US ECONOMICS

IMF. 2017 June 27, 2017. Article IV Consultation with the United States of America - Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

The Macroeconomic Outlook

1. The U.S. economy is in its third longest expansion since 1850. Real GDP is now 12 percent higher than its pre-recession peak, job growth has been persistently strong and, although there are measurement uncertainties, the U.S. economy appears to be back at full employment.

2. However, the outlook is clouded by important medium-term imbalances. The U.S. economic model is not working as well as it could in generating broadly shared income growth. It is burdened by a rising public debt. The U.S. dollar is moderately overvalued (by around 10-20 percent). The external position is moderately weaker than implied by medium term fundamentals and desirable policies. The current account deficit is expected to be around 3 percent of GDP over the medium-term and the net international investment position has deteriorated markedly in the past several years. Most critically, relative to historical performance, post-crisis growth has been too low and too unequal.

3. To address these shortcomings, the administration intends a wide-ranging overhaul of policies, although a fully articulated policy plan has yet to emerge. The administration’s budget proposes to reduce the fiscal deficit and debt, to reprioritize public spending, and to revamp the tax system. However, during the Article IV consultation it became evident that many details about these plans are still undecided. Given these policy uncertainties, the IMF’s macroeconomic forecast uses a baseline assumption of unchanged policies. Specifically, it neither builds in the effect of tax reform nor the expenditure reductions proposed in the administration’s budget. Under this forecast, growth is expected to rise modestly above 2 percent this year and next, driven by continued solid consumption growth and a cyclical rebound in private investment. Growth is forecast to subsequently converge to the underlying potential growth rate of 1.8 percent.



4. Significant policy uncertainties imply larger-than-usual, two-sided risks to the forecast. On the one hand, a medium-term path of fiscal consolidation, such as that proposed in the budget, would result in a growth rate that is below this baseline. On the other hand, spending reductions could be less ambitious and tax reforms could lower federal revenues, providing stimulus to the economy, raising near-term growth (and possibly potential growth), but with negative implications for debt sustainability and the current account imbalance. Over the medium-term, a broader retreat from cross-border integration would represent a downside risk to trade, sentiment, and growth.

Policy Goals

5. Like many other advanced economies, the U.S. is being confronted with secular shifts on multiple fronts. These include technological change that is reshaping the labor market, low productivity growth, rising skills premia, and an aging population. Despite having high per capita income and being one of the most flexible, competitive, and innovative economies in the world, the U.S. model appears to be having difficulties adapting to these secular changes. As was pointed out in the administration’s budget, these shifts are having real consequences for people’s livelihoods: household incomes are stagnating for a large share of the population (in inflation-adjusted terms, more than half of U.S. households has a lower income today than they did in 2000); job opportunities are deteriorating with many workers too discouraged to remain in the labor force (since 2007, the labor force participation rate has fallen from 66 to below 63 percent of the non-institutionalized civilian population); prospects for upward mobility are waning; and the poverty rate (at 13.5 percent) is one of the highest among advanced economies.



6. A comprehensive policy package is needed. The administration’s priorities include taking steps to spark faster economic and productivity growth, stimulate job creation, incentivize business investment, balance the budget, bring down the public debt, and create fiscal space to finance priorities such as infrastructure. These objectives are welcome but the consultation revealed differences on a range of policies and left open questions as to whether the administration’s proposed policy strategies are best suited to achieve their intended purpose. Nonetheless, there was agreement that the policy package will need to incorporate reforms on multiple, macro-critical fronts. These include building a more efficient tax system, improving education and developing skills, reprioritizing federal spending, improving the effectiveness of the regulatory system, and reforming the immigration and welfare systems. The right policy package represents an upside risk to growth and would serve to ensure a broad-based improvement in living standards. The remainder of this concluding statement aims to outline a possible set of macroeconomic and supply-side policies that would achieve such an outcome.

7. However, it should be said at the start that, even with an ideal constellation of pro-growth policies, the potential growth dividend is likely to be less than that projected in the budget and will take longer to materialize. The U.S. is effectively at full employment. For policy changes to be successful in achieving sustained, higher growth they would need to raise the U.S. potential growth path. The international experience and U.S. history would suggest that a sustained acceleration in annual growth of more than 1 percentage points, as projected by the administration, is unlikely. Indeed, since the 1980s there are only a few identified cases among the advanced economies where this has happened. These episodes mostly took place in the mid to late 1990s against a backdrop of strong global demand and many of them were associated with recoveries from recessions. The U.S. itself experienced one comparable growth acceleration as it recovered from the deep recession of the early 1980s. However, this event occurred during a period of favorable demographics, rising labor force participation, a significant expansion of the federal fiscal deficit, and an acceleration in trading partner growth. These tailwinds are unlikely to recur today.



The Macroeconomic Policy Mix


8. With the economy at full employment it is important that the U.S. puts in place the right policy mix for this stage in the cycle. That would involve gradually removing both fiscal and monetary support and refocusing efforts on expanding potential growth, raising competitiveness, and strengthening the supply side. Doing so will lower the current account deficit and improve the net international investment position, reduce the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar, and have positive spillovers to others. There are two parts to this policy shift:

Part 1: A balanced medium-term fiscal consolidation

9. Under unchanged policies, demographic trends and rising interest rates will lead to a steady increase in fiscal deficits and public debt over the medium-term. To prevent this, the U.S. should put in place a plan for medium-term fiscal consolidation that targets a federal primary surplus of around 1 percent of GDP (or a general government primary surplus of around ¾ percent of GDP). This adjustment can be gradual but ought to start in 2018 so as to lower the federal debt-GDP ratio over the medium-term.



10. The administration’s budget proposes an expenditure-based medium-term fiscal consolidation. Under the authorities’ budget, the federal primary balance is forecast to go from a 1.9 percent of GDP deficit to a 2.1 percent of GDP surplus over the next 10 years. This adjustment is predicated on a modest increase in revenues, a reduction in both non-defense spending and defense outlays as a share of GDP, and an extremely optimistic growth assumption. The non-defense spending reductions are concentrated in two broad areas: a downsizing of line agencies (outside of defense and security) and reductions in spending on safety net programs. Fewer details are currently available on the tax reform that the budget is based upon but our understanding is that it will be designed to improve efficiency and lower marginal rates while leaving the federal revenue-GDP ratio broadly unchanged.

11. A different composition of adjustment could stabilize the public debt-GDP ratio with smaller costs to growth and living standards. As currently framed, the budget implies significant cuts to discretionary spending that, in the staff’s view, would seem to place a disproportionate share of the adjustment burden on low- and middle-income households. This would appear counter to the budget’s goals of promoting safety and prosperity for all Americans. An alternative approach would rely on:

• A tax reform that simplifies the tax system, improves efficiency and, importantly, increases the federal revenue-GDP ratio (see below).
• More balanced expenditure restraint that strengthens the effectiveness and efficiency of the safety net and reprioritizes appropriations, increasing spending on those programs that encourage labor force participation, improve infrastructure, and raise productivity and human capital.
• Measures to reform the social security system including raising the income ceiling for social security contributions, indexing benefits to chained CPI or PCE inflation, raising the retirement age, and instituting greater progressivity in the benefit structure.
• Policy action to contain healthcare cost inflation including through technological solutions that increase efficiency, greater cost sharing with beneficiaries, and shifting incentives toward remunerating providers for health outcomes (rather than per procedure).

Part 2: A gradual and well-communicated monetary normalization

12. With the Federal Reserve having largely achieved its dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment, policy rates should continue to rise. The pace of rate increases can be gradual, especially when compared with previous tightening cycles, and should certainly be data dependent. Given the downside risks to inflation and the asymmetries posed by the effective lower bound, the Federal Reserve should be ready to accept some modest, temporary overshooting of its inflation goal that allows inflation to approach the 2 percent medium-term target from above. Doing so would provide valuable insurance against the risks of disinflation and having to bring the federal funds rate back down to zero.

13. Alongside the ongoing normalization in policy rates, it is appropriate that the Federal Reserve looks to unwind the post-crisis increase in its holdings of treasury and mortgage backed securities. Given the risk of triggering an unexpected steepening of the yield curve or a rise in MBS spreads, plans for the Fed’s balance sheet should be well-telegraphed at an early stage. The recent addendum to the policy normalization principles and plans provides market participants with a clear path for changes in reinvestment policy that will help avoid undue volatility in fixed income markets. The addendum also outlines the criteria that the Fed will consider in deciding whether to deviate from its announced principles. As balance sheet normalization proceeds, the FOMC could provide a broad indication of what the eventual monetary policy operating framework may look like over a longer horizon. Continued clear communication will maintain the Federal Reserve’s estimable track record of smoothly normalizing U.S. monetary policy.



Strengthening the Foundations for Growth and Resilience


Taxes


14. The U.S. needs a fundamental tax reform. There is broad agreement on the objectives: simplify the system, lower marginal rates, scale back the extensive network of tax preferences, incentivize labor force participation, mitigate income polarization, and support low and middle-income households. To provide resources for fiscal outlays that can strengthen potential growth and to contribute to the needed reduction in the public debt, tax reform ought to be designed to be revenue enhancing over the medium-term. Such a reform could include:

• Business tax . The U.S. corporate income tax could move to a rent tax (either a cashflow tax or an allowance for corporate capital tax) with a somewhat lower marginal rate. This would incentivize business investment and lessen the existing bias toward debt finance. Such a reform could be combined with an elimination of the various corporate tax preferences that currently complicate the system, making the tax code more equitable and efficient. Naturally, such a change would have important domestic effects (on activity and investment) and sizable international spillovers.
• Taxing offshore profits . The administration’s proposal to enact a one-time tax on the stock of unrepatriated profits of multinationals deserves support as part of a comprehensive tax reform package. Such profits could be taxed at a rate that is modestly lower than the current corporate rate. Providing only moderate tax relief would be efficient (since it is a tax on past profits) particularly given that the existing system of tax deferral has already conveyed significant benefits to those taxpayers that have chosen not to repatriate profits. Such a policy would generate a temporary uplift in fiscal revenues and payment of the resulting tax liability could be spread over several years to address liquidity concerns of affected corporations. Transitioning to a territorial system, as has been proposed by the administration, merits consideration but ought to be combined with a minimum tax for profits earned in low tax jurisdictions to limit the scope of profit-shifting.
• Individual income tax . Providing tax relief for low and middle-income groups, as has been proposed by the administration, would help alleviate income polarization and encourage labor force participation. The bulk of itemized deductions can be eliminated alongside an increase in the standard deduction. Any remaining deductions (e.g. for mortgage interest and charitable contributions) could be capped. The authorities could also expand eligibility and increase the generosity of the earned income tax credit (EITC) to support lower income households and incentivize work. To lessen the risk an expanded EITC leads to a decline in pre-tax wages at the bottom of the income distribution, the EITC expansion ought to be combined with an increase in the federal minimum wage.
• Pass-through entities. Any tax rate reductions for pass-throughs need to take revenue implications into account. Setting the effective rate on pass-throughs below the effective rate on distributed corporate profits or the top marginal personal income tax rate creates important incentives for some firms to become pass-throughs and for high income employees to become independent contractors in order to lessen their tax burden.
• Consumption taxes . To ensure the overall tax reform is revenue-gaining the U.S. has the scope to rely more on other revenue sources including a federal level consumption tax, a broad-based carbon tax, and a higher federal gas tax. To give a sense of what is feasible, a broad-based, 5 percent consumption tax would generate around 1½ percent of GDP per year in revenues, a carbon tax of around US$45 per ton of CO2 would generate 0.5 percent of GDP per year, and each 50 cents increase in the gas tax would raise revenues of around 0.3 percent of GDP per year.

Infrastructure


15. As pointed out in the administration’s budget, underinvestment in infrastructure has become a growing constraint on private sector productivity and long-term growth and job creation. Investment in public infrastructure has declined significantly in the post-recession period. This has led to a deterioration in the public capital stock (particularly since maintenance spending has been eroded). A permanent increase in federal, state and local infrastructure spending of at least 0.5 percent of GDP per year is needed (based on the American Society of Civil Engineers estimates of the U.S. infrastructure gap). Priorities include improving the quality and reliability of surface transportation and upgrading infrastructure technologies (e.g., in high speed rail, ports, and telecommunications). It will be important to ensure the right mix is achieved between the public funding of maintenance and repair versus new projects. The US$200 billion appropriation in the budget aimed at catalyzing US$1 trillion in private and public infrastructure investment would, if realized, support long-term growth.



Financial regulation


16. Important gains have been made in strengthening the financial oversight structure since the global financial crisis. There is scope to fine-tune some aspects of the system as has been proposed by the U.S. Treasury. For example, there is a case for a simpler regime for small and community banks, that is backed by risk-based supervision, or a revisiting of the thresholds for institutions to be subject to stress tests or to be considered systemic. However, the current approach to regulation, supervision and resolution should be preserved. This would include supporting the Financial Stability Oversight Council in its efforts to identify risks and respond to emerging threats to financial stability; extending the analytical work of the Office of Financial Research; and continuing to strengthen the Fed’s Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review stress testing exercise. The U.S. ought to maintain its special resolution regime for systemic financial entities as a backstop to resolution under the bankruptcy code so as to facilitate orderly resolution and prevent any contagion that could put system-wide stability at risk. In this regard, a court-based bankruptcy regime may prove insufficiently nimble, lack the authority to provide needed temporary public financial support, lead to a dilution of regulators’ powers, and give rise to stability and contagion risks. The current risk-based capital framework should not be replaced with a simple leverage ratio. Such an effort may give incentives for banks to increase capital but also creates incentives for capital to be placed into more risky activities. It would be particularly problematic to allow banks to self-select into a lower regulatory and supervisory regime, regardless of the underlying systemic risk of their operations. Finally, the current designation framework could be improved to be more expeditious, transparent, and accountable. The maintenance of a robust financial regulatory regime in the U.S. has had positive spillovers to others both by reducing financial stability risks in the U.S. and the knock-on effects from encouraging progress to strengthen the global regulatory framework.

Trade

17. The U.S. commitment to free, fair and mutually beneficial trade and to improving the rules-based international trading system is welcome. The U.S. has also reiterated that it intends to keep its markets open and to fight protectionism, while standing firm against all unfair trade practices. Open international trade has long supported U.S. growth and job creation with positive spillovers for others. However, a slower pace of global trade reform since the early 2000’s has left in place trade barriers, subsidies, and other trade-distorting measures. Further trade integration and the promotion of a level playing field in international trade, particularly in growth areas such as services, would offer important gains to the U.S. in terms of productivity, economic growth, and job creation. U.S. participation in multilateral efforts to resolve global excess capacity is welcome. However, the U.S. ought to be judicious in its use of import restrictions on national security grounds and avoid measures that inadvertently weaken, rather than strengthen, the overall economy. Finally, there is scope to modernize trade agreements (including NAFTA)—for example on transparency provisions, e-commerce, services, as well as labor, environmental and safety standards—in ways that are mutually beneficial for all signatories. The U.S. would benefit by remaining open as it pursues new or amended trade agreements.

Deregulation

18. A central plank of the new administration’s economic plan is to revisit federal regulations in a range of areas. In international comparisons, the U.S. already scores favorably on regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship, trade and investment. Nonetheless, a simplification and streamlining of federal regulations as well as an effort to harmonize rules across states would likely boost efficiency and could stimulate job creation and growth. There may also be scope to achieve desired outcomes through means other than regulation (e.g. to replace regulatory limits on carbon with a broad-based carbon tax). However, in reforming the current regulatory system, care is needed to avoid negative consequences for the environment, workplace safety, and protections for lower income workers.



Maintaining a Productive and Flexible Workforce

19. To complement the policies described above, there is a range of measures that could be taken to increase the flexibility and adaptability of households and businesses, to mitigate secular trends in income polarization and poverty, raise labor force participation, and create the environment to increase investments in human capital. Many of these macro-critical areas would both raise potential growth but would also help ensure that gains in income and opportunities are able to improve the living standards of the majority of the population. Such reform areas include:

Education


20. Access to better and more cost-effective education can raise productivity and increase the flexibility of U.S. workers to adjust to structural shifts in labor demand or displacement by technology or trade. There is also broad evidence that investments in education can lessen the intergenerational persistence of poverty. Funding can be better prioritized toward early childhood education (including instituting universal pre-K) and to support science, technology, engineering, and mathematics programs. There is also a strong case to redesign the financing model for public schools to reduce funding differences across districts and provide more resources to schools with high concentrations of students from low income households. The administration’s support for federal, state and local efforts to offer attractive, non-college career paths (e.g., through apprenticeship and vocational programs) is welcome. However, the high levels of private and public expenditure on higher education, alongside relatively unimpressive attainment statistics, suggest the need for a greater focus on preparing students for college and fostering retention once they are enrolled. Alternative state and federal financing options for tertiary education may help increase access for students from lower and middle income households.

Family-friendly benefits

21. The cost and availability of childcare is a constraint to labor force participation. It is also of concern that one-in-four single parent households are living in poverty. The administration recognizes that family-friendly benefits can be an important policy lever to slow the downward trend in labor force participation and support low- and middle-income families. In this regard, the budget’s intention to create a program that offers six weeks of paid leave to new parents and provide help for families struggling with child and dependent care expenses are positive steps.

Supporting low- and middle-income households

22. Mitigating the ongoing hollowing out of middle-income earners and reducing the currently high levels of poverty would raise labor supply, boost human capital and productivity, and improve living standards. In addition to the reforms discussed above—education, family-friendly benefits, and expanding the EITC—other policies that could help include:

• Disability insurance . As proposed in the budget, there is scope to strengthen the design of the disability insurance program to provide incentives for beneficiaries to work part time or eventually return to full time work (rather than drop out of the labor force). Such a reform ought to be undertaken carefully, however, to prevent legitimate recipients being excluded from this important safety net.
• Social assistance . There is significant scope to upgrade federal and state-level social programs to better help the most vulnerable. “Cliffs” in social benefits—such as Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, the Child Health Insurance Program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and housing assistance—could be reassessed with a view to smoothing the phase-out for the near-poor. This would not only reduce disparities but also encourage labor force participation for those earning above, but close to, the federal poverty line. There is scope to simplify and unify the various programs underlying the safety net, increase the generosity of direct transfer programs, learn from the diversity of experiences at the state-level to identify the most effective approaches, and better-target federal payments to program outcomes. These improvements to social programs could be undertaken with a relatively small budgetary cost.

Immigration

23. A skills-based immigration system would enhance labor participation and productivity. The administration has recognized the importance of such reform. Demographic changes will lead to a steady decline in labor force participation in the coming years, slowing labor force growth from an annual average of about 1 percent over the last 25 years to about ½ percent in the coming decade. The dependency ratio—the share of the old and young population as percent of the working age population—is expected to rise from about 60 percent today to 75 percent by 2037. This is even with around 0.6 million new immigrants entering the labor force each year. A comprehensive, skills-based reform of the immigration system has the potential to expand the labor force, improve the dependency ratio, and raise the average level of human capital. This could have significant positive effects on long-term potential growth and help ease the medium-term fiscal challenges.

Healthcare


24. Health care policies should protect those gains in coverage that have been achieved since the financial crisis (particularly for those at the lower end of the income distribution) and contain healthcare cost inflation. Doing so will have positive implications for well-being, productivity, and labor force participation. This, in turn, will strengthen growth and job creation, reduce economic insecurity associated with the lack of health coverage, and have positive effects for the medium-term fiscal position. Changes have been proposed to remove the individual and employer mandates, eliminate various taxes and subsidies, reverse the Medicaid expansion, and give states more flexibility and control over the health care market. Such changes ought to be undertaken carefully to avoid compromising the pooling of risks (an essential foundation for a well-functioning health insurance system) or excluding those with limited incomes from the healthcare system. Mechanisms to encourage cost control in the provision of services need to be examined, including through an evaluation of existing pilot programs and an application of new technologies that can increase efficiencies and pricing transparency. There also ought to be some assessment of the scope for anti-trust actions where the market concentration of providers or insurers has risen and where premiums for non-group policies have been rising rapidly.

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund will conclude the 2017 Article IV Consultation with the United States by reviewing and discussing the IMF staff findings that have been outlined in this statement. This Board discussion is currently scheduled for July 24, 2017.

FED. June 27, 2017. Speech. An Assessment of Financial Stability in the United States. Vice Chairman Stanley Fischer. At the IMF Workshop on Financial Surveillance and Communication: Best Practices from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Advanced Economies, Washington, D.C.

In the years since the start of the global financial crisis, an enormous amount of effort has gone into ensuring that we have a robust financial system that promotes responsible risk taking and an efficient allocation of resources. But despite these efforts, financial stability cannot be taken for granted, for financial decisions that benefit the people who make them can create systemic risk and harm society as a whole. Further, the phenomenon familiar from macroeconomics‑‑and for that matter from life‑‑of decisions that result in short-run happiness and long-run grief is visible also in the area of financial stability. For example, excessive leverage and reliance on short-term funding, which may reward risk takers whose bets pay off, may also increase the risk of fire sales and contagion, creating a fragile financial situation. The disruption in credit intermediation that typically accompanies such episodes can have lasting negative consequences for the real economy and welfare‑‑some of which we are still seeing today. The Federal Reserve's financial stability responsibilities therefore strongly complement its dual-mandate objectives of achieving price stability and full employment.

Today I will review the monitoring framework we have implemented at the Federal Reserve, before providing an assessment of current U.S. financial stability conditions. I will conclude by arguing that while significant progress has been made in recent years toward making the financial system more stable and resilient, we should not ever be complacent.1 We still lack sufficient information to understand some parts of the shadow banking system, and risks sometimes evolve outside the scope of prudential regulation, with potentially negative implications for financial stability. And sometimes we fail to understand the situation in which we find the financial system and the economy.

Framework for Monitoring Financial Stability

Participants in today's workshops have grappled with the question of what is the best framework to monitor financial stability. One approach is to focus on trends in, and interactions among, financial vulnerabilities across financial institutions, markets, and instruments. Another approach is to track the resilience of institutions, either broad categories or individual systemically important institutions. Good monitoring frameworks combine elements of both.

Let me start with the vulnerabilities-focused approach, as developed by Tobias Adrian, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang.2 That approach defines financial vulnerabilities as a collection of factors that may amplify financial shocks and, when elevated, have the potential to generate systemic risk. The focus is on vulnerabilities rather than shocks, because the timing of shocks, such as sudden drops in asset prices, are inherently hard to predict. Vulnerabilities, in contrast, tend to build up over time, and policies can be designed to help contain these vulnerabilities, reducing the likelihood of systemic events.

Some financial vulnerabilities are cyclical in nature, rising and falling over time, while others are structural, stemming from longer-term forces shaping the nature of credit intermediation. Informed by academic research, some of it in-house, we at the Federal Reserve focus on four broad cyclical vulnerabilities: (1) financial-sector leverage, (2) nonfinancial-sector borrowing, (3) liquidity and maturity transformation, and (4) asset valuation pressures.3 Briefly, leverage, across a range of institutions, is a key amplifier of solvency shocks, leading to a greater chance of a credit crunch or fire sale. Liquidity and maturity mismatches can generate run risk, leading to fire sales and contagion. Finally, elevated valuation pressures, especially when combined with high leverage, can lead to excessive credit growth. When asset prices are appreciating rapidly and expected to continue to do so, borrowers and lenders are more willing to accept higher degrees of risk and leverage.

Using a range of indicators, we assess these cyclical vulnerabilities relative to past experience. That is, we evaluate where the current levels of these indicators stand compared with their historical values, to identify whether they point to a low, average, or high level of vulnerabilities. While we try to rely on quantitative indicators, in the end, this evaluation requires some degree of judgment. We also closely monitor potential structural vulnerabilities, such as funding models and institutions that provide critical plumbing services to the system. Because these structural vulnerabilities are less amenable to traditional quantitative monitoring, their identification and assessment follow a less formal process. I will leave that discussion to another time.

As mentioned, complementary to the vulnerabilities-oriented approach is an approach that focuses on institutions. If the financial system is overleveraged, that vulnerability has to be evident at particular institutions. An institutions-oriented framework can help us keep track of sector- or institution-specific structural vulnerabilities that may be masked by our overall assessment and provides additional ways to understand how distress at a particular institution or class of institutions may spill over to the wider financial system.

Regardless of whether we are looking at vulnerabilities or institutions, a key feature of this monitoring framework is its forward-looking nature. For example, evidence suggests that periods of elevated risk appetite are frequently accompanied by a rise in leverage at financial intermediaries.4 This evidence implies that elevated asset valuation pressures today may be indicative of rising vulnerabilities tomorrow.5

Of course, while a framework provides a disciplined way to evaluate financial stability, we constantly evaluate the framework so that we can identify new risks and vulnerabilities, which may arise as the financial system evolves--for example, in response to market-driven innovation or regulatory reform. Federal Reserve staff research helps us understand and evaluate the evolving, dynamic financial system.

Before turning to the assessment of the current state of U.S. financial stability, let me discuss how we communicate our views on this matter. The Federal Reserve, unlike many other central banks, does not publish a financial stability report. The United States already has two congressionally mandated financial stability reports, one authored by the independent Office of Financial Research and a separate report published by the Financial Stability Oversight Council that represents the views of the range of financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve. Additional views of Federal Reserve officials can be reflected in a range of other venues, including, notably, the Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report, the Board's annual report, and speeches, such as this one.

Current Assessment

That was the framework, now for the current assessment: In the interest of time, my main focus will be on the four cyclical vulnerabilities--leverage, borrowing by households and non-financial firms, liquidity and maturity transformation, and asset valuations--but I will also briefly touch on the most salient structural vulnerabilities. To summarize the assessment, overall, a range of indicators point to vulnerability that is moderate when compared with past periods: Leverage in the financial sector is at historically low levels, and, following the reforms of money market mutual fund regulations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) last fall, vulnerabilities associated with liquidity and maturity transformation appear to have decreased. However, the increase in prices of risky assets in most asset markets over the past six months points to a notable uptick in risk appetites, although this shift has not yet led to a pickup in the pace of borrowing or a sizable rise in leverage at financial institutions.

Leverage

To start with, leverage: Regulatory capital at large banks is now at multidecade highs. The largest banks have already met their fully phased-in capital requirements, including the conservation buffer and the capital surcharge for the global systemically important banks. Also, the largest banks have been able to meet the post-stress capital requirements in the past couple of stress-test exercises run by the Federal Reserve. Measures of earnings strength, such as the return on assets, continue to approach pre-crisis levels at most banks, although with interest rates being so low, the return on assets might be expected to have declined relative to their pre-crisis levels--and that fact is also a cause for concern.

Borrowing by households and businesses

In the private nonfinancial sector, which includes corporations and households, total debt remains well below its long-run trend, largely driven by subdued borrowing among households. However, the corporate business sector appears to be notably leveraged, with the current aggregate corporate-sector leverage standing near 20-year highs.

Some studies, including one by the International Monetary Fund in this April's Global Financial Stability Report, have recently highlighted this vulnerability, so let me briefly offer my perspective.6 Despite the elevated levels of corporate borrowing, recent developments show signs of improvement. Leverage has declined slightly since its peak a year ago, and firms with high debt growth appear relatively healthy. Interest expenses relative to earnings also declined of late and are below their median value since 2001. Furthermore, the fraction of corporate debt due within one year relative to total debt stands at historically low levels. Thus, positive shocks to interest rates may adversely affect the ability of some firms to service debt, but this risk may have only limited system-wide effects. Nonetheless, elevated leverage leaves the corporate sector vulnerable to other shocks, such as earnings shocks.

In the household sector, new borrowing is driven mostly by borrowers with higher credit scores, and the amount of debt that borrowers have relative to their incomes is falling, suggesting that the debt is more manageable. That said, two pockets in the household sector deserve scrutiny. Auto loan balances and delinquency rates are high for borrowers with lower credit scores, meaning that the riskiest borrowers are borrowing more and not paying it back as often. Of note, delinquencies on recently issued auto loans have also increased, indicating that underwriting standards in the auto loan industry may be deteriorating. Student loan balances keep rising, and delinquency rates on those loans are near historical highs. These strains within the household sector leave such borrowers vulnerable to adverse shocks and probably weigh on their spending. At first glance, one is tempted to say that the potential for this distress to adversely affect the financial system seems moderate, because both subprime auto loan and student loan borrowers account for a small share of other debt categories. But, on second thought, one should remember that pre-crisis subprime mortgage loans were dismissed as a stability risk because they accounted for only about 13 percent of household mortgages, and not take excessive confidence.7

Liquidity and maturity transformation

Similar to my assessment of leverage, I believe that the primary vulnerability associated with liquidity and maturity transformation--that of a self-fulfilling run--is relatively low. In recent years, banks have shifted away from more run-prone short-term wholesale sources of funds toward more stable sources such as core deposits. Large domestic banks have also significantly boosted their holdings of high-quality liquid assets, making them more resilient to funding stress.

In the nonbanking sector, the SEC revised the regulations governing money market mutual funds, first adopted in 2014, with the aim of reducing the key structural vulnerabilities exposed by the massive and destabilizing run on the funds in late 2008. The second round of reforms went into full effect in October 2016; ahead of this date, $1.2 trillion flowed out of prime money funds--the more fragile funds that also provide direct funding to large banking institutions--toward government money funds, which are constrained to hold government-guaranteed assets. Those assets include repurchase agreements (or repos) with private banks backed by Treasury securities and the liabilities of government-sponsored enterprises, such as, notably, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs). While the current configuration of money markets reveals a reduced financial stability risk compared with the situation prior to the recent reforms, this configuration may not yet represent the final equilibrium. It will be important to keep an eye on the growth of alternative investment vehicles that perform liquidity transformation in money markets.

Of note, in part supported by increased demand from government-only money funds, the FHLB system has increased its issuance of shorter-maturity liabilities, which are more attractive to money funds. In turn, this development has led to an increase in the FHLB system's maturity transformation because its assets--loans to banks and insurance companies--have remained relatively long maturity. As a result, the FHLBs face an increased need to roll over maturing liabilities and thus greater vulnerability should they encounter liquidity pressures. I should note that the FHLBs' regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (also known as the FA-FA) flagged this issue more than a year ago and is working with the FHLBs (the FLUBS) to address it.

Asset valuations

Let me conclude my assessment of current financial stability conditions with a discussion of asset valuation pressures. Prices of risky assets have increased in most major asset markets in recent months even as risk-free rates also rose. In equity markets, price-to-earnings ratios now stand in the top quintiles of their historical distributions, while corporate bond spreads are near their post-crisis lows. Prices of commercial real estate (CRE) have grown faster than rents for some time, and measures of the amount of operating income relative to the sale price of commercial properties--the capitalization rate--have reached historical lows, suggesting continued pressures in the CRE market despite some tightening in credit conditions. Valuation pressures in single-family residential real estate markets appear, at most, modest, with price-to-rent ratios only slightly higher than their long-run trend.

The general rise in valuation pressures may be partly explained by a generally brighter economic outlook, but there are signs that risk appetite increased as well. For example, estimates of equity and bond risk premiums are at the lower end of their historical distributions, and, relative to some non-price-based measures of uncertainty, the implied volatility index VIX is particularly subdued. So far, the evidently high risk appetite has not lead to increased leverage across the financial system, but close monitoring is warranted.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by offering my view on where we stand in our effort to promote financial stability in the United States. There is no doubt the soundness and resilience of our financial system has improved since the 2007-09 crisis. We have a better capitalized and more liquid banking system, less run-prone money markets, and more robust resolution mechanisms for large financial institutions. However, it would be foolish to think we have eliminated all risks. For example, we still have limited insight into parts of the shadow banking system, and--as already mentioned--uncertainty remains about the final configuration of short-term funding markets in the wake of money funds reform.

The U.S. financial system is inherently dynamic, with a range of institutions competing to offer a changing mix of financial products. New financial technologies promise great benefits but will no doubt carry novel risks. As a result, we monitor these vulnerabilities, and we are vigilant with respect to economic and financial developments across markets and institutions within the United States and around the world. And we know that complacency must be avoided.

References

• Adrian, Tobias, Daniel Covitz, and Nellie Liang (2015). "Financial Stability Monitoring," Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 7 (December), pp. 357-95.
• Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun Song Shin (2010). "Liquidity and Leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 19 (July), pp. 418-37.
• Aikman, David, Michael Kiley, Seung Jung Lee, Michael G. Palumbo, and Missaka Warusawitharana (forthcoming). "Mapping Heat in the U.S. Financial System," Journal of Banking and Finance.
• Gerardi, Kristopher, Andreas Lehnert, Shane M. Sherlund, and Paul Willen (2008). "Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis (PDF)," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp. 69-145.
• International Monetary Fund (2017). "Getting the Policy Mix Right," in Global Financial Stability Report. Washington: IMF, April.

1. I am grateful to Chiara Scotti and Filip Zikes of the Federal Reserve Board for their assistance. Views expressed in this presentation are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
2. See Adrian, Covitz, and Liang (2015). Return to text
3. For example, see Adrian, Covitz, and Liang (2015); Aikman and others (forthcoming); and the references therein. Return to text
4. See Adrian and Shin (2012). Return to text
5. See Aikman and others (forthcoming). Return to text
6. See International Monetary Fund (2017). Return to text
7. See Gerardi and others (2008). Return to text

DOCUMENT: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/fischer20170627a.pdf

REUTERS. 27/06/2017. Trump está frustrado com a China e considera sanções comerciais, dizem autoridades
Por Steve Holland

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - O presidente dos Estados Unidos, Donald Trump, está ficando cada vez mais frustrado com a China devido à inação em relação à Coreia do Norte e a questões comerciais bilaterais e avalia possíveis ações comerciais contra Pequim, disseram à Reuters três autoridades graduadas do governo.

As autoridades disseram que Trump está impaciente com a China e que analisa uma série de opções, incluindo tarifas sobre a importação de aço, que foram discutidas anteriormente pelo secretário de Comércio norte-americano, Wilbur Ross.

Ainda não está claro se Trump vai realmente tomar medidas contra Pequim. Em abril, o presidente norte-americano desistiu de uma ameaça de sair do Nafta, depois de dizer que líderes do México e do Canadá lhe telefonaram pedindo que ele detivesse um decreto presidencial planejado a favor da abertura de discussões.

(Reportagem de Steve Holland)

________________

BACEN. 27/06/2017. Setor Externo em maio/2017

I - Balanço de pagamentos

No mês, as transações correntes apresentaram superavit de US$2,9 bilhões, novamente influenciado por saldo comercial recorde. As transações correntes registraram deficit de US$18,1 bilhões, equivalente a 0,96% do PIB, nos doze meses encerrados em maio. Na conta financeira, os ingressos líquidos de investimentos diretos no país somaram US$2,9 bilhões no mês, acumulando US$80,7 bilhões nos últimos doze meses, ou 4,28% do PIB.

A conta de serviços registrou deficit de US$2,5 bilhões em maio, estável em relação ao mesmo mês do ano anterior. As despesas líquidas com viagens internacionais totalizaram US$1,1 bilhão, aumento de 58,7% comparadas àquelas observadas em maio de 2016, resultado de elevação de 34,5% nos gastos em viagens ao exterior, e recuo de 3,4% nas receitas auferidas em viagens ao país. A conta de aluguel de equipamentos apresentou deficit de US$1,3 bilhão em maio, redução de 20,1% comparativamente ao mesmo mês do ano anterior.

As despesas líquidas de renda primária atingiram US$2,3 bilhões no mês, redução de 19,6% com relação a maio de 2016. As despesas líquidas com juros alcançaram US$911 milhões, 19,6% abaixo do ocorrido no mesmo mês do ano anterior. As remessas líquidas de lucros e dividendos totalizaram US$1,4 bilhão no mês, diminuição de 19,1% quando comparadas às observadas em maio de 2016.

No mês, a conta de renda secundária registrou ingressos líquidos de US$203 milhões, recuo de 25,5% em relação a maio do ano anterior. As receitas brutas em transferências pessoais totalizaram US$215 milhões, aumento de 5,7% na comparação com maio de 2016.

INVESTIMENTO

Os fluxos líquidos de investimentos diretos no exterior atingiram US$66 milhões no mês, e US$841 milhões no período de janeiro a maio, ante US$6,0 bilhões ocorridos nos cinco meses iniciais de 2016.

Os investimentos diretos no país totalizaram ingressos líquidos de US$2,9 bilhões no mês (ingressos de US$2,9 bilhões em participação no capital e amortizações de US$21 milhões em operações intercompanhia), e US$32,5 bilhões nos cinco primeiros meses de 2016, 8,5% acima do ocorrido entre janeiro e maio de 2017.

Os passivos de investimento em carteira registraram saídas líquidas de US$1,5 bilhão no mês. As saídas líquidas em títulos de renda fixa negociados no mercado doméstico somaram US$3,2 bilhões, enquanto os títulos negociados no mercado externo proporcionaram ingressos líquidos de US$932 milhões. Os ingressos líquidos de investimentos em ações e fundos de investimento atingiram US$802 milhões.

As aplicações líquidas de outros investimentos ativos totalizaram US$4,9 bilhões em maio, destacando-se as concessões líquidas de US$2,8 bilhões em créditos comerciais e adiantamentos e a constituição líquida de depósitos no exterior, US$2,2 bilhões.

Os passivos de outros investimentos totalizaram ingressos líquidos de US$998 milhões em maio, incluindo ingresso líquido de US$1,9 bilhão em créditos comerciais e adiantamentos, e saídas líquidas de US$587 milhões em empréstimos.

II - Reservas internacionais

Em maio, as reservas internacionais totalizaram US$377,7 bilhões no conceito liquidez, aumento de US$1,4 bilhão em relação ao mês anterior. O estoque de linhas com recompra apresentou redução de US$150 milhões, em comparação ao mês anterior. A receita de remuneração das reservas somou US$320 milhões no mesmo período, as variações por preços e paridades aumentaram o estoque, na ordem em US$215 milhões e US$758 milhões. No conceito caixa, o estoque de reservas atingiu US$376,5 bilhões em maio, aumento de US$1,5 bilhão em relação ao mês anterior.

III - Dívida externa

A posição da dívida externa bruta estimada para maio de 2017 totalizou US$314,3 bilhões, elevação de US$62 milhões em relação à posição de março. A dívida externa estimada de longo prazo atingiu US$262,2 bilhões, aumento de US$445 milhões, enquanto o endividamento de curto prazo somou US$52,1 bilhões, redução de US$383 milhões.

Dentre os determinantes da variação da dívida externa de longo prazo para o período, destacaram-se os desembolsos de títulos do setor financeiro, US$1,4 bilhão, as amortizações dos empréstimos de outros setores, US$1,4 bilhão, e dos títulos do governo, US$256 milhões. De maneira complementar, houve aumento decorrente variação cambial de longo prazo, US$381 milhões, e da variação dos preços dos títulos de dívida do governo geral, US$110 milhões. Com relação ao estoque de curto prazo, destacaram-se as amortizações de empréstimos do setor financeiro, US$236 milhões, e de outros setores, US$192 milhões.

MPOG. 26/06/2017. Fundo Brasil-China entra em operação nesta segunda-feira (26). Parceria bilateral atrai oportunidades de negócio no país

A partir desta segunda-feira (26), entra em operação o Fundo Brasil-China de Cooperação para Expansão da Capacidade Produtiva no país. Os projetos serão recebidos por meio de Cartas-Consultas, que estão disponíveis para preenchimento em meio digital no site do Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão (MP).

Para o secretário de Assuntos Internacionais do MP e secretário-executivo do fundo, Jorge Arbache, a iniciativa é uma ação única e inovadora, que representa uma conquista importante para os dois países. “Além de ser um mecanismo adicional para o financiamento de projetos no Brasil, o fundo criará a oportunidade para uma interação sem precedentes entre as autoridades de ambos os países”, enfatiza Arbache.

O fundo atua por meio de um Grupo Técnico de Trabalho e de um Comitê Diretivo, que irá avaliar se os projetos que serão propostos atendem aos interesses bilaterais. O Comitê Diretivo será responsável por classificar os projetos de acordo com os interesses de ambos os países. Uma vez classificado como de interesse, o exame da viabilidade econômico-financeira do projeto e a eventual participação em co-investimento estará sob a responsabilidade das instituições financeiras brasileiras e do Claifund (instituição governamental chinesa para financiamento na América Latina).

A participação como potencial financiador será aberta a qualquer instituição financeira brasileira. Instituições financeiras públicas, como a Caixa Econômica Federal e o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), também podem ser consideradas financiadoras potenciais.

O processo de análise pelo Comitê Diretivo implica a classificação de projetos considerados prioritários pelo governo brasileiro em atividades de infraestrutura, manufatura, agronegócio e tecnologias que possam facilitar a cooperação de capacidade industrial entre o Brasil e a China. As decisões dos potenciais financiadores seguirão suas próprias normas para a avaliação dos projetos classificados e na determinação de condições de financiamento ou investimento. A classificação não implica direito de receber aportes financeiros.

“Essa parceria bilateral servirá de referência para os demais países da América Latina”, avalia o embaixador chinês no Brasil, Li Jinzhang. Para ele o fundo deve funcionar segun​do princípios de mercado com avaliação criteriosa de riscos e vai partir de projetos individuais para uma cooperação sistemática produtiva entre os dois países.

​O Fundo

Fundo Brasil-China terá aportes de até US$ 20 bilhões, dos quais US$ 15 bilhões serão desembolsados pelo Claifund. Os outros US$ 5 bilhões virão das instituições financeiras brasileiras. Não haverá aporte de recursos públicos.

O mecanismo de cooperação classifica projetos de interesse comum nos setores de logística e infraestrutura; de energia e recursos minerais; de tecnologia avançada; de agricultura; de agroindústria; de armazenagem agrícola; de manufatura; de serviços digitais; e outros setores que venham a ser de comum interesse do Brasil e da China.

Lançamento

O Fundo Brasil-China foi anunciado durante a realização do Fórum de Investimentos Brasil 2017, em 30 de maio. A solenidade contou com a presença do ministro do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão, Dyogo Oliveira, de secretários-executivos do governo federal, bem como de representantes do Claifund, do embaixador da China no Brasil e de três vice-ministros chineses.

MDIC. 26/06/2017. Balança comercial registra superávit de US$ 1,7 bilhão na quarta semana de junho. No mês, as exportações somam US$ 15 bilhões e as importações, US$ 9,8 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 5,3 bilhões

Brasília (26 de junho) - Na quarta semana de junho, a balança comercial registrou superávit de US$ 1,753 bilhão, resultado de exportações no valor de US$ 4,880 bilhões e importações de US$ 3,126 bilhões.

No mês, as exportações somam US$ 15,154 bilhões e as importações, US$ 9,820 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 5,334 bilhões. No ano, as exportações totalizam US$ 103,081 bilhões e as importações, US$ 68,722 bilhões, com saldo positivo de US$ 34,359 bilhões.

A média das exportações da quarta semana chegou a US$ 975,9 milhões, 4,5% acima da média de US$ 934,1 milhões até a terceira semana, em razão do aumento nas exportações de produtos básicos (18,8%), por conta de petróleo em bruto, carnes de frango e suína, minério de cobre, minério de ferro e soja em grão; e semimanufaturados (1,1%), em razão de semimanufaturados de ferro e aço, alumínio em bruto, açúcar em bruto, catodos de cobre e celulose.

Por outro lado, caíram as vendas de produtos manufaturados (-10,7%), em razão de tubos flexíveis de ferro e aço, veículos de carga, automóveis de passageiros, açúcar refinado, polímeros plásticos e óxidos e hidróxidos de alumínio.

Do lado das importações, houve crescimento de 2,8%, sobre igual período comparativo (média da quarta semana) explicado, principalmente, pelo aumento nos gastos com bebidas e álcool, veículos automóveis e partes, cereais e produtos da indústria da moagem, adubos e fertilizantes e equipamentos mecânicos.

Mês

Nas exportações, comparadas as médias até a quarta semana de junho de 2017, houve crescimento de 24,5%, em razão do aumento nas vendas das três categorias de produtos: básicos (31,9%) por conta, principalmente, de petróleo em bruto, soja em grão, minério de ferro, carnes bovina e suína e milho em grão;  semimanufaturados (28,7%), por conta de açúcar em bruto, celulose, semimanufaturados de ferro e aço, celulose, ferro fundido e óleo de soja em bruto; e manufaturados (14,2%), por conta de automóveis de passageiros, tubos flexíveis de ferro e aço, veículos de carga, laminados planos de ferro e aço e açúcar refinado.

Relativamente a maio de 2017, houve crescimento de 5,3%, em virtude do aumento na venda de produtos semimanufaturados (13,2%), básicos (6,3%) e manufaturados (1,3%).

Nas importações, a média diária até a quarta semana de junho de 2017 ficou 5,7% acima da média de junho de 2016. Nesse comparativo, cresceram os gastos, principalmente, com bebidas e álcool (204,2%), combustíveis e lubrificantes (63,1%), adubos e fertilizantes (39,6%), plásticos e obras (25,4%), veículos automóveis e partes (24,0%) e equipamentos eletroeletrônicos (16,4%).

Ante maio de 2017, houve crescimento de 11,3%, pelos aumentos em adubos e fertilizantes (68,7%), combustíveis e lubrificantes (33,2%), instrumentos de ótica e precisão (19,1%), equipamentos mecânicos (13,1%) e equipamentos eletroeletrônicos (7,1%).

CNI. 26/06/2017. Produção na indústria aumenta, mas emprego continua em queda. Pesquisa da CNI mostra que ociosidade diminuiu em maio. Mesmo assim, a intenção de investimentos no setor continua muito baixa



Depois do fraco desempenho em abril, provocado especialmente pelo grande número de feriados, a produção da indústria brasileira cresceu em maio. O indicador de evolução da produção alcançou 53,8 pontos em maio, informa a Sondagem Industrial, divulgada pela Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI) nesta segunda-feira (26). Os indicadores da pesquisa variam de zero a cem pontos. Quando estão acima de 50 pontos, indicam aumento da produção.
A pesquisa mostra ainda que a utilização média da capacidade instalada ficou em 66% em maio, 3 pontos percentuais acima do registrado em abril, o que mostra queda da ociosidade do parque industrial. Os estoques ficaram dentro do planejado pelos empresários. Mesmo assim, observa o economista da CNI Marcelo Azevedo, a reação de maio é insuficiente para configurar uma recuperação da atividade. "A reação veio depois de um mês muito atípico, com muitos feriados. É cedo para dizer que a recuperação de maio vai se sustentar nos próximos meses", afirma Azevedo.

O emprego no setor continua em queda, embora em ritmo menor do que o registrado nos meses anteriores. O índice de evolução do número de empregados subiu 1,1 ponto em relação a abril, alcançou 48,1 pontos e ficou abaixo da linha divisória dos 50 pontos, que separa os dados negativos dos positivos. "A distância do índice para a linha divisória é a menor desde abril de 2014", observa a CNI.

As perspectivas são de que o emprego continuará caindo no curto prazo. O indicador de expectativa de evolução do emprego nos próximos seis meses ficou em 48,8 pontos, abaixo da linha divisória dos 50 pontos, que separa as previsões positivas das negativas.

Os empresários, no entanto, estão mais otimistas com a evolução do consumo e das vendas externas. Os indicadores de expectativas em relação à demanda, às exportações e à compra de matérias-primas ficaram acima dos 50 pontos em junho.

As perspectivas positivas, no entanto, são insuficientes para estimular os investimentos.  O indicador de intenção de investimento ficou em 46,5 pontos, acima dos 41,2 pontos registrados no mesmo mês do ano passado, mas muito abaixo dos 54,6 pontos de maio de 2014.

Sondagem Industrial. Aumento da atividade industrial em maio

Os dados de atividade levantados pela Sondagem Industrial mostram recuperação, após o fraco mês de abril. Contudo, os resultados mais favoráveis de maio não afetaram as perspectivas dos empresários para os próximos seis meses ou sua disposição para investir.



DOCUMENTO: https://static-cms-si.s3.amazonaws.com/media/filer_public/ab/71/ab711df5-2f71-4271-b66d-8dfc1d83e919/sondagemindustrial_maio2017.pdf

FGV. IBRE. 27/06/2017. Sondagens e Índices de Confiança. Sondagem do Comércio. Confiança do Comércio recua em junho

O Índice de Confiança do Comércio (ICOM) da Fundação Getulio Vargas recuou 2,9 pontos em junho, ao passar de 88,6 para 85,7 pontos, retornando assim ao nível de março passado. Apesar da queda, o indicador de média móvel trimestral ficou estável em relação a maio, sustentado pelas altas dos meses anteriores.

“A redução da confiança do comércio em junho foi bastante influenciada pelo aumento da incerteza a partir de 17 de maio. Mas houve, além disso, piora da percepção das empresas em relação ao nível atual da demanda, sugerindo uma leitura pouco favorável da atual conjuntura. Ainda assim, sustentados pela melhora das vendas após a liberação de recursos de contas inativas do FGTS e pelo otimismo com a tendência de queda dos juros, as expectativas dos revendedores de duráveis mantiveram em junho a fase ascendente”, avalia Aloisio Campelo Jr., Superintendente de Estatísticas Públicas da FGV/IBRE.

A queda do ICOM em junho ocorreu em 8 dos 13 segmentos pesquisados e foi determinada tanto pela piora no Índice de Situação Atual (ISA-COM), que recuou 3,3 pontos, para 79,6 pontos, quanto pelo Índice de Expectativas (IE-COM), que caiu 2,4 pontos, para 92,4 pontos.

Expectativas de revendedores de duráveis mantêm tendência de alta

As expectativas do Comércio pioraram em junho pelo segundo mês consecutivo, revertendo o sinal da série de médias móveis trimestrais (queda de 1,1 ponto). Este comportamento, no entanto, não foi homogêneo entre os diferentes segmentos do setor. O Índice de Expectativas dos revendedores de bens duráveis subiu 0,5 ponto no mês, mantendo a tendência de alta iniciada em janeiro da série de médias móveis trimestrais. Já o IE-COM dos revendedores de não duráveis, caiu 4,4 pontos no mês, intensificando a tendência esboçada no mês anterior. A aproximação do indicador de expectativas de duráveis dos 100 pontos parece estar ligada tanto a uma efetiva melhora das vendas a partir de março quanto a um otimismo com a manutenção da tendência de redução dos juros e da consequente melhora das condições creditícias no país.

A edição de junho de 2017 coletou informações de 1.139 empresas entre os dias 01 e 23 deste mês.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C5593FD36B015CE915C702606D

FGV. IBRE. 27/06/2017. Sondagens e Índices de Confiança. Sondagem da Construção. Confiança da Construção tem ligeira alta e retorna ao nível de setembro de 2016

Índice de Confiança da Construção (ICST), da Fundação Getulio Vargas, variou 0,2 ponto em junho, atingindo 74,2 pontos, considerando-se dados ajustados sazonalmente. Com o resultado, o índice retorna ao  nível de setembro de 2016.

“A pequena alta do ICST em junho sugere que o efeito percebido do aumento da incerteza após 17 de maio sobre os negócios não foi expressivo. A desagregação setorial do resultado revela dinâmicas distintas entre os principais segmentos do setor. No de Edificações - menos dependente de iniciativas diretas do governo - as expectativas voltaram a subir em junho após queda expressiva no mês anterior. Já no segmento de Obras de Infraestrutura, houve piora adicional neste último mês”, avaliou Ana Maria Castelo, Coordenadora de Projetos da Construção da FGV/IBRE.

A alta do ICST em junho decorreu de melhora discreta tanto da avaliação presente das empresas quanto das perspectivas no curto prazo: ambos os índices avançaram 0,2 ponto. O destaque do Índice de Situação Atual (ISA-CST) foi o indicador que mede a situação dos negócios correntes, que avançou 1,2 ponto, para 65,8 pontos, após recuar 2,2 pontos em maio.

A alta do Índice de Expectativas (IE-CST) foi provocada pela subida do indicador que mede o otimismo com a situação a situação dos negócios nos próximos seis meses, que subiu 0,4 ponto, para 86,0 pontos, após cair 3,8 pontos no mês anterior.

O Nível de Utilização da Capacidade (NUCI) do setor recuou 0,6 ponto percentual  (p.p.), em junho, alcançando 61,5%, 21,4 pontos percentuais abaixo do maior nível da série histórica da pesquisa, registrado em setembro de 2013 (82,9%).
 Os indicadores da Sondagem de Construção revelam um quadro ainda de pessimismo entre as empresas do setor. A contribuição do ambiente de incerteza política para a continuidade desta visão pessimista sobre o rumo dos negócios, pode ser ilustrada pela expressiva piora das expectativas no segmento de Obras de Infraestrutura nos últimos dois meses, como mostra o quadro abaixo.

A edição de junho de 2017 coletou informações de 702 empresas entre os dias 01 e 23 deste mês.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C5593FD36B015CE91D1C3D0DDC

FGV. IBRE. 27/06/2017. Índices Gerais de Preços. INCC-M. INCC-M registra variação de 1,36% em Junho

O Índice Nacional de Custo da Construção – M (INCC-M) registrou, em junho, taxa de variação de 1,36%, acima do resultado do mês anterior, de 0,13%. O índice relativo a Materiais, Equipamentos e Serviços registrou variação de 0,02%. No mês anterior, a taxa havia sido de -0,04%. O índice referente à Mão de Obra registrou variação de 2,48%. No mês anterior, a taxa de variação foi de 0,27%. O INCC-M é calculado com base nos preços coletados entre os dias 21 do mês anterior e 20 do mês de referência.

Materiais, Equipamentos e Serviços

No grupo Materiais, Equipamentos e Serviços, o índice correspondente a Materiais e Equipamentos registrou variação de -0,08%. No mês anterior, a taxa havia sido de -0,04%. Dos quatro subgrupos componentes, dois apresentaram decréscimo em suas taxas de variação, destacando-se equipamentos para transporte de pessoas, cuja taxa passou de -0,24% para -1,24%.

A parcela relativa a Serviços passou de uma taxa de -0,05%, em maio, para 0,39%, em junho. Neste grupo, vale destacar a aceleração de taxas de serviços e licenciamentos, cuja taxa passou de 0,00% para 2,18%.

Mão de obra

O índice referente à Mão de Obra registrou variação de 2,48% em junho, ante 0,27% no mês anterior. Esta variação ocorreu devido aos reajustes salariais de Salvador, Brasília, Porto Alegre e São Paulo.

Capitais

Seis capitais apresentaram aceleração em suas taxas de variação: Salvador, Brasília, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Porto Alegre e São Paulo. Em contrapartida, Rio de Janeiro registrou desaceleração.

DOCUMENTO: http://portalibre.fgv.br/main.jsp?lumPageId=402880972283E1AA0122841CE9191DD3&contentId=8A7C82C5593FD36B015CE929510F5646

USP. FIPE. REUTERS. 27/06/2017. IPC-Fipe tem alta de 0,04% na 3ª quadrissemana de junho

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - O Índice de Preços ao Consumidor (IPC) de São Paulo teve variação positiva de 0,04 por cento na terceira quadrissemana de junho, depois de mostrar leve alta de 0,05 por cento na leitura anterior, informou a Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas (Fipe) nesta terça-feira.

O IPC-Fipe mede as variações quadrissemanais dos preços às famílias paulistanas com renda mensal entre 1 e 10 salários mínimos.

USP. FIPE. ZAP IMÓVEIS. REUTERS. 27/06/2017. Preços para venda e aluguel de imóveis comerciais caem em maio, diz FipeZap

SÃO PAULO (Reuters) - Os preços de imóveis comerciais para aluguel e venda caíram em maio, segundo o índice FipeZap Comercial, que monitora conjuntos e salas com até 200 metros quadrados em quatro cidades do país.

No caso vendas, o índice mostrou queda de 0,43 por cento, enquanto os preços dos aluguéis tiveram perda de 0,49 por cento ante abril. No acumulado em 12 meses, os índices tiveram quedas de 4,17 e 5,82 por cento, respectivamente.

Nos cinco primeiros meses do ano, o índice que monitora os preços para vendas acumula baixa de 2,07 por cento, enquanto o de aluguel teve perda de 1,46 por cento.

O valor do metro quadrado comercial em maio nos municípios monitorados pela pesquisa foi de 9.895 reais para venda e de 42,02 reais para locação.

O metro quadrado mais caro para venda em maio foi verificado na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, de 10.937 reais, enquanto São Paulo liderou com o maior preço médio de locação (45,03 reais).

O menor valor para venda foi verificado em Belo Horizonte, somando 7.525 reais o metro quadrado, enquanto Porto Alegre teve o aluguel comercial mais baixo, de 31,35 reais.

(Por Flavia Bohone)

MME. 26/06/2017. Importação de etanol merece atenção especial, diz ministro

O ministro de Minas e Energia, Fernando Coelho Filho, acredita que a importação do etanol merece uma atenção especial por parte do governo. "Os produtores nacionais tem de estar em pé de igualdade para que todos possam ter os mesmos níveis de concorrência", afirmou durante a abertura do  Ethanol Summit 2017 nesta segunda-feira (26/06), em São Paulo.

Coelho Filho explicou que o produtor nacional de etanol tem uma série de obrigações que o importador não tem, como por exemplo a manutenção de um estoque mínimo.

"O Conselho Nacional de Política Energética (CNPE) já aprovou medidas para que essas obrigações sejam exigidas também dos importadores. É justo para quem produz no Brasil, paga impostos, gera emprego e renda e consiga competir em nível de igualdade com o etanol importado", disse.

Uma das soluções para o setor proposto pelo Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) é o programa RenovaBio, lembrado pelo ministro durante o evento. De acordo com ele, a iniciativa vem como uma medidas para manter o País na liderança da produção, pesquisa e indústria de etanol.

"O RenovaBio é uma ação para garantir o pioneirismo do Brasil no setor sucroenergético e também para sinalizar com clareza que nós estamos comprometidos com as metas de redução de gases de efeito estufa que assumimos em acordos internacionais", finalizou.

O MME continuará marcando presença no Ethanol Summit 2017 na próxima terça-feira (27). O secretário executivo do MME, Paulo Pedrosa, debate sobre bioeletricidade pela manhã, enquanto o secretário de Petróleo, Gás e Biocombustíveis, Márcio Félix, apresenta os biocombustíveis como solução de baixo carbono. O diretor de Biocombustíveis, Miguel Ivan Lacerda, também participa de painel sobre o papel dos biocombustíveis na relação entre abastecimento e meio ambiente.

BNDES. 26/06/2017. Micro, pequenas e médias empresas. BNDES lança Canal do Desenvolvedor MPME e facilita acesso das empresas a seus financiamentos

Interativa, ferramenta dá mais poder a micro, pequenos e médios empresários na negociação de melhores condições de financiamento. Plataforma simplifica, agiliza e amplia o acesso aos recursos do BNDES, aproximando-o dos clientes finais. Pela internet, empresários podem manifestar interesse por financiamento, em qualquer lugar, 24 horas por dia, sete dias da semana

O presidente do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), Paulo Rabello de Castro, lança nesta segunda-feira, 26, na representação do BNDES, em São Paulo, o Canal do Desenvolvedor MPME – o canal do desenvolvimento da micro, pequena e média empresa. A plataforma de relacionamento pela Internet, voltada exclusivamente para MPMEs, representa um marco estratégico na atuação do Banco junto ao segmento.

O Canal do Desenvolvedor MPME permitirá que o BNDES passe, pela primeira vez, a se comunicar diretamente com o empreendedor interessado em suas linhas de financiamento. Até então, essa interação se dava apenas de forma indireta, através de agentes financeiros repassadores.

Por meio do canal, as micro, pequenas e médias empresas (MPMEs), ou seja, empresas com faturamento anual de até R$ 300 milhões, podem fazer manifestações de interesse de crédito, via internet, em qualquer lugar, 24 horas por dia, nos sete dias da semana, sem precisar visitar um agente repassador de recursos para iniciar a busca de apoio financeiro  do BNDES para seus projetos.

O canal é responsivo, ou seja, pode ser acessado por meio de dispositivos móveis (celulares e tablets). O objetivo do ambiente é simplificar, agilizar e ampliar o acesso ao crédito, aproximando o BNDES dos seus clientes finais. Produtores rurais, microempreendedores individuais (MEIs) e transportadores autônomos de cargas (caminhoneiros) também podem utilizar a ferramenta.

Rapidez, simplicidade, proximidade e transparência – Por meio do Canal do Desenvolvedor MPME, o empresário identifica as linhas de crédito mais adequadas para o seu empreendimento; simula financiamentos; aponta os agentes financeiros intermediadores (bancos) de sua preferência (o canal permite a indicação de mais de um banco), e encaminha, de forma ágil, manifestação de interesse de financiamento diretamente para os especialistas (back office) dos agentes financeiros intermediadores, responsáveis pela carteira do BNDES. Esses têm acesso a uma área restrita no canal, onde podem fazer o controle e o acompanhamento das manifestações de interesse recebidas.

O ambiente cria uma nova forma de interação entre o Banco, os agentes financeiros e os clientes finais. O BNDES passa a conhecer e a monitorar as necessidades e as demandas dos empresários, assim como suas principais dificuldades de acesso às linhas e instrumentos financeiros. O próprio empresário, por sua vez, pode acompanhar (através do recebimento de avisos por e-mail) em que estágio se encontra sua manifestação de interesse de financiamento, o que aumenta a transparência da tramitação do seu processo no canal.

A ferramenta dá mais poder ao empreendedor na negociação de melhores condições de financiamento para desenvolver o seu negócio. Além disso, responde à necessidade de modernização do modelo de negócios do BNDES no atendimento às MPMEs, com maior rapidez, simplicidade, proximidade e transparência.

Desempenho – As MPMEs ficaram com 38% do total que o BNDES emprestou nos cinco primeiros meses do ano, mantendo trajetória de crescimento da participação no desembolso total do Banco. Entre 2015 e 2016, a fatia desse segmento cresceu de 27,5% para 30,8%. Essa expansão continua em 2017 refletindo a prioridade da ampliação do acesso de MPMEs ao crédito do BNDES nas novas políticas operacionais do Banco.

Operações Indiretas - Cerca de 50% dos financiamentos do BNDES são por meio de operações indiretas, intermediadas por agentes financeiros repassadores, que dão capilaridade aos recursos e fazem o apoio do Banco chegar a MPMEs em todo o território nacional.

DOCUMENTO: http://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/financiamento/canal-mpme/!ut/p/z1/04_iUlDg4tKPAFJABpSA0fpReYllmemJJZn5eYk5-hH6kVFm8eaB7s4ejiaGPv5Ghk4GjuaOLh4uhiGGFi6G-l76UfgVFGQHKgIA3ovXlw!!/

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LGCJ.: