicultura) apresentou elevação da renda média de 5,7%, enquanto quando os demais grupamentos não apresentaram variação estatisticamente significativa.

A massa de rendimento real habitualmente recebido em todos os trabalhos pelas pessoas ocupadas foi estimada, para o trimestre móvel de agosto a outubro de 2017, em R$ 189,8 bilhões. Quando comparada ao trimestre móvel de maio a julho de 2017, apresentou variação de 1,4% (mais R$ 2,6 bilhões). Frente ao mesmo trimestre do ano anterior, o aumento foi de 4,2% (acréscimo de R$ 7,7 bilhões).

Trabalho doméstico reduz desocupação, mas reforça informalidade

No trimestre terminado em outubro, houve um aumento de 2,9% no número de trabalhadores domésticos, ou cerca de 177 mil postos de trabalho a mais, frente ao trimestre terminado em julho. Essa foi uma das principais contribuições para a queda na taxa de desocupação, de 12,8% para 12,2% nesses mesmos trimestres, segundo a Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua (PNAD-C), divulgada hoje pelo IBGE.

O gerente da pesquisa, Cimar Azeredo, destacou que a geração de postos de trabalho aconteceu, principalmente, em segmentos com predominância do trabalho informal. De fato, entre as 868 mil pessoas a mais na população ocupada, frente ao trimestre terminado em julho, 326 mil são trabalhadores por conta própria, 254 mil são empregados do setor privado sem carteira e 177 mil são trabalhadores domésticos.

“Quando o trabalho doméstico sobe pela formalização é positivo. No entanto, na conjuntura atual, as pessoas estão buscando trabalho doméstico, na maioria das vezes sem carteira, por falta de espaço na economia formal”, explicou.



Entre os grupamentos de atividade, a recuperação no trimestre terminado em outubro frente ao terminado em julho deveu-se, principalmente, ao grupamento informação, comunicação e atividades financeiras, imobiliárias, profissionais e administrativas (alta de 3,2% ou mais 311 mil postos), comércio, reparação de veículos automotores e motocicletas (alta de 1,2% ou mais 208 mil postos) e construção (alta de 2,5% ou mais 169 mil postos). Na comparação com o mesmo trimestre do ano anterior, o destaque foi o setor de alojamento e alimentação, que gerou quase 500 mil postos de trabalho a mais.

Apesar de ter recuado na comparação trimestral, a taxa de desocupação ficou acima da observada no mesmo trimestre de 2016, quando estava em 12,2%. “Embora os resultados do trimestre mostrem aumento da ocupação e redução na fila da desocupação, os números são desfavoráveis em relação ao ano passado”, concluiu Cimar Azeredo.

Texto: Adriana Saraiva
Arte: Helena Pontes
Fotografia: Pedro Vidal

DOCUMENTO: https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas-novoportal/sociais/trabalho/9171-pesquisa-nacional-por-amostra-de-domicilios-continua-mensal.html

FGV. IBRE. 30-Nov-2017. Confiança da Indústria cresce e atinge maior nível desde janeiro de 2014

O Índice de Confiança da Indústria (ICI) da Fundação Getulio Vargas avançou 2,9 pontos em novembro de 2017, para 98,3 pontos, o maior desde janeiro de 2014 (100,1 pontos). Após cinco altas consecutivas, o ICI acumula alta de 8,8 pontos no segundo semestre.

“A retomada da confiança industrial vem ganhando consistência nos últimos meses. A produção do setor vem crescendo e os estoques se ajustaram, um cenário virtuoso que se reflete nas decisões estratégicas de contratação de pessoal”, afirma Tabi Thuler Santos, coordenadora da Sondagem da Indústria da FGV IBRE.

Recuperação consistente das avaliações sobre o momento presente

A alta da confiança industrial alcançou 13 dos 19 segmentos industriais em novembro de 2017. O Índice de Expectativas (IE) subiu 4,2 pontos, para 99,4 pontos, acumulando alta de 7,3 pontos no segundo semestre. O Índice da Situação Atual (ISA) subiu 1,7 ponto, para 97,2 pontos, com alta de 10,2 pontos no mesmo período.

A melhora na percepção sobre os estoques foi o principal fator a contribuir para a alta do ISA no mês. Entre outubro e novembro, a parcela de empresas que avaliam o nível dos estoques como excessivo caiu de 11,3% para 8,7% do total – a menor desde maio de 2013 (8,1%). Já a parcela das que o consideram insuficiente permaneceu relativamente estável, ao passar de 4,1% para 4,0% do total.

A principal contribuição para a alta do IE em novembro veio do indicador de expectativas com a evolução do total de pessoal ocupado nos três meses seguintes. O indicador subiu 6,6 pontos, para 99,3 pontos – o maior desde dezembro de 2013 (99,8). Houve aumento da proporção de empresas prevendo aumento do quadro de pessoal, de 15,3% para 19,7% do total, e diminuição da proporção das que esperam redução do total de pessoal ocupado, de 15,7% para 12,3% do total.

Após subir 0,4 ponto percentual (p.p.) no mês anterior, o Nível de Utilização da Capacidade Instalada (NUCI) recuou 0,1 p.p. entre outubro e novembro, para 74,2%.

A edição de novembro de 2017 coletou informações de 1.101 empresas entre os dias 01 e 27 deste mês. A próxima divulgação da Sondagem da Indústria ocorrerá em 28 de dezembro de 2017. A prévia deste resultado será divulgada no dia 21 de dezembro.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&lumItemId=8A7C82C55EC04CF101600C565B617B27

FGV. IBRE. 30-Nov-2017. Sondagens e Índices de Confiança. Índice de Confiança Empresarial. Confiança Empresarial avança em novembro

O Índice de Confiança Empresarial (ICE) da Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV IBRE) avançou 1,5 ponto em novembro, para 91,8 pontos1, retornando ao nível de maio de 2014.

“Gradualmente a confiança empresarial avança e se aproxima de níveis compatíveis com períodos de expansão econômica. A aceleração da melhora das percepções sobre a situação atual nos últimos meses deu mais consistência à tendência recuperação da confiança em 2017. Do lado das expectativas, chama atenção em novembro o fato de que pela primeira vez em três anos há mais empresas prevendo aumentar que reduzir o total de pessoal ocupado nos meses seguintes.” afirma Aloisio Campelo Jr., Superintendente de Estatísticas Públicas do FGV IBRE.

O Índice de Confiança Empresarial (ICE) consolida os índices de confiança dos quatro setores cobertos pelas sondagens empresariais produzidas pelo FGV IBRE: Indústria, Serviços, Comércio e Construção.

Em novembro, houve melhora das avaliações em relação à situação atual e das expectativas para os meses seguintes. A alta de 1,1 ponto do Índice de Expectativas (IE-E), para 98,5 pontos, leva este indicador ao maior nível desde dezembro de 2013 (100,3 pontos). Já o Índice da Situação Atual (ISA-E) subiu 0,7 ponto, para 86,7 pontos. Após a quinta alta consecutiva, este subíndice acumula ganho de 13,7 pontos no ano e atinge o maior patamar desde dezembro de 2014.

A confiança empresarial avançou em dois dos quatro setores que integram o ICE. A maior contribuição para a alta do ICE em novembro foi dada pela Indústria (1,4 ponto) seguida pelo Setor da Construção (0,1 ponto).

Um destaque de novembro é a evolução do indicador de ímpeto de contratações pelo setor empresarial: pela primeira vez desde novembro de 2014 a parcela de empresas que preveem aumentar o quadro de pessoal nos três meses seguintes (15,2%) supera a das que projetam redução (14,6%). O resultado foi influenciado pelo avanço do ímpeto de contratações na indústria, segmento em que a diferença entre a proporção de previsões de aumento e de redução do total de pessoal ocupado alcançou 6,8 pontos percentuais no mês. Em Serviços e no Comércio a diferença ficou próxima a zero e na Construção continua negativa (-9,5 p.p.).

Difusão da alta da confiança entre os segmentos

Em novembro, a confiança aumentou em 49% dos 49 segmentos pesquisados pela FGV IBRE para compor o ICE. Considerando-se médias móveis trimestrais, a proporção de segmentos em alta na margem é de 60% do total.

Para a edição de novembro de 2017, foram coletadas informações de 4.923 empresas entre 1 e 27 de novembro.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C55EC04CF101600C46B6BF3BD1

MERCOSUL-UE. MAPA. 29/11/2017. Acúcar e Álcool. Sistema de cotas é o novo desafio do açúcar brasileiro na Europa. Na Inglaterra, Ministério da Agricultura defende mercado para o etanol combustível

Em Londres, no 26º Seminário da Organização Internacional do Açúcar (OIA), que começou ontem (28/11) e terminará amanhã (30/11), o Brasil está sendo representado por Cid Caldas, coordenador-geral de Cana de Açúcar e Agroenergia do Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA).

Organismo com tradição no suporte ao mercado açucareiro mundial, a OIA monitora as ações mundiais para construção de um mercado internacional de etanol combustível.

“É um foro privilegiado para o Brasil incrementar suas relações comerciais”, disse Caldas, “com amplas possibilidades de negócios para exportação de tecnologia e equipamentos”.

O Seminário da OIA em 2017 - "Sustentabilidade, - Novos caminhos a seguir – está se realizando simultaneamente à 28ª  reunião da Associação Mundial de Plantadores de Cana de Açúcar e Beterraba.

 “Com a reforma do sistema de cotas da União Europeia”, informou Cid Caldas, “os produtores mundiais de açúcar deverão enfrentar novos desafios para demostrar que estão baseados no tripé de sustentabilidade social, ambiental e econômica. Esse será o grande pleito para o futuro do setor açucareiro”.

Líder mundial na produção de açúcar, com 50% do comércio internacional, em 2016 o Brasil exportou  29 milhões de toneladas, o que corresponde a US$ 10,4 bilhões.

MERCOSUL-UE. MDIC. 29 de Novembro de 2017. Brasil avalia reconhecimento de Indicações Geográficas da União Europeia. Prazo para produtores brasileiros se manifestarem em consulta pública termina em seis de dezembro

Brasília (29 de novembro) – Termina no próximo dia seis de dezembro (6/12) o prazo da consulta pública sobre a lista de Indicações Geográficas (IGs) da União Europeia, no âmbito das negociações do acordo de livre comércio do Mercosul com o bloco europeu. Neste período, produtores brasileiros - ou qualquer pessoa ou instituição contrária à recomendação de reconhecimento no Brasil -  devem se manifestar junto ao Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Industrial (INPI), órgão vinculado ao Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços (MDIC).

Como participar

Os subsídios devem ser apresentados e enviados até o fim do prazo para o e-mail subsidios@inpi.gov.br . O usuário interessado em se manifestar deve preencher um formulário específico.

São exemplos de questões que podem levar à apresentação de oposição:

• Instituições ou empresas que entendam que a concessão de proteção de alguma (s) das IGs solicitadas fere direitos já adquiridos. Nesse caso, sugere-se apresentar, por nome de cada indicação geográfica, informações necessárias que demonstrem como esta proteção pode vir a afetar seus direitos adquiridos;
• Nome idêntico ou semelhante, registrado ou com solicitação de registro, a uma indicação geográfica europeia, para mesmo produtos ou produto similar, de forma a poder causar confusão ao consumidor;
• Nome considerado genérico ou de uso comum para bens produzidos no país. Demonstrar desde quando o item é produzido de boa-fé;
• Nome entra em conflito com uma variedade vegetal ou raça animal, de forma que possa causar confusão no consumidor sobre a verdadeira origem do produto;

Estas oposições devem ser apresentadas por nome constante da lista da União Europeia, subsidiadas com argumentos e informações que as justifiquem. Decorrido o prazo de 30 dias, a partir de sete de dezembro, o INPI analisará os recursos brasileiros interpostos, abrirá prazo para contestação e emitirá parecer técnico. Após a finalização de todo o processo, serão negociadas as possíveis exceções às regras definidas no acordo, que permitirão a internalização da lista de Indicações Geográficas em cada país do bloco Mercosul.

Ao fim do prazo para envio de oposições, a representação diplomática da União Europeia será notificada para se manifestar e, depois, o INPI emitirá parecer técnico. Procedimento similar está sendo realizado com a lista de Indicações Geográficas que o Mercosul apresentou para proteção na União Europeia.

Negociações Mercosul-UE

O Mercosul e a União Europeia estão negociando um acordo de preferências comerciais entre os blocos e trocaram listas com as Indicações Geográficas que pretendem reconhecer e proteger diretamente via acordo. Na lista da União Europeia constam 347 IGs e na do Mercosul, 200. No âmbito deste acordo, o reconhecimento e a proteção das Indicações Geográficas estão em discussão no capítulo sobre Propriedade Intelectual.

“Presunto de Parma” e “Gorgonzola” são algumas das Indicações Geográficas que a União Europeia submeteu ao Mercosul para reconhecimento pelos países do bloco. Outras IGs submetidas pela União Europeia são Cava (Espanha) para vinho e presunto toscano (Itália). A lista de queijos é grande e contempla o francês Gruyère, além dos italianos Pecorino Romano e Parmigiano Reggiano (que inclui o nome Parmesão em português).

O Brasil incluiu na lista do Mercosul as IGs de "Salinas" (para cachaça), "Canastra" e "Serro" (para queijos) e "Vale dos Vinhedos" (para vinho), entre outros.  O tema integra o capítulo sobre Propriedade Intelectual do acordo comercial que está em negociação. As negociações, pelo lado do Brasil, estão sendo conduzidas pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores, com apoio do Ministério da Indústria, Comércio Exterior e Serviços e do Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento.

O que são Indicações Geográficas

Indicações Geográficas, segundo o Acordo sobre Aspectos dos Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual Relacionados ao Comércio (TRIPS) da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), são indicações que identificam um produto como originário do território de um membro, ou região ou localidade deste território, quando determinada qualidade, reputação ou outra característica do produto seja essencialmente atribuída à sua origem geográfica.

Ou seja: a IG identifica o local de origem de um produto ou serviço quando esse local tenha se tornado um centro produtor conhecido ou quando determine a característica ou qualidade do item ao qual se refere. A proteção das Indicações Geográficas nas legislações dos países do Mercosul e da União Europeia são diferentes. O texto do acordo entre os dois blocos definirá como serão tratadas essas diferenças, o que envolve um longo processo de negociação para garantir que os direitos garantidos nas legislações nacionais não sejam comprometidos.

SINDUSCON-SP. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. Indústria da construção deve crescer 2% em 2018 e recuar 6,4% em 2017, estima Sinduscon-SP

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - A indústria de construção deve crescer 2 por cento em 2018, amparado em uma possível redução dos estoques de imóveis e distratos e nas obras de infraestrutura e das unidades contratadas dentro do Minha Casa Minha Vida (MCMV), estimou nesta quinta-feira o Sindicato da Indústria da Construção Civil do Estado de São Paulo (Sinduscon-SP).

A estimativa também leva em conta a tendência de ampliação do crédito imobiliário por agentes financeiros, tendo em vista aspectos macroeconômicos favoráveis, como inflação baixa e queda no juro real. A entidade pondera, contudo, que o cenário traçado para 2018 está sujeito às incertezas políticas e ao quadro fiscal preocupante no país.

Para 2017, o Sinduscon-SP projeta queda de 6,4 por cento no Produto Interno Bruto da construção, o que configura piora significativa em relação à estimativa divulgada no começo do ano, de alta de 0,5 por cento.

Por Gabriela Mello

ABRAS. 30/11/2017. VENDAS DOS SUPERMERCADOS ACUMULAM ALTA DE 0,90%

As vendas do setor supermercadista acumulam alta de 0,90% de janeiro a outubro, em relação ao mesmo período de 2016, de acordo com o Índice Nacional de Vendas ABRAS, divulgado hoje (30).
Em outubro, as vendas do setor supermercadista, em valores reais - deflacionadas pelo IPCA/IBGE, apresentaram queda de -0,65% na comparação com o mês de setembro e queda de -0,84% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano de 2016.

Em valores nominais, as vendas do setor apresentaram queda de -0,23% em relação ao mês de setembro e, quando comparadas a outubro do ano anterior, alta de 1,86%. No acumulado do ano, as vendas cresceram 4,52%.



"Como outubro antecede a Black Friday, os consumidores aguardam as promoções e postergam as suas compras, principalmente de produtos de maior valor agregado", destaca o presidente da Associação Brasileira de Supermercados (ABRAS), João Sanzovo Neto.

Abrasmercado

No mês de outubro, a cesta de produtos *Abrasmercado, pesquisada pela GfK e analisada pelo Departamento de Economia e Pesquisa da ABRAS, registrou alta de -0,04%, passando de R$ 446,57 para R$ 446,77. Já no acumulado dos últimos 12 meses, a cesta apresentou queda de -7,82.



As maiores quedas de preço no mês de outubro foram registradas em produtos como: arroz, pernil, açúcar e sabão em pó. Já as maiores altas foram nos itens: batata, tomate, extrato de tomate e farinha de mandioca. Confira a tabela abaixo:



Regiões

Em outubro, a Região Sudeste foi a que registrou maior alta nos preços (0,38%), passando de R$ 426,58 para R$ 428,19. A maior queda foi registrada na Região Sul, -0,19%, impactada principalmente pelo interior do Paraná (-1,44%) e Grande Porto Alegre (-1,13%). Confira mais detalhes na tabela abaixo:



*Abrasmercado não é a cesta básica, mas sim, uma cesta composta por 35 produtos mais consumidos nos supermercados: alimentos, incluindo cerveja e refrigerante, higiene, beleza e limpeza doméstica.

Índice de Confiança

O otimismo dos empresários do autosserviço se manteve estável em relação ao cenário macroeconômico, de acordo com o Índice de Confiança do Supermercadista, elaborado pela ABRAS em parceria com a GfK. O resultado apresentado na última pesquisa, realizada em agosto, apontava 51,7 pontos (numa escala de 0 a 100), e no mês de outubro, registrou 51,8 pontos.



Apresentação: http://abras.com.br/pdf/ppt_nov.pdf

ABRAS. PORTAL G1. Jornal Valor Econômico. 30/11/2017. Vendas reais dos supermercados caem 0,84% em outubro ante setembro. Segundo Abras, também houve queda de 0,84% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano de 2016.

Em outubro as vendas do setor supermercadista em valores reais (deflacionadas pelo IPCA/IBGE) apresentaram queda de 0,65% na comparação com o mês de setembro. Também houve queda de 0,84% em relação ao mesmo mês do ano de 2016, informou em comunicado a Associação Brasileira de Supermercados (Abras).
Em valores nominais, as vendas do setor apresentaram queda de 0,23% em relação ao mês de setembro e, quando comparadas a outubro do ano anterior, houve alta de 1,86%.No acumulado do ano, as vendas nominais cresceram 4,52% e, em termos reais, subiram 0,9%.
Em nota, o comando da Abras destacou efeito negativo da Black Friday sobre as vendas das lojas em outubro. Na visão da entidade, o evento em novembro fez o consumidor adiar as compras e isso afetou a demanda em outubro.
“Como outubro antecede a Black Friday, os consumidores aguardam as promoções e postergam as suas compras, principalmente de produtos de maior valor”, disse em nota o presidente da Associação Brasileira de Supermercados, João Sanzovo Neto.

SERASA. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. Inadimplência de micro e pequenas empresas bate recorde em outubro, diz Serasa Experian

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - A inadimplência de micro e pequenos empresários do Brasil em outubro atingiu o maior nível desde março de 2016, apesar dos sinais de recuperação da economia, segundo dados divulgados nesta quinta-feira pela empresa de análise de informações de crédito Serasa Experian.

Segundo o levantamento, que começou a ser realizado pela companhia em março de 2016, o número de micro e pequenas empresas inadimplentes do país atingiu 4,9 milhões em outubro, um aumento de 12,5 por cento sobre o mesmo período do ano passado.

Do total de 4,9 milhões de empresas inadimplentes, 45,6 por cento eram prestadoras de serviços, 45,2 por cento empresas comerciais e 8,8 por cento indústrias.

“A recuperação da economia em 2017 vem se dando de forma não uniforme para todos os setores e, neste sentido, o setor de serviços é um dos que está mais atrasado neste processo”, afirmou a Serasa Experian em comunicado à imprensa,

As micro e pequenas empresas respondem por 27 por cento do Produto Interno Bruto do país, segundo a Serasa Experian. “Por isso, o recorde de inadimplência traz preocupação.”

Mais cedo, o Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) informou que a taxa de desemprego do país caiu a 12,2 por cento no trimestre até outubro, atingindo nível mais baixo desde o final de 2016. Porém, a pesquisa indicou que o número de desempregados seguiu caindo por conta da informalidade.

Por Alberto Alerigi Jr.

ANP. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Importação de derivados de petróleo pelo Brasil cresce 60% em outubro, diz ANP

RIO DE JANEIRO (Reuters) - As importações de derivados de petróleo pelo Brasil em outubro subiram 60 por cento ante o mesmo mês do ano passado e cresceram 21 por cento em relação a setembro, evidenciando que o produto importado continua ganhando mercado da Petrobras.

A direção da Petrobras admitiu, durante comentários sobre o desempenho no terceiro trimestre, que estava perdendo mercado para concorrentes, que têm elevado compras externas para suprir a demanda doméstica. Isso ocorre enquanto a Petrobras tenta calibrar seus reajustes de preços, que ocorrem quase que diariamente.

O volume total de derivados importado em outubro somou aproximadamente 21,438 milhões de barris, ante 13,386 milhões de barris um ano antes e 17,656 milhões de barris em setembro, publicou a Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP) nesta quinta-feira.

No acumulado do ano, as importações totais de derivados do petróleo pelo Brasil cresceram 25 por cento para 193 milhões de barris, próximo de um recorde anual registrado em 2014, quando as compras externas do país, no acumulado do ano inteiro, somaram 196,735 milhões de barris, em meio a uma forte demanda.

No entanto, o crescimento expressivo das importações em 2017 acontece apesar das vendas totais de combustíveis no acumulado do ano até outubro no país terem aumentado apenas 0,2 por cento, segundo a ANP.

O impulso acontece devido ao aumento de importações de concorrentes da Petrobras, que vêm ganhando participação de mercado desde que a petroleira estatal adotou uma política de preços que segue a lógica do mercado, em busca de resultados favoráveis para a sua área de abastecimento.

As importações de óleo diesel, combustível mais consumido do Brasil, mais que dobraram em outubro, para 8,463 milhões de barris, ante 4,145 milhões de barris no mesmo mês de 2016. Ante setembro, as importações cresceram 36 por cento.

De janeiro a outubro, as compras de diesel no exterior avançaram 61,3 por cento para 65,559 milhões de barris.

Já as importações de gasolina em outubro cresceram 65 por cento em relação ao mesmo mês do ano passado, para 2,010 milhões de barris. Em relação a setembro, as importações cresceram 35 por cento.

No acumulado do ano, as importações de gasolina do Brasil cresceram 56,1 por cento.

Por Marta Nogueira

ANP. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Vendas de combustíveis no Brasil em outubro crescem 4,4% puxadas por diesel e etanol

RIO DE JANEIRO (Reuters) - As vendas de combustíveis no Brasil em outubro cresceram 4,4 por cento na comparação com o mesmo mês do ano anterior, para 75 milhões de barris, impulsionadas pela comercialização de diesel e de etanol, informou nesta quinta-feira a Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP).

O total vendido no país ainda registrou alta no acumulado de 2017 pela primeira vez, segundo dados da ANP, numa sinalização positiva para o setor que vem registrando quedas anuais nos últimos dois anos. A variação do total vendido de janeiro a outubro foi de 0,2 por cento ante o mesmo período de 2016.

As vendas de combustíveis no mês passado avançaram 1,7 por cento ante setembro, quando o total comercializado no país haviam caído 3 por cento ante o mês anterior.

O avanço das vendas em outubro aconteceu apesar dos preços mais altos dos combustíveis no Brasil, especialmente diesel e gasolina, após o impacto de alta no PIS/Cofins nos combustíveis e com a Petrobras repassando avanços das cotações internacionais.

A ANP não divulgou comentários sobre as vendas.

As vendas de diesel, principal combustível vendido no Brasil, cresceram 6 por cento, para 30,9 milhões de barris. Na comparação com setembro, houve alta de 1,1 por cento.

No acumulado do ano, as vendas de diesel subiram 0,4 por cento.

As vendas de gasolina, por sua vez, caíram 2,3 por cento na comparação com o mesmo mês do ano passado, para 22,25 milhões de barris, enquanto subiram 1 por cento ante setembro.

No acumulado do ano, as vendas de gasolina apresentam alta de 5 por cento até outubro.

Já as vendas de etanol hidratado em outubro subiram 14,8 por cento na comparação com o mesmo mês do ano passado e cresceram 4,8 por cento ante o mês anterior, com o biocombustível mais competitivo e ganhando mercado da gasolina, cujos preços dispararam.

No acumulado do ano, entretanto, as vendas de etanol hidratado, que abastece os veículos flex, ainda apresentam queda de 13 por cento.

Por Marta Nogueira

OPEP. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Opep e aliados devem concordar com extensão de cortes de produção até fim de 2018
Por Alex Lawler e Rania El Gamal e Shadia Nasralla

VIENA (Reuters) - Produtores de petróleo integrantes e não integrantes da Opep tendem a concordar nesta quinta-feira em estender cortes de produção até o final de 2018, de modo a concluir a eliminação de uma sobreoferta do produto, ao mesmo tempo em que sinalizam uma eventual saída do pacto antes do previsto caso o mercado superaqueça.

A Rússia, não membro da Opep e que neste ano reduziu a produção de forma significativa juntamente com o restante do cartel, vem pressionando por uma mensagem clara sobre como sair dos cortes para que o mercado não entre em uma situação de déficit.

O acordo atual dos produtores, sob o qual estão reduzindo a oferta em cerca de 1,8 milhão de barris por dia (bpd), em um esforço para dar suporte aos preços do petróleo, expira em março.

À medida que a reunião da Opep começou em Viena, com presença de 14 países, o ministro da Energia da Arábia Saudita, Khalid al-Falih, disse ser a favor de cortes de produção por mais nove meses, até o final de 2018.

Ele disse ser prematuro falar sobre sair dos cortes pelo menos por alguns trimestres e acrescentou que a Opep irá examinar o progresso do pacto na próxima reunião, em junho.

“Quando chegarmos a uma saída, vamos fazer isso muito gradualmente... Para garantir que não haja choques no mercado”, disse ele.

Os ministros iraquiano, iraniano e angolano também disseram que uma revisão do acordo atual é possível na próxima reunião da Opep, em junho, caso o mercado fique muito apertado.

“Os principais parâmetros que poderiam justificar uma revisão são mudanças no mercado e mudanças nos preços”, disse o ministro iraquiano do Petróleo, Jabar al-Luaibi.

Bijan Zanganeh, do Irã, disse que o patamar de 60 dólares por barril é um bom preço. O Brent, referência internacional, é negociado nesta quinta-feira em torno de 64 dólares.

VENEZUELA. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. ENERGIA. Ex-ministro do Petróleo da Venezuela e ex-presidente da PDVSA são presos, dizem fontes

CARACAS (Reuters) - O ex-ministro do Petróleo da Venezuela Eulogio Del Pino e o ex-presidente da petroleira estatal venezuelana PDVSA foram presos nesta quinta-feira, em meio a investigações do Ministério Público sobre corrupção no setor de petróleo, afirmaram à Reuters duas fontes familiarizadas com o assunto.

Não ficou imediatamente claro por que ocorreu a prisão dos dois funcionários, que foram substituídos em seus cargos nesta semana. Uma das fontes disse que eles podem ter sido levados para um interrogatório.

Por Alexandra Ulmer

EMBRAER. PORTAL G1. 30/11/2017. AVIAÇÃO. Embraer anuncia venda de seis A-29 Super Tucanos para Força Aérea das Filipinas. Embraer informou que aeronave foi escolhida para missões de apoio aéreo tático; entregas começarão em 2019. Valores do negócio não foram revelados.
Por G1 Vale do Paraíba e Região


Super Tucano A-29, da Embraer, foi escolhido pela Força Aérea das Filipinas. (Foto: Divulgação/Embraer)

A Embraer anunciou nesta quinta-feira (30) a venda de seis aeronaves de ataque leve e treinamento avançado A-29 Super Tucano para a Força Aérea das Filipinas.
Os valores do negócio não foram revelados pela fabricante brasileira. As entregas das aeronaves começarão em 2019.
De acordo com a Embraer, o Super Tucano foi selecionado como parte do plano de modernização da Força Aérea das Filipinas após um processo de licitação pública que envolveu outros fabricantes.
A aeronave será utilizada em missões de apoio aéreo tático, ataque leve, vigilância, intercepção e contra-insurgência.
O Super Tucano é um avião turboélice capaz de executar missões como ataque aéreo leve, vigilância, interceptação aérea e contra-insurgência.
Segundo a Embraer, o Super Tucano já foi selecionado por 14 forças aéreas em todo o mundo. O modelo tem mais de 320 mil horas de voo e mais de 40 mil horas de combate.

EMBRAER. REUTERS. 30 DE NOVEMBRO DE 2017. AVIAÇÃO. Embraer recebe da Força Aérea das Filipinas pedido firme para 6 jatos A-29 Super Tucano

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - A Embraer recebeu da Força Aérea das Filipinas um pedido firme de seis jatos A-29 Super Tucano, informou a fabricante brasileira em comunicado na manhã desta quinta-feira.

Segundo a companhia, a encomenda dos jatos A-29 Super Tucano fazem parte do atual plano de modernização da Força Aérea das Filipinas e começarão a ser entregues em 2019.

“Estamos honrados em ser selecionados pela Força Aérea das Filipinas, nosso segundo operador na região da Ásia-Pacífico, e com a confiança expressa por nosso cliente”, afirmou em nota Jackson Schneider, presidente da divisão de Defesa e Segurança da Embraer.

Por Gabriela Mello

________________

SPECIAL

DoS. November 28, 2017. The U.S. and Europe: Strengthening Western Alliances. Remarks. Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State. Jane Harman, President and CEO of the Wilson Center. The Wilson Center

Washington, DC - MS HARMAN: Good morning. I’m Jane Harman, president and CEO of the Wilson Center. Happy to be talking to a packed crowd and to welcome Secretary Rex Tillerson back to the Wilson Center. As you know, Mr. Secretary, the Wilson Center has a tradition of honoring business and political leaders who follow our 28th president’s dictum – that would be Woodrow Wilson – to, quote, “enable the world to live more amply, with greater vision, with a finer spirit of hope and achievement.” The center honored you in 2010 and you honored us by attending our event in Dallas in 2014 where Richard Fisher, outgoing chairman of the Dallas Fed, received our public service award. You and I sat together. We’re delighted to welcome you back this morning to talk about the future of U.S. relations with Europe and to take some questions from me and some of you in the audience.
Since we only have 50 minutes of your time, those here today submitted questions on arrival, and we selected a few at random, which I will put to the Secretary. By the way, your predecessors and most recently John Kerry have addressed us on prior occasions, but the times in which they served seem less perilous than the present. Today, as you and I were discussing, our country and the world face an existential threat from North Korea’s nuclear program; many governments in the Middle East are struggling for stability; despite the enormous reduction in the capacity of terror groups like ISIS, plots and horrific violence against civilians, mostly Muslims, continue; and there is clear evidence of Russia meddling in democratic elections in the U.S. and Europe, just to name a few of the issues on your plate.

It’s clear that old answers don’t work. That’s why many here applaud the fact that you have an unusual resume for a Secretary of State. Educated as an engineer, your journey over four decades to become CEO of the world’s sixth and most – the world’s sixth-most valuable company is nothing less than astonishing. But hey, you were an Eagle Scout, one who later headed the Boy Scouts. Before joining the Trump administration, you traveled widely, met regularly with global leaders, and displayed curiosity about the world, which is of course why you received our award.

As you know, conducting foreign policy is hard, requiring an understanding of nuance and linkages among issues, as well as focus and the ability to earn the trust and respect of those with whom you interact. You should know that for the past five years, the Wilson Center’s world-class scholars and program directors have helped over 500 Congressional staff on a bipartisan, bicameral basis; analyzed the toughest foreign policy challenges, from a risen China to Putin’s Russia, to Assad’s Syria, to Maduro’s Venezuela. We are laying the groundwork for informed, bipartisan foreign policy as we build knowledge and relationships across the aisle. And just maybe, some of our alums from our program will run for Congress themselves or work for you in the State Department.

Let me recognize a few of our guests and then turn the podium to you, starting with thanks to the International Trade Center Management Association for hosting this event. Thank you, Reagan Building. Nine hundred people wanted to fit into this 600-person auditorium, so I apologize to those who came a bit late and couldn’t be accommodated. Some of our White House-appointed trustees are here, including Thelma Duggin, Barry Jackson, Earl Stafford, and Nathalie Rayes, and our beloved former chairman, Ambassador Joe Gildenhorn, and his amazing wife Alma are also here.

Welcome to all our Wilson supporters, including our cabinet and council members, and to ambassadors from Belgium, Greece, Hungary, the League of Arab States, Luxembourg, Nepal, Nicaragua, the Republic of Slovenia, and Spain. And welcome too to Senator Ron Johnson, who has escaped for an hour from the tax wars on Capitol Hill, and to former senator Bennett Johnston. By the way, one staffer from Senator Johnston’s office attended our foreign policy program. And finally, let me acknowledge my own relationships and our respect for some of your senior staff, including my old Capitol Hill buddy, Margaret Peterlin, your chief of staff, and your newly minted and highly reviewed Assistant Secretary for Europe Wes Mitchell.

So now, please welcome the 69th Secretary of State. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. (Applause.)

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, good morning, and thank you, Jane, for that very kind introduction, and also thanks to the Wilson Center for this opportunity to address you today.

The Wilson Center has made many important contributions to public policy over the years, and therefore it’s a very fitting venue for our discussion today on Europe, considering that 100 years ago this year the United States entered World War I under the leadership of President Wilson. While we tend to associate Wilson with spearheading America’s first major involvement in European affairs, I think it’s worth remembering that our commitment to Europe was earlier championed by a predecessor of his, Theodore Roosevelt.

When Roosevelt died in 1919, just as Wilson was striving for peace in Europe, European leaders joined the American people in an outpouring of grief and praise. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George remembered him as an “inspiring figure far beyond the country’s shores.” Another British politician said he had been “the greatest of all Americans in a moment of dire stress.” And a French senator said he had been “the apostle of the cause of right on the other side of the Atlantic.”

President Roosevelt was beloved in Europe because of his vigorous commitment to the continent in the years before and during World War I. While President Wilson steadfastly adhered to a neutrality policy, Roosevelt felt a responsibility to come to Europe’s defense. It was reported he even once asked President Wilson for permission to personally lead an Army division into Europe, and he had even written to a British army officer, saying, “If we had done what we ought to have done after the sinking of the Lusitania, I and my four boys would now be in the Army getting ready to serve with you in Flanders.”

What motivated Theodore Roosevelt’s rejection of neutrality and an ardent commitment to the defense of Europe?

We can see the answer in something Roosevelt told the U.S. Congress in 1904, and I quote, “A great free people owes it to itself and to all mankind not to sink into helplessness before the powers of evil.” Roosevelt knew that the defense of freedom demanded action from free nations, confident in their strength and protective of their sovereignty.

Roosevelt also knew that the United States and Europe, then as we are now, are bound by shared principles. Our nations live according to a self-evident truth on which Western civilization is built: Liberty, equality, and human dignity. These foundational principles are protected by the construct of our institutions dedicated to the rule of law, separation of powers, and representative government.

Our principles are also protected from external threats by our collective determination, action, and sacrifice in the face of security challenges. World War I was the first great test in the 20th century of whether the United States would pay the high cost of liberty. Theodore Roosevelt never participated in that war, but he did pay that high cost: His son Quentin, a fighter pilot, was killed in the skies over France.

In past decades, our way of life – and by extension, our core Western principles – have been tested by the totalitarian threat of Nazism, by Soviet power and its communist ideology, by ethnic and sectarian conflicts, and by internal political pressures. Together, the U.S. and Europe have passed these tests, but we know that the United States and Europe are again tested today and we will be tested again.

Under President Trump, the United States remains committed to our enduring relationship with Europe. Our security commitments to European allies are ironclad.

If we are to sustain the shared security commitments that ensure stability in the region, the Trump administration views it as necessary for our allies to be strong, sovereign, prosperous, and committed to the defense of shared Western ideals. Over the past 10 months, we have embarked on a new strategic policy that bolsters European and American security: namely, a recommitment to Europe in the wake of the failed “Russia reset;” a new effort to adapt security institutions to combating emerging threats like terrorism, cyberattacks, and nuclear proliferation; and an expectation that European nations accept they are more secure when they contribute more toward their own defense.

These new policy directions will better position the United States and Europe to confront the challenges that threaten our prosperity, the actors that seek to sow chaos and instill doubt in our laws and institutions, and the enemies that threaten our security and oppose our way of life.

This is a message I will repeat in my meetings with NATO and OSCE leaders, and in bilateral meetings in a trip to Europe next week.

The preservation of our liberty begins with guaranteeing that our people can live in safety. To that end, the United States places the highest importance on security relationships with European allies, including NATO. Alliances are meaningless if their members are unwilling or unable to honor their commitments. Earlier this year, President Trump reaffirmed the United States commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty because it is the best mechanism we have to deter aggression. And as the text of Article 5 reads, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Any attack by any actor on a NATO member-state will trigger Article 5, and the United States will be the first to honor the commitment we have made. We will never forget how NATO members came quickly to stand with us after the September 11th attack, and we will do the same for them if they are attacked.

While the West continues to seek a productive new relationship with post-Soviet Russia, thus far it has proved elusive, as both attempts by the prior administration to reset the Russia and U.S.-Europe relationships have been followed by Russia invading its neighbor Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. Russia continues aggressive behavior toward other regional neighbors by interfering in election processes and promoting non-democratic ideals. We, together with our friends in Europe, recognize the active threat of a recently resurgent Russia.

That is why the United States has strengthened its deterrence and defense commitments in Europe through the European Deterrence Initiative, or EDI. Earlier this year, the administration requested $4.8 billion in its budget towards the EDI. This increase of $1.4 billion over the previous year will enhance the U.S. military’s deterrence and defense capabilities and improve the readiness of our forces in Europe. The EDI facilitates training and exercises with our European allies and partners to better integrate our militaries and provide security for Europe. And it will bolster the capacities of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps to deploy assets and support NATO joint exercises. In view of Russia’s Zapad military exercises conducted near the borders of Baltic States in September, our ability to respond to an attack in concert with our allies is more important than ever.

The EDI also includes $150 million to help Ukraine build its capacity for defending its territorial integrity. The United States recognizes that the war in Ukraine – in which people are still dying every day – must come to an end. We have repeatedly urged Russia to begin the path to peace by honoring its commitments under the Minsk agreements. Any resolution of the war that does not entail a fully independent, sovereign, and territorially whole Ukraine is unacceptable. Russia chose to violate the sovereignty of the largest country in Europe. The United States and Europe have stood shoulder-to-shoulder since 2014 in confronting this Russian aggression with a coordinated sanctions policy. Our transatlantic unity is meant to convey to the Russian Government that we will not stand for this flagrant violation of international norms. We hope Russia will take steps to restore Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity and fully implement its Minsk commitments, allowing us to begin then the process of restoring normal relations. But let me be clear, Minsk-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia reverses the actions that triggered them.

We are committed to the success of an independent and whole Ukraine. However, Ukraine’s future depends also on winning its internal struggle to implement a broad range of economic, justice, security, and social sector reforms. We encourage Ukraine to continue building capable, trustworthy institutions that will reduce and eventually eliminate corruption, strengthen their judicial system, and deliver economic prosperity to their citizens.

The Ukraine crisis also made clear how energy supplies can be wielded as a political weapon. Enhancing European energy security by ensuring access to affordable, reliable, diverse, and secure supplies of energy is fundamental to national security objectives. The United States is liberalizing rules governing the export of liquefied natural gas and U.S.-produced crude, and we’re eager to work with European allies to ensure the development of needed infrastructure like import terminals and interconnecting pipelines to promote the diversity of supply to Europe.

In July, President Trump announced at the Three Seas Summit that the United States will provide technical support for Croatia’s Krk Island project. The United States will continue to support European infrastructure projects, such as LNG-receiving facilities in Poland and the Interconnector Greece Bulgaria pipeline, to ensure that no country from outside Europe’s Energy Union can use its resources or its position in the global energy market to extort other nations. We continue to view the development of pipelines like the Nord Stream 2 and the multiline TurkStream as unwise, as they only increase market dominance from a single supplier to Europe.

The United States recognizes the fragility of the Balkans and will continue to work with partners in the EU to bring stability, prosperity, and democracy to the region. The people of the Balkan countries, to them we say: Abandon your old animosities so that peace may become permanent. You have a chance to direct a new course of history. Bloodlines should no longer be battle lines. The United States and the world long to see a new generation of Serbs, Croatians, Albanians, Bosnians, Kosovars, and others who will forgive the past, even if they can never forget it.

A testament to America’s shared values with Europe is our cooperation on issues beyond the borders of Europe, which affect us all. The United States and our European allies have partnered to hold Bashar al-Assad accountable through sanctions for his crimes against his own people. Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the EU and its member states have pledged over 9.5 billion Euros in humanitarian, stabilization, resilience assistance, and those efforts are continuing as the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS stabilizes liberated areas.

As the last pockets of ISIS are defeated in Syria and international focus turns to resolving the Syrian civil conflict, our European partners must continue to be strong advocates for the UN-led Geneva process under UN Security Council Resolution 2254. That alone can be the basis for rebuilding the country and implementing a political solution that leaves no role for the Assad regime or his family in Syria’s government.

Our European partners have also been strong supporters of our diplomatic and economic pressure campaign against North Korea. In addition to enthusiastically supporting UN Security Council resolutions, countries have taken unilateral steps to maximize pressure on the regime in Pyongyang. Portugal froze all diplomatic relations with the DPRK in July. Spain and Italy have expelled North Korean ambassadors. Latvia has fined banks who have violated the sanctions. Our European allies know North Korea is a threat to all responsible nations and requires a coordinated response. We commend our allies for increasing pressure on the regime in Pyongyang in order to achieve the complete, permanent, and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The partnership that the United States and European nations have forged are critical – are a critical basis for confronting the threats of today and tomorrow, both in Europe and outside of Europe.

The United States and Europe face many challenges and threats that – unlike in the past – are simultaneously dispersed among many geographic frontlines and across multiple domains, whether non-state terrorist actors, threats of a more conventional nature, cyber threats, or nuclear threats. Because we know we are stronger in confronting these challenges when we are working together, we will pursue even greater cooperation from and with the nations of Europe, our best partners. History has shown that when we are united, we succeed in the face of shared challenges.

As I remarked earlier, one of these challenges is Russia. Europe and the United States seek a normalized relationship with Russia. However, Russia has shown it seeks to define a new post-Soviet global balance of power, one in which Russia, by virtue of its nuclear arsenal, seeks to impose its will on others by force or by partnering with regimes who show a disregard for their own citizens, as is the case with Bashar al-Assad’s continuous use of chemical weapons against his own people.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union liberalized Russian society and created new trade opportunities that benefit Russians, Europeans, and Americans. But Russia has often employed malicious tactics against the U.S. and Europe to drive us apart, weaken our confidence, and undermine the political and economic successes that we have achieved together since the end of the Cold War. Playing politics with energy supplies, launching cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns to undermine free elections, and serially harassing and intimidating diplomats are not the behaviors of a responsible nation. Attacking a neighboring country and threatening others does nothing to improve the lives of Russians or enhance Russia’s standing in the world.

We want Russia to be a constructive neighbor of Europe and of the larger transatlantic community. But that is Russia’s choice to make. Russia can continue to isolate and impoverish itself by sowing disorder abroad and impeding liberty at home, or it can become a force that will advance the freedom of Russians and the stability of Eurasia.

Following the President’s recent decision regarding our policy toward Iran, there is actually much more that binds the United States and Europe together than drives us apart. The JCPOA is no longer the only point of U.S. policy toward Iran; we are committed to addressing the totality of the Iranian threat. We ask our European partners to join us in standing up to all of Iran’s malign behavior. The Iranian regime is antithetical to Western principles in its totalitarian suppression of individual, political, and religious freedom. Neither the United States nor Europe wants another type of North Korea nuclear threat on its hands, nor are any of our nations at ease with Iran’s attempts at hegemony in the Middle East through support for terrorist organizations, militias on the ground in Iraq and Syria, and an active ballistic missile development program.

At Europe’s intersection in the region, we know Turkey cannot ignore Iran because of geographic proximity and cultural ties. But we ask Turkey, as a NATO ally, to prioritize the common defense of its treaty allies. Iran – and Russia – cannot offer Turkish people the economic and political benefits that membership in the Western community of nations can provide.

We recognize the important contributions of our NATO allies that have been made in Afghanistan, and we ask them to maintain their commitment to the mission. The end state of the United States’ new South Asia strategy is to destroy terrorist safe havens and deny their re-establishment while the Afghan Government continues to strengthen its own capacity to maintain security and create the conditions for reconciliation with the Taliban and an inclusive government that accounts for the ethnic diversity of all Afghans. We know this will take time. But if we fail to exercise vigilance and undertake action against the terrorist threat, wherever it is found, we risk re-creating the safe havens from which the 9/11 plot was hatched and carried out. We urge proportionate contributions of troops, funds, and other forms of assistance as we seek to eradicate a terrorist threat that will not be confined to the place where it was born. NATO’s Resolute Support mission is essential to our shared goal of ensuring that Afghanistan develops the capability to contribute to regional stability and prevail over terrorist threats, including al-Qaida and ISIS.

Even though ISIS is on the brink of complete extinction in Iraq and Syria, the threat of ISIS and associated terror networks will persist in our own country and in others. ISIS is looking for new footholds wherever they can find them, including the Sahel region of West Africa. We must take action so that areas like the Sahel or the Maghreb do not become the next breeding ground for ISIS, al-Qaida, or other terrorist groups. When these groups are able to occupy territory without disruption, their strategists, their bomb makers, and online propagandists have an easier time encouraging, plotting, and executing attacks elsewhere in the world. This was for many months the case in Raqqa. In support of our African and European partners, particularly France, the United States recently committed up to $60 million to assist the G5 Sahel Joint Force to combat terrorism and the potential rise of ISIS in the African Sahel region.

The emergence of ISIS in the Sahel is just one indication that threats to the safety and well-being of our people will continue to have new and unexpected origins. The evolving and unpredictable nature of the threats we face is already clear to the residents of Paris, Brussels, Orlando, Nice, Berlin, Istanbul, London, Manchester, Barcelona, New York, and many other places where our people have suffered at the hands of Islamist terrorists, many of whom were radicalized in front of a computer screen inside their own homes inside their own countries. And the threats we face are clear to countries like Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Germany, who have confronted the destabilizing impact of waves of irregular migration from North Africa and the Middle East.

In the darkest hour of World War II, Winston Churchill declared that the British people would fight on the fields, in the beaches, and in the streets to protect their country. Today, our fight is increasingly located on the internet, at passport checkpoints, and in the hearts and minds of young people in Europe and around the globe. European security institutions, including NATO, must be properly adapted to address internal and external threats such as radical Islamic terrorism to address cyberattacks and to address unchecked migration. Though we know these are the threats of the future, too many headlines have already declared these are the threats of today.

New threats to the United States and Europe are long-term, unpredictable in timing, and localized in many different places. Properly anticipating and combating these threats require a greater European commitment to security, because local responders are the most effective deterrent. While the United States will continue to maintain our guarantees against a catastrophic failure of security in the region, and will continue to expend resources to maintain our protective umbrella, the nations of Europe must accept greater responsibility for their own security challenges. Our alliances must be made stronger in the current strategic environment; a lack of diligence and duty will only invite greater risk.

President Trump said in Warsaw, and I quote, “We have to remember that our defense is not just a commitment of money, it’s a commitment of will.” Our expenditures are in some ways a reflection of how much we seek to protect peace and freedom. We once again urge European partners who have not done so already to meet the 2 percent of GDP target for defense spending. This year, Albania, Croatia, France, Hungary, and Romania have newly committed to attaining the 2 percent benchmark. These nations know they must invest in security to preserve liberty. Every NATO member has previously agreed to the Wales Pledge on Defense Investment. It’s time for each of us to honor that agreement. We also urge greater security integration, provided that the relationships are efficient and serve shared interest.

These commitments are necessary because our freedom and security is at stake. The United States and all nations of Europe – especially those who once lived under the weight of communist dictatorships – value our freedoms as nations who can act on our own authority. If we do not exercise responsibility, we will not have sovereignty; and if we do not have sovereignty, we will not have freedom.

Maintaining sovereignty also entails cultivating the virtues that make it possible. Free nations must exercise vigilant protection of civil societies and the groups, families, and individuals that compose them. Rule of law and representative governments are empty shells when detached from a vibrant civil society and a deep respect for certain self-evident truths. We can win every great geopolitical struggle, but if we are not perennially vigilant of our own behavior, our own people may lose in the long run. The preservation of Western ideals depends on how willing we are to protect the core truths upon which our political and economic freedoms are based.

We know the people and leaders of Europe are having many conversations about their future. America will not attempt to impose answers to those questions. We recognize that Europe is composed of free nations who, in the great tradition of Western democracy, must be able to choose their own paths forward. As in the past, the United States is committed to working with Europe’s institutional arms, and while we also recognize that our allies are independent and democratic nations with their own history, perspective, and right to determine their future.

This position has a particular relevance for what is transpiring in the UK over the Brexit. The United States will maintain our longstanding special relationship with the United Kingdom, and at the same time maintain a strong relationship with the EU, regardless of the outcome of Brexit. We will not attempt to influence the negotiations, but we urge the EU and UK to move this process forward swiftly and without unnecessary acrimony. We offer an impartial hand of friendship to both parties.

The next chapter of European history must be written in Europe’s own words.

As I mentioned at the beginning, 2017 marks the 100th anniversary of America’s entry into World War I. But this November also marks the centennial of another event in world history: the beginning of the Russian Revolution. Though the Soviet Union collapsed 26 years ago, a few symbols and phrases associated with decades of Soviet rule endure in the English language: the Gulag, the five-year plan, the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall. These few words, almost universally understood, capture the bitter and brutal history of communist rule in Europe and Russia. And they remind us of what can happen if we fail to defend the core principles of liberty and sovereignty in the Western tradition.

In our time, forces like authoritarian nation-states, radical Islamist terrorists, and hackers with a lust for chaos are attempting to erode our principles of freedom, equality, human dignity, the rule of law, and representative government. We cannot fail to take on the sovereign responsibility of protecting those freedoms. As Theodore Roosevelt also said, “Every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.”

Aware of this responsibility, the U.S. will remain firmly committed to peace, stability and prosperity, and liberty for Europe. As we reflect on how our ties with Europe have endured over the past 100 years, the United States stands by our European allies and partners, so that our free societies will be standing strong together another 100 years from now.

Thank you. (Applause.)

MS HARMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for a speech that I think is worthy of many of the leaders you cited – Woodrow Wilson, who served us as president a hundred years ago; Theodore Roosevelt; Franklin Roosevelt; Winston Churchill. You linked all parts of the world, and that is why we honor people like you with our public and business awards over the years.

So let me focus just a bit more on Europe since that was your topic and you’re going to Europe next week. Bob Dickie and I were recently at NATO visiting with our extremely able ambassador, Kay Bailey Hutchison, and she convened a lunch of eight foreign ambassadors to NATO. And what came through is – to me, is a view they have that this is a zero-sum game. As the United States focuses on problems around the world like – urgent problems, and you cited many of them – like North Korea and Iran, it will pay less attention to Europe.

I thought that your speech made the point that this is not a zero-sum game, that if a strong Europe stands with us, we are stronger together to face the tough problems around the world that are also developing blowback to Europe. And am I right? Is that – was that the elevator pitch?

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, that – yeah, that is the message that I’ll be taking next week, that just as the last 100 years I think have proven, we view the current times we’re in similarly, that the United States cannot alone confront all of these threats. They are so widespread, and they are also so interconnected. You can pick any one of the threats that I went through and you will find points of connection between every one of them, in some form or fashion, whether it’s a Russian involvement, a China involvement, an Iranian involvement, Islamist terrorism involvement. But we are confronted with a particularly complex time in our world of dealing with threats to our civil society. And we’re only going to prevail against those threats with continuing to use our allies, the strength of our allies.

And one of the things the United States is blessed in our foreign policy and in our national security posture is we have many, many allies, many allies, all over the world, and those alliances were forged in shared blood and shared sacrifice, unlike many of our adversaries who can count their allies on less than all the fingers on one hand, because they didn’t forge those alliances through those shared sacrifices, nor are they forged through shared ideals.

So I think what we’re recognizing and promoting is the strength of these historic alliances, which I think over some period of time, perhaps since the end of the Cold War, we lost our way a bit in some of these relationships, maybe a view in particular in Europe that with the end of the Cold War, the imminent threat that everyone faced for that 70-year period was now diminishing, and what we now realize is it didn’t. It didn’t diminish. It’s still defining itself; it’s still searching for its role in the name of Russia.

But these threats that are emanating out of the Middle East, which now have brought themselves right to the shores and to the borders of our European allies, whether it be through the mass migration but also with the mass migration comes the transport of those who would kill others and sacrifice themselves in doing it, that these are threats that we can only confront with a very strong network of the alliances.

And so it is really – in some respects, it’s a recommitment, but it’s also a redefinition of what this alliance means. And I think the message President Trump carried early on when he went to Europe – and received a lot of criticism for it – was to demand of our allies that you care as much about your freedom and you care as much about the security of your people as we care about you. And when you looked at the commitments that the U.S. – the sacrifice that the U.S. makes in terms of not just the taxpayers’ dollars but our own men and women in uniform, the commitment we made seemed to be a little out of balance. And I think the President was just sending the message that we’re committed to this alliance. You have to get committed – you need to get as committed to it as we are.

And I think what I’ve heard in my – and I’ve had a lot of dialogue with European counterparts – that message has resonated. And we’re seeing it in the commitments to NATO, commitments to defense spending, a recommitment of personnel. And this is really what was needed at this time, where we are under these enormous threats, and we have to strengthen the alliances; we have to strengthen NATO’s capability to deal with what are now new and changing threats. And that was really the purpose of the President’s message early in his presidency, which we’ve now followed through on in crafting these stronger relationships.

We have more work to do, but I think our message to Europe is nothing has changed in terms of our commitment to you. Nothing from that time we made that decision 100 years ago to enter World War I in your defense – nothing has changed fundamentally. The same values that bind us are still there.

MS HARMAN: Thank you.

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Let’s keep that strong.

MS HARMAN: Mindful of your time, I just want to get in a few questions about other topics, including questions from the audience. But I would note that an interesting point you made in your talk was about Turkey, that Turkey now has a choice: It can become more connected to Europe, which is a huge advantage, and to us, or not. And I heard that loud and clear.

I want to turn to the question of State Department funding and organization, something that many people are interested in. Every organization needs renewal. The Wilson Center needs renewal. And surely, everyone here, including long-serving Foreign Service officers, think the State Department needs renewal. However, questions have arisen about the steep cuts in your budget proposed by the Office of Management and Budget – that doesn’t mean that’s what Congress will enact – and what some claim is a hollowing out of your department. Most recently today, two valued friends of the Wilson Center, Nick Burns and Ryan Crocker, both of them enormously experienced Foreign Service officers and ambassadors, wrote a piece in The New York Times with a lot of information about who’s leaving and what its implications are.

My understanding is there is another side to this story. And so I would like to ask you to tell your side of this story and give us your vision for what the State Department should become.

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, let me start quickly with the budget, because it’s – I think it’s the easier – actually easier question to address. The budget that the State Department was given in 2016 was a record-high budget – almost $55 billion. This was above what traditionally has been a budget that runs kind of the mid-30 billion level. And this was ramping up over the last few years, in many respects for some good reasons. But as we look at that spending level, quite frankly, it’s just not sustainable. It is very difficult to execute a $55 billion budget and execute it well. That’s a lot of spending and deployment of resources, and I take our stewardship of those dollars very seriously, and I take the congressional oversight obligations on us very seriously and am not going to brush them aside light handedly. So part of this was just a reality check: Can we really keep this up? And the truth of the matter is, it’d be very difficult to keep it up and do it well.

And secondly though, part of this bringing the budget numbers back down is reflective of an expectation that we’re going to have success in some of these conflict areas of getting these conflicts resolved and moving to a different place in terms of the kind of support that we have to give them. So it’s a combination of things – that sustainability, a recognition that those numbers are really the outliers. The numbers we’re moving to are not the outliers; they’re more historic in terms of the levels of spending.

As to the State Department redesign – and I use the word “redesign” because it would have been really easy to come in on day one and do a reorg. A “reorg,” when I use that word, is moving the boxes around on the org chart. When I showed up in the State Department, I was stunned when I got the organization chart out and I had 82 direct reports to the Office of the Secretary, to me – 82. Now, almost 70 of those are special envoys, special ambassadors, positions that have been created. So we immediately undertook an examination of just what’s a reasonable way to run the place, and that isn’t it. Having run a large global organization – and I have been through three major reorganizations in my history and actually enjoy doing it – it’s always focused on how do we help the people be more effective, how do we get the obstacles out of their way.

So we undertook a different approach, and since I don’t know the department and didn’t know its culture, we had a massive listening exercise. We had 35,000 people respond and we had over 300 face-to-face interviews, and we continue an active dialogue with people today about what is it – if I could do one thing for you that would make you more effective and make you – make your work more satisfying, what would that be. And we got hundreds of ideas. We’ve actually selected about 170 of those ideas that we are now perfecting.

The reason we call it a redesign is most of these have to do with work processes internally and work processes with inter-agencies that we should be able to improve the way people get their work done. Some of it is tools and enablement, so things like – we have a really antiquated IT system. I was shocked when I went down to spend an afternoon with the A Bureau, and I said, “What’s the one thing I could do?” And they said, “Get us into the cloud.” And I looked at them. I said, “What do you mean? We’re not in the cloud?” And they said, “No, no. We’re still on all these servers.” Well, that’s a big cyber risk, first. But it really made it very cumbersome for people, and when I started using my own computer I started realizing just how cumbersome it was.

So a lot of the projects that have been identified out of the redesign are process redesigns and some enablement for people, and it’s all directed at allowing the people of the State Department to get their work done more effectively, more efficiently, and have a much more satisfying career. We have a lot of processes in the HR function that have not been updated in decades, and they need to be updated. How we put people out on assignment – we invest enormous amounts of money in people that we deploy to missions overseas, and I was stunned to find out in a lot of the missions these are one-year assignments. So we invested all this money; we send them out to the mission. They’re there for one year, and about the time they’re starting to figure it out and have an impact, we take them out and we move them somewhere else. Well, a lot of people have said to me, “I would really like to stay another year and start contributing.” So it’s a lot of things like that that came out of the listening exercise.

So the – so we have five large teams. They’re all employee-led. I’ve brought in some consultants to help us facilitate, but the redesign is all led by the employees in the State Department.

The issue of the hollowing out – I think all of you appreciate that every time you have a change of government you have a lot of senior Foreign Service officers and others who decide they want to move on and do other things. We’ve had a – our numbers of retirements are almost exactly what they were in 2016 at this point. We have the exact same number of Foreign Service officers today – we’re off by 10 – that we had at this time in 2016. There is a hiring freeze that I’ve kept in place, because as we redesign the organization we’re probably going to have people that need to be redeployed to other assignments. I don’t want to have a layoff; I don’t want to have to fire a bunch of people. So I said, “Let’s manage some of our staffing targets with just normal attrition.”

Having said that, I have signed over 2,300 hiring exceptions, because I’ve told every post if you have a critical position and you really need that filled, just send it in. And I think I have out of 2,300 requests I think I’ve denied eight positions that I decided we really didn’t need. So we’re keeping the organization fully staffed. We’ve had over – we’re still running our Foreign Service officer school; we’ve hired over 300 this year. So there is no hollowing out. These numbers that people are throwing around are just false; they’re wrong.

There was a story about a 60 percent reduction in career diplomats. The post career diplomat was created by the Congress in 1955 to recognize an elite few. The number of career diplomats in the State Department have ranged from as low as one at any given time to as many as seven. When I took over the State Department we had six. Four of those people have retired. These are your most senior – they were – they reached 65, they retired, they moved on. We have a review process – we’re very selective in replacing those, but we actually have a review process underway and we’re evaluating a handful of people who might be worthy of that designation. But we still have two. But we went from six to two; it was a 60 percent reduction. It sounded like the sky was falling.

The other comment I would make is while the confirmation process has been excruciatingly slow for many of our nominees, I have been so proud of the acting assistant secretaries and people who’ve stepped into acting under secretary roles. And when the – I read these articles that there’s this hollowing out, I take offense to that on their behalf because the people that are serving in those roles are doing extraordinary work, and they know they’re not going to get the job permanently. They already know we have a nominee, but they come in every day, they work hard, they travel with me around the world, and that’s – it’s that group of people that have helped me put in place and helped the President put in place the North Korean strategy with the international sanctions; a Syrian approach to the peace process that we think we’re about to get on the right track; an approach to negotiating with the Russians on Ukraine; an approach to the Defeat ISIS campaign; the Iran policy, the South Asia policy in Afghanistan, our new posture towards Pakistan; the open – free and open Indo – all of that’s been done with the people that are working there today, and I’m very proud. I’m very proud of what they’ve done. They’re working hard and I’m offended on their behalf. I’m offended on their behalf when people say somehow we don’t have a State Department that functions.

But I can tell you it’s functioning very well from my perspective. Have we got more we want to do? Yes, we got more we want to do. And my only objective in the organization redesign is to help these people who are – who have chosen this as a career – because I’ll come and go, and there will be other politicals that will come and go – what can I do to help them? Because they’ve decided they want to spend their life doing this and they should be allowed to do it as effectively and efficiently and without a lot of grief and obstacles. And if I can remove some of that for them, that’s what I want to do.

MS HARMAN: Let me tell you, that message will resonate around the world. A lot of people wanted to hear that. Your time is very short. I just would like to group, briefly, three questions from the audience into one. Molly Cole who works for Representative Gerry Connolly, and I’m sure was one of our vaunted stars in our foreign policy programs, asks, “Do you think support for democracy and human rights abroad is an important part of the State Department’s mission?” That’s one.

Matt Rojansky who heads our Kennan Institute – George Kennan literally was a scholar here at one point – asks, “Where do you think progress with Russia is possible?”

And finally, Mike Sfraga, whom you met, who heads our Polar Initiative, asks, “In light of the increased interest and activity in the Arctic, is the Arctic and Alaska of strategic importance to the United States and to its European Arctic allies?”

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Well, as to human rights and human dignity, of course they are priorities. What I have said about those elements of our foreign policy is those are values, and those are values that are enduring and they never change. Now, when you’re constructing foreign policy and strategies and approaches, you have to prioritize, and you can’t de-prioritize human rights. It’s with you, it’s part of every policy decision you make. The question is how do you want to affect it? And if you make – if you say, well, it’s a priority, priorities can change. Well, this can never change. This is enduring and it’s a part of every foreign policy construct that we develop.

What I would say is that – but if you’re dealing with a place like Syria or Iraq was in under ISIS occupation, the most important thing was saving people’s lives. How can we keep people from getting killed? Because the ultimate human right is the right to live. The right to live first. If I can live, then I can begin to take care of my family, then I can begin to fight for my human rights, then I can begin to fight for my human – but if I’m being killed every day, I’m being bombed, I’m being gassed – our priority was save lives. So we want to save lives first, and if we do that, we stabilize areas and then we can start creating the conditions to ensure people’s human rights and dignity are respected.

With respect to Russia, there are areas of mutual cooperation. We’re working hard in Syria to defeat ISIS and we are on the cusp of having ISIS once and for all defeated in Syria. We got work yet to do. We are working together with Russia on how to prevent the civil war from re-erupting, and so we’ve had a lot of conversations over what does Russia see as the end state of Syria, what do we see as the end state, and there’s a lot of commonality there.

Tactically, how we get to those to peace talks, we’re working very closely with one another on. We have our ups and downs. If you saw – I think it was a very important joint statement was issued by President Trump and President Putin from Da Nang, Vietnam on the margins of the APEC meeting. That was an important alignment of how we see the Syria peace process going forward, and it was an important statement to have Russia confirm that they see it the same way we do. We’ll use that and we’ll build on it.

I think there are other areas of counterterrorism. Russia has great fear of migration out of the Central Asian regions and terrorism inside of Russia. We think there’s areas of greater cooperation on counterterrorism with Russia. There may be opportunities for cooperation in Afghanistan. We’ve not yet come to what that might be, but we’re talking about it.

In Ukraine, what I’ve said to the Russians is we’re never going to get this relationship back to normal until we solve Ukraine. It just sits there as an enduring obstacle, and we’ve got to address it. So, as you know, I appointed a special representative, former ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker, to focus on nothing but working with his Russian counterpart which Putin appointed to see if we can find a way forward – not marginalizing the Normandy process, but working with it to see if we can break the logjam. We’ve had some very substantive discussions. We’re pursuing the possibility of a peacekeeping force in Ukraine to stop the ongoing – every day people are killed, civilians are killed. We want to stop that first and save the lives first, and then let’s start working toward the process.

So there are many areas of cooperation with Russia, and they have many others they’d like to work with us on. We just don’t think it’s time to do that.

Now, with respect to the Arctic, the Arctic is going – is important today. It’s going to be increasingly important in the future, particularly as those waterways have opened up. What I can tell you is the United States is behind. We’re behind all the other Arctic nations. They are – they have dealt with this. They’ve gotten way ahead of us. The Russians made it a strategic priority. Even the Chinese are building icebreaking tankers. Now, why are they building icebreakers? They’re not an Arctic nation. Because they see the value of these passages. So we’re late to the game. I think we have one functioning icebreaker today. The Coast Guard’s very proud of it – (laughter) – as crummy as it is.

MS HARMAN: Yeah. Yeah.

SECRETARY TILLERSON: And I know in the budget – there is money in the budget for us to --

MS HARMAN: For one more.

SECRETARY TILLERSON: -- to make – to build another icebreaker. But the whole Arctic region, because of what’s happened with the opening of the Arctic passageways from an economic and trade standpoint, but certainly from a national security standpoint, is vitally important to our interest. And so our engagement through not just the Arctic Council but through other mechanisms is important to working with the Arctic countries on international norms, what are the rules of the game going to be, because these are areas that have not been addressed in the past, so very important.

MS HARMAN: So time is up. I was going to ask you what you want your legacy to be, but listening to you, I don’t know that that question can be answered yet. You’re all over the world, you’re focused deeply on the tough questions. You’re headed to Europe next week. You have to come back and answer all the other questions we couldn’t ask today. (Laughter.) Was that a yes?

SECRETARY TILLERSON: Yes, I’ll be back. (Laughter.)


MS HARMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. (Applause.)

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LGCJ.: