US ECONOMICS

FED. September 26, 2017. Speech. Inflation, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy. Chair Janet L. Yellen. At the "Prospects for Growth: Reassessing the Fundamentals" 59th Annual Meeting of the National Association for Business Economics, Cleveland, Ohio

I would like to thank the National Association for Business Economics for inviting me to speak today and for the vital role the association plays in fostering debate on important economic policy questions.

Today I will discuss uncertainty and monetary policy, particularly as it relates to recent inflation developments. Because changes in interest rates influence economic activity and inflation with a substantial lag, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) sets monetary policy with an eye to its effects on the outlook for the economy. But the outlook is subject to considerable uncertainty from multiple sources, and dealing with these uncertainties is an important feature of policymaking. Key among current uncertainties are the forces driving inflation, which has remained low in recent years despite substantial improvement in labor market conditions. As I will discuss, this low inflation likely reflects factors whose influence should fade over time. But as I will also discuss, many uncertainties attend this assessment, and downward pressures on inflation could prove to be unexpectedly persistent. My colleagues and I may have misjudged the strength of the labor market, the degree to which longer-run inflation expectations are consistent with our inflation objective, or even the fundamental forces driving inflation. In interpreting incoming data, we will need to stay alert to these possibilities and, in light of incoming information, adjust our views about inflation, the overall economy, and the stance of monetary policy best suited to promoting maximum employment and price stability.

Recent Inflation Developments and the Outlook

Let me begin by reviewing recent inflation developments and the economic outlook. As the solid blue line in figure 1 indicates, inflation as measured by the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) has generally run below the FOMC's 2 percent longer-run objective since that goal was announced in January 2012.1 Core inflation, which strips out volatile food and energy prices, has also fallen persistently short of 2 percent (the red dashed line). Furthermore, both overall and core inflation, after moving up appreciably last year, have slipped again in recent months. Sustained low inflation such as this is undesirable because, among other things, it generally leads to low settings of the federal funds rate in normal times, thereby providing less scope to ease monetary policy to fight recessions. In addition, a persistent undershoot of our stated 2 percent goal could undermine the FOMC's credibility, causing inflation expectations to drift and actual inflation and economic activity to become more volatile.

As noted in its recent statement, the FOMC continues to anticipate that, with gradual adjustments in the stance of monetary policy, inflation will rise and stabilize at around 2 percent over the medium term. This expectation is illustrated by the green stars, which represent the medians of the inflation projections submitted by FOMC participants at our meeting last week. In part, this expectation reflects the significant improvement in labor market conditions over the past few years. As shown in figure 2, the unemployment rate (the blue line) now stands at 4.4 percent, somewhat below the median of FOMC participants' estimates of its longer-run sustainable level (the black line). As the green stars indicate, labor market conditions are expected to strengthen a bit further. The inflation outlook also reflects the Committee's judgment that inflation expectations will remain reasonably well anchored at a level consistent with PCE price inflation of 2 percent in the long run, and that the restraint imposed in recent years by a variety of special factors, including movements in the relative prices of food, energy, and imports, will wane in coming quarters.

To understand this assessment, it is useful to decompose the forces driving movements in inflation since the financial crisis, as estimated using a simple model of inflation that I presented in a speech two years ago.2 Figure 3 reports this decomposition as the contributions made by various factors to the shortfall of PCE price inflation from 2 percent, year by year. As illustrated by the purple dotted portion of the bars, labor underutilization, or "slack," accounts for a shrinking share of the shortfall since 2012 and is now having a negligible effect. By comparison, the influence of changes in relative food, energy, and import prices--the solid blue and checkered red portions--has been more substantial in the past few years, although their contribution is estimated to have greatly diminished this year.3

Not surprisingly, the simple model does not account for all of the year-to-year movements in inflation. As indicated by the green striped portion of the bars, the residual component of the shortfall was modestly positive on average from 2008 through last year. This year, however, inflation has been unexpectedly weak from the model's perspective. This unusually large error does not necessarily imply that inflation is more likely to continue to come in on the low side in coming years.4 Some of the recent decline in inflation, although not all, reflects idiosyncratic shifts in the prices of some items, such as the large decline in telecommunication service prices seen earlier in the year, that are unlikely to be repeated. As the green dashed line in figure 4 illustrates, if the average change in consumer prices each month is calculated excluding items whose price changes are outliers on both the high and low side, the resulting "trimmed mean" measure of inflation shows less of a slowdown this year.5

Based on analyses of this sort, my colleagues and I currently think that this year's low inflation is probably temporary, so we continue to anticipate that inflation is likely to stabilize around 2 percent over the next few years. But our understanding of the forces driving inflation is imperfect, and we recognize that something more persistent may be responsible for the current undershooting of our longer-run objective. Accordingly, we will monitor incoming data closely and stand ready to modify our views based on what we learn.

Uncertainty about the Inflation Outlook

Although we judge that inflation will most likely stabilize around 2 percent over the next few years, the odds that it could turn out to be noticeably different are considerable. This point is illustrated by figure 5. Here the red line indicates the median of the latest inflation projections submitted by FOMC participants that I showed previously. The pertinent feature of this figure is the blue shaded region around the red line, which shows a 70 percent confidence interval around FOMC participants' median outlook. The width of this region reflects the average accuracy of inflation projections made by private and government forecasters over the past 20 years. As the figure shows, based on that history, there is a 30 percent probability that inflation could be greater than 3 percent or less than 1 percent next year.6

Most of this uncertainty reflects the influence of unexpected movements in oil prices and the foreign exchange value of the dollar, as well as that of idiosyncratic developments unrelated to broader economic conditions. These factors could easily push overall inflation noticeably above or below 2 percent for a time. But such disturbances are not a great concern from a policy perspective because their effects fade away as long as inflation expectations remain anchored.7 For this reason, the FOMC strives to look through these transitory inflation effects when setting monetary policy. Such was the case when rising oil prices pushed headline inflation noticeably above 2 percent for several years prior to the financial crisis. Similarly, the Committee substantially discounted the reductions in inflation that occurred from 2014 through 2016 as a result of the decline in oil prices and the effects of the dollar's appreciation on import prices.

A more important issue from a policy standpoint is that some key assumptions underlying the baseline outlook could be wrong in ways that imply that inflation will remain low for longer than currently projected. For example, labor market conditions may not be as tight as they appear to be, and thus they may exert less upward pressure on inflation than anticipated. Alternatively, long-run inflation expectations, which have an important influence on actual inflation, may not be consistent with the FOMC's 2 percent goal. More broadly, the conventional framework for understanding inflation dynamics could be misspecified in some fundamental way. Let's now consider each of these possibilities in turn.

Resource Utilization

The unemployment rate consistent with long-run price stability at any time is not known with certainty; we can only estimate it. The median of the longer-run unemployment rate projections submitted by FOMC participants last week is around 4‑1/2 percent. But the long-run sustainable unemployment rate can drift over time because of demographic changes and other factors, some of which can be difficult to quantify--or even identify--in real time.8 For these and other reasons, the statistical precision of such estimates is limited, and the actual value of the sustainable rate could well be noticeably lower than currently projected.9 Thus, although FOMC participants generally view current labor utilization as probably somewhat greater than what can be sustained in the longer run, the statistical evidence from past experience does not rule out the possibility that some slack still remains in the labor market. If so, the economy could sustain a higher level of employment and output in the longer run than now anticipated--a very beneficial outcome, albeit one that would require recalibrating monetary policy over time in order to reap those benefits and compensate for the accompanying reduction in inflationary pressures.

A related question is whether the unemployment rate alone is an adequate gauge of economic slack for the purposes of explaining inflation. Although the unemployment rate is probably the best single summary measure of labor utilization, some indicators have shown less improvement since the financial crisis.10 As the solid blue line in figure 6 illustrates, the employed share of the "prime-age worker" population--that is, persons from ages 25 to 54--remains noticeably below the 2007 level.11 But employment rates for this group may now be permanently lower than in the past as a result of declining employment opportunities for less-skilled workers, a rising number of people receiving disability insurance, and other worrisome trends.12 Similarly, although the share of part-time workers who would like a full-time job is still somewhat above where it stood before the last two recessions (the dashed red line), it could reflect a structural change in firms' reliance on part-time labor.13 In addition, these two measures have to be weighed against other labor indicators that have either returned to, or are currently above, their pre-recession levels. As shown in figure 7, those indicators include the quits rate (the short-dashed blue line), household perceptions of job availability (the short-and-long-dashed green line), the jobs opening rate (the long-dashed red line), and the percentage of small firms finding it hard to fill jobs (the solid black line).

On balance, the unemployment rate probably is correct in signaling that overall labor market conditions have returned to pre-crisis levels. But that return does not necessarily demonstrate that the economy is now at maximum employment because, due to demographic and other structural changes, the unemployment rate that is sustainable today may be lower than the rate that was sustainable in the past.

In that regard, some observers have pointed to the continued subdued pace of wage growth as evidence that the economy is not yet back to full employment. As shown in figure 8, labor compensation as measured by the employment cost index (the short-dashed red line) has been growing at more or less the same rate since 2014, and hourly compensation in the nonfarm business sector (the short-and-long-dashed green line)--a quite noisy measure, even after smoothing--is actually growing more slowly. But growth in average hourly earnings (the solid blue line) and the Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker (the long-dashed black line) have clearly picked up.14 In addition, productivity growth has been quite weak in recent years, and empirical analysis suggests that it is has been holding down aggregate growth in labor compensation independent of labor utilization in recent years.15 An analysis of the pattern of wage growth at the U.S. state level also suggests that subdued growth for the country as a whole probably reflects sluggish productivity or some other factor common to all states, because cross-state differences in wage growth are about what one would expect given cross-state differences in unemployment rates.16 Finally, I would note that the percentage of firms planning wage increases has moved back up to its pre-recession level, many firms report difficulties in finding qualified workers, and some have responded by expanding training programs and offering signing bonuses--possible harbingers of stronger wage gains to come.

Overall, I view the data we have in hand as suggesting a generally healthy labor market, not one in which substantial slack remains or one that is overheated. That said, the evidence does not allow for any definitive assessment, so policymakers must remain open minded on this question and its implications for reaching our inflation goal.

Inflation Expectations

Another source of uncertainty concerns inflation expectations. In standard economic models, inflation expectations are an important determinant of actual inflation because, in deciding how much to adjust wages for individual jobs and prices of goods and services at a particular time, firms take into account the rate of overall inflation they expect to prevail in the future. Monetary policy presumably plays a key role in shaping these expectations by influencing the average rate of inflation experienced in the past over long periods of time, as well as by providing guidance about the FOMC's objectives for inflation in the future. Even so, economists' understanding of exactly how and why inflation expectations change over time is limited.17 Moreover, we have to contend with the fact that we do not directly observe the inflation expectations relevant to wage and price setting. Instead, we can only imperfectly infer how they might have changed based on survey responses and other data.

The FOMC's outlook depends importantly on the view that longer-run inflation expectations have been stable for many years at a level consistent with PCE price inflation that will average around 2 percent in the longer run. Provided this stability continues, standard models suggest that actual inflation should stabilize at about 2 percent over the next two or three years in an environment of roughly full employment, absent any future shocks. However, there is a risk that inflation expectations may not be as well anchored as they appear and perhaps are not consistent with our 2 percent goal. To assess this risk, the FOMC considers a variety of survey measures of expected longer-run inflation, some of which are shown in figure 9. Long-range projections of PCE price inflation made by private forecasters, the solid red line, have been remarkably stable for many years, as have been the longer-run inflation expectations reported in surveys of financial market participants (not shown).18 Households' longer-term expectations as reported in the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, the short-dashed blue line, have also been fairly stable overall since the late 1990s.19 That said, results from this survey, as well as a survey of consumers carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, do hint that expectations may have slipped a bit over the past two or three years. If so, stabilizing inflation at around 2 percent could prove to be more difficult than expected.20

In theory, differences between yields on conventional Treasury securities and those on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are also informative about inflation expectations in that they measure the compensation received by investors for exposing themselves to future changes in consumer prices. As indicated by the long-dashed green line, TIPS inflation compensation for the five-year period starting five years from now has fallen roughly 1 percentage point over the past three years. This decline could be interpreted as a significant drop in market participants' expectations for the most likely outcome for inflation in the longer run. However, research suggests that the fall in TIPS inflation compensation instead primarily reflects a decline in inflation risk premiums and differences in the liquidity of nominal and indexed Treasury securities.21 This research notwithstanding, the notable decline in inflation compensation may be a sign that longer-term inflation expectations have slipped recently.

Misspecified Inflation Dynamics

Another risk is that our framework for understanding inflation dynamics could be misspecified in some fundamental way, perhaps because our econometric models overlook some factor that will restrain inflation in coming years despite solid labor market conditions. One possibility in this vein is a continuation of the subdued growth in health-care prices that we have seen in recent years--a sector-specific factor not controlled for in standard models. Because health care accounts for a large share of total consumer spending, this slow growth has restrained overall inflation materially and may continue to do so for some time.22 A similar situation occurred during the 1990s, when a significant shift in health insurance enrollment away from fee-for-service and toward HMO (that is, Health Maintenance Organization) plans reduced cost pressures and held down overall inflation for several years. If these sorts of favorable supply-type shocks continue, achieving our 2 percent inflation goal over the medium term may require a more accommodative stance of monetary policy than might otherwise be appropriate.

Some commentators have conjectured that, because of rising trade volumes and the integration of production chains across countries, U.S. inflation now depends on global resource utilization, not just on conditions here at home and those effects arising through movements in energy and import prices. However, studies of this issue do not, on balance, provide much empirical support for this possibility.23 Moreover, foreign economic growth has firmed this year and the global economy appears to have largely recovered, so any influence that global resource utilization might have on U.S. inflation would presumably be small. Nevertheless, increased competition from the integration of China and other emerging market countries into the world economy may have materially restrained price margins and labor compensation in the United States and other advanced economies. In fact, one study concludes that most of the decline in the labor share of national income in the United States since the late 1980s can be attributed to offshoring of labor-intensive production.24 If this restraint on the labor share continues to build over the next few years (and not merely holds steady), then it could indirectly hold down the growth of domestic wages and prices in ways not captured by conventional models.

More speculatively, changes in the structure of the domestic economy may also be altering inflation dynamics in ways not captured by conventional models. The growing importance of online shopping, by increasing the competitiveness of the U.S. retail sector, may have reduced price margins and restrained the ability of firms to raise prices in response to rising demand.25 That said, the economy overall appears to have become more concentrated and less dynamic in recent years, which may tend to increase firms' pricing power.26 Because these changes occur slowly, determining their complex effects on the economy will, as a practical matter, require studying data over a considerable time.

Finally, I would note the possibility that inflation may rise more sharply in response to robust labor market conditions than anticipated. The influence of labor utilization on inflation has become quite modest over the past 20 years, implying that the inflationary consequences of misjudging the sustainable rate of unemployment are low. But we cannot be sure that this modest sensitivity will persist in the face of strong labor market conditions, given that we do not fully understand how it came to be so modest in the first place. Although the evidence is weak that inflation responds in a nonlinear manner to resource utilization, this risk is one that we cannot entirely dismiss.

Policy Implications

What are the policy implications of these uncertainties? For one, my colleagues and I must be ready to adjust our assessments of economic conditions and the outlook when new data warrant it. In this spirit, FOMC participants--like private forecasters--have reduced their estimates of the sustainable unemployment rate appreciably over the past few years in response to the continual flow of information about the always changing economy.27 To the extent these assessments change over time, so too will the outlook and judgments about the appropriate stance of monetary policy. Importantly, even if resource utilization is currently lower than we estimate or if longer-run inflation expectations are running at levels consistent with longer-run PCE price inflation somewhat below 2 percent, the FOMC can still achieve its inflation goal. Under those conditions, continuing to revise our assessments in response to incoming data would naturally result in a policy path that is somewhat easier than that now anticipated--an appropriate course correction that would reflect our commitment to maximum employment and price stability.

Similar considerations apply to other important sources of uncertainty, such as the value of the neutral real interest rate--that is, the inflation-adjusted level of the federal funds rate consistent with keeping the economy operating on an even keel. Estimates of this rate have declined considerably in recent years, and, by some estimates, the real neutral rate is currently close to zero. But the neutral rate changes over time as a result of the interaction of many forces, including demographics, productivity growth, fiscal policy, and the strength of global demand, so its value at any point in time cannot be estimated or projected with much precision. My FOMC colleagues and I will therefore need to continue to reassess and revise our assessments of the neutral rate in response to incoming data and adjust monetary policy accordingly.

How should policy be formulated in the face of such significant uncertainties? In my view, it strengthens the case for a gradual pace of adjustments. Moving too quickly risks overadjusting policy to head off projected developments that may not come to pass. A gradual approach is particularly appropriate in light of subdued inflation and a low neutral real interest rate, which imply that the FOMC will have only limited scope to cut the federal funds rate should the economy be hit with an adverse shock.28 But we should also be wary of moving too gradually. Job gains continue to run well ahead of the longer-run pace we estimate would be sufficient, on average, to provide jobs for new entrants to the labor force. Thus, without further modest increases in the federal funds rate over time, there is a risk that the labor market could eventually become overheated, potentially creating an inflationary problem down the road that might be difficult to overcome without triggering a recession. Persistently easy monetary policy might also eventually lead to increased leverage and other developments, with adverse implications for financial stability. For these reasons, and given that monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation with a substantial lag, it would be imprudent to keep monetary policy on hold until inflation is back to 2 percent.

Conclusion

To conclude, standard empirical analyses support the FOMC's outlook that, with gradual adjustments in monetary policy, inflation will stabilize at around the FOMC's 2 percent objective over the next few years, accompanied by some further strengthening in labor market conditions. But the outlook is uncertain, reflecting, among other things, the inherent imprecision in our estimates of labor utilization, inflation expectations, and other factors. As a result, we will need to carefully monitor the incoming data and, as warranted, adjust our assessments of the outlook and the appropriate stance of monetary policy. But in making these adjustments, our longer-run objectives will remain unchanged--to promote maximum employment and 2 percent inflation.

Appendix: PCE Inflation Model, Inflation Decomposition Procedure, and the ECI Growth Equation

PCE Inflation Model

The inflation model used in the decomposition procedure includes two equations: an identity for the change in the price index for total personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and a simple reduced-form forecasting equation for core PCE price inflation. The identity is

πt=πct+ωetRPIEt+ωftRPIFt,

where πtπt and πctπtc denote growth rates (expressed as annualized log differences) of total and core PCE prices, respectively. RPIEtRPIEt and RPIFtRPIFt are annualized growth rates for prices of consumer energy goods and services and prices of food and beverages, both expressed relative to core PCE prices, and ωetωte and ωftωtf are the weights of energy and food in total consumption. The core inflation forecasting equation is

πct=.41πet+.36πct−1+.23πct−2−.08SLACKt+.56RPIMt+ϵt,

where πetπte is expected long-run inflation; SLACKtSLACKt denotes the level of resource utilization, RPIMtRPIMt controls for the effect of changes in the relative price of core imported goods, ϵtϵt is a white-noise error term, and the coefficients are ordinary least squares estimates obtained using data from 1990:Q1 to 2014:Q4. 29

For estimation purposes, SLACKtSLACKt is approximated using the unemployment rate less the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) historical series for the long-run natural rate. From 2007 to the present, πetπte is approximated using the median forecasts of long-run PCE price inflation reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters; from 1991:Q4 to 2006:Q4, the series is based on the median long-run forecasts of inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), less a constant adjustment of 40 basis points to put the CPI forecasts on a PCE basis; before 1991:Q4, πetπte is approximated by the long-run inflation expectations reported in the Hoey survey. The relative import price term, RPIMtRPIMt, is defined as the annualized growth rate of the price index for core imported goods (defined to exclude petroleum, natural gas, computers, and semiconductors) less the lagged four-quarter change in core PCE inflation, all multiplied by the share of nominal core imported goods in nominal GDP.30

Inflation Decomposition Procedure

To decompose recent movements in inflation into its various components, the series used in the inflation model--for which complete quarterly data are available only through 2017:Q2 in most cases--are first extended through the end of 2017. In the case of inflation, the extensions are consistent with the medians of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants' projections for total and core PCE inflation in 2017 that were reported at the press conference following the September 2017 FOMC meeting.31 Similarly, SLACKtSLACKt over the second half of 2017 is defined to be consistent with the median of FOMC projections for the 2017:Q4 unemployment rate less the CBO's estimates of the historical path of the long-run natural rate. The CBO's 2017 estimate is slightly higher than the median of FOMC participants' most recent projections of the normal longer-run level of the unemployment rate. For changes in the price of core imports, the 2017:H2 extrapolations are based on a regression of this series on current and lagged changes in exchange rates. This approach predicts that core import prices should rise about 4-1/2 percent at an annual rate in the second half of this year.32 Energy and food prices over the second half of 2017 are assumed to rise at annual rates of 10 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively; these assumptions (which take into account published monthly PCE data through July and published CPI data through August, as well as recent movements in gasoline prices in the wake of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma) ensure that the combined contribution of food and energy prices to inflation in 2017 is consistent with the median difference between FOMC participants' projections for total and core inflation. Finally, nominal spending shares for food, energy, and core imports are assumed to remain unchanged at their 2017:Q2 levels, and long-run inflation expectations are assumed to remain constant at 2 percent.

After computing historical ϵtϵt tracking errors for the two equations of the model, the final step in the decomposition procedure is to run a sequence of counterfactual simulations of the model from 1990:Q1 through 2017:Q4. One by one, each explanatory variable of the model is set to zero, and the model is simulated; the resulting difference between actual inflation and its simulated value equals the historical contribution of that particular factor. Importantly, the simulations are all dynamic in that the lagged inflation term in the core inflation equation is set equal to its simulated value in the preceding period rather than its actual value. As a result, the decompositions incorporate the effects of changes in lagged inflation that are attributable to previous movements in the explanatory variables.

ECI Growth Equation

The estimated equation for the employment cost index (ECI) is:

πwt=−0.72+.58πet−1+.10πwt−1+.12πwt−2+.10πwt−3+.11πwt−4−.19SLACKt−.57ΔSLACKt+.58MA_PRODt+εt,

where πwtπtw is the annualized log difference of the ECI for hourly compensation of private industry workers, πetπte and SLACKtSLACKt have the same definition as the corresponding variables from the PCE price inflation model, ΔSLACKtΔSLACKt denotes the first difference of SLACKtSLACKt, MA_PRODtMA_PRODt is a moving average of an estimate of trend productivity growth for the business sector, and εtεt is an error term.33 The coefficients are obtained from a restricted least squares regression using quarterly data from 1988:Q1 to 2017:Q2.34 Trend productivity growth is estimated as the low-frequency component of the annualized log difference of business-sector output per hour from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Productivity and Costs report.35 The moving average of trend productivity growth (which is used in the estimation) is computed as a geometrically declining weighted average,

MA_PRODt=0.95MA_PRODt−1+0.05PRODt,

where PRODtPRODt denotes trend productivity growth and where the moving average is initialized in 1955:Q1 with that quarter's estimate of the trend growth rate.

The model is used to compute a decomposition of ECI growth following a procedure similar to that used to construct the decomposition for core PCE price inflation. The table summarizes the results of this decomposition over various periods; note that the column labeled "Slack" combines the effects of ΔSLACKtΔSLACKt and SLACKtSLACKt, the effect of the model's constant term is included in the column labeled "Trend productivity," and the column labeled "Other" gives the contributions of the model's tracking errors.

Model-Based Decomposition of ECI Hourly Compensation Growth

	ECI growth	Contributions of:
		Expected inflation	Trend productivity	Slack	Other
2002-07	3.28	2.09	1.44	-0.08	-0.17
2008-09	1.80	2.16	1.18	-0.97	-0.56
2010-11	2.08	2.14	0.82	-1.09	0.22
2012-13	1.92	2.12	0.44	-0.67	0.02
2014-15	2.05	2.01	0.15	-0.20	0.09
2016-17:Q2	2.31	1.99	0.01	0.03	0.28

Note: ECI growth is reported as average percent changes at an annual rate for the periods shown; contributions are expressed in percentage points. The contribution of the model's constant term is included in the contribution for trend productivity. Contributions may not sum to total growth because of rounding.

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• Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore, Ryan Nunn, Lauren Bauer, and Audrey Breitwieser (2017). The Closing of the Jobs Gap: A Decade of Recession and Recovery. Washington: Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, August 4.
• Trainer, David (2016). "How the Internet Economy Killed Inflation," Forbes, September 28.
• Valletta, Rob, and Catherine van der List (2015). "Involuntary Part-Time Work: Here to Stay?" FRBSF Economic Letter 2015-19. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, June 8.
• Yellen, Janet L. (2014). "Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy," speech delivered at "Re-evaluating Labor Market Dynamics," a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, held in Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 21-23.
• -------- (2015). "Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Philip Gamble Memorial Lecture, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Amherst, Mass., September 24.
• -------- (2016). "Macroeconomic Research after the Crisis," speech delivered at "The Elusive 'Great' Recovery: Causes and Implications for Future Business Cycle Dynamics," 60th annual economic conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass., October 14.
• Yoon, Jong-Won, Janill Kim, and Jungjin Lee (2014). "Impact of Demographic Changes on Inflation and the Macroeconomy (PDF)," IMF Working Paper WP/14/210. Washington: International Monetary Fund, November.

1. The Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy is available on the Board's website at www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_LongerRunGoals.pdf.
2. The simple model links the current rate of inflation to several factors, including lagged inflation, long-run inflation expectations, labor utilization, and changes in the relative prices of food, energy and imports (Yellen, 2015). Additional details on the model can be found in the appendix. 
3. In the decomposition procedure, movements in core inflation affect headline inflation one-for-one; as a result, the contributions of food and energy price inflation are defined as each component's price change relative to the core, weighted by its share in total nominal consumer spending. The estimated contribution of movements in import prices is also computed relative to core inflation; thus, if import prices are rising at the same rate as core inflation, they have no estimated effect on the shortfall of overall inflation from 2 percent. In addition, the decomposition takes account of lags in the adjustment of core inflation to movements in resource utilization and other factors. More details on the decomposition procedure can be found in the appendix. 
4. In the simple model, inflation depends in part on lagged inflation. As a result, an unexplained movement in inflation is predicted to influence inflation beyond the current quarter, but to a degree that fades over time. On average, the model predicts that roughly 85 percent of any unexplained movement will have disappeared after four quarters. 
5. In general, price changes measured over a few months tend to be noisy, even when measured on a core or trimmed-mean basis. For this reason, the FOMC usually focuses on the growth rate of PCE prices over the previous 12 months, which smooths through the volatility in the monthly price data. This approach also sidesteps distortions in the monthly data associated with residual seasonality; these distortions are likely to hold down month-to-month changes in prices over the balance of the year (see Peneva, 2014). That said, 12‑month rates of inflation will continue to be held down through early 2018 by the unusually weak monthly readings on price changes recorded in early 2017. 
6. See Reifschneider and Tulip (2017) for details on the calculation of these confidence intervals. 
7. This statement abstracts from any persistent effects such disturbances might have on real activity, which could have implications for monetary policy. 
8. For example, Aaronson and others (2015) estimate that increases in the average age and educational attainment of U.S. workers will reduce the sustainable rate of unemployment almost 1/2 percentage point between 2014 and 2020. Barnichon and Mesters (2017) also present evidence that demographic changes have somewhat reduced the structural unemployment rate in the United States in recent years. Relatedly, Yoon, Kim, and Lee (2014) and Juselius and Takats (2015) estimate that ongoing demographic transitions are having modest disinflationary effects in the United States and other developed economies. 
9. The statistical evidence also suggests that the sustainable rate of unemployment could be higher. As illustrated by the results reported in Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2015) and Barnichon and Matthes (2017), standard errors for estimates of the sustainable rate of unemployment are typically at least 1/2 percentage point. Accordingly, if the sustainable rate is estimated to be about 4-1/2 percent, there is roughly a 15 percent probability that the actual value is less than 4 percent; symmetrically, there is a 15 percent probability that it is greater than 5 percent. 
10. Several years ago, I discussed the interpretation of a wide range of labor market indicators at length (Yellen, 2014). 
11. The employment-to-population ratio for all persons aged 16 and over has recovered much less than the prime-age ratio since 2007, in large part reflecting the ongoing retirement of the baby boomers and a rise in school attendance rates for young adults aged 20 to 24 (Aaronson and others, 2014). Schanzenbach and others (2017) estimate that the substantial overall employment-to-population gap that opened up in the wake of the financial crisis finally closed in July 2017. 
12. The labor force participation rate for prime-age men has been declining for decades. Evidence suggests that a portion of the decline is attributable to a reduction in the demand for low-skilled workers resulting from advances in technology and globalization. For a general discussion of the decline in male labor force participation, see Aaronson and others (2014). For a discussion of the role played by technical factors in this decline, see Deming (forthcoming) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011); for a discussion of the role of globalization, see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Pierce and Schott (2016). In addition to these factors, Autor and Duggan (2003) and French and Song (2014) present evidence suggesting that increases in the number of people on disability rolls have also been important. Relatedly, an alarming deterioration in health outcomes among low-education workers, including a rise in deaths related to alcohol, drugs, and suicide, may be having an adverse effect on both male and female employment (Case and Deaton, 2017). 
13. For a discussion of how secular forces may be influencing the trend share of part-time employment, see Valletta and van der List (2015). 
14. In contrast to the other wage and compensation measures, the Wage Growth Tracker only measures wage changes for individuals who had a job in both the current month and a year ago. 
15. For example, predictions from a simple empirical model track recent movements in the employment cost index reasonably well, because the model estimates that the increasing upward pressure on compensation growth from rising labor utilization is being offset by a declining contribution from productivity growth. (See the appendix for further details.) Relatedly, research also suggests that cyclical changes in the composition of the workforce associated with the absorption of new workers with relatively low skills and experience may be currently restraining growth in both aggregate wages and productivity. See Daly and Hobijn (2017) and Daly, Hobijn, and Pyle (2016), who also point to the retirement of baby boomers as a factor holding down wage growth. 
16. See J.P. Morgan (2017) for more on this analysis. 
17. As I discussed in a speech one year ago, I view expectations formation as one of the key areas requiring further research by economists (see Yellen, 2016). 
18. In the Survey of Primary Dealers conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the median of respondents' longer-term projections for PCE inflation have been essentially flat at 2 percent since the survey began in 2011. Similarly, in the Blue Chip Financial Indicators survey, which solicits the views of a large number of financial firms (as well as a few other institutions) about the extended outlook every June and December, the median of long-run expectations for GDP price inflation has stayed close to 2.1 percent over the past six years. Comparisons of results from these surveys to those reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (as well as surveys of households) are somewhat complicated by differences in the projection period used. For example, some surveys include the low rates of inflation expected over the next few years in the calculation of projected longer-run averages, while other surveys exclude them. 
19. Expected inflation over the next 5 to 10 years as reported in the Michigan survey runs appreciably above PCE price inflation on average since the mid-1990s, perhaps because households are less informed about actual inflation developments than professional forecasters and financial firms. For this reason, it may be best to focus on changes over time in the Michigan measure, not on the level. 
20. In addition to monitoring survey measures of expected inflation, Federal Reserve staff also use statistical techniques to try to directly estimate possible movements over time in the underlying long-run trend in inflation, using data for actual inflation and other series, including resource utilization. Many of these statistical estimates suggest that the underlying trend in PCE inflation is currently somewhat below 2 percent. Econometrically, however, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to disentangle estimates of the underlying trend in PCE inflation from estimates of the sustainable rate of unemployment. To be consistent with the data, the higher one's estimate of trend inflation or expected long-run inflation, the lower must be one's estimate of the sustainable unemployment rate, at least over the medium run. 
21. For example, Andreasen and Christensen (2016) show that once TIPS liquidity premiums are taken into account, the model-implied one-year inflation expectation becomes more stable and shows a smaller decline since 2013. In addition, quotes on inflation derivatives suggest that most of the decline in inflation compensation over this period is associated with investor perceptions of reduced risks of above-target inflation outcomes rather than increased risks of below-target inflation outcomes. 
22. Personal consumption expenditures include all medical services, including those paid by Medicare and Medicaid; prices for the latter may be viewed as "administered" because they are essentially set by the government. The formulas used to set Medicare prices were adjusted by the 2010 Affordable Care Act and additional legislation passed in 2015, resulting in smaller increases in prices for the same increase in costs than would have been the case in the prior decade. In addition, Medicaid prices have probably been restrained somewhat by budget pressures on state governments. Aside from these direct influences of government policy on healthcare prices, some research suggests that lower Medicare prices tend to lead to lower negotiated prices by private insurers as well (see Clemens, Gottlieb, and Shapiro, 2016). 
23. In an early study, Borio and Filardo (2007) reported results suggesting that global economic slack adds considerable explanatory power to reduced-form inflation equations (such as the one discussed in the appendix), and that its role has been growing over time. However, Ihrig, Kamin, Lindner, and Marquez (2010) subsequently argued that the estimated link was not robust to alternative measures of global resource utilization. Federal Reserve Board staff have updated this analysis using data through early 2017 and confirmed that global slack does not appear to exert an appreciable direct effect on domestic inflation in the United States and most other advanced economies. 
24. Using sector-level data, Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) estimate the contributions of offshoring, the substitution of capital for low-skilled labor, and several other factors on the aggregate U.S. labor share of income, and find that only offshoring has been important. They also conclude that the decline in the labor share since the late 1980s has been overstated as a result of statistical measurement problems. In contrast to the influence of globalization on the U.S. labor share, Feenstra and Weinstein (2017) find that the influence of increased globalization on price markups in the United States has been modest. 
25. For more on the inflation implications of innovation in the retail sector, see Curran and Jamrisko (2017) and Trainer (2016). 
26. For a review of changes over time in the competitive structure of the overall economy, see Council of Economic Advisers (2016). For a discussion of the evidence for, and some of the implications of, changes in the dynamism of the economy, see Hathaway and Litan (2014) and Decker and others (2016). 
27. The median of FOMC participants' projections of the longer-run unemployment rate has declined almost a full percentage point over the past five years; the revision in the long-run consensus forecast reported in the Blue Chip Survey between October 2012 and March 2017 was slightly larger. 
28. It might be thought that the FOMC could mitigate this problem by raising the federal funds rate higher than might otherwise be called for while the economy continues to expand in order to increase the extent to which interest rates could be cut later should a recession occur. But this strategy would be counterproductive, because it would only serve to weaken economic activity and push down inflation before the recession. 
29. Although the data used in the decomposition analysis have been revised and extended, the specification of the model and the estimation period are the same as that discussed in a speech I gave two years ago (Yellen, 2015). As a result, the estimated coefficients of the model are essentially unchanged. Extending the estimation period through 2017:Q2 has little effect on the estimated coefficients and the decomposition estimates. 
30. This measure of core import prices is constructed by Board staff using published and unpublished data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
31. The information on participants' forecasts provided at the September 20, 2017, press conference is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20170920.pdf. 
32. The level of core import prices, expressed relative to core consumer prices, displayed a modest downward trend from 1990 through 2001 but since then has displayed little persistent trend, particularly if one controls for shifts related to recent changes in the real exchange rate. If the post-2001 pattern persists in coming years, then RPIMtRPIMt would be expected to converge to zero within a few quarters and core PCE inflation to converge to 2 percent within two or three years, assuming that the unemployment rate remains near 4-1/2 percent (the median of the longer-run projections provided by FOMC participants) and there are no further shocks to the exchange rate and other factors. If, however, core import prices were expected to resume trending down relative to consumer prices, then the model as specified would imply that the unemployment rate consistent with inflation stabilizing at 2 percent in the longer run would be somewhat lower than 4-1/2 percent. 
33. The ECI series used here is obtained from a ratio splice of the SIC- and NAICS-based indexes; the SIC-based index is used before 2001 and the NAICS-based index used thereafter. (All data used in the model were current as of September 1, 2017.) 
34. The estimation procedure imposes the joint restriction that the sum of the coefficients on πet−1πt−1e and the lagged ECI growth terms are equal to 1, and that the coefficients on πet−1πt−1e and MA_PRODtMA_PRODt are equal. This joint restriction receives a pp value of 0.57. 
35. The low-pass component is obtained from a band-pass filter. The filter width and cutoffs are set equal to the values used in Douglas Staiger, James Stock, and Mark Watson (2001), "Prices, Wages, and the U.S. NAIRU in the 1990s," in Alan Krueger and Robert Solow, eds., The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be Sustained? (New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Century Foundation Press), pp. 3‑60. Before the series' starting point in 1947:Q2, actual productivity growth is padded with an ARIMA(4,1,0) model; after its 2017:Q2 endpoint, the series is padded with the CBO's January 2017 forecast of average nonfarm business trend productivity growth from 2017 to 2027 (which is 1.67 percent in log differences) and with the 2027 value of the CBO forecast (1.77 percent) thereafter. 

FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/yellen20170926a.pdf

DoC. BEA. September 27, 2017. U.S. Net International Investment Position, Second Quarter 2017

The U.S. net international investment position increased to -$7,934.9 billion (preliminary) at the end of the second quarter of 2017 from -$8,091.6 billion (revised) at the end of the first quarter, according to statistics released today by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The $156.7 billion increase reflected a $1,004.2 billion increase in U.S. assets and an $847.5 billion increase in U.S. liabilities (table 1).



The $156.7 billion increase reflected net financial transactions of –$107.5 billion and net other changes in position, such as price and exchange-rate changes, of $264.2 billion (table A).

The net investment position increased 1.9 percent in the second quarter, compared with an increase of 2.7 percent in the first quarter, and an average quarterly decrease of 5.6 percent from the first quarter of 2011 through the fourth quarter of 2016.

U.S. assets increased $1,004.2 billion to $25,937.6 billion at the end of the second quarter, mostly reflecting increases in portfolio investment and direct investment assets.

• Assets excluding financial derivatives increased $1,019.6 billion to $24,006.3 billion. The increase resulted from other changes in position of $657.3 billion and financial transactions of $362.2 billion (table A). Other changes in position mostly reflected the appreciation of major foreign currencies against the U.S. dollar that raised the value of assets in dollar terms. Financial transactions mostly reflected net acquisition of portfolio investment and direct investment equity assets.

Table A. Quarterly Change in the U.S. Net International Investment PositionBillions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted

	Position, 2017:I	Change in position in 2017:II			Position, 2017:II
		Total	Attributable to:
			Financial transactions	Other changes in position 1
U.S. net international investment position	-8,091.6	156.7	-107.5	264.2	-7,934.9
Net position excluding financial derivatives	-8,133.3	161.3	-116.8	278.1	-7,972.0
Financial derivatives other than reserves, net	41.6	-4.6	9.3	-13.9	37.1
U.S. assets	24,933.4	1,004.2	(2)	(2)	25,937.6
Assets excluding financial derivatives	22,986.7	1,019.6	362.2	657.3	24,006.3
Financial derivatives other than reserves	1,946.7	-15.4	(2)	(2)	1,931.3
U.S. liabilities	33,025.0	847.5	(2)	(2)	33,872.5
Liabilities excluding financial derivatives	31,120.0	858.3	479.1	379.2	31,978.2
Financial derivatives other than reserves	1,905.1	-10.8	(2)	(2)	1,894.3
1 Disaggregation of other changes in position into price changes, exchange-rate changes, and other changes in volume and valuation is only presented for annual statistics released in June each year.
2 Financial transactions and other changes in financial derivatives positions are available only on a net basis; they are not separately available for U.S. assets and U.S. liabilities.

U.S. liabilities increased $847.5 billion to $33,872.5 billion at the end of the second quarter, mostly reflecting increases in portfolio investment and direct investment liabilities.

• Liabilities excluding financial derivatives increased $858.3 billion to $31,978.2 billion. The increase resulted from financial transactions of $479.1 billion and other changes in position of $379.2 billion (table A). Financial transactions mostly reflected net incurrence of portfolio investment liabilities. Other changes in position mostly reflected price increases on portfolio investment and direct investment liabilities.

Updates to First Quarter 2017 International Investment Position AggregatesBillions of dollars, not seasonally adjusted

	Preliminary estimate	Revised estimate
U.S. net international investment position	−8,141.2	−8,091.6
U.S. assets	24,833.2	24,933.4
Direct investment at market value	7,843.6	7,895.4
Portfolio investment	10,570.2	10,591.6
Financial derivatives other than reserves	1,946.7	1,946.7
Other investment	4,039.6	4,066.6
Reserve assets	433.1	433.1
U.S. liabilities	32,974.5	33,025.0
Direct investment at market value	7,952.4	7,952.4
Portfolio investment	17,859.8	17,908.3
Financial derivatives other than reserves	1,905.1	1,905.1
Other investment	5,257.2	5,259.2

FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/2017/pdf/intinv217.pdf

________________

WEF. 26 Sep 2017. These are the world's 10 most competitive economies. arren Whiteside
Alex Gray, Formative Content

Almost 10 years after the economic crisis, the world economy is in much better shape. The slow yet steady growth seen over the last few years is set to continue, with a predicted 3.5% in growth in 2017.

However, we are living in a time of unprecedented change and uncertainty. Geopolitical headwinds are colliding with rapid technological change, creating a world where global leaders have to think long and hard about their political and economic policies. Continued growth is far from guaranteed.



The latest World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index ranks 137 economies by their ability to sustain inclusive growth. That’s growth that delivers positive change and benefits citizens and the environment. The index looks at 12 pillars of competitiveness including innovation, infrastructure and the macroeconomic environment. It ranks countries on how they score in each category.



Switzerland tops the overall ranking for the sixth year in a row, scoring highly on nearly every pillar of competitiveness. Its economy is resilient, its labour markets are strong and its people and businesses are good at absorbing new technologies. Swiss citizens benefit from high levels of public health and education, while Swiss businesses demonstrate high levels of sophistication and innovation.



The US has recorded its best ever performance this year, landing second place. That’s up from third place last year and seventh when the rankings began. However, its position is far from secure. While the world’s largest economy scores highly for efficiency and innovation, it doesn’t score so well in the macro-economic pillar. The US also performs poorly on health and primary education.



Singapore has slipped one place this year to third. Despite a strong performance across the board - scoring in the top three in many pillars - rising government debt has dragged down its macro-economic score. That said, Singapore’s transport infrastructure, product and labour markets, and financial sector are all highly efficient.

The rest of the top 10 is made up of five European countries (Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Finland and the UK) along with Hong Kong SAR and Japan.

There may be trouble ahead

While the uptick in the world economy is cause for celebration, the latest Competitiveness Report has spotted some problems on the horizon.

It notes that, a decade after the financial crisis, the financial sector remains vulnerable. The increasing levels of private debt in emerging economies, and the growth of unregulated capital markets, are just two of the elements that worry the authors of the report.

While this year's index has seen some economies score highly for innovation, the benefits of this are not spread widely. Economies would do well to put more effort into increasing the readiness populations and businesses to adopt new technology, says the report.

Many economies also score well on their labour market flexibility, something which helps to drive economic growth. However, unless this is balanced with worker protection, not everyone will prosper.

The report also notes that the global economic recovery is built on unsteady foundations. That’s because it is being driven more by low interest rates than by fundamental drivers of growth.

“Economic growth is important for human development and well-being. Growth creates the resources needed for better education, health, and security, and for higher incomes,” concludes the report.

“Yet economic growth should not be an end in itself. It should contribute to human welfare, be rooted in political legitimacy, and be defined and measured based on a multidimensional notion of economic progress that includes values such as a broad-based distribution of economic gains, environmental sustainability, and intergenerational equity for young people and future generations.”

The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017-2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf

________________

ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA

BACEN. 27/09/2017. Política Monetária e Operações de Crédito do Sistema Financeiro

I - Operações de crédito do sistema financeiro

O crédito total do sistema financeiro, incluindo operações com recursos livres e direcionados, totalizou R$3.047 bilhões em agosto, com retrações de 0,1% no mês e 2,2% em doze meses (-0,9% e -2,1%, respectivamente, em julho). A redução mensal resultou do declínio de 1% na carteira de pessoas jurídicas, saldo de R$1.437 bilhões, e do aumento de 0,7% na de pessoas físicas, que atingiu R$1.610 bilhões. A relação crédito/PIB declinou 0,1 p.p. no mês, situando-se em 47,1%, comparativamente a 50,4% em agosto de 2016.

O crédito livre atingiu R$1.527 bilhões (+0,3% no mês e -1,5% em doze meses). A carteira de empresas permaneceu estável no mês, com saldo de R$699 bilhões. No crédito às famílias, o saldo situou-se em R$828 bilhões (+0,6% no mês), destacando-se, no mês, o crédito consignado, os financiamentos de veículos e o cartão de crédito à vista.

O crédito direcionado somou R$1.520 bilhões (-0,6% no mês e -2,9% em doze meses). As operações com pessoas físicas totalizaram R$782 bilhões (+0,7% no mês), com aumentos de 1,3% e 0,5% nos créditos rurais e imobiliários, respectivamente. O crédito a pessoas jurídicas recuou 1,9% no mês, para R$738 bilhões, refletindo maiores liquidações e menores concessões de financiamentos com recursos do BNDES, além de liquidações no crédito rural.

Considerados os segmentos de atividade econômica dos tomadores de crédito, destacaram-se as retrações no comércio (-3,9%, saldo de R$238 bilhões), na indústria de construção (-2,4%, R$89 bilhões) e em serviços industriais de utilidade pública (-0,8%, R$202 bilhões). Regionalmente, consideradas as operações acima de R$1 mil, foram observadas retração do saldo alocado no Sudeste (-0,3%, R$1.605 bilhões) e expansões nas demais regiões, principalmente no Sul (+0,4%, R$549 bilhões) e no Nordeste (+0,2%, R$399 bilhões).

Taxas de juros e inadimplência

O custo médio das operações de crédito ativas, aferido pelo Indicador de Custo do Crédito (ICC), recuou 0,2 p.p. em agosto, situando-se em 22,1% a.a. (-0,8 p.p em doze meses). No crédito livre, o indicador recuou 0,4 p.p. no mês e 2,3 p.p. em doze meses, situando-se em 36,7%, permanecendo estável em 8,9% a.a. no crédito direcionado.

A taxa média de juros, compreendendo os segmentos com recursos livres e direcionados, alcançou 28,5% a.a. em agosto (-0,5 p.p. no mês e -4,5 p.p. em doze meses). No crédito livre, a taxa média recuou 1,0 p.p. no mês, situando-se em 45,6% a.a.; no crédito direcionado, redução de 0,1 p.p., para 10% a.a.

No crédito às famílias, a taxa média situou-se em 35,6% a.a. (-0,9 p.p no mês e -6,6 p.p. em doze meses). Nas contratações livres, a taxa declinou 1,5 p.p., para 62,3% a.a., destacando-se os recuos em cheque especial (-4 p.p.) e crédito pessoal não consignado (-2,8 p.p.). No direcionado, a taxa média declinou 0,5 p.p., para 8,5% a.a., com reduções de 0,4 p.p. no crédito rural e de 0,7 p.p. nos financiamentos imobiliários.

A taxa de juros do cartão de crédito rotativo regular recuou de 10,3% a.m., em julho, para 10,2% a.m., em agosto, mantendo a trajetória declinante observada desde o início da vigência das medidas que alteraram o funcionamento do cartão de crédito rotativo (em março de 2017 atingiram 14,9% a.m.). No cartão parcelado e no rotativo não regular, as taxas médias de juros permaneceram estáveis no mês em 8,3% a.m. e 16,2% a.m., respectivamente. Em agosto, a taxa de juros do cheque especial registrou ligeira redução, para 12,6% a.m. (de 12,7% a.m. em julho).

No crédito às empresas, a taxa média de juros atingiu 18,8% a.a. (-0,1 p.p. no mês e -3,2 p.p. em doze meses). No segmento livre, a queda de 0,9 p.p. no mês, para 24,4% a.a., refletiu reduções em capital de giro (-0,6 p.p.) e desconto de duplicatas e recebíveis (-2,5 p.p.). No crédito direcionado, a taxa alcançou 12,2% a.a. (+0,6 p.p. no mês), com alta de 0,8 p.p. nos financiamentos para investimentos com recursos do BNDES.

O spread médio das contratações com recursos livres e direcionados situou-se em 21,3 p.p. (-0,2 p.p. no mês e -2,0 p.p. em doze meses), refletindo o recuo nas operações com as famílias (-0,4 p.p., para 28,6 p.p.). No crédito às empresas, o indicador alcançou 11,5 p.p. (+0,1 p.p. no mês). No crédito livre, o spread declinou 0,7 p.p., para 36,9 p.p., enquanto, no direcionado, aumentou 0,3 p.p., para 4,5 p.p. em agosto.

A taxa de inadimplência permaneceu estável pelo terceiro mês consecutivo em 3,7%. A estabilidade se verificou tanto nos créditos às famílias (4,0%) e às empresas (3,4%), quanto nos segmentos livre (5,6%) e direcionado (1,8%).

II - Evolução dos agregados monetários

A média dos saldos diários da base monetária totalizou R$249,9 bilhões em agosto, com retração de 0,6% no mês e acréscimo de 5,4% em doze meses. A variação mensal refletiu o declínio de 0,8% no saldo do papel-moeda emitido e a ampliação de 0,3% na posição das reservas bancárias.

Entre os fluxos mensais dos fatores condicionantes da base monetária, sobressaíram, sobretudo, as operações com títulos públicos federais, com impacto contracionista de R$7,2 bilhões (compras líquidas de R$29 bilhões no mercado secundário e colocações líquidas de R$36,2 bilhões no mercado primário) e as operações do Tesouro Nacional, que implicaram expansão de R$3,8 bilhões.

O saldo médio diário dos meios de pagamento restritos (M1) atingiu R$313,7 bilhões em agosto, após decréscimo de 1,8% no mês, decorrente das reduções de 3,1% nos depósitos à vista e de 0,9% no papel-moeda em poder do público. Em doze meses, o M1 cresceu 4,1%.

O saldo dos meios de pagamento no conceito M2, que corresponde ao M1 mais depósitos de poupança e títulos emitidos por instituições financeiras, totalizou R$2,4 trilhões em agosto (avanço de 0,6% no mês). Esse resultado foi determinado pelas expansões de 1,1% nos títulos privados (saldo de R$1,4 trilhão) e de 0,8% nos depósitos de poupança (R$690,4 bilhões). No mês, ocorreram captações líquidas de R$2,1 bilhões na poupança e de R$14 bilhões nos depósitos a prazo.

O M3, que compreende o M2, as quotas de fundos de renda fixa e os títulos públicos, que lastreiam as operações compromissadas entre o público e o setor financeiro, elevou-se 1,6% no mês, para R$5,6 trilhões, refletindo o acréscimo de 2,4% no saldo das quotas de fundos, que somou R$3,1 trilhões. No mesmo período, o saldo de operações compromissadas recuou 2,4%, situando-se em R$89 bilhões. O M4, que compreende o M3 e os títulos públicos de detentores não financeiros, cresceu 1,3% no mês e 9% em doze meses, totalizando R$6,5 trilhões.

DOCUMENTO: http://www.bcb.gov.br/htms/notecon2-p.asp

CNI. 27 de Setembro de 2017. Produção da indústria tem forte alta em agosto, aponta CNI. Indicadores de evolução da produção e de expectativas para os próximos seis meses apontam para recuperação mais consistente da atividade industrial. Dados sinalizam, ainda, o fim das demissões no setor



A indústria começa a apresentar sinais mais consistentes de recuperação. Em agosto, o índice de evolução da produção do setor chegou a 54,8 pontos. O desempenho marca a primeira vez, desde outubro de 2013, em que se registra alta na produção por dois meses consecutivos. Os dados são da pesquisa Sondagem Industrial, divulgada nesta quarta-feira (27), pela Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI). Os indicadores da pesquisa variam de zero a cem pontos.

Números acima dos 50 pontos indicam expansão e, abaixo deste patamar, retração. Indicadores de continuidade da melhora na indústria também surgem em relação ao emprego, após mais de dois anos de encolhimento no número de postos de trabalho. “O índice de evolução do número de empregados, por sua vez, mostra que o emprego industrial está praticamente estável. Além disso, não há expectativa de novas demissões”, afirma o estudo.

A pesquisa da CNI mostra, ainda, que duas fontes de preocupação apresentadas na edição de julho tiveram melhora. Primeiro, o desajuste no nível dos estoques, que havia registrado 51,1 pontos, foi corrigido e chegou a exatos 50 pontos, demonstrando equilíbrio entre o volume efetivo ante o planejado. Por fim, a utilização da capacidade instalada chegou a 67%, alta de 2 p.p. em relação ao mês anterior, e de 1 p.p. ante o mesmo mês de 2015 e de 2014.

ALTA NAS EXPECTATIVAS – O empresário industrial também está mais otimista quanto ao próximo semestre. Pelo quarto mês consecutivo, o índice de expectativa de demanda apresentou alta, chegando a 56,9 pontos, nível mais elevado desde março de 2014. A perspectiva de aumento na produção, nos próximos meses, também é confirmada por nova alta no índice de expectativa de compras de matérias primas, que subiu 0,8 ponto, para 54,5 pontos, maior valor desde abril de 2014.

Em relação ao emprego, os dados mostram que o período de demissões na indústria está perto do fim. Em agosto, o índice de expectativa de número de empregados apresentou nova melhora, chegando a 49,6 pontos. Neste patamar, situando-se praticamente sobre a linha divisória de 50 pontos, sinaliza-se que não há expectativa de novas quedas no emprego industrial. “Ou seja, o fim das demissões na indústria está se consolidando”, diz a pesquisa.

Com sinais mais disseminados de melhora, cresce também a disposição do empresário industrial de investir. De acordo com a sondagem, o índice de intenção de investimento cresceu pelo terceiro mês consecutivo, em setembro, chegando a 49,4 pontos. Este é o maior índice desde março de 2015 e está 6 pontos acima do registrado em setembro de 2016.

Esta edição da Sondagem Industrial foi realizada entre 1o e 15 de setembro 2.376 empresas industriais de todo país. Destas, 978 são pequenas, 867 são médias e 531 são grandes.

Sondagem Industrial. Melhora na indústria tem continuidade em Agosto

A Sondagem Industrial de agosto dá sequência aos bons resultados apresentados em julho e afasta algumas preocupações sugeridas pela última edição da pesquisa.



Sondagem Industrial: https://static-cms-si.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/dd/b9/ddb9cab7-f3e1-47dd-8799-5597dc5d94ba/sondagemindustrial_agosto2017.pdf

FGV. IBRE. 27-Set-2017. Sondagens e Índices de Confiança. Sondagem do Comércio. Confiança do Comércio avança depois de quatro quedas consecutivas

O Índice de Confiança do Comércio (ICOM) da Fundação Getulio Vargas avançou 6,8 pontos em setembro, atingindo 89,2 pontos. Após quatro meses de quedas consecutivas, o indicador retorna ao nível de abril (89,1 pontos).

“A queda da confiança nos meses anteriores havia refletido o aumento da incerteza com a crise política de maio, e mais recentemente, a preocupação coma sustentação das vendas após o fim do período de liberação de recursos do FGTS. O bom resultado de setembro mostra que este momento já passou e o setor retoma a tendência de alta da confiança que vinha apresentando nos primeiros meses do ano”, avalia Aloisio Campelo Jr., Superintendente de Estatísticas Públicas da FGV IBRE.

A alta do ICOM em setembro ocorreu de forma disseminada pelos 13 segmentos pesquisados. Houve melhora tanto das expectativas quanto das avaliações sobre a situação atual. O Índice de Situação Atual (ISA-COM) subiu 6,5 pontos, para 83,9 pontos, maior desde janeiro de 2015 (87,4 pontos). Já o Índice de Expectativas (IE-COM) avançou 7,0 pontos, para 95,1 pontos, retornando ao nível de abril de 2017 (95,8 pontos).

Resultado trimestral

Apesar da recuperação em setembro, a média do ICOM no terceiro trimestre terminou ficando 2,8 pontos abaixo à do trimestre anterior, interrompendo uma sequência de seis trimestres de alta. No trimestre, O IE-COM recuou 3,8 pontos depois de subir 4,8 pontos nos dois primeiros trimestres do ano. Já o ISA-COM perdeu 1,6 ponto, após acumular 13,0 pontos no primeiro semestre. Segundo Aloisio Campelo “o resultado de setembro sugere a retomada da tendência de alta virtuosa da confiança com melhora gradual da percepção sobre a situação presente e otimismo moderado em relação aos meses seguintes.”

A edição de setembro de 2017 coletou informações de 1.166 empresas entre os dias 01 e 25 deste mês.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C55EC04CF1015EC2E689DE40DA

IBGE. 27/09/2017. Índice de Preços ao Produtor varia 0,31% em agosto

Em agosto de 2017, o Índice de Preços ao Produtor (IPP) teve variação de 0,31% em relação a julho, valor superior ao observado na comparação entre julho e junho deste ano (-1,01%). Entre as 24 atividades, 11 apresentaram variações positivas de preços, contra seis no mês anterior. O acumulado do ano atingiu -0,99%, contra -1,29% em julho de 2017.

Período	Taxa
Agosto de 2017	0,31%
Julho de 2017	-1,01%
Agosto de 2016	-0,25%
Acumulado no ano	-0,99%
Acumulado em 12 meses	1,66%

O Índice de Preços ao Produtor (IPP) das Indústrias Extrativas e de Transformação mede a evolução dos preços de produtos “na porta de fábrica”, sem impostos e fretes, e abrange informações por grandes categorias econômicas, ou seja, bens de capital, bens intermediários e bens de consumo (duráveis e semiduráveis e não duráveis).

Tabela 1
Índices de Preços ao Produtor, segundo Indústrias Extrativas e de Transformação (Indústria Geral) e Seções  - Últimos três meses
Indústria Geral e Seções	Variações (%)
	M/M-1			Acumulado Ano			M/M-12
	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17
Indústria Geral	-0,20	-1,01	0,31	-0,29	-1,29	-0,99	1,53	1,09	1,66
B - Indústrias Extrativas	-6,67	-1,81	6,21	-15,34	-16,88	-11,72	0,68	12,26	14,47
C - Indústrias de Transformação	0,02	-0,98	0,12	0,28	-0,70	-0,58	1,56	0,77	1,27
Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Indústria

 
Em agosto, 11 das 24 atividades apresentaram variações positivas de preços, contra seis do mês anterior. As quatro maiores variações se deram nas seguintes atividades industriais: refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool (6,48%), indústrias extrativas (6,21%), perfumaria, sabões e produtos de limpeza (3,06%) e outros produtos químicos (-2,06%).

Em termos de influência, na comparação entre agosto e julho de 2017, os destaques foram refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool (0,64 p.p.), alimentos (-0,33 p.p.), outros produtos químicos (-0,20 p.p.) e indústrias extrativas (0,19 p.p.).

Em agosto, o acumulado do ano (agosto de 2017 contra dezembro de 2016) foi de -0,99%, contra -1,29% em julho de 2017. Nesse indicador, as atividades que tiveram as variações percentuais mais intensas foram indústrias extrativas (-11,72%), alimentos (-8,07%), minerais não-metálicos (-7,39%) e papel e celulose (5,40%).

Ainda no acumulado, os setores de maior influência foram alimentos (-1,73 p.p.), indústrias extrativas (-0,43 p.p.), metalurgia (0,34 p.p.) e veículos automotores (0,32 p.p.).

Ao comparar agosto de 2017 com agosto de 2016, a variação de preços foi de 1,66%, contra 1,09% em julho/2017. As quatro maiores variações de preços ocorreram em indústrias extrativas (14,47%), metalurgia (7,57%), minerais não-metálicos (-7,52%) e alimentos (-6,54%).

Neste indicador, os setores de maior influência foram: alimentos (-1,41 p.p.), refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool (0,64 p.p.), metalurgia (0,56 p.p.) e veículos automotores (0,55 p.p.).

Em agosto de 2017, a variação de preços de 0,31% frente a julho repercutiu da seguinte maneira entre as Grandes Categorias Econômicas: -0,19% em bens de capital; 0,00% em bens intermediários; e 0,91% em bens de consumo, sendo que 0,08% foi a variação observada em bens de consumo duráveis e 1,18% em bens de consumo semiduráveis e não duráveis.

Tabela 4
Índices de Preços ao Produtor, segundo Indústrias Extrativas e de Transformação (Indústria Geral) e Grandes Categorias Econômicas  - Últimos três meses
Indústria Geral e Seções	Variações (%)
	M/M-1			Acumulado Ano			M/M-12
	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17	JUN/17	JUL/17	AGO/17
Indústria Geral	-0,20	-1,01	0,31	-0,29	-1,29	-0,99	1,53	1,09	1,66
Bens de Capital (BK)	0,96	-0,63	-0,19	2,09	1,45	1,26	3,15	4,05	3,94
Bens Intermediários (BI)	-0,39	-1,07	0,00	-0,10	-1,17	-1,17	1,03	1,02	1,49
Bens de consumo(BC)	-0,19	-1,00	0,91	-1,15	-2,13	-1,24	1,93	0,48	1,38
Bens de consumo duráveis (BCD)	-0,02	0,20	0,08	3,04	3,25	3,33	4,94	5,14	4,26
Bens de consumo semiduráveis e não duráveis (BCND)	-0,25	-1,38	1,18	-2,40	-3,74	-2,60	1,02	-0,92	0,50
Fonte: IBGE, Diretoria de Pesquisas, Coordenação de Indústria

A influência do resultado da indústria geral (0,31%) nas Grandes Categorias Econômicas foi a seguinte: -0,02 p.p. de bens de capital, 0,00 p.p. de bens intermediários e 0,32 p.p. de bens de consumo. No caso de bens de consumo, o resultado 0,32 p.p. se deve às variações de preços observadas nos bens de consumo semiduráveis e não duráveis e 0,01 p.p. nos bens de consumo duráveis.

No acumulado no ano (mês atual contra dezembro do ano anterior), as variações de preços da indústria acumularam, até agosto, variação de -0,99%, sendo 1,26% a variação de bens de capital (com influência de 0,11 p.p.), -1,17% de bens intermediários  (-0,65 p.p.) e
-1,24% de bens de consumo (-0,44 p.p.). No último caso, este resultado foi influenciado em 0,27 p.p. pelos produtos de bens de consumo duráveis e -0,72 p.p., pelos bens de consumo semiduráveis e não duráveis.

Na taxa anual, em agosto a variação de preços da indústria alcançou 1,66%, com as seguintes variações: bens de capital, 3,94% (0,34 p.p.); bens intermediários, 1,49% (0,83 p.p.); e bens de consumo, 1,38% (0,49 p.p.), sendo que a influência de bens de consumo duráveis foi de 0,36 p.p. e a de bens de consumo semiduráveis e não duráveis de 0,14 p.p.

Seis setores se destacam no mês de agosto

Indústrias extrativas: apresentaram variação positiva de 6,21%, interrompendo a sequência de quedas de preços nos três meses anteriores. O acumulado do ano apresentou variação de -11,72%, sendo a principal variação negativa do indicador entre as atividades pesquisadas. Na comparação com agosto do ano anterior, houve variação positiva de 14,47%. Minérios de ferro e gás natural foram os produtos que mais se destacaram.

Alimentos: em agosto de 2017, os preços do setor variaram, em média, -1,62%, o sétimo resultado negativo no ano (o único positivo foi o de maio: 0,40%) e o terceiro menor (janeiro, -2,23%; julho, -2,08%). Com este resultado, o acumulado no ano chegou a -8,07% (o último agosto com acumulado negativo foi registrado em 2014: -2,27%).

Entre os produtos de maior influência no resultado de agosto, destacam-se açúcar cristal e açúcar refinado de cana, leite esterilizado/UHT/Longa Vida” e óleo de soja refinado - único produto com variação positiva de preço. Os quatro produtos influenciaram em -0,99 p.p. o resultado de -1,62%. Entre os produtos com maior variação de preços, aparecem alguns que usam como matéria-prima tanto o açúcar quanto o leite e, por isso, seus preços tiveram variação negativa. É o caso de “leite condensado”, “bombons e chocolates de cacau” e o próprio “açúcar cristal”. O único produto com variação positiva de preços foi “sorvetes, picolés e produtos gelados comestíveis”, cuja explicação das empresas aponta para “acréscimos competitivos”.

No caso do açúcar, a variação negativa de preços ainda está ligada à safra. Já o leite, além da maior captação nas bacias leiteiras, enfrenta a retração da demanda (que também reflete nos derivados, como é o caso do “leite condensado”). No caso de “óleo de soja”, ainda que a matéria-prima esteja em queda, o aumento está ligado justamente a uma recuperação dos preços que ocorre nos últimos meses.

Refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool: a variação média de preços do setor, na comparação agosto contra julho, foi a maior da série (6,48%), invertendo o acumulado no ano que passou de -3,17% para 3,11%. Na comparação com o mesmo mês de 2016, a taxa de 6,45% é a maior desde dezembro de 2014, 6,78%.

Os quatro produtos que mais influenciam os resultados do setor tiveram variação positiva de preços (influência de 6,16 p.p. em 6,48%), encabeçados por aqueles de maior peso no cálculo do setor: “óleo diesel e outros óleos combustíveis” (que pesa aproximadamente 53%) e “gasolina automotiva” (16%). A variação do preço da gasolina, em particular, explica em grande parte a elevação dos preços do “álcool etílico (anidro ou hidratado)”, em especial aquele usado como combustível.

Outros produtos químicos: os preços do setor variaram, em média, -2,06%, menor resultado desde agosto de 2016 (-2,60%). No ano, é o quarto resultado negativo e, a partir dele, o acumulado no ano sofreu uma inversão, saindo de 1,51%, em julho, para -0,59%, sendo a primeira vez desde dezembro de 2016 (-12,28%) que o acumulado fica negativo. Estes resultados negativos devem ser vistos à luz de uma apreciação recente do Real, que alcançou 4,4%, na comparação agosto contra junho. Produto importante como “adubos ou fertilizantes à base de NPK” tem o preço ligado àqueles praticados no exterior, haja vista que a oferta interna é limitada. No caso da comparação com igual mês de 2016, a taxa de 0,38% foi a primeira positiva desde abril (0,01%). De toda forma, nessa comparação, desde janeiro de 2016, em vinte resultados portanto, apenas seis foram positivos.

Metalurgia: ao comparar os preços de agosto contra julho, houve uma variação de -1,15%, terceiro resultado negativo no ano, observado em meses consecutivos. Desta forma, o setor acumulou no ano uma variação de 4,58% e, nos últimos 12 meses, de 7,57%, sendo a maior variação observada nos setores da Indústria de Transformação. Para efeito de uma simples comparação, em agosto de 2016 o setor metalúrgico apresentava uma variação positiva de 2,55% no acumulado em 12 meses.

Em relação aos produtos que mais influenciaram os resultados no mês contra mês anterior, aparecem os dois produtos de maior peso na atividade, ambos com resultados negativos: “lingotes, blocos, tarugos ou placas de aço ao carbono” e “alumínio não ligado em formas brutas”. Os outros dois produtos que mais influenciaram o indicador mensal apresentaram resultados positivos: “arames e fios de aços ao carbono” e “barras, perfis e vergalhões de cobre e de ligas de cobre”.

Entre os 22 produtos selecionados para a pesquisa, os quatro com destaque na análise de influências do sobre a série com ajuste sazonal mencionados anteriormente, representaram
-1,11 p.p. da variação no mês, ou seja, os demais 18 produtos influenciaram em -0,04 p.p.

Veículos automotores: em agosto, a variação observada no setor foi de -0,09%, quando comparada com o mês imediatamente anterior, quebrando uma sequência de 12 variações positivas seguidas da atividade, que vinha exibindo resultados positivos no indicador desde agosto de 2016. Com isso, a variação acumulada no ano alcançou 2,98%, a segunda maior para o mês de agosto desde o início da série histórica, ficando atrás apenas de agosto de 2015, com 4,50%. A título de comparação, em agosto de 2016, o acumulado era de 1,80%. Nos últimos 12 meses, o setor acumulou uma variação de 5,09%.

Além de ser um dos setores de maior peso no cálculo do indicador geral (atrás apenas do setor de alimentos), a atividade de veículos automotores também se destacou, dentre todos os setores pesquisados, em outros dois indicadores: apresentou a quarta maior influência na variação acumulada no ano (0,32 p.p. em -0,99%) e a quarta maior influência na variação acumulada nos últimos 12 meses (0,55 p.p. em 1,66%).

Entre os quatro produtos de maior influência na comparação com o mês anterior, “chassis com motor para ônibus ou para caminhões” e “motores diesel e semi-diesel para ônibus e caminhões”) tiveram impacto positivo no índice. Os outros dois produtos, impactaram negativamente o indicador: “bombas injetoras para veículos automotores” e “carrocerias para ônibus”. No entanto, nenhum desses produtos está entre os de maiores pesos no setor. A influência desses quatro produtos que mais impactaram a variação mensal foi de -0,05 p.p. em -0,09%, ou seja, os demais 21 produtos da atividade contribuíram com -0,04 p.p.

Petróleo e álcool influenciam aumento do Índice de Preços ao Produtor

Após dois meses de resultados negativos, o Índice de Preços ao Produtor (IPP) apresenta avanço de 0,31% em agosto, valor fortemente influenciado pelo setor de refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool, que alcançou variação de 6,48%, a maior da série iniciada em 2009.

O acumulado do ano atingiu -0,99%, contra -1,29% em julho de 2017. Na comparação entre  agosto de 2017 e agosto de 2016, a variação de preços foi de 1,66%.

De acordo com o pesquisador da Coordenação de Indústria do IBGE, Alexandre Brandão, apesar de terem crescido, os preços de agosto foram contidos principalmente pelo setor de alimentos, que tem segurado o IPP de forma geral. “É o setor de maior peso no IPP, mas está com variações negativas”, explica.

Além de refino de petróleo e produtos de álcool, os setores indústrias extrativas (6,21%), perfumaria, sabões e produtos de limpeza (3,06%) e outros produtos químicos (-2,06%) também se destacaram em agosto, na comparação com julho.

O Índice de Preços ao Produtor (IPP) das Indústrias Extrativas e de Transformação mede a evolução dos preços de produtos, sem impostos e fretes, e abrange informações por grandes categorias econômicas: bens de capital, bens intermediários e bens de consumo (duráveis e semiduráveis e não duráveis).

 

#PraCegoVer gráfico de linhas IPP mês comparado ao mês anterior. dados destacados: agosto de 2016 -0,20%; julho de 2017 -1,01%; agosto de 2017 0,31%

Texto: Marcelo Benedicto
Gráfico: Pedro Vidal

DOCUMENTO: ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Precos_Indices_de_Precos_ao_Produtor/Fasciculo_Indicadores_IBGE/ipp_201708_Publicacao.pdf

USP. FIPE. REUTERS. 27 DE SETEMBRO DE 2017. IPC-Fipe recua 0,02% na 3ª quadrissemana de setembro

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPC) de São Paulo registrou recuo de 0,02 por cento na terceira quadrissemana de setembro, depois de ter caído 0,04 por cento na segunda quadrissemana do mês, de acordo com os dados divulgados nesta quarta-feira pela Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas (Fipe).

O IPC-Fipe mede as variações quadrissemanais dos preços às famílias paulistanas com renda mensal entre 1 e 10 salários mínimos.

Por Camila Moreira

________________

MSaúde. PORTAL BRASIL. 27/09/2017. SAÚDE. Imunização. Vacina contra zika começa a ser testada em humanos. Após testes bem sucedidos com animais, Brasil e Estados Unidos firmam parceria para a segunda etapa de produção da vacina

A produção da vacina contra o vírus da zika vai entrar na segunda etapa.  Após testes bem sucedidos com animais, a vacina começará a ser testada em humanos. De acordo com o Ministério da Saúde, essa fase deve ter início em um ano, após produção dos lotes clínicos e avaliações pré-clínicas. Também é necessário que o estudo seja aprovado pelo comitê de ética do Instituto de Tecnologia em Imunobiológicos da Fundação Oswaldo Cruz (Fiocruz/Biomanguinhos), que produzirá a vacina.

O Ministério da Saúde, Ricardo Barros, destaca os impactos positivos da imunização contra o vírus. “A vacina será útil para controle da Zika em todo o mundo evitará sequelas nas pessoas contaminadas. Tenho certeza que o Brasil vai dar um grande exemplo ao mundo, mostrando como resolveu, rapidamente, a epidemia de zika”, afirmou.

Barros firmou, nesta terça-feira (26), uma parceria com o secretário de Saúde dos EUA, Thomas Price, para a produção da segunda etapa. Segundo ele, a expectativa é que a vacina esteja disponível para a população em até dois anos, dependendo da evolução dos testes.

Proteção de gestantes e bebês

A vacina, desenvolvida pelo Instituto Evandro Chagas (IEC), apresentou resultado positivo nos testes em camundongos e macacos. Nesta fase da produção, os pesquisadores conseguiram impedir que o vírus da zika causasse microcefalia e outras alterações do sistema nervoso central das duas espécies.

A aplicação de uma única dose da vacina preveniu a transmissão da doença nos animais e, durante a gestação, o contágio de seus filhotes. É um dos mais avançados estudos para a oferta de uma vacina contra a doença para proteger mulheres e crianças da microcefalia e outras alterações neurológicas.

MDefesa. PORTAL BRASIL. 26/09/2017. DEFESA E SEGURANÇA. Forças Armadas. Participação brasileira em missão de paz no Haiti chega ao fim. Passagem do Furacão Irma, que devastou áreas do Caribe e dos Estados Unidos, atrasou o retorno dos militares para o Brasil. Sensação comum é de dever cumprido, afirmam militares

Todos os 816 militares do Exército, da Marinha e da Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB) que estavam na  Missão das Nações Unidas para Estabilização do Haiti (Minustah) retornaram ao Brasil. O terceiro e último voo chegou na madrugada desta terça-feira (26) a São Paulo (SP), trazendo também 72 militares da Companhia de Engenharia Paraguaia.

Com o regresso do contingente, chega ao fim a participação do Brasil na Minustah. Após quatro meses de missão, o tenente João Lourenço Espolaor Neto descreve sua experiência no Haiti como única. "Tudo o que vivenciei agregou muito ao meu crescimento pessoal e profissional. Tive a oportunidade de comandar um pelotão num território hostil e de conhecer um povo que passa por reais necessidades, vendo de perto o que é miséria e pobreza", disse.

Um dos desafios encarados pelos militares do último batalhão foi a passagem do furacão Irma. Classificado inicialmente como de categoria 5, o fenômeno devastou áreas do Caribe e dos Estados Unidos. O tenente Espolaor conta que o fenômeno atrasou o regresso da tropa. "Estávamos preparados para atuar em prol da população haitiana, mas graças a Deus não fomos atingidos", afirmou.

União

Para os peacekeepers que retornam ao País, a sensação comum é de dever cumprido. "Nunca mais vou esquecer o Haiti. A missão foi incrível, entre ajudas humanitárias, patrulhas e furacões, vivemos de tudo um pouco. Trabalhar com os companheiros de todas as forças, unidos pelo mesmo ideal, não tem preço", disse o soldado José Gabriel Meritello do Carmo.

Comandante da Ala 13, o coronel aviador Kennedy Fernandes Ferreira enfatizou que o sucesso do emprego da tropa da FAB no Haiti foi fruto de dedicação e preparo profissional. "Os militares que ora retornam dessa nobre missão são homens de Força Aérea testados em terreno hostil, fato este que impulsiona a instrução de nossas tropas com a força de seu exemplo prático", concluiu.

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LGCJ.: