US ECONOMICS

OAS

DoS. June 1, 2018. Secretary of State Pompeo to Lead U.S. Delegation to the Organization of American States General Assembly

Washington, DC - Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will lead the U.S. delegation to the 48th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Western Hemisphere’s oldest and most respected multilateral organization, to be held in Washington, D.C. June 3-5. Secretary Pompeo will address the General Assembly’s plenary session at 11:05 a.m. on Monday, June 4 and will engage in discussions and consultations with regional counterparts on issues of shared interest.

The U.S. delegation will also include Deputy Secretary of State John J. Sullivan, Ambassador Carlos Trujillo, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS, and Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

G7

U.S. Department of the Treasury. MAY 31, 2018. Readout from a Treasury Spokesperson on Secretary Mnuchin’s Meeting with Finance Minister Bill Morneau of Canada


WHISTLER - U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin met with Canadian Minister of Finance Bill Morneau. Secretary Mnuchin thanked Minister Morneau for Canada’s leadership in the G-7, as well as for hosting the G-7 Finance and Development Ministerial meeting. The Secretary and Minister discussed NAFTA, and the importance of a reciprocal trade relationship between the United States and Canada.

ECONOMY

FED. May 31, 2018. Speech. Sustaining Full Employment and Inflation around Target. Governor Lael Brainard. At the Forecasters Club of New York, New York, New York

I appreciate the opportunity to join the Forecasters Club to discuss the path ahead for our economy and monetary policy.1 In the months ahead, I expect to see tightening resource utilization in the U.S. economy as rising fiscal stimulus reinforces above-trend growth. Continued gradual increases in the federal funds rate are likely to be consistent with sustaining strong labor market conditions and inflation around target, with the balance sheet running off gradually and predictably in the background. This outlook suggests a policy path that moves gradually from modestly accommodative today to neutral--and, after some time, modestly beyond neutral--against the backdrop of a longer-run neutral rate that is likely to remain low by historical standards. Let me consider each element in turn

Growing above Trend

Although indicators of economic activity were on the soft side earlier in the year, the outlook for the remainder of 2018 remains quite positive, supported by sizable fiscal stimulus as well as still-accommodative financial conditions.

In the latest report, real gross domestic product (GDP) increased 2.2 percent at an annual rate in the first quarter of 2018, a slowdown from the 3 percent pace in the final three quarters of 2017. The first-quarter slowdown was especially noticeable in consumer spending, which increased at only a 1 percent pace last quarter, compared with 2-3/4 percent in 2017. By contrast, business fixed investment increased 9 percent at an annual rate last quarter, surpassing its robust 2017 pace.

I expect real GDP growth to pick up in the next few quarters. In particular, the fundamentals for consumer spending are favorable: Income gains have been strong, consumer confidence remains solid, and employment prospects remain bright. And business investment should remain solid, with drilling and mining bolstered by increased oil prices.

Moreover, the sizable fiscal stimulus that is in train is likely to provide a tailwind to growth in the second half of the year and beyond.2 From a position of full employment, the economy will likely receive a substantial boost from $1.5 trillion in personal and corporate tax cuts and a $300 billion increase in federal spending, with estimates suggesting a boost to the growth rate of real GDP of about 3/4 percent this year and next.3

Risks and Uncertainties

In short, with a tightening labor market and inflation near target, fiscal stimulus in the pipeline suggests some risk to the upside. By contrast, recent developments abroad suggest some risk to the downside.

Global growth has been synchronized over the past year, but recent developments pose some risk. Political developments in Italy have reintroduced some risk, and financial conditions in the euro area have worsened somewhat in response. With some uptick in political uncertainty, and inflation still below target in the euro area and Japan, monetary policies among the advanced economies look likely to be divergent for some time. In addition, some emerging markets may find conditions more challenging. An environment with a strengthening dollar, rising energy prices, and the possibility of rising rates raises the risks of capital flow reversals in some emerging markets that have seen increased borrowing from abroad. Although stresses have been contained to a few vulnerable countries so far, the risk of a broader pullback bears watching. In addition, uncertainty over trade clouds the horizon. An escalation in measures and countermeasures--although an outside risk--could prove disruptive at home and abroad.

Sustaining Full Employment

Here at home, the labor market is strong. So far this year, payroll gains have averaged 200,000 per month, sufficient to put further downward pressure on unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate moved down to 3.9 percent in April following six consecutive months at 4.1 percent. The unemployment rate for African Americans dropped in April to 6.6 percent, which is the lowest level recorded since this series began in 1972 but still high relative to other groups.

It is difficult to know how much slack remains. April's 3.9 percent unemployment rate was the lowest reading since December 2000. If the unemployment rate falls another couple of tenths--which seems likely, based on recent trends--it will be at its lowest level since 1969. Although the late 1960s marked the beginning of what is now called the Great Inflation, it is worth keeping in mind that there have been important shifts in the labor market since that time. For example, educational attainment is much higher today than it was in the 1960s, and college degree holders tend to have much lower unemployment rates, on average, than those with a high school degree or less.4

While the unemployment rate is now lower than before the financial crisis, the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers remains about 1 percentage point below its pre-crisis level. It is an open question what portion of the prime-age Americans who are out of the labor force may prove responsive to tight labor market conditions.

While it is difficult to know with precision how much slack still remains, I am seeing more evidence that labor markets are tightening, and wages are accelerating, although at a measured pace. The 12-month change in the employment cost index (ECI) for private industry workers in the first quarter was 2.8 percent, up from 2.3 percent in the year-earlier period. By way of comparison, in the period from 2005 to 2007, just before the financial crisis, the ECI rose a bit more than 3 percent at an annual rate, while core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation was around 2-1/4 percent. I am hearing anecdotes of labor market shortages in particular occupations and sectors, echoing a theme in our recent Beige Book. Going forward, I will be looking for confirmation in other measures of wages that labor market tightness is feeding through to wage gains.

Sustainably Achieving Our Inflation Objective

Turning to the second leg of our dual mandate, in the most recent data, the trailing 12-month change in core PCE prices was 1.8 percent, up from a year earlier, when core PCE prices increased only 1.6 percent. Overall PCE prices, which include the volatile food and energy sectors, increased 2.0 percent, largely reflecting the recent run-up in crude oil prices. While the recent core PCE data are somewhat encouraging, we will want to see inflation coming in around target on a sustained basis after seven years of below-target readings.

As I have noted before, the persistence of subdued inflation, despite an unemployment rate that has moved below most estimates of its natural rate, suggests some risk that underlying inflation--the slow-moving trend that exerts a pull on wage and price setting--may have softened.5 For example, some survey measures of longer-run inflation expectations are currently lower than they were before the financial crisis, as are most estimates based on statistical filters. Inflation compensation has moved up recently but is still running somewhat below levels that prevailed before the crisis.

Re-anchoring underlying inflation at the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) 2 percent objective is an important goal. Recent research has highlighted the downside risks to inflation and inflation expectations that are posed by the effective lower bound on nominal interest rates, and it underscores the importance of ensuring underlying inflation does not slip below target in today's new normal.6 In that regard, if we were to see a mild, temporary overshoot of the inflation target, this could well be consistent with the symmetry of the FOMC's target and may help nudge underlying inflation back to target.7

In short, it is reassuring to see core PCE inflation moving up, along with market-based measures of inflation compensation retracing earlier declines. After seven years of below-target inflation, it will be important to see inflation coming in around target on a sustained basis to be confident that underlying trend inflation is running at 2 percent.

The Yield Curve

Even though longer-term Treasury yields have moved up, on net, since the beginning of the year, there has been growing attention of late to the possibility of an inversion of the yield curve--that is, circumstances in which short-term interest rates exceed long-term interest rates on Treasury securities. Historically, yield curve inversions have had a reliable track record of predicting recessions in the United States.8 Since 1960, the 3-month Treasury yield has moved above the 10-year Treasury yield before every recession except the one in 1990, and, conversely, there has only been one case where the yield curve has inverted and a recession has not followed--in 1966.

This correlation between yield curve inversions and recessions might arise for a variety of reasons. First, let us take a case where short-term rates rise relative to long-term rates. When the FOMC is undertaking a deliberate tightening in policy, short-term interest rates typically rise, as do expectations of short-term interest rates in the medium term, while interest rates in the distant future may be less affected. For example, if short-term interest rates were raised to stabilize temporary swings in the economy, the logic of the expectations hypothesis would suggest that long rates would not rise as much. And if tighter monetary policy were to weaken the economy with a lag, this would lead to long rates not rising by as much or at all.

Second, let us take a case where long-term rates decline relative to short-term rates, perhaps reflecting a flight to safety. If market participants become concerned about a future macroeconomic risk that could lead to a weaker economy, this concern would tend to lower expected longer-term interest rates, both because monetary policy would be expected to become more accommodative in the future and because market participants may increase their relative holdings of safe assets, such as Treasury securities. In this case, longer-dated Treasury yields may fall, and if short-term interest rates do not adjust commensurately, the yield curve will invert ahead of a weaker economy.

Turning to current conditions, the spread between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields has declined from 375 basis points in early 2010 to about 125 basis points in the first quarter of this year. While that represents a considerable flattening, the current spread between the 10-year and 3-month yields is only about 20 basis points narrower than the average over the 45 years before the financial crisis.

As we try to assess the implications of this flattening of the yield curve, it is important to take into account the very low level of the current 10-year yield by historical standards. For the 20 years before the crisis, the 10-year Treasury yield averaged about 6‑1/4 percent, compared with recent readings around 3 percent. One reason the 10-year Treasury yield may be unusually low is that market expectations of interest rates in the longer run may be unusually low. A second reason may be that the term premium--the extra compensation an investor would demand for investing in a 10-year bond rather than rolling over a shorter-dated instrument repeatedly over a 10-year period--has fallen to levels that are very low by historical standards. According to one estimate from Federal Reserve Board staff, the term premium has tended to be slightly negative in recent years. By contrast, when the spread between the 10-year and 3-month Treasury yields was at its peak in early 2010, this measure of the term premium was close to 100 basis points.9

Other things being equal, a smaller term premium will make the yield curve flatter by lowering the long end of the curve. With the term premium today very low by historical standards, this may temper somewhat the conclusions that we can draw from a pattern that we have seen historically in periods with a higher term premium. With a very low term premium, any given amount of monetary policy tightening will lead to an inversion sooner so that even a modest tightening that might not have led to an inversion in the past could do so today.

There are a number of possible explanations of the low level of the term premium. The asset purchases of the Federal Reserve and other central banks may be contributing factors. The goal of these policies was to lower longer-term interest rates--and in many cases, expressly by lowering term premiums. A number of studies suggest that these polices have indeed been successful in lowering term premiums.10

A second reason the term premium may be lower than in the past is the changing correlation between stock and bond returns, likely caused by changes in expected inflation outcomes.11 While in the 1970s and 1980s stock and bond returns tended to be positively correlated, more recently the correlation has tended to be negative. With an inverse correlation, bonds recently have been a good hedge for stocks, and that correlation may have contributed to lower bond term premiums by increasing the demand for bonds as an instrument for hedging portfolio risks. This changed correlation between stock and bond returns in turn may be related to better anchored inflation expectations following a long period of low and stable inflation.

Looking ahead, it seems likely the term premium will increase somewhat, although perhaps not to the levels seen historically. On the one hand, a continued gradual runoff of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve and reduced bond buying by other central banks will tend to put upward pressure on the term premium. On the other hand, the FOMC's demonstrated commitment to maintaining low and stable inflation makes it unlikely that expectations of high inflation will reemerge. Thus, on balance, while term premiums may recover somewhat from their recent depressed values, it is unlikely they will return to the high levels of earlier decades.

The Path of Policy

In the median outlook in the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), the federal funds rate is projected to reach its longer-run value by 2019 and exceed it in 2020. If the 10-year term premium were to stay very low, that path would likely imply a yield curve inversion. But for the reasons I just noted, if the term premium remains low by historical standards, there would probably be less adverse signal from any given yield curve spread.

It is important to emphasize that the flattening yield curve suggested by the SEP median is associated with a policy path calibrated to sustain full employment and inflation around target. So while I will keep a close watch on the yield curve as an important signal on how tight financial conditions are becoming, I consider it as just one among several important indicators. Yield curve movements will need to be interpreted within the broader context of financial conditions and the outlook and will be one of many considerations informing my assessment of appropriate policy.

As suggested by the SEP median path, I believe that the forward-guidance language in the Committee statement that was introduced a few years ago that "the federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time, below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run" is growing stale and may no longer serve its original purpose. For purposes of comparison, in March 2016, the median of SEP projections for the federal funds rate path had the funds rate rising to 3.0 percent and remaining below the longer run value that was projected to be 3.3 percent. A year later, the median projection of the longer-run federal funds rate fell. In the March 2018 SEP, the median projection of the federal funds rate peaks at 3.4 percent in 2020--1/2 percentage point above the median projection of its longer-run value of 2.9 percent. It is worth noting that this progression reflects a decrease in the long-run federal funds rate as much as an increase in the medium-run federal funds rate.

Conclusion

In an environment of tightening resource utilization and above-trend growth, with sizable fiscal stimulus likely to provide a boost to demand in the near-to-medium term that should fade somewhat further out, it seems likely that the neutral rate could rise in the medium term above its longer-run value. I expect current tailwinds to boost the neutral rate gradually over the medium term but leave little imprint on the long-run neutral rate. The short-run level of the neutral rate should rise gradually because the forces that are moving the economy from headwinds to tailwinds are likely to play out gradually. Although the tax cuts are already in place, their effects may not be fully felt for a few years, and the spend-out from the recent budget agreement may occur with some delay. A gradual pace is also warranted in light of the long period of undershooting the inflation target.

I would not underestimate the challenge of calibrating monetary policy to sustain full employment and re-anchor trend inflation around 2 percent, while adjusting to sizable stimulus at a time when resource constraints are tightening and the economy is growing above trend. I continue to view gradual increases in the federal funds rate as the appropriate path, although I will remain vigilant for the emergence of risks and prepared to adjust if conditions change.

References

• Bauer, Michael D., and Thomas M. Mertens (2018). "Economic Forecasts with the Yield Curve," FRBSF Economic Letter 2018-07. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, March.
• Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2018). "Federal Open Market Committee Reaffirms Its 'Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy,' " press release, January 31.
• Brainard, Lael (2015). "Normalizing Monetary Policy When the Neutral Interest Rate Is Low," speech delivered at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, Calif., December 1.
• -------- (2016). "The 'New Normal' and What It Means for Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago, September 12.
• -------- (2017). "Understanding the Disconnect between Employment and Inflation with a Low Neutral Rate," speech delivered at the Economic Club of New York, New York, September 5.
• -------- (2018). "Navigating Monetary Policy as Headwinds Shift to Tailwinds," speech delivered to the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, March 6.
• Chen, Andrew, Eric Engstrom, and Olesya Grishchenko (2016). "Has the Inflation Risk Premium Fallen? Is It Now Negative?" FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 4.
• Congressional Budget Office (2018). The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028 (PDF). Washington: CBO, April 9.
• Estrella, Arturo, and Frederic S. Mishkin (1997). "The Predictive Power of the Term Structure of Interest Rates in Europe and the United States: Implications for the European Central Bank," European Economic Review, vol. 41 (July), pp. 1375‑401.
• Favara, Giovanni, Simon Gilchrist, Kurt F. Lewis, and Egon Zakrajsek (2016). "Recession Risk and the Excess Bond Premium," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 8.
• International Monetary Fund (2018). World Economic Outlook Update: Brighter Prospects, Optimistic Markets, Challenges Ahead. Washington: IMF, January.
• Johansson, Peter, and Andrew Meldrum (2018). "Predicting Recession Probabilities Using the Slope of the Yield Curve," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 1.
• Kiley, Michael T., and John M. Roberts (2017). "Monetary Policy in a Low Interest Rate World (PDF)," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, pp. 317-96.
• Kim, Don H., and Jonathan H. Wright (2005). "An Arbitrage-Free Three-Factor Term Structure Model and the Recent Behavior of Long-Term Yields and Distant-Horizon Forward Rates (PDF)," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-33. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September (revised December 2011).
• Li, Canlin, and Min Wei (2013). "Term Structure Modeling with Supply Factors and the Federal Reserve's Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs (PDF)," International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9 (March), pp. 3-39.
• Nakata, Taisuke, and Sebastian Schmidt (2016). "The Risk-Adjusted Monetary Policy Rule," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-061. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August.

Notes

1. I am grateful to John Roberts of the Federal Reserve Board for his assistance in preparing this text. These remarks represent my own views, which do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee.
2. See Brainard (2018).
3. For example, the International Monetary Fund (2018) estimates that the tax cut legislation will raise the level of U.S. GDP 1-1/4 percent by 2020, and the Congressional Budget Office (2018, p. 13) estimates that increased spending caps will boost the level of real GDP by 0.6 percent in 2019.
4. The share of the labor force aged 25 or older with a college degree or more is around 40 percent today, compared with 15 percent in the late 1960s, and the share with less than a high school degree has fallen from around 40 percent to around 7 percent today. The unemployment rates of college-educated adults are typically much lower--around 2 percent today--compared with high school noncompleters--currently around 6 percent.
5. See Brainard (2017, 2018).
6. See, for example, Kiley and Roberts (2017), Nakata and Schmidt (2016), and Brainard (2015, 2016).
7. See Board of Governors (2018) and Brainard (2018).
8. An earlier paper discussing the predictive power of the yield curve is Estrella and Mishkin (1997). In more recent work, Bauer and Mertens (2018) emphasize that the predictive content of the yield curve is still largely intact. Johansson and Meldrum (2018) and Favara and others (2016), however, argue that adding information about bond risk premiums reduces somewhat the predictive power of the yield spread.
9. See Kim and Wright (2005) for technical details; the latest estimates are available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/200533/200533abs.html.
10. See, for example, Li and Wei (2013). 
11. See Chen, Engstrom, and Grishchenko (2016). 

FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/brainard20180531a.pdf

US TARIFFS ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM IMPORTS

EUA. PORTAL G1. REUTERS. France Press. 01/06/2018. Países adotam medidas retaliatórias contra EUA por tarifas sobre aço e alumínio. União Europeia diz que 'não está em guerra com ninguém', mas que defenderá seus interesses. Canadá e México também anunciam tarifas sobre produtos dos EUA. EUA confirmam novas tarifas para importação de aço da UE, Canadá e do México.

Canadá e México responderam com a imposição de tarifas sobre bilhões de dólares de produtos dos Estados Unidos, desde suco de laranja a carne de porco, e a União Europeia vai taxar uísque bourbon e as motocicletas Harley Davidson, depois que o governo de Donald Trump confirmou novas tarifas para importação de aço e alumínio da UE, Canadá e México.

A comissária de Comércio da UE, Cecilia Malmstrom, anunciou uma coletiva de imprensa às 15h (horário de Brasília) para apresentar a resposta do maior bloco comercial do mundo às tarifas dos EUA. O ministro da Economia da Alemanha disse que a UE pode procurar coordenar sua resposta com o Canadá e o México.

As tarifas norte-americanas sobre seus aliados mais próximos, anunciadas pela primeira vez pelo presidente Donald Trump em março, foram condenadas por congressistas republicanos e pelo principal grupo de lobby dos EUA e provocaram uma queda nos mercados financeiros.

As tarifas de 25% sobre as importações de aço e 10% sobre alumínio da UE, Canadá e México estavam previstas para entrar em vigor a partir desta sexta-feira, disse o secretário de Comércio dos EUA, Wilbur Ross, a repórteres.

"Estamos ansiosos para continuar as negociações, tanto com o Canadá e o México, por um lado, e com a Comissão Europeia, por outro lado, porque há outras questões que também precisamos resolver", disse ele.

Canadá e México, envolvidos em conversas com os Estados Unidos para modernizar o Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte (NAFTA), responderam rapidamente.

Canadá

O Canadá, maior fornecedor de aço para os Estados Unidos, vai impor tarifas cobrindo US$ 12,8 bilhões de importações dos EUA, incluindo uísque, suco de laranja, aço, alumínio e outros produtos, disse a chanceler Chrystia Freeland.

"A administração norte-americana tomou hoje uma decisão que nós deploramos, e obviamente vai levar a medidas de retaliação, como deve", disse o primeiro-ministro Justin Trudeau.

México

O México anunciou o que descreveu como medidas "equivalentes" em uma ampla gama de produtos agrícolas e industriais dos EUA, incluindo pernil de porco, maçãs, uvas e queijo, bem como aço e outros produtos. As tarifas serão mantidas até que o governo dos EUA elimine suas tarifas, disse o Ministério da Economia do México.

União Europeia

A UE já ameaçou impor tarifas sobre as motocicletas Harley Davidson e bourbon, medidas que atingiriam as bases políticas dos congressistas republicanos dos EUA.

"Queremos mercados abertos, mercados livres, mas temos que convencer o governo dos EUA", disse o ministro da Economia, Peter Altmaier. "Nós tentamos fazer isso através de negociação e agora vamos fazê-lo unindo-nos e formulando uma resposta europeia comum, possivelmente trabalhando mais de perto com o México e o Canadá."

Os membros da UE deram amplo apoio ao plano da Comissão Europeia de estabelecer tarifas sobre 2,8 bilhões de euros (3,4 bilhões de dólares) de exportações norte-americanas, caso Washington ponha fim às isenções tarifárias.

As tarifas da UE devem entrar em vigor em 20 de junho, desde que os 28 Estados-membros as aprovem. As exportações da UE sujeitas a impostos norte-americanos valem 6,4 bilhões de euros (7,5 bilhões de dólares).

"A UE não está em guerra com ninguém (...) é um projeto de paz, também em comércio", mas "claramente, a UE tem que defender seus interesses", disse a chefe da diplomacia europeia, Federica Mogherini.

* Com France Presse

EUA. PORTAL G1. EFE. 31/05/2018. México, União Europeia e Canadá anunciam retaliações à sobretaxa dos EUA ao aço e alumínio. México vai taxar de lâmpadas a maçãs; União Europeia vai tributar jeans a Harley Davison e Canadá aplicará tarifas de US$ 12,8 bilhões.

México, Canadá e União Europeia anunciaram nesta quinta-feira (31) que responderão às sobretaxas sobre aço e alumínio impostas pelos Estados Unidos com "medidas equivalentes a diversos produtos".

O Departamento de Comércio americano anunciou a suspensão da isenção às tarifas à importação de 25% para aço e de 10% para alumínio de União Europeia, Canadá e México. A decisão entrará em vigor nesta sexta-feira (1º) e elevou as tensões comerciais globais.

O governo do presidente Donald Trump impôs o aumento em 23 março, mas ordenou a suspensão da imposição dos mesmos a UE, Argentina, Austrália, Brasil, Canadá, Coreia do Sul e México.

Para o governo mexicano, que este tipo de medida tarifária "não é adequada, nem justificada", e lembrou que aço e alumínio contribuem para a "competitividade de vários setores estratégicos e altamente integrados" na América do Norte, como o automotivo e o eletrônico.

México

"Diante das tarifas impostas pelos Estados Unidos, o México imporá medidas equivalentes a diversos produtos como aços planos [laminação a quente e a frio], lâmpadas, pernis e paletas suínas", informou a Secretaria de Economia do país em comunicado.

As tarifas mexicanas -- que também contemplarão embutidos, maçãs, uvas, mirtilos e diversos queijos -- serão aplicadas "por um montante equiparável" ao que o país perderá com as sanções americanas.

"O México lamenta profundamente e reprova a decisão dos Estados Unidos de impor estas tarifas às importações de aço e alumínio provenientes do México a partir de 1º de junho, sob o critério de segurança nacional", diz o comunicado.

Canadá

O Canadá anunciou a imposição de tarifas no valor de US$ 12,8 bilhões às exportações americanas de aço, alumínio e outros produtos como cerveja, uísque, papel higiênico e laquê para cabelo.

União Europeia

O presidente da Comissão Europeia, Jean-Claude Juncker, anunciou hoje que, em resposta, Bruxelas imporá tarifas a produtos americanos como calças jeans, motocicletas Harley Davidson e uísque bourbon.

EUA. FMI. PORTAL G1. EFE. 31/05/2018. FMI avisa aos EUA que 'todo o mundo perde' com guerra comercial. Governo Trump decidiu aplicar sobretaxa ao aço e alumínio importados da União Europeia, Canadá e México.

O Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) avisou os Estados Unidos nesta quinta-feira (31) que "todo mundo perde" em uma longa guerra comercial e pediu que o país trabalhe de forma "construtiva" com seus aliados para resolver seus desacordos, em vez de impor tarifas.

O alerta foi uma reação do FMI à decisão do presidente americano, Donald Trump, de impor tarifas às importações de aço e alumínio de União Europeia (UE), Canadá e México. A medida norte-americana foi respondida com represálias similares imediatas.

"Todo o mundo perde em uma guerra comercial prolongada. Encorajamos os países a trabalhar juntos de forma construtiva para reduzir as barreiras comerciais e resolver seus desacordos sobre comércio sem recorrer a medidas excepcionais", disse o porta-voz do FMI, Gerry Rice, em nota.

"É infeliz que as tensões comerciais estejam crescendo em um momento no qual a recuperação global está se apoiando no comércio", ressaltou.

Pela primeira vez "em muito tempo", acrescentou, "o comércio está crescendo mais rápido que o PIB global, e potencializando a recuperação no mundo todo", o que ajuda "bilhões de pessoas a viver vidas mais longas, saudáveis e prósperas".

A diretora-executiva do FMI, Christine Lagarde, também comentou de forma indireta à decisão de Trump em uma mensagem publicada no Twitter.

"Mais tarde, se o comércio se alterar maciçamente, se o nível de confiança entre os atores econômicos ficar gravemente danificado, quem mais sofrerá serão os mais pobres", frisou Lagarde.

Taxas para aço e alumínio

O secretário de Comércio dos EUA, Wilbur Ross, anunciou hoje que UE, Canadá e México estarão sujeitos às tarifas de 25% ao aço e de 10% ao alumínio, anunciadas por Trump em março.

Há um mês, os EUA haviam concedido uma suspensão temporária das tarifas, mas as negociações não convenceram o governo Trump a manter essa isenção.

O presidente da Comissão Europeia, Jean-Claude Juncker, anunciou hoje que, em resposta, Bruxelas imporá tarifas a produtos americanos como calças jeans, motocicletas Harley Davidson e uísque bourbon.

O governo do México contra-atacou com "medidas equivalentes a diversos produtos", entre os quais citou "aços planos, lâmpadas, pernas e paletas de porco".

O Canadá anunciou a imposição de tarifas no valor de US$ 12,8 bilhões às exportações americanas de aço, alumínio e outros produtos como cerveja, uísque, papel higiênico e laquê para cabelo.

EUA. UE. REUTERS. 1 DE JUNHO DE 2018. EU vai adotar medidas na OMC contra os EUA e China, diz Juncker à mídia alemã

BERLIM (Reuters) - A Comissão Europeia apresentará queixas na Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) contra os Estados Unidos devido à imposição de tarifas na importação de metais, e contra a China por violação dos direitos de patente das empresas europeias, disse o presidente da comissão, Jean-Claude Juncker, à mídia alemã.

“Estamos reclamando junto à Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) contra os Estados Unidos sobre suas tarifas e, ao mesmo tempo, contra a violação dos direitos de patente das empresas europeias pela China”, disse Juncker ao grupo de mídia RND na sexta-feira.

Por Madeline Chambers

EUA. REUTERS. 1 DE JUNHO DE 2018. Aliados dos EUA adotam medidas retaliatórias contra Washigton por tarifas sobre aço e alumínio
Por Jason Lange e Philip Blenkinsop

WASHINGTON/BRUXELAS (Reuters) - Canadá e México responderam com a imposição de tarifas sobre bilhões de dólares de produtos dos Estados Unidos, desde suco de laranja a carne de porco, e a União Europeia vai taxar uísque bourbon e as motocicletas Harley Davidson, depois que Washington arriscou desencadear uma guerra comercial global impondo tarifas sobre aço e alumínio.

A comissária de Comércio da UE, Cecilia Malmstrom, anunciou uma coletiva de imprensa às 15h (horário de Brasília) para apresentar a resposta do maior bloco comercial do mundo às tarifas dos EUA. O ministro da Economia da Alemanha disse que a UE pode procurar coordenar sua resposta com o Canadá e o México.

As tarifas norte-americanas sobre seus aliados mais próximos, anunciadas pela primeira vez pelo presidente Donald Trump em março, foram condenadas por congressistas republicanos e pelo principal grupo de lobby dos EUA e provocaram uma queda nos mercados financeiros.

As tarifas de 25 por cento sobre as importações de aço e 10 por cento sobre alumínio da UE, Canadá e México estavam previstas para entrar em vigor a partir das 7h (horário de Brasília) desta sexta-feira, disse o secretário de Comércio dos EUA, Wilbur Ross, a repórteres.

“Estamos ansiosos para continuar as negociações, tanto com o Canadá e o México, por um lado, e com a Comissão Europeia, por outro lado, porque há outras questões que também precisamos resolver”, disse ele.

Canadá e México, envolvidos em conversas com os Estados Unidos para modernizar o Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte (NAFTA), responderam rapidamente. O Canadá, maior fornecedor de aço para os Estados Unidos, vai impor tarifas cobrindo 12,8 bilhões dólares de importações dos EUA, incluindo uísque, suco de laranja, aço, alumínio e outros produtos, disse a chanceler Chrystia Freeland.

“A administração norte-americana tomou hoje uma decisão que nós deploramos, e obviamente vai levar a medidas de retaliação, como deve”, disse o primeiro-ministro Justin Trudeau.

O México anunciou o que descreveu como medidas “equivalentes” em uma ampla gama de produtos agrícolas e industriais dos EUA, incluindo pernil de porco, maçãs, uvas e queijo, bem como aço e outros produtos. As tarifas serão mantidas até que o governo dos EUA elimine suas tarifas, disse o Ministério da Economia do México.

A UE já ameaçou impor tarifas sobre as motocicletas Harley Davidson e bourbon, medidas que atingiriam as bases políticas dos congressistas republicanos dos EUA.

“Queremos mercados abertos, mercados livres, mas temos que convencer o governo dos EUA”, disse o ministro da Economia, Peter Altmaier. “Nós tentamos fazer isso através de negociação e agora vamos fazê-lo unindo-nos e formulando uma resposta europeia comum, possivelmente trabalhando mais de perto com o México e o Canadá.”

Os membros da UE deram amplo apoio ao plano da Comissão Europeia de estabelecer tarifas sobre 2,8 bilhões de euros (3,4 bilhões de dólares) de exportações norte-americanas, caso Washington ponha fim às isenções tarifárias.

As tarifas da UE devem entrar em vigor em 20 de junho, desde que os 28 Estados-membros as aprovem. As exportações da UE sujeitas a impostos norte-americanos valem 6,4 bilhões de euros (7,5 bilhões de dólares).

Por Eric Walsh, David Shepardson and David Chance em Washington, Ingrid Melander e Michel Rose em Paris, Madeline Chambers em Berlim, Philip Blenkinsop em Bruxelas e Allison Martell em Toronto

EUA. REUTERS. 31 DE MAIO DE 2018. Índices dos EUA fecham em queda por novas preocupações de guerra comercial, mas sobem no mês
Por April Joyner

NOVA YORK (Reuters) - Os índices acionários dos Estados Unidos caíram nesta quinta-feira após os Estados Unidos decidirem impor tarifas sobre importações de metais de Canadá, México e União Europeia, levando a medidas retaliatórias de alguns de seus parceiros comerciais.

O Dow Jones .DJI caiu 1,02 por cento, a 24.415 pontos, o S&P 500 .SPX perdeu 0,69 por cento, a 2.705 pontos, e o Nasdaq Composite .IXIC recuou 0,27 por cento, a 7.442 pontos.

No mês, no entanto, o S&P 500, Dow e Nasdaq tiveram seus maiores ganhos percentuais desde janeiro. O índice de pequenas empresas Russell 2000 , cujos que integram tendem a ser focados internamente, teve seu maior ganho percentual mensal desde setembro.

Na quinta-feira, o secretário de Comércio dos EUA, Wilbur Ross, disse que tarifas de 25 por cento sobre importações de aço e de 10 por cento sobre importações de alumínio de seus aliados entram em vigor na sexta-feira.

O México respondeu anunciando que vai impor medidas sobre produtos agrícolas e industriais dos EUA, inclusive aço.

O Canadá disse que irá impor tarifas em retaliação sobre 12,8 bilhões de dólares em exportações dos EUA e questionar as tarifas de aço e alumínio sob o Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte (Nafta, na sigla em inglês) e na Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC).

Reportagem adicional de Medha Singh

EUA. MOODY'S. REUTERS. 31 DE MAIO DE 2018. Tarifas sobre aço e alumínio podem prejudicar economia dos EUA, diz Moody's

NOVA YORK (Reuters) - A imposição norte-americana de tarifas sobre aço e alumínio sobre a União Europeia, Canadá e México pode impulsionar alguns produtos internos de metal, mas isto provavelmente irá prejudicar a economia norte-americana, informou nesta quinta-feira o Serviço aos Investidores da Moody’s.

“Vão aumentar custos de entrada para uma série de manufaturas, possivelmente alimentar níveis gerais de preços e podem atrair medidas retaliatórias que prejudicam certos exportadores dos EUA”, disse o diretor administrativo da Moody’s, Atsi Sheth, em comunicado.

EMPLOYMENT

DoL. BLS. June 1, 2018. THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- MAY 2018

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 223,000 in May, and the unemployment rate edged 
down to 3.8 percent, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Employment continued 
to trend up in several industries, including retail trade, health care, and construction.

Household Survey Data

The unemployment rate edged down to 3.8 percent in May, and the number of unemployed persons 
declined to 6.1 million. Over the year, the unemployment rate was down by 0.5 percentage point, 
and the number of unemployed persons declined by 772,000. (See table A-1.)

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for adult men (3.5 percent), Blacks 
(5.9 percent), and Asians (2.1 percent) decreased in May. The jobless rates for adult women 
(3.3 percent), teenagers (12.8 percent), Whites (3.5 percent), and Hispanics (4.9 percent) 
changed little over the month. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.) 

The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more) was little changed at 
1.2 million in May and accounted for 19.4 percent of the unemployed. Over the past 12 months, 
the number of long-term unemployed has declined by 476,000. (See table A-12.)

Both the labor force participation rate, at 62.7 percent, and the employment-population ratio, 
at 60.4 percent, changed little in May. (See table A-1.)

The number of persons employed part time for economic reasons (sometimes referred to as 
involuntary part-time workers) was essentially unchanged at 4.9 million in May. These 
individuals, who would have preferred full-time employment, were working part time because 
their hours had been reduced or they were unable to find full-time jobs. (See table A-8.)

The number of persons marginally attached to the labor force, at 1.5 million in May, was little 
different from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally adjusted.) These individuals were 
not in the labor force, wanted and were available for work, and had looked for a job sometime 
in the prior 12 months. They were not counted as unemployed because they had not searched for 
work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. (See table A-16.)

Among the marginally attached, there were 378,000 discouraged workers in May, little changed 
from a year earlier. (The data are not seasonally adjusted.) Discouraged workers are persons 
not currently looking for work because they believe no jobs are available for them. The 
remaining 1.1 million persons marginally attached to the labor force in May had not searched 
for work for reasons such as school attendance or family responsibilities. (See table A-16.) 

Establishment Survey Data

Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 223,000 in May, compared with an average monthly 
gain of 191,000 over the prior 12 months. Over the month, employment continued to trend up in 
several industries, including retail trade, health care, and construction. (See table B-1.)

In May, retail trade added 31,000 jobs, with gains occurring in general merchandise stores 
(+13,000) and in building material and garden supply stores (+6,000). Over the year, retail 
trade has added 125,000 jobs.

Employment in health care rose by 29,000 in May, about in line with the average monthly gain 
over the prior 12 months. Ambulatory health care services added 18,000 jobs over the month, 
and employment in hospitals continued to trend up (+6,000).  

Employment in construction continued on an upward trend in May (+25,000) and has risen by 
286,000 over the past 12 months. Within the industry, nonresidential specialty trade 
contractors added 15,000 jobs over the month.

Employment in professional and technical services continued to trend up in May (+23,000) and 
has risen by 206,000 over the year.

Transportation and warehousing added 19,000 jobs over the month and 156,000 over the year. In 
May, job gains occurred in warehousing and storage (+7,000) and in couriers and messengers 
(+5,000).

Manufacturing employment continued to expand over the month (+18,000). Durable goods accounted 
for most of the change, including an increase of 6,000 jobs in machinery. Manufacturing 
employment has risen by 259,000 over the year, with about three-fourths of the growth in 
durable goods industries. 

Mining added 6,000 jobs in May. Since a recent low point in October 2016, employment in mining 
has grown by 91,000, with support activities for mining accounting for nearly all of the 
increase.

In May, employment changed little in other major industries, including wholesale trade, 
information, financial activities, leisure and hospitality, and government. 

The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls was unchanged at 34.5 hours 
in May. In manufacturing, the workweek decreased by 0.2 hour to 40.8 hours, and overtime edged 
down by 0.2 hour to 3.5 hours. The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory employees 
on private nonfarm payrolls remained at 33.8 hours. (See tables B-2 and B-7.)

In May, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls rose by 8 cents 
to $26.92. Over the year, average hourly earnings have increased by 71 cents, or 2.7 percent. 
Average hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory employees increased by 
7 cents to $22.59 in May. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)

The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for March was revised up from +135,000 to 
+155,000, and the change for April was revised down from +164,000 to +159,000. With these 
revisions, employment gains in March and April combined were 15,000 more than previously 
reported. (Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and 
government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal 
factors.) After revisions, job gains have averaged 179,000 over the last 3 months.

FULL DOCUMENT: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf

_______________

ORGANISMS

COLOMBIA

IMF. 06/01/2018. Diálogo a fondo. La economía de Colombia en un punto de inflexión

Colombia se ha recuperado del duro shock de los precios del petróleo de 2015-2016 que frenó el sólido ritmo de crecimiento, elevó la inflación y amplió el déficit en cuenta corriente, y ahora las perspectivas del país están dando un giro favorable.

La implementación continua del acuerdo de paz de Colombia, sumada al programa de reforma estructural del gobierno, que incluye la eficaz reforma tributaria (véase el video), ha contribuido a un entorno económico estable, señaló el FMI en su evaluación anual de la economía colombiana.

Según el informe, el crecimiento está repuntando este año a 2,7%, gracias al compromiso de las autoridades con la ejecución de las reformas fundamentales, como mejorar el clima de negocios e incrementar la inversión en infraestructura. La actividad económica en Colombia también se ha visto alentada por una coyuntura mundial más favorable y por la recuperación de los precios de las materias primas, que han ayudado a estimular las exportaciones.

Las presiones inflacionarias han cedido en Colombia al haberse disipado los shocks previos y en virtud de oportunas decisiones de política monetaria que también han respaldado la recuperación. Las mejoras que se están introduciendo en el proceso de toma de decisiones del banco central facilitarán el anclaje de las expectativas inflacionarias.  

Pero para lograr un crecimiento más duradero y con beneficios generalizados, Colombia deberá seguir diversificando su economía para que dependa menos del petróleo y seguir estimulando el crecimiento de la productividad.

Las políticas que pueden ayudar a alcanzar estos objetivos son las siguientes:

• Promover la inversión en infraestructura mediante la ejecución de las reformas previstas del transporte vial. Por ejemplo, los costos logísticos equivalen a un 15% de las ventas de las empresas, debido principalmente a ineficiencias en el transporte.
• Eliminar obstáculos regulatorios para incentivar la actividad en el sector privado.
• Continuar reduciendo la informalidad en el mercado laboral y mejorar la educación mediante incrementos de la cobertura y la calidad de la misma a fin de dotar a los potenciales empleados de las aptitudes necesarias para el actual mercado mundial.
• Reducir las barreras comerciales; por ejemplo, los aranceles deben realinearse para disminuir la dispersión entre diferentes productos. Un examen de las barreras comerciales no arancelarias también podría ayudar a reducir los costos de producción de los bienes transables.

Como se señaló, la eficaz reforma tributaria adoptada por Colombia en respuesta al shock de los precios del petróleo y la implementación del plan de paz han ayudado a estabilizar la economía. En los siguientes videos se da una mirada a lo que vivieron en ese momento las autoridades y los ciudadanos de Colombia.

Diálogo a Fondo

Diálogo a fondo es un foro en el que los funcionarios y las autoridades del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) debaten sus opiniones sobre importantes temas económicos y de política de actualidad.

El FMI es una institución con sede en Washington D.C. que está formada por 189 países y cuya labor consiste en fomentar la cooperación monetaria y la estabilidad financiera en todo el mundo.

Las opiniones expresadas son las de los autores y no representan necesariamente las opiniones del FMI y el Directorio Ejecutivo de la institución

Condiciones de uso

Este blog es un foro con un moderador que está sujeto a las condiciones del FMI en cuanto a derechos de autor y uso y política de privacidad. En todo comentario, entrada y enlace a otro sitio web, los usuarios deben referirse al tema en cuestión, expresarse en términos profesionales y evitar un lenguaje ofensivo o difamatorio. Los usuarios garantizan que sus comentarios son originales y no violan los derechos de autor ni de propiedad de ningún tercero. Los comentarios o las entradas que no se ciñan a estas condiciones pueden ser modificados o retirados. Nos reservamos también el derecho de desautorizar enlaces inversos, o trackbacks, que consideremos improcedentes.

Para cualquier otra pregunta sobre el uso, sírvase escribirnos a través de este sitio.

Política de reutilización de blogs


Está permitido reproducir entradas de Diálogo a fondo. No obstante, le pedimos que se sirva atribuir el texto citado a los autores y señalar que se publicó originalmente en Diálogo a fondo, con un enlace a nuestro blog.

• VIDEO 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=5&v=D9lENwl4Yhc
• VIDEO 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-uMAQFv7nI

________________

ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA / BRAZIL ECONOMICS

MERCADO DE AÇÕES

BOVESPA. PORTAL G1. 01/06/2018. Bovespa opera em alta no 1º pregão de junho após pior maio desde 2014. Na quarta-feira (30), o índice fechou em queda de 0,90%, acumulando perda de 10,87% no mês de maio.

O principal índice de ações da bolsa brasileira (B3), o Ibovespa, abriu em alta nesta sexta-feira (1), após ter registrado em maio o pior desempenho mensal desde setembro de 2014.

Perto das 10h10, o Ibovespa subia 1,05%, aos 77.556 pontos. Veja mais cotações.

Na quarta-feira (30), o índice fechou em queda de 0,90%, aos 76.753 pontos. No mês, a bolsa perdeu 10,87%.

Ibovespa em 2018

Pontuação de fechamento

5/4
● : 85.209

Fonte: B3

MERCADO DE CÂMBIO

BACEN. PORTAL G1. 01/06/2018. Dólar opera em alta no 1º pregão de junho ao redor de R$ 3,75. Moeda dos EUA subiu 6,65% no mês de maio.

O dólar abriu em alta nesta sexta-feira (1), voltando a ser negociada ao redor de R$ 3,75, após ter registrado em maio o maior avanço mensal desde setembro de 2015.

Às 09h10, a moeda dos EUA subia 0,38%, a R$ 3,7503.

O dólar encerrou o mês de maio cotado a R$ 3,7356 na venda, acumulando alta de 6,65% no mês. No ano, a moeda acumulou até o pregão de quarta-feira (30) alta de 12,74%.

Nesta sexta, a agenda econômica é pautada pela divulgação dos dados do mercado de trabalho norte-americano, que podem dar pistas sobre a força da economia do país e indicações sobre o ritmo de mudanças nos juros nos Estados Unidos. Os investidores também seguem monitorando os desdobramentos da greve dos caminhoneiros sobre a economia.

Variação do dólar em 2018

Diferença entre o dólar turismo e o comercial, considerando valor de fechamento

30/5
● dólar comercial: 3,7356

Fonte: Valor PRO

O BC realiza nesta sessão leilão de até 8.800 swaps cambiais tradicionais - equivalentes à venda futura de dólares - para rolagem do vencimento de julho. Também ofertará até 15 mil novos swaps.

* Com Reuters

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LGCJ.: